Dan Snow's History Hit - History's Greatest Commanders

Episode Date: August 1, 2023

In war, leadership matters. Poorly trained or outnumbered armies have often been led to victory by the sheer brilliance of their leaders. Celebrated or criticised, loved or hated, those who forged their legacies on the battlefield are some of the most famous people in human history. But what makes them great? Is it the reverence they inspire in their troops, or their aptitude for logistics and supply? And how did their legacies influence one another?For this episode, Dan is joined by an anonymous guest, author of the blog The Angry Staff Officer and commentator on all things military history. By studying the achievements of everyone from Alexander the Great to Dwight D. Eisenhower, they'll put forward their picks for history's greatest commanders.Produced by Mariana Des Forges and edited by Dougal Patmore.Discover the past on History Hit with ad-free original podcasts and documentaries released weekly presented by world-renowned historians like Dan Snow, Suzannah Lipscomb, Lucy Worsley, Matt Lewis, Tristan Hughes and more. Get 50% off your first 3 months with code DANSNOW. Download the app or sign up here.PLEASE VOTE NOW! for Dan Snow's History Hit in the British Podcast Awards Listener's Choice category here. Every vote counts, thank you!We'd love to hear from you! You can email the podcast at [e-mail] can take part in our listener survey here.

Hello everyone, welcome to Dan Snow's History. What an episode I've got for you today. Alexander the Great once said, I'm not afraid of an army of lions led by a sheep. I'm afraid of an army of sheep led by a lion. In war, folks, leadership matters. There have been many interesting examples of a bad, underperforming army being turned into a good, successful army simply by changing the leader. Napoleon electrified a ragtag, mutinous, shoeless,

hopeless bunch of Frenchmen, the French army in Italy in the 1790s, and led them to victory after victory. Gallipas the Spartan arrived in Syracuse during the Athenian siege, during the Peloponnesian War, and his presence is regarded as the key turning point in that campaign that would prove such a hubristic catastrophe for the Athenians.

And I think that's why traditional history really was the story of great men, of great commanders. I mean, when I was growing up, my bookshelves, the bookshelves in our house were just full of books of great commanders, of great commanders. I mean, when I was growing up, my bookshelves, the bookshelves in our house were just full of books of great commanders studying their successes. They were almost semi-divine figures. You felt they had powers beyond us mortals. And I think to be fair, we took our lead from that, from those practitioners of war themselves, those great men.

They liked nothing better to do than claim that victory was all down to them and, by the way, compare themselves to other great commanders. We're told how Hannibal and Scipio had a nice chat about how great they were and which one of them was second to Alexander the Great when they met after their showdown at the Battle of Zama at the end of the Second Punic War. Napoleon himself, he loved comparing himself to the greats. He advised aspiring commanders, he said, the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene and Frederick, model yourself upon them. This is the only means of becoming a great captain

and of acquiring the secret of war. Your own genius will be enlightened and improved by this study and you will learn to reject all maxims foreign to the principles of these great commanders. Our British Field Marshal Montgomery never bored of lecturing people on the pantheon of great commanders, in which he naturally included himself. Now, more recently, we have rightly spent much more time studying, I think, the deeper and perhaps less glamorous reasons for victory. We now like to talk about logistics. Who's got the better stuff? Who's able to eat better? Who's

able to recruit more healthy soldiers? We talk about financial resources. We've got to pay for these wars. I think the study of Britain's astonishing 18th century is now not dominated as it once was by these biographies of great men, be they politicians like Peart or commanders like Clive, Nelson, Anson, and Wolfe. We talk much more now about the ability of the British government to borrow at extraordinarily low rates of interest, spend tons and tons of money on war, and the strides forward in technology and engineering, partly helped by that money, leading things like better cannon, like the carronades of Nelson's fleet at Trafalgar, or copper-bottom ships, automated block and tackle manufacture.

It's geeky, but it's vital. And it's right that we're looking at that. But today, I'm afraid to say, we're going to kick it old school. It's August. It's summer. It's time for guilty pleasures. We're going to take Napoleon's advice. We're going to embrace that guiltiest of pleasures, which is gorging ourselves on the careers of those individuals whose reputations were forged on the battlefield and who remain celebrated to this day for their ability to win. To help me do that, I've got one of my

favourite contributors. He's a historian. He's a blogging sensation. His analysis of the Battle of Winterfell on Game of Thrones broke the internet. They actually had to switch it off and restart it. It was extraordinary. He goes on a Gettysburg live tweet binge each year, fueled by gin on the anniversary. He's a phenomenon. He's also anonymous because of his ongoing military role with the US military.

He's the angry staff officer. I've been described as his British brother from another mother, but I have to say intellectually and experience-wise, he's in a different league to me. I'm honored to have him back on the podcast. We're going to jump from Alexander the Great to Eisenhower, Ibn al-Wahid, and Joan of Arc. We're going to come up with the greats,

perhaps the greatest of all time. Will it be Napoleon? Will it be Charles Martel? Or are we going with the opinion of the mighty Zhukov himself on the list? He once said, Generalissimo Stalin directed every move, made every decision. He is the greatest and wisest military genius who ever lived. Is Stalin on the list? Was Zhukov right?

Listen and find out. Enjoy. T-minus 10. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. God and find out. Enjoy. T-minus 10. Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. God save the king. No black-white unity until there is first and black unity. Never to go to war with one another again. And liftoff. And the shuttle has cleared the tower.

Buddy, great to have you on the podcast. It is fantastic to be back. It's been too long. This is going to be a session. Buckle up, folks. We're going to get into it. We're going to geek out and we're going to be bringing commanders from all over the world. It's going to be fun. First of all, though, first of all, what's the yardstick? How are we judging the greatest of commanders? That's what we've been arguing about via text ever since you suggested this idea. So, because you've got two options, right? You can go with the cool stories

or you can go with the ones who won, but then also won what, at what level, right? I agree with you. The more you study, the more you get away from some of those romantic stories that were attractive as a young person getting into history, the more you just think, geez, this is all about like bond yields and industrial base and meritocratic promotion. And yeah, exactly. So we're going to be pretty strict on victory. If you're going to be named the history hit greatest

commander in history, you're going to have to, I think, end up winning and winning tactically and strategically, like in a kind of enduring way. And and linked to that are we going with like clarity of objective right that seems to me something that lots of great battlefield leaders go on fighting and winning and beating the enemy in front of them but they don't actually know what their end goal is well are you saying that we shouldn't engage in 20 year long military conflicts without actually having some sort of an end state. That's crazy talk. It's my hottest of takes. It really is. Where does one start? Do we start with the very beginning? Do we go all the way back to the ancient times? Yeah, we're going to go all the way back to ancient times, but let's try and thrash out this little cheat sheet of how we're

going to measure these people. So people talk about the three levels of command, tactically brilliant, operationally, or you've got to be as good operationally and strategically. Can you, as the extremely distinguished academic and practitioner of war, explain the difference quickly between tactical, operational, and strategic? You said quickly, that's impossible. You can't ask a historian to do a thing quickly. So tactically, we're talking, if we're looking at levels of war, tactical operations would be things involving divisions and below. And definitely your battlefield operations. The operational level will be, and of course, it's depending on the size of the conflict. But you're looking more at the core field army level, maneuvering field armies around. You think 1944,

