Dan Snow's History Hit - How did Brexit Happen? A History

Episode Date: July 1, 2024

On the eve of the 2024 General Election, we're tackling one of the UK's most divisive topics; Brexit.The 2016 referendum on EU membership split voters in two, creating two entrenched camps - Brexiteers and Remainers - whose differences show no signs of abating 8 years later. To better understand this political hot potato, we're charting Britain's relationship with the EU from the 1950s all the way up to the present day.Dan is joined by Tim Bale, Professor of Politics at Queen Mary University of London. Tim explains why Britain first pursued closer integration with Europe, and how various factors saw the Brexit movement eventually gain traction.Produced by Mariana Des Forges and James Hickmann, and edited by Dougal Patmore.Enjoy unlimited access to award-winning original documentaries that are released weekly and AD-FREE podcasts. Sign up HERE for 50% off for 3 months using code ‘DANSNOW’.We'd love to hear from you - what do you want to hear an episode on? You can email the podcast at [e-mail] can take part in our listener survey here.

Hi everybody, welcome to Dan Snow's History Hit. Well, the dust has pretty much settled. The gutters of our streets are no longer running with blood and tears. Both sides in Britain's Brexit debates have come to some kind of uneasy peace. So I thought on Dan Snow's History Hit we could have a first go, a first draft at trying to tell the story of Brexit. We're going to start in the 1950s with the start of the European economy community. We're going to go through to the 60s when Britain

tried and failed to join, thanks to that famous French veto, through the 70s when Britain did eventually become a member, right through to 2016 and the referendum and the political upheavals that followed as Britain and Europe tried to come to some kind of accommodation. The story isn't finished yet, of course. It will go on forever. That is the nature of Britain's relationship with Europe. But that's probably another podcast. To talk me through these last 50 or 60 years of history, we've got the best of the best. He's Professor Tim Bale, Professor of Politics in the School of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London.

A wonderful analyst of British politics and the Conservative Party in particular. So great time to talk to him. We're going to talk about what people got right, what people got wrong, the drawbacks of Brexit, and if there are any successes to report. Enjoy. T-minus 10. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. God save the king. No black-white unity till there is first in black unity. Tim, thank you for daring to come on this podcast and trying to help us cut through the jungle

of Britain's journey to Brexit. Good to be here. I hope my machete is sharp enough. Get it sharpened, buddy. You know me, I'd like to go all the way back with the arrival of the bell guy into Britain in the Iron Age. But let's go back to the 1950s. We get the beginning of this European economic community.

Just a quick one on that. Britain's not in it at that point. Was it just economic? Was it sort of coal and steel at that point? Or was there a real transnational political objective at that point? I think there was always a political objective. I mean, the aim was to use coal and steel and then other economic aspects of European countries' ties to each other to gradually push, first of all, the economies and then the societies and the politics of the countries together, at least in terms of the architects of what became the EU.

Britain, I think, was always rather suspicious of that. You had a Labour government, obviously elected 45 to 51, that was concerned about moves in that direction because they believed in socialism in one country and didn't want to get trapped in what they saw as a potentially capitalist club. And then, of course, you have the Tories coming in 1951, who were, you know, on, if you like, nationalistic, patriotic grounds, very wary of getting involved in something that would also reduce Britain's freedom of manoeuvre. And you can understand why the Europeans wanted to launch that experiment. They've spent the last several hundred years kicking the living snot out of each other, and the continent was in ruins. By the 1960s, the UK, early 60s, the UK does apply for membership. What's changed? Is it the loss of Britain's empire? Is it searching a kind of global role? Well, I mean, I think the loss of empire had something to do with it, but far more

actually was the economic success of the EEC. It became pretty clear, I think, to most Britons that Europe was, if not racing away from Britain, then doing a lot better than Europe, while Britain's economy was beginning, I think, to stagnate slightly. So the Conservatives under Harold Macmillan were really looking for a way of dynamising the British economy, if you like, and looking for a way forward. And also, you're right to say, looking for a new role in the context of the decline of empire, and the EEC seemed like a way of doing that. There was quite a lot of resistance within the Conservative Party, you'd have to say to it, but Milner decided that our future was European rather than necessarily global.