45 Europe, and you've got a couple of different field armies and army groups running around Europe there. And then strategically, how do nations make war is basically how that boils down. So doing something that you can definitely have tactical things that influence the strategic, and you can have tactical successes that influence strategic strategic, and you can have tactical successes that influence strategic success, but they all sort of have to be aligned. Operational success is, of course, that nebulous thing that I don't know how to define it, but I know it when I see it. That's the operational level of war. And when you see that done really well, you're like, oh, yeah, no, that makes sense. You synchronize the tactical into the thing that supports the

strategic operation. So there's your succinct, and I think that was about a minute and a half, and that's the best you're going to get. That was awesome. That was the best run that I've ever heard. So well done you. And strategically, spoiler alert here, Napoleon sucked strategically, but may have been a genius in other respects. Anyway, we'll get onto him. Okay. So there's some criteria. We're talking about clarity objective. We're talking about straddling the different levels of command. They've got to be tactical. They've got to be good at moving armies around operational.

They've got to know what the hell's going on. They've got to be strategic. They've got to have an instinctive connection with the men. They've got to have integrity, perhaps morality as well. We want them to show some technological chops. And we want them to be winners, all right? I'm afraid you've got to win. So here we go.

We're going to do this. Let's start with a little guy people may have heard of, Alexander of Macedon, Alexander the Great. Just a quick potted biography, jump any time, but 356 BC to 323, he was tutored by Aristotle until he was 16. That's one of the just extraordinary facts about his life that I can never quite get over. He grew up in the army.

He grew up living under canvas. He was king at 20. He'd annihilated the city of thieves that rose in rebellion. He'd commanded a flank of his dad's army, Philip Massen, who is a good claim himself to one of the great commanders of history. Then he launches this extraordinary campaign into Asia. He decides to conquer the greatest empire at that time on earth, probably the Persian empire. He survives by literally millimeters in his first battle on the Granicus. I think it is his helmet gets cleft in. He's got an ax or an edged weapon, comes very close to chopping his skull in half, but goes on to win stunning victories and build briefly one of the history's largest empires. Dies at age 32. How are we evaluating Alexander the Great? Well, I was just thinking as you were talking, physical know, physical courage is another criteria that we didn't quite throw in there.

But I think you have to take it as a given for any of these individuals. But very much so in the ancient era with lots of cleaving and clefting and hacking about. So, all right. Tactically, obviously, he's a genius. Technologically, he's taking what his father had capitalized on with tactical formations, utilizing, taking the old hoplite idea and just running with it. And also using combined arms tactics with auxiliaries and cavalry as well. So very good tactically. But when we talk about ways, ends and means, what are his strategic goals?

Conquering all of Asia. That's an end. I mean, there it is. But one could ask, all right, so how does he go about doing that? And then what is his plan of keeping that? Which of course is how it all falls apart. That's right. It's a catastrophe. It falls apart literally not even on his death. Just before his death, he falls into a catatonic state and he's already fist fights breaking out in his death chamber and the empire is fractured the minute he dies. And so maybe that's another piece of this as well is, did these great commanders set up something that lasted beyond their lives? I think that's important. Yeah. That's the winning bit. Because with Alexander,

Alexander does not. And one could argue that it's a disaster from which Macedon and Greece and countries like Afghanistan have never recovered. Oh, okay. So we're blaming him. I mean, I think on the tactical, the thing we people really talk about and celebrate with Alexander, obviously, is battlefield victories. It's just Gargamelor, astonishing battlefield leadership in the tradition of Macedonian kings. He leads from the front. his flying wedge cavalry charge at Gargamelos is still studied today. It's astonishing. He kind of goes on this feint, he gallops off to his right flank, then does this kind of lightning bolt, hard turn, charges straight at the Persian emperor, takes his extraordinary elite cavalry into the heart of the Persian army. And the Persian emperor sees death coming in that charge

and flees. And Napoleon said, this is an interesting army. And the Persian emperor sees death coming in that charge and flees. And Napoleon said, this is an interesting one, and you've talked about this to me before, the art of war consists in bringing to bear with an inferior army a superiority of force at the point at which one attacks or is attacked. And I think that Alexander is, like Napoleon, an extraordinary exemplar of that, right? So he can create, how would you describe it? Like local superiority?

You have a massive army, a million guys kind of kicking their heels and wondering what's going on. But you can decide things in a very small portion of that battlefield, right? If you bring enough force to bear. As Clausewitz would say, you know, where do you find your enemy's center of gravity and how do you attack it? And of course, at the time he was talking more national and strategic center of gravity.

But I think that holds true on the tactical level is, you know, where do you find if it's France 1940? Where do you find that one Marn crossing for the Germans to actually change the entire nature of the conflict? How do you find your enemy's critical vulnerability? critical vulnerability. Yes, if outnumbered, there's the famous Robert E. Lee at Chancellorsville, except he only attacks one part of the Union Army and then keeps attacking it and doesn't get the rest of it involved. But yeah, you can, with a smaller force, influence the enemy and the fact that Alexander is able to do that. And part of that is me also now asking, how do great commanders view risk? Yeah, these people are very complicated people. I guess there is a risk appetite that is through the roof here, right?

Well, in the case of Alexander, if what he's going for is glory, then he's got unmitigated risk. He doesn't have to worry about, oh, I need to consolidate gains to be able to pass on for the civil population and all these other things that today in modern warfare we would consider if he's just going for personal glory. If that's his actual strategic end, well, then by his criteria, he's definitely winning. Yeah. And he's, for example, established that he really does think he's the son of Zeus, the hybrid Greek-Egyptian all-powerful deity. So I think he thinks he's won. Yeah, absolutely. If that's your mindset, then you are strategically victorious. And no matter what you do, including dying in your 30s,

that's part of it. And possibly dying in his 30s because of the astonishing trauma he'd put his body through. I mean, he's wounded all over his body many times. He was always at the thick of the fighting. Well, and we'll come on to some other commanders, but I think sort of personal valor to the point of actually, it's not much use if you're dead or you're seriously weakened and then can't rule over this empire. And so it sounds like you and I aren't massive Alexander the Great guys, weirdly. No, not really. I mean, he's, here's an interesting one. I think it's because you and I like to have an ideological reason for fighting, and we would like to sort of be on the right side of that ideological reason, and we can't find one with Alexander. One can almost make an argument for Napoleon that he is at least fighting for sort of an idea of France. Really weird idea.