And the French veto British entries are saying they're too pro-American, they'll be a pro-American fox in the chicken coop. But the Brits keep trying, and by the 1970s, with Thatcher campaigning enthusiastically in favour of it, Britain does join the European economic community. It does, yes. I mean, de Gaulle had vetoed Britain's entry in 63 and in 1967, but de Gaulle wasn't there forever. And when Pompidou came in to replace him as French president, he was much more inclined towards a more favourable view of Britain. He didn't have that kind of bitterness left over from the Second World War that some people allege had something to do with De Gaulle's decision. And he and Heath managed to negotiate Britain's entry. And in 1973, we joined. Of course,

it wasn't so smooth because quite soon after 1973, in 1975, we had a referendum, in part, I think, decided by the Labour government, which came in in 1974, because Labour was quite split on the issue. And one thing that Wilson wanted to do was try and unite the Labour Party and indeed Britain as a whole behind it. So Tim, what a novel idea. You're worried about a split in your party, so you try and have a referendum to sort it out. Yeah, who knew? Yeah. I mean, I don't think anyone's ever tried that since, but yeah. Did it sort of help to settle the argument within the Labour Party? Well, not entirely, actually, but it did seem to settle the argument within the country.

The argument for continuing our membership of the EEC won the referendum by two thirds to one third. And most people thought then it had been sort of put to bed forever. Having said that, however, both within the Conservative Party, and there were still people who, you know, in the Conservative Party, even though its official line was to stay in Europe, wanted to leave. And in the Labour Party, where a lot of left wingwingers still saw rather conspiratorially if you like the EEC as this capitalist club there was still quite a lot of resistance to the idea of Britain both being in the EEC and being drawn closer into the project. The EEC reminds me of my years working at the BBC which people on the right said we were a bunch of

cabal of socialists and people on the left said we were sort of neo-colonial American liberals. And it seems that he suffered from the same fate. Margaret Thatcher wins the election in 1979, an enthusiastic European in the 70s, but she becomes really sort of infamous, or she's claimed by the Eurosceptics as the sort of original, the OG Eurosceptic. By 1988, she's making speeches saying, we haven't embarked on the business of throwing back the frontiers of the state at home, only to see a European super state exercising a new dominance from Brussels. So what goes on with her? Well, if you look at her 1979 manifesto, it's a little bit more Eurosceptic than some people remember, actually. There were feelings within the Conservative Party that this European project was

accelerating too fast and going too far. There was a feeling that Britain, because it had joined late, wasn't getting as good an economic or financial deal from the EEC, as should have been the case, partly because the EEC was set up in some ways to reward small farmers rather than the more intense agriculture that we had in this country. And we didn't have the kind of very efficient industry when it came to manufacturing that the Germans had. So the feeling was that this was a kind of Franco-German project. We'd joined late.

We hadn't done as well out of it as we should have done. And therefore, Mrs. Thatcher campaigned very famously for our money back. She did manage by kind of handbagging fellow heads of government at the Fontainebleau summit in the early 80s to get this famous rebate. But for some Eurosceptics, that simply wasn't enough. They wanted, in fact, to, if not completely withdraw from the European Union, then at least to ensure that this goal that the European Union, as it then became, of ever closer union, wasn't actually realised in reality. They worried that it was, in essence, and with some justification, a federalist project, and they wanted to have none of that. And increasingly,

Mrs Thatcher, partly actually through her dealings with fellow heads of government, began to sympathise more with that view than perhaps a pragmatic view. But things are a little bit complicated in the 1980s, because as well as becoming more Eurosceptic, what Thatcher also does is sign something called the Single European Act, which was this great leap forward, actually, in terms of European integration. It got rid of countries' vetoes in all sorts of areas and meant that the bloc could go forward using something called qualified majority voting, which we're not going to get into because it's far too complicated to explain, but simply means that it was actually easier to move things along and stop individual countries blocking progress. So in some ways, she was responsible for the European project rolling forward quite extensively

in terms of integration. But on the other hand, she was becoming more Eurosceptic at the same time. I mean, Thatcher's great legacy is widening the European project to the former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. Yes, I mean, that comes a little bit later, but certainly that was very much part of Britain's foreign policy. The aim being in some ways that if you widen the European Union, in other words, if you pulled more countries in, it was felt that it will be less likely to deepen. So there was always this sort of trade-off, if you like, at least in Tory minds, by getting the countries of Eastern Europe in and therefore making it far more difficult for the European Union as it became in 1992 to actually make decisions and become, if you like,

a more integrated trading bloc. Thatcher was in part lost power because she was, well, unpopular with some in her cabinet because of her increasing hostility towards the European project. Her successor, John Major's tenure was absolutely destroyed by Europe. Yes, I mean, Major comes in in 1990, Thatcher having been defenestrated, partly because of arguments going on in her cabinet due to Europe, but actually mainly because, you know, she had sort of moved past her electoral sell-by date, if you like. But a lot of bad blood was created by the party's decision to

dump Margaret Thatcher, particularly among the kind of right of the party. And that, if you like, starts to dovetail with very Eurosceptic feelings on the right of the party. So there's this kind of melding, if you like, of this betrayal narrative on the one hand and Euroscepticism on the other. And that comes out in something called the Maastricht Treaty, which John Major signs to greater claim, actually, even within the Conservative Party, which actually creates the European Union as another kind of integrative move forward on the part of the European Union. But the problem being is between the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, which, as I say, was greeted with some acclaim

within the Conservative Party, and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, you have something called Black Wednesday in 1992. And without going into too much of the kind of nitty gritty detail on that, what happens is that Britain joins something called the exchange rate mechanism, which is a way of sort of tying European currencies together. For some countries, a way of moving towards a single currency. For others, as in the UK, simply a kind of anti-inflationary device. But we go in at two higher exchange rates, which cannot be maintained because of the difficulties that the British economy is going through. You get markets betting against the pound. And in the end, the pound has to fall out of the exchange rate mechanism and

devalue on so-called Black Wednesday in 1992, just after the Conservatives have won this surprise election victory. And that means that for a lot of Conservative MPs, they really don't want to have anything to do with Europe ever again, because they associate Black Wednesday, quite rightly, actually, with them losing to Labour five years later. Interesting. And what do you think Black Wednesday did in terms of the public's view of the European project? I mean, I think in some ways, it was probably more important for conservative MPs than it was for the public. Although, obviously, in terms of the electorate, it was the kind of kiss of death, if you like, for that conservative government that had only just been elected. Clearly, you know, there are some parts of the British public that see this as a kind of, you know, giant German conspiracy or international conspiracy against the UK and against Britain. But I don't think that was that big a part of it. I think if we're

looking at, you know, public views on the European Union, they're far more to do with people just not feeling particularly European in terms of their identity. I think us being an island nation might have something to do with that. Some people claim, of course, that the kind of media hostility and party hostility towards the European Union to some extent kind of cues those feelings. So I don't think Black Wednesday in and of itself

mattered that much to most ordinary people. But there is a kind of very strong strain of Euroscepticism, not necessarily Euro hostility at that point, in the British public. And if you compare us to other populations in parts of Europe, you'd have to say that in some ways, the British people had never really reconciled themselves to being a kind of full member of the European Union in the way that most other countries' populations had. Tony Blair sort of walked a tricky path on Europe. Labour seemed sort of scared of the latent Euroscepticism amongst a portion of the population, whilst also trying to betray