I don't know what Alexander is fighting for. And you sound like his Macedonian buddies who kind of point this out to him towards the end of his life. And indeed he killed one of them who was his great friend and who had rescued him at Battle of Granicus that I mentioned, saved his life. So he killed him in a drunken rage when he dared to make the criticisms that you are making now. So we're on the shoulders of giants here. All right. Well, I've got to watch out fors of Alexander knifing me in the back when I can say that I don't think I put him in my top five. Oh, okay. What about, should we go to Caesar?

Let's do that. Because he's a winner, man. Like, Gaul is conquered and stays conquered. We're going to give him some points for that, right? Caesar accomplishing something that two German Reichs could not do. Yeah, that's true. And even Henry V, Henry Plantagenet of England. Goddamn legend.

Yeah, anyway. And so Julius Caesar, born 100 BC, died in a very celebrated fashion, an infamous way, on the Ides of March in 44 BC. Caesar was, I think, astonishingly ambitious like Alexander. I think shared that kind of risk appetite, that thirsting for glory. We hear that he wept when he touched a statue of Alexander because he felt so small and pathetic compared to that great commander. we're sort of evaluating him on his astonishing conquest of Gaul. And we should say astonishing, bloody, destructive, extraordinary conquest of Gaul.

58, 52, he very wisely, as Winston Churchill said, a history will judge me kindly because I intend to write that history. And Caesar wrote a literary masterpiece, sort of an autobiographical. Is he the first one? I think he's a great commander. I think he is. I want to say yes. I think he's the first one to do the uh the thing that navy seals do all the time now which is um i was in a war let me write let me

publicize it that's really interesting too because now caesar is suddenly looking he's not just looking at glory per se he's looking at what do the people think about me? Yes, good point. So he's actually beginning to take into consideration what any great commander should do, which is how do I keep the people on my side in this conflict? These guys got to be politicians, right? No question, the great commanders are politicians. And that's exactly where Caesar is going, is the politician route. Yeah. So that's a good point. So he writes these extraordinary accounts. The Battle of

Alesia is famous, 52 BC, the extraordinary campaign. He's besieging the Gauls and a relief force arrives and he builds, what do we call it? Come on, man, you're an engineer, like double circumvalations or something. But he builds a second set of earthworks to protect his own. So he's now besieging. He walls himself in the Gaul. He's not trapped in there with the Gauls. The Gauls are trapped in there with him. Yeah, yeah.

So he builds like a second line of siege works outside his other line. So he's in the donut. The middle of the donut is the Gauls. He's then in the doughy bit of the donut is the goals he's then in the the doughy bit of the donut and then the other goals are outside it kind of roaming around and they come very very close to penetrating that donut and biting it in half and i will leave the metaphor there and he personally interviews he's not as like alexander is ostentatiously present on all the battlefields but he does at this moment he wore wore this kind of, apparently, this kind of scarlet cape, and he threw himself into the fray at this point. And he did have this

extraordinary connection with the soldiers. And by that, I think I partly just mean he just heaped praise and wealth upon them and booty, which is one way of doing it, right? And they fought for him. Very, very clearly. There's a whole element of how do commanders create loyalty? Is it through personal inspiration or is it through massive amounts of bribery? Or is that just the welfare of their soldiers? Yeah. Well, Plutarch says, the first century Greek historian says that in the past there were the wisest and most valiant generals that there ever were. But he says Caesar's prowess and deeds of arms did excel them all. And we talk about his histories, his reports from the battlefield after he defeated one enemy of

Rome. He famously said, I came, I saw, I conquered. And the one that I like from the Gaulish campaign is he, there was a surprise attack at one point, he was ambushed. And he just simply wrote, he wrote in the third person, obviously, because he's a total legend. Caesar had everything to do at one time. And I love that. I'm sure as someone who's held command, you'll be able to relate to that. Like when things go wrong on the battlefield, like you have to do everything, including probably kill the guy coming at you, but also extricate your units, keep the campaign going. Like there's a bunch of stuff. And I think to multi-skill like that is astonishing. And that's sort of, I think when it comes down to the crux of what does it mean to be a tactical or operational leader? It means you do have to

be doing everything all the time. There is no rest. You cannot just think of what are my frontline troops doing? You have to be thinking of what are my frontline troops doing? You have to be thinking of what my frontline troops need, how much food, what are the supplies, where am I getting them? What is the condition of my army? Do I need recruits? Do I need new weapons? What all of the things and also be thinking about your frontline troops. And in today's conflicts, where you move beyond just the single linear sort of formations. You now have to think about what's happening in the air, what's happening in the information space, what's happening in the cyber realm, what's happening all over the place. And so now even more than ever,

I would argue that it's actually more difficult to be a great commander because I feel like things have become so complex. But Caesar sort of nails it. Also, points to him for brevity on the I Came, I Saw, I Conquered. I appreciate that. I would point lots of freshman history students to if they're looking for how to really come at an idea in a clear way, you know, follow Julius Caesar's lead. Definitely. You mentioned logistics there. I think

we're probably going to be talking a lot about logistics. They're not the most glamorous things when you get into history, but you come to realize that they're everything. He built this gigantic bridge across the Rhine. He took an invasion fleet across the Channel, which is actually astonishing. He landed on the south coast of England. Apart from anything else, as it happens, when he got to the other side of the channel, he had to show personal leadership helping slightly unwilling legionaries to get off into the surf and take on the Britons. And a side note, which I always find fascinating, we think in the long history of invasion and war on this little island that I live on, we think this first invasion that we know about, the first recorded invasion, is the only one, we think, where it was opposed on the beach. So that's a weird thing. And it was successful, but there was a kind of Roman D-Day. The Brits were all there. They fought them in the shallows. They were driven off, and then Caesar was able to go inland.

name is logistics. The Romans won through logistics. That's why I think there are a lot of parallels between the United States military history and the Roman, not so much from the imperial aspect, but some might argue on the imperialism level. But I don't think any of us will get to the great imperial level of your small island, I might say. But the way that the Romans fought war was with stuff and systems. They systemized war. Caesar had so much to do with that. The Roman army was not just responsible for defeating their enemies. They were also responsible for building roads, for ensuring safety of the lines of communication and the lines of supply of an empire, not just for armies. of communication and the lines of supply of an empire, not just for armies. They've literally integrated their army into their empire's logistics system, which is

rather incredible. So where the army goes, cities spring up. Good roads, which I don't think we can even conceive of how bad roads once were. But Roman roads were good roads. And that allowed the free travel of information, of commerce, of ideas that created this amazing thing of the Roman Empire. And so the legions built Rome. And one could argue that, you know, Caesar takes advantage of those legions to build the Roman Empire further. And then, of course, when we ask, what is Caesar's strategic end? Well, I guess it involves crossing a river.

Yeah, he wants to expand the empire and make himself the first man in that republic. And he does both of those two things. I'm glad you mentioned systemization. I think we're going to talk more about that, I think, with the Mongols, with British Navy in the 18th century, the US in the 20th century. I think that's a really, really important point. And actually, I think slightly undermines the case for great commanders, right? Because if you've got an unbelievable system, you don't need a great commander. And there's the rub, because good systems win wars. A lot of people say, when you're talking about sort of junior level leadership, a good leader changes a culture in a unit and leaves it better than they found it. A great leader changes the culture within the unit and changes the systems in the unit.

So that way, when they leave, it doesn't matter who replaces them. The systems that they've built are going to survive beyond them. And I think there's, yes, that is sort of, it does begin to undermine some of the great commanders, but you still have the question of how can commanders control their individual or personal desires within that system? And could Caesar subordinate himself to that system? Well, that's the problem with him.

Let's move on to Hannibal, the Carthaginian general. Carthage, North African empire spread into other parts of the Western Mediterranean, locked in an extraordinary series of, I would say generational, but it's multi-generational series of wars with Rome for dominance of the Mediterranean, North Africa, Western Mediterranean space. Hannibal comes on in the second Punic War in particular. He lives 250 BC to around 180 BC. He was asked once, apparently, who the history's greatest general was. And he said, probably Alexander, then myself.

So he's a modest guy and he won the most some of the most eye-catching victories in classical history he read the terrain beautifully hides troops in dried water courses in trebuchet like that kind of weird hollywood thing you always see in hollywood where the sort of cavalry charge along and then these troops emerge from a feature of the ground which they hadn't been spotted in well that actually happened with with hannibal he does mock retreats he teases the the enemy out. He's extremely maneuverable. Very good at deception. Very good deception, which is great. The other thing I think he does deserve points for,

we should say he did not win the war in which he fought. In fact, he was catastrophically defeated and Carthage was ruined by the end of that war. So I think that's a mark against him. But I'm struck by the fact that even at the Battle of Cannae, which is his greatest success and indeed one of the greatest battlefield successes in history, tens of thousands of Romans encircled and murdered, possibly one of the bloodiest days in human history, a complete catastrophe for Rome, and a battle that generals will have mentioned ever since and eyed up ever since and talked about ever since, and it was mentioned in relation to since and eyed up ever since and talked about ever since. And it was mentioned in relation to the first Iraq war. Schwarzkopf talked about Cannae

there. Interesting though, the very few Carthaginian troops I'm struck by, Hannibal managed to get pretty average people to fight for him. He was using like random impressed men that he'd picked up in France when he was crossing the Alps or in the same in Spain, he was recruiting locally. These weren't the Alexander the Great's kind of companion Macedonian cavalry. And I think that he does deserve credit for that. That's pretty remarkable. I think you're right. I think that's another aspect that we have to consider is what are the soldiers that the great commander is using? Where do they come from? How are they trained? Are they professionals? You know, the Roman legionaries being what we would consider sort of today, I guess, the first

standardized professionals versus the volunteer model, a citizen soldier. Can you take an average person and rapidly form them into a elite soldier? I think that's where a lot of the personality of a commander can make a huge difference. How can you inspire your soldiers to go beyond themselves, to think of something beyond themselves, whether that thing is you as the great commander or whether it is the idea of something, you know, home England and beauty, etc. England and beauty, et cetera. How do you get somebody to get over their initial inclination, which is to move as far from danger as possible to going, no, I will throw all of that at risk and I will go expose myself to the utmost danger and I will do it enthusiastically, willingly, and while remembering my training. Polybius says it's a remarkable and very cogent proof of Hannibal's having been by nature a real leader and far superior to anyone else in statesmanship. Though he spent 17 years in the field, passed through so many barbarous countries, and employed to aid him in desperate and extraordinary enterprises, numbers of men of

different nations and languages, no one ever dreamt of conspiring against him, nor was he ever deserted by those who once joined him or submitted to him. We're going to give him some good marks for that. But his cavalry commander, after the Battle of Cannae, when he annihilates this Roman army and then doesn't immediately march on Rome and try and chop the head off the viper, his cavalry commander shouted, you can win a victory, but you can't use them. And that's one of the great expressions, isn't it? Because if you're a great commander, you've got to know how to use those victories. Yes, you have to be able to use them and you have to be able to turn them into something more than just that tactical success. And you have to understand the importance of time, the importance of time and what that does to your military force, the military force of the enemy. You and I have had discussions on, you know, what the hell was General Howe thinking after?

We're not mentioning his name in this context, buddy. Come on. You know, I'm still a bit raw about this. Well, it drives the question of what is a nation fighting for and is Howe fighting for victories or is he fighting for some sort of a reconciliation? And the more I look at it, the more I'm believing that Howe is fighting for some sort of a reconciliation, which is why he doesn't immediately march into either New England or into the Mid-Atlantic following the victories around New York. But understanding the nature of your enemy, understanding the nature of the conflict. So do you actually understand the nature of the conflict? Howe certainly did not. Gage did not. Clinton did not. I don't know that you really get any of the military commanders in the Revolutionary War who fully grasp, you know, maybe Burgoyne, Burgoyne and Cornwallis,

but neither of them had realistic approaches to the tactical or operational situation. No. And coming back to Hannibal, he didn't grasp that essence that he was fighting these wolf-like Romans who would deal with the loss of their finest field army by just raising another one. And so that, again, that's the question of what is your enemy center of gravity? Can you defeat their main field army and they still maintain a will to fight? How do you break your enemy's will? What is your enemy's will? Is it the people? Is it a religion? Is it a political idea? If you look at Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese, you know, constantly losing all their engagements, and Giap, constantly losing engagements, but understanding that the more Americans that are killed, the more it weakens

the strategic staying power of the United States. That was an accurate read of your enemy's center of gravity. I'm glad you mentioned Vietnam because I do think taking on and inflicting a strategic reverse on America, the most powerful military force the world had ever seen to date at the height of the 20th century, is actually a pretty remarkable thing. And I think it's probably, yeah, I'm glad we quickly touched on that. Okay, so Hannibal, unrealistic strategically, didn't end up winning lots of extraordinary tactical and operational successes. So he's not going to win the big prize. Let's come on to Genghis Khan. We maybe should call him Chinggis Khan, Mongolian, lived 1162 to 1227. He was from a notable family,

I think, but his father was killed. He ended up being ostracized and ended up catching rats and vermin with his family, just camping out. So marginalized, to say the least. He ends up rising to having conquered the largest contiguous empire the world's ever seen. So empire, to say the least. He ends up rising to having conquered the largest contiguous empire the world's ever seen. So empire that's joined up to each other. It is an astonishing story. He first unites the warring and very, very divided steppe tribes, the Mongol tribes. He then takes on the Northern Chinese Empire. He takes on a great Central Asian empire, and he and his subordinates will advance as far as Eastern Central Europe. Where do we start with this guy? We haven't done enough deception. He's a master of deception. Deception and terror. Using reputation to

politically and militarily cow his enemies into submission. So some would argue that the mark of a great commander is never having to fight a battle in the first place. How do you get to the spot of never having to fight a battle? Well, you've got a couple. I mean, you can outmaneuver your enemy to a point. The 1863 campaign of General Rosecrans outmaneuvering Bragg out of an entire state, never fights a battle, one could argue very successful, loses it all of course at Chickamauga. So being able to downmaneuver your enemy or create a persona so fierce, so terrifying that everyone either flees before you, lays down their arms and submits, which of course

means that you're going to have to do a bunch of things that today we would refer to as being highly problematic ethically. And I think at the time as well, the people who were being slaughtered were also probably thinking, this isn't really the most ethical thing to be happening to us. Yeah, they had some considerations. So not trying to do presentism, but yes, he kills them. He kills hundreds of thousands of people in the Silk Road city of Merv, for example. Historians call these exemplar massacres. So you kill every living thing in a city. And we should say, of course, the Romans did this and many other nations and armies have done things

like this. Even Wellington was not against a little exemplar action from time to time. And the city of Badajoz, when it fell in the Peninsular War, Wellington wasn't happy about it. He didn't like to see the indiscipline, the looting, the barbarism, but he did think it was possibly a useful example, perhaps, if subsequently that might make people a little bit less willing to try and resist his advances, his sieges. And so you do see this. So Genghis, you mentioned deception, he ties branches to horses' tails to create massive dust clouds, which mean that the enemy think there's far more of them than they are. He fake retreats. He's got a very big network of spies. He uses merchants as spies.

I love one story. He let his enemies capture some really puny, ill-fed horses at the start of the campaigning season. And so they think, well, his army must be absolutely, the limit of their endurance. They haven't got any food. The horses haven't been fed. And then Genghis's men come out and obviously fighting on well-fed

and well-rested horses and take everyone by surprise. They often did things like light hundreds of extra campfires that weren't required. So people thought they were facing a much greater force than they were. And actually deception becomes even more important in the 20th century. There's something about the First and Second World War. I mean, deception figures very, very... Because I guess you have to amass such enormous men and material stockpile of arms and supplies, shells. It's easy to spot.

And you have to go to great pains to try and make sure the enemy don't see those things. So deception's huge. It is. And so is mobility. And if we're talking Genghis Khan, I mean, that's his hallmark is mobility. He's able to use deception because he's able to have highly, highly mobile, agile forces that can quickly move from point to point on the tactical side of things and even the operational. That agility through a mobile force is enormous. And his ability to know how to time his attacks,

to be able to basically outmaneuver his foes through his greater mobility is something that, of course, once we start looking at the motorization and mechanization of warfare, everyone's going to try to capitalize on. And to a certain extent, the allure of the totally mobile force is a little bit like the allure of the great battle. That's something that we haven't really mentioned with the great commanders, but they sort of all have this great battle mentality. Hannibal Alcane, great battle, what happens? What are you going to do with it, man? You had your decisive battle, now what? Napoleon, of course, is going to be the poster child of the decisive battles. Everyone after Napoleon is going to be chasing the will of the wisp. That is the decisive battle.

But for what? What happens after that? And so if you have this highly mobile, agile force, you still have to understand where is the center of gravity? Where do you strike? And I mean, Genghis, if we're talking square miles, dudes want it. He's got it. And in an enduring way, he want it. He's got it. field. They're already marching, very light logistics. They're riding with spare horses. They can forage as they go. They use birds to capture vermin and things on the step. They can drink their horse's blood. They can mix it with some kind of porridge-like stuff. So they can do

big distances, nothing slowing them down. And they converge within days in the right place. You feel sorry for anyone fighting them. really do and it endures it endures for a couple of generations at least so i think we're saying chingus is pretty remarkable he's gonna have to be up there i mean yes he's a heartless bloodthirsty dude but yeah i think he's still up there you're listening to dan snow's history hit we're looking at the great commanders. More after this. I'm Tristan Hughes, host of the Ancients from History Hit, where twice a week, every week, we delve into our ancient past. I'm joined by leading experts, academics and authors who share incredible stories from our distant history and shine a light on some of antiquity's great

questions. Was the Oracle of Delphi really able to see into the future? The Oracle certainly operated, certainly gave many thousands these prophecies, and they were taken seriously in most cases. What can be discovered from lost civilizations? There was a lot of volcanic activity, and then one of these sites called Cuicoco actually got covered with volcanic flows. And the early archaeologists, they used dynamite, you know, to get at this archaeology.

And was King Arthur actually real? Ambrosius is far less well known. It looks as if he has got a significant impact on the creation of the Arthur story itself. You can expect all of this and more from the Ancients on History hit wherever you get your podcasts. I'm Matt Lewis. And I'm Dr. Alan Orjanaga. And in Gone Medieval, we get into the greatest mysteries. The gobsmacking details

and latest groundbreaking research from the greatest millennium in human history. We're talking Vikings, Normans, Kings and Popes, who were rarely the best of friends, murder, rebellions, and crusades. Find out who we really were by subscribing to Gone Medieval from History Hit, wherever you get your podcasts. Let's keep going. We've got lots of people we wanted to throw in who deserve shout

outs, but we're going to just quickly take on another big guy who's in this list, whether they deserve to be on it, and that's Napoleon. Born in 1769, he died in 1821. We should point out he died on the most remote island on planet Earth, a prisoner of the Brits, his enemy. I like how you just, nothing about the Grand Coalition, just, you know, the Brits, but it's okay. It's okay. Yeah, okay, fine, you're right.

But they had helped getting him, but he was transported on a British ship, and it was a little British colony, a little British rock in the South Atlantic. Napoleon, well, he still has so many fans. There's the big movie coming out this year. People are obsessed. One of the things he's good at,

I'll start by just saying, I think he does the homework. It's something you don't often think about in Napoleon. I think he works really hard. He studies maps. He works out where he can get food. The preparation for his campaigns is astonishing. And maybe that was true of Alexander as well,

because we may know a little bit less, and Caesar, but I'm very struck by it. It's kind of on the glamorous side of it, but he does the work before his most successful campaigns. He does, and he's taking advantage again of that system of warfare. So after the 1500s, you begin to see the professionalization of warfare. You see the development of systems within armies. I always argue that the US Army is the brainchild of the British and the French armies because we just pilfered fully in the 1700s from both

militaries. So he is definitely the beneficiary of a professional military education system, the beneficiary of a professional military education system, while also fully embracing new ideas, the levée en masse, this idea that it isn't just professional soldiers from inside that system. The common person in France can fight in great numbers, effectively to overwhelm these very expensive, smaller professional forces from Europeans. He also has the ability to read other commanders. And I think that goes into the bucket of sort of prudent risk and the center of gravity. How are you able to assess the risk while knowing what your enemies are going to do? He seems to get into the minds of his enemies to be able to foresee their next move, which leads him to great victory, of course, over the Italians. One could say, oh, yeah,

but they're the Italians. Well, yeah, they're also fighting in horrific terrain and with the supply lines that are just absolutely atrocious. His successful campaigns in Italy are going to bring him to really his greatest victories, I think, are Austria and overcoming the Habsburgs, which are always a formidable thing to do since there's just so many of them. Yeah, he captures Vienna, he destroys. He wrote a great letter, I think, after the Battle of Austerlitz in 1805. He wrote to his wife and he said, I've fought a great battle. i have defeated an army commanded by two emperors the russian emperor and the austrian emperor i am a little tired right and i i don't blame him he seemed to have an electrifying effect on the men under his command i mean you talk about that he obviously created one of the most enduring brands in history so he's got a quote he said a man does not have himself killed for a half pence a day or a petty distinction. You must speak to the soul in order to electrify him. And he famously said, a leader is a dealer in hope.

But then he would also say, and I'm paraphrasing because I can't remember the exact quote, but a man will do an astonishing thing for a little bit of ribbon. I know that's the other, that's a counter quote, which I always use. No, I don't think it's a counter. I think it goes with it because how do you take a individual and a massive machine, the massive machine that is a field army, 100,000 people? How do you make one person suddenly feel like they're special and noticed and appreciated and meet that personal desire that everyone has, I don't care who you are, for wanting to feel recognized for what you do. The military award system is a good way of doing that. And I have argued always that is the easiest and cheapest way of recognizing military accomplishment, especially if you're in military leadership today, it costs you absolutely nothing to do this.

And it leaves that person who might have been a faceless nothing suddenly feel like they are actually a individual. They've been seen. They've been seen. And then that person is going to probably be more motivated to go do things. I look at this with the creation

of the Army Corps badge system in 1863 by Major General Joseph Hooker, commander of the Army of the Potomac in the American Civil War, for however briefly. He's not the best in the battlefield, probably because he's concussed most of the time. But when you talk how to inspire the best out of your soldiers, one, improve their supply situation, which Napoleon absolutely does. You know, the famous quote, you know, an army marches on its stomach. This is a man who fully recognizes that logistics are massively important, uses innovations such as canning to ensure supplies of food with his troops. So ensure a good supply system, make sure that your soldiers are well-equipped, well-armed, and that they are recognized. And that's something that I think Napoleon does

amazingly. And you see it with the young guard, the old guard, being able to, a little bit with Alexander and his companions, choosing individuals and making them part of this goal that everyone wants to be a part of this organization. He inflicts astonishing defeats on his enemy on the battlefield, but he also knows defeat himself. And as we come towards the end of his career, the War of 1812, the advance into Russia, the attempt to take Moscow is strategically flawed. It's operationally catastrophic. He loses an army of 700,000 men. I mean, it's one of the great disasters of global military history. So I think we have to mark him down for that. He's then completely destroyed the next year at the Battle of Leipzig. And then he's

comprehensively defeated by the Prussians and the British Allied Force at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. So it feels, I think, we're going to struggle to give him the top prize. Well, because we can't. I mean, if you look at it from a strategic perspective, what is he trying to do? He's overreaching once again. He's attempting for control over too much and he's trying to do too much. He's also neglecting some key things. One, the naval aspect. Yes, he's doing very well on land, but he can't defeat one little island and its wooden

walls. The French Navy can never achieve the same mastery that Napoleon can on land. And also, you cannot fight alone. You have to fight as part of an alliance to be utterly victorious. That's what overcomes him in the end, is the fact that he's managed to strategically tick off the entire rest of the world around him that then unites and completely crushes him. around him that then unites and completely crushes him. And so, yeah, no, he doesn't get top spot. He's not able to actually think beyond himself. details and latest groundbreaking research from the greatest millennium in human history. We're talking Vikings, Normans,

Kings and Popes, who were rarely the best of friends, murder, rebellions, and crusades. Find out who we really were by subscribing to Gone Medieval from History Hit, wherever you get your podcasts.

I always love his quote, death is nothing because to live defeated and without glory is to die every day. So is there a problem with great commanders being romantics? I think so. And can you be a great commander if you are so caught up in yourself that you cannot see the greater good of your nation and your army? There we go. I think you're probably right. Shout out to Wellington, the man who helped defeat Napoleon in 1815. Astonishing reader of the ground, Wellington. He hid his men. He surprised his enemy. He was a logistician. He was very keen to maintain his links with the Royal

Navy. He knew that his strength derived from the Navy's ability to keep him supplied, supported. Great intelligence gatherer, great diplomat, great strategist. Well, I was about to say great politician. He was one of the most disastrous prime ministers this country's ever had, but he was a very good political general. He was able to create relationships to create a better situation on the battlefield. relationships to create a better situation on the battlefield. And what he's also able to do is he's able to do a lot with a very small force, which we've sort of alluded to before as one of the qualities of a great commander. He said in later life, he should have given more praise. He was pretty distant from the men, but they fought for him. But I don't think they loved him.

Maybe they didn't need to. We should talk about Nelson, whose men did love him. 1758, born just before that year of victories in the Seven Years' War, died at the Battle of Trafalgar from a wound received in the battle in thick of the fighting in 1805. You've talked about the systematizing. I mean, there's that Aristotle quote, because I was thinking about Aristotle because of Alexander the Great, and he's got a quote saying, we are defined by what we do repeatedly. Therefore, excellence is a habit, not an act. And I think the Royal Navy had that habit of excellence for a good hundred years or so, and if not longer.

One of the most astonishing organizations and institutions on earth and an organization that didn't need Nelsons. I mean, I think the proof of the pudding is that Nelson died and nothing changed. Britain was as dominant at sea after Nelson as it was before. He was personally brave. His letters are all about logistics. They're all about water. These men, food, disease, cleanliness.

We're moving to a kind of modern war of packing loads of guys in strange machines. In this case, ships that line with vast amounts of artillery on board. He was brilliant. And the other thing we should say about him is mission command, devolving, and I know it's something you'll talk about, but devolving decision-making down to the right level where it needs to be. And I think that's presumably a very important aspect, particularly as forces get bigger and more sophisticated and more diverse. And emphasizing excellence through training. It's not good enough to just have one core of troops,

such as your old guard that is just amazingly good. Everyone has to be proficient. And I think that there's a standard that he sets. One question that I have with Nelson, is he as monumental of a figure if he does not die in battle? Yeah, I mean, he leaves a pretty corpse, doesn't he? So I think that probably helps him with some historians and sort of fans. I mean, British memory. I mean, he becomes, he is Britain.

Yeah, I mean, had Wellington been killed on the ridge at Mont Saint-Jean at Waterloo, I think we Brits would love him even more than we do. He's a sort of unlovable character in British history, and that's partly because of his afterlife. It's long and difficult. Nelson, like Gustavus Adolphus, he dies on the battlefield at the scene of his greatest success. It probably doesn't hurt his reputation.

I think that's probably true. He would have made a nuisance of himself. Yes. It's hard, I think, for great commanders to grow older. For some of them, you live long enough to see yourself become the villain in the case of Philippe Patin, who's this incredible French reformer, reforming general in the First World War, who, after the French mutinies of 1917, reforms the French army, really creates it into this incredible fighting force that enables the victory, Allied victories in 1918. And then, of course, goes on to be the great Nazi collaborator, just a really tragic figure. So maybe it's best for history and for Nelson's memory and reputation that he does

have his moment on the deck of victory. I think you could be right. He wouldn't be on the top of the big column in Trafalgar Square, I think, if he'd gone to become a sort of bilious and argumentative first sea lord and fallen out with people and said stupid things in the House of Lords. So anyway, man, bring some others to the table here. So my go-to always, and this is controversial because I think a lot of people downplay him, but is Dwight David Eisenhower. Interesting. You have a guy who never held a combat command prior to becoming an allied commander in World War II. That just absolutely defies our concepts of what it means to be a great commander. He's a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He's a contemporary of a whole bunch of guys who are going to become big names as battlefield

leaders, your Pattons and MacArthur's, et cetera. But during World War I, he is not part of the AEF. He does not go to France. He actually commands a tank school at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, oddly enough. He trains Renault FT-17s across the fields of Pickett's Charge. There's something sort of symbolic in that one, I guess. But the war ends before he's able to go get proven in combat. During the interwar years, what's interesting is he's one of these guys who, like Patton, is writing a lot and thinking a lot about warfare. What is the new form of warfare going to be? Unlike Patton, he has excellent interpersonal skills and does not tick off

everybody that he meets. He's an incredible planner. During the GHQ maneuvers of 1941, which are the largest maneuvers the U.S. Army has ever held, over 400,000 troops maneuvering across most of Arkansas and half of Texas. He's the lead planner. That's where he's recognized by George C. Marshall, who I should come up as honorary mention, even though he does not ever command anything, which makes me wonder, is the entire question of a great commander moot? Because I would say that Marshall should be at the top of this list, even though he never commanded, but he created the space for great commanders to go forth and do what they did. Anyway, Eisenhower, his background in planning logistics and interpersonal relationships leaves him to be the guy who ends up holding the incredibly horrible, uncomfortable bag of being Supreme Allied Commander, working with just the worst sets of personalities of individuals for subordinate commanders that a Supreme Allied Commander can have when you're dealing with Montgomery, Patton, Bradley himself was not a cup of tea. Lee Mallory. Oh God, Lord. Yeah. And let's not

forget Leclerc, de Gaulle. This is a guy who is trying to manage an alliance where as Samuel Elliott Morrison, one of the great historians of the U.S. Navy writes, it's a credit to Eisenhower that he's able to keep the Americans and the British and French from fighting each other long enough to be able to fight the Nazis. And to be able to do this while not having the combat background of a Montgomery, which, of course, Montgomery held over his head constantly and complained vociferously about to anybody who would ever listen. And the fact that Eisenhower is able to do all of this, do it successfully, hold this group together, not allow his own ego to get in the way and then step aside at the end. Of course, he'll go on to be president. But absolutely incredible to me that he's able to do this. He has nothing on the tactical side. He's got very little on the operational side. On the strategic side, however, he has this vision of

what victory looks like. He's able to take FDR and Churchill's visions and bring those to fruition and get the best out of the people that he's working with. He's one of several who from the battlefield or from high command has gone on to take their presidency. We should probably talk about the first guy, George Washington, who even his deadliest foe, George III, described as the greatest man in the world. And I think he does so for everyone surprised by that, because it's pointed out to George III that Washington is happy to leave the presidency and return to private life. And George III said, there's no way he can do that. There's no way once you've tasted this, the power, once you've been head of state, you can't walk away. If he does that, it'll be the greatest man in the world. And of course, Washington did do that. Where are we on Washington? I rate him very highly indeed. a massive enigma. Tactically, he has a handful of victories, Trenton and Princeton being the chief ones. Washington knew about how to bring about a small-scale tactical victory at the right

time and the right place, Stony Point in 1779. These are tiny little engagements, tiny. I mean, they would be skirmishes, not even worth mentioning in any of the world wars. These little engagements to keep up the morale of his troops, to keep mentioning in any of the world wars, these little engagements to keep up the morale of his troops, to keep up the morale of the population. But his greatest ability is keeping an army in the field against a superior foe while barely supported by his own nation. The idea that the American people were gung-ho and super excited everyone was on board for this idea of American independence is entirely flawed, especially as the war entered its later years, 1779, 1780. By 1781, Washington is despairing at Yorktown

because he says the people fighting for their own nation are outnumbered here by the French. There are more French here than there are American. He's disparaging of this. And the temptation for him, after having fought for so long, by 1783, after having fought for so long with so little support, always fighting with Congress about anything, for him to step away. Yes, he does step away from the presidency, but the first time he steps away is he steps away from army command. And he always defers

to civilian control of the military. He could have at any point established a military dictatorship. He could at any point establish even just military control of the military. even just military control of the military. He subordinates himself and the subsequent institution of the U.S. military to the civilian side from the get-go. And that's incredible. So his ability to think beyond himself and to think beyond his own ego, not to say that he was a peach, not to say that he was some sort of a saint. He has so many flaws, so, so many flaws. I mean, why is he fighting the British in the first place? Well, then you got to start looking at where his land holdings are. And you're going, oh, wow, this guy is not exactly the most patriotically minded guy. He's going to war because they just cut off his access to all of

his future income. But when he does make that decision and the decisions that guide him through his generalcy are those of the good of the nation. What is going to be for the good of the nation? And that's why for me, he's got to be up there. Even though, yes, he's not commanding hundreds of thousands of troops. He's not engaged in these existential conflicts. He's not out there individually fighting, coming within millimeters of his life. Although there are a few times where it does get a little bit too close for his personal aides. But I think it's his character as a leader means that he's got to be up there. Buddy, I posted something on Twitter about this podcast. Lots of people started talking about American Civil War, Grant, Sherman, Lee. And you

laughed and said, you know, the funny thing about talking about them in the context of being great is that actually the American Civil War was a bunch of amateurs just going at it. And you laughed and said, you know, the funny thing about talking about them in the context of being great is that actually the American Civil War was a bunch of amateurs going at it. And I think you're being self-deprecating, but there was genius on display in that war, wasn't there? There is. I mean, to be able to fight with amateurs, to get the best out of them is absolutely noteworthy. But at the same time, I risk so much ire for saying this, but the American Civil War is sort of a backwater. I risk so much ire for saying this, but the American Civil War is sort of a backwater. None of these individuals are going to come forth and do major things in European conflicts or larger conflicts. What you do have, however, is the seeds of the beginning for greater professionalization of the U.S. Army. Grant is unique because of his abilities to overcome adversity and tactical reverses with an eye on the strategic end state. In a counterpoint to that, Lee is unable to do that.

Lee cannot ever translate tactical success to anything beyond local success. He's not ever able to win a victory outside of Virginia, nor is he actually able to see the real strategic problem of the Confederacy. And in fact, by 1864, where he's penned in at Petersburg, he's going to keep fighting for another eight incredibly bloody, horrific months when everyone knows that the war is over. You know, the Western theater has collapsed. Sherman has marched to the sea. It's pretty much over. You know, the Western theater has collapsed. Sherman has marched to the sea. It's pretty much over. You know, a great commander should not continue

causing lives to be lost when they know that the cause itself is lost. There's some other interesting characters in the American Civil War. You've got George H. Thomas, who's never actually lost a tactical engagement. You've got Phil Sheridan, who honestly, Sheridan's most interesting facet to

me is that he's an observer during the Franco-Prussian War. And he basically writes a whole bunch of letters back to Sherman, where it's very clear that he has the hots for Prussian infantry. And that's the future that he wants to foresee everything. And that's when the tactical influence of the US Army begins to be influenced highly by the Prussians. And we don't sort of lose that German influence for a while. But yeah, there's a cast of characters in the American Civil War that are interesting, but I don't know when we talk about the future of warfare. And you notice I didn't even mention Stonewall Jackson, except I just did, because he's dead and dies so quickly that his significance on the battlefield is about one year. And that's not really notable enough.

He's able to have tactical success with smaller forces, cannot translate that into operational or strategic success. I'm going to get so much hate mail. You are, man. You're a brave guy. We've got some honorable mentions. I want to mention a woman here, Joan of Arc. She is an extraordinary battlefield commander. A historian of the Hundred Years' War once said to me, if it was a Hollywood movie, you just wouldn't believe it. The story of what that peasant girl, that teenager did with no military experience is completely insane. And raising the English Siege of Orléans, victories after that, it's a wild, wild story. And it's true. And it doesn't make any sense at all.

And it's a reminder of the moral factor on the battlefield, inspiration, leadership. It just is, we are a strange set of animals, right? Any others, any, and I'm going to shout a few more, but yeah, interrupt me, send some in yourself. I think Jeffrey Amherst, the guy who was actually able to see into the woods of North America

and figure out how to get victory out of it. I do not understand how armies can make war in such a country as one British officer said when viewing the North American woods for the first time in the 1750s. Being able to bring victory out of that very messy situation, I think he deserves a shout out there. And also for his wisdom in 1774-75, when George III asked if he would consider going back to North America, and he basically said, not a chance. You know, you made that mess yourself. I'm not going back to that.

And how can we talk about great commanders without mentioning Frederick the Great? Of course, pioneering the artillery arm, doing it well, as also as openly not a heterosexual soldier. And basically, many say Napoleon basically just stole his artillery tactics straight from Frederick the Great. But also, he's another one of those systematizers, ones who are creating a system of warfare for success that's going to endure long after that death. And you see that with the dominance of the Prussian state following the Seven Years' War. An astonishing commander. I've always had an obsession with Khalid ibn al-Walid,

who lived in around 600, 592, we think, to 642 AD. He was Muhammad's most significant commander. He was actually initially opposed to Muhammad. Then he switched sides. He was responsible for the capture of Mecca. Of course, we don't know enough about all this stuff, but we think all this. After Muhammad died, it was him that put down the rebellious tribes. He ensured the kind of legacy

of this political and military revolution in the Arabian Peninsula. He then invaded Persia, knocked Persia out. The two great empires of the Mediterranean and the Near East entirely conquered Persia and then invaded Roman Syria, the richest province of the Byzantine Empire, captured Roman Syria and which led to Egypt. Astonishing march across deserts annihilated the Romans at the Battle of Yarmouk. And in terms of enduring legacy, I mean, I believe you may be familiar with the Islamic religion and the extent of the Arab realms and empires that followed that. He never lost a battle. We think his nickname was the Drawn Sword of Allah. And I am a huge fan of his.

He is an extraordinary commander. Now, listen, man, we need to bring this to a close because we've gone crazy. We've gone crazy here. What are you thinking? Where are your thoughts at? Who are we going to give the big prize to? So if a great commander is one who wins conflicts, I don't think that's a good definition

of what wins conflicts. I think nations win conflicts or groups of peoples win conflicts. And I think it's through a whole bunch of different things. We've mentioned systems a lot. We've mentioned cultures a lot. Great commanders can influence that. same time i wonder whether chingis khan you know because he creates that nation and then the nation itself he probably could have died at that point because he'd shown them how powerful they could be as a united entity and then it could bequeath them the ambition to conquer their neighbors and i think they've done that very effectively with their extraordinary innate their skills their attributes their advantages but by forming that nation itself it feels to me like Chinggis Khan does straddle possibly those two aspects of command and of mobilizing a nation and setting it on a particular path and allowing it to impose its will on its neighbors, militarily and politically. So I find it very hard to look beyond Chinggis. hard to look beyond Chinggis. Yeah, I think out of all the commanders that we've sort of discussed, yes, from a point of just overall military dominant control emanating from one individual's personality, he would be that one. If I were to change my definition of the great commander to be that, he would have to be it. If I was looking at overall from just who is the greatest commander

who achieved the most, I'm going to have to come back to Dwight David Eisenhower and make the ghost of Montgomery incredibly furious with me. But I just think it is such a difficult position to be in. There's no battlefield glory. There's no, you know, hanging out with the troops and sharing their, you know, their late night campfires and the sufferings of them. It's a bureaucratic diplomatic hell that I think most military commanders would hate to be in. I'm just thinking of Richard Montgomery after he takes Montreal in 1775, former British officer, now American, saying, please, somebody send me some politicians to deal with the people here.

I can't do this. I'm a military commander. This isn't my job. And now you have a military commander. That's his job, is managing peoples and nations and trying to get them all to work together to overcome,

you know, the single greatest evil I think the world has really ever faced in Nazi Germany. So if I were to have to pick one in my waffling, that'd be my guy. Listen, angry staff officer, thank you very much for coming on the pod again. That was fun.

Thank you so much for having me on. As always, it is a blast. you you