themselves as sort of enthusiastic people at the heart of Europe. How did he pull that off? Well, I mean, it's a difficult trick to pull off. I mean, in some ways, I think Tony Blair was probably the most Euro-enthusiastic prime minister we've ever had. I wouldn't say the same for Gordon Brown, his deputy and his chancellor, who was always rather more kind of Eurosceptic. And the argument between them was whether to join the single currency or not, whether to join the Euro. Blair was actually quite enthusiastic about doing that. Brown was not enthusiastic because he didn't feel it was actually particularly appropriate for the British economy, rightly or wrongly. I think Ed Balls felt very much the same, who was his advisor at the time. And in the end,

those arguments won out, in part also because it was very clear that the Eurosceptic press, and in particular, the papers run by Rupert Murdoch, really wouldn't give Labour their support if Tony Blair opted to go into the single currency without a referendum. So in effect, Blair says to Murdoch, in return for your support, I will promise to hold a referendum on the single currency. So that means that Labour is always, to some extent, slightly weighed down by its fear, if you like, of the Eurosceptic press, and obviously then, you know, by implication, Eurosceptic voters. The first decade of the 21st century, the European project deepened. And I remember Blair

constantly saying, this is it, this far and no further. Even though the constitution was signed, it started to take on some of the attributes of a nation state. As it did so, was there a growth in scepticism among the British public? What were the key points kind of moving the dial? What got us to 50% plus one on that day in 2016? Well, I think you would have to look at the Conservative Party's attitude, really. After 1997, you know, it loses very badly to New Labour. And William Hague, although he's seen as this sort of, you know, rather venerable sage nowadays, comes in as leader and takes it in quite a kind of radical right-wing populist direction on all sorts of issues, but particularly

on migration, asylum seeking, and indeed on the single currency. So people may remember in 2001, William Hay going round on a flatbed truck around the country in that election, holding up a pound coin and making it all about saving the pound. And the Conservative Party travels at that point really just further and further. There's a ratchet effect in a Eurosceptic direction. And in so doing, it takes a lot of its supporters along with it. Parties, to some extent, cue their own voters. And I think that is certainly true of Conservative voters. And you also have, as I said, this mythology surrounding Thatcher's defenestration. So in order to be loyal to Thatcherite eternal verities, you then have to portray yourself as

a Eurosceptic. It becomes very, very difficult for any MP to be elected as a candidate for the Conservative Party or selected as a candidate for the Conservative Party or selected as a candidate for the Conservative Party by local grassroots members without declaring that they are a Eurosceptic. That ratchet effect, that snowball effect means that by certainly the second decade of the 21st century, and that of course is when the Conservatives win power again in 2010, And that, of course, is when, you know, the Conservatives win power again in 2010. The Conservative Party is a very Eurosceptic organisation. Now, that's not to say that the majority of Eurosceptics, even when the Conservative Party actually want to leave the European Union,

but it is to say that their rhetoric is generally anti-European. They want to slow down any progress. And they are, in fact, quite worried about some of the directions that the European Union is taking, feeling in particular, perhaps, that by what I would call the party in the media. In other words, the Sun, the Mail, the Express, the Times and the Telegraph, all of whom are owned by people who are determined either to see Britain out of Europe altogether or to reduce the regulatory burden on rich people on capital that the EU in their view imposes. And you've got the Greek economy appearing to implode, riots in the streets, and you've got lines of migrants arriving at European frontiers caused by the ripples of the Arab Spring and the civil war in Syria. So it's a sort of perfect storm, I suppose. Yes, it is. And it's important also to realise that, of course, the Conservatives aren't the only people making hay with that. Nigel Farage becomes the leader of UKIP. And, you know, his great contribution is really to fuse the concerns

about migration that people have with concerns about the European Union. And in some ways, it's a logical fusion, right? You know, it's quite logical to argue that if we are to do something about reducing migration in this country, then we have to actually end free movement. This is his argument. And that's an argument that has increasing appeal, as you say, after the migration crisis of 2015. And as you say, you know, the chaos, the financial meltdown causes to some European economies. And the fact that Europe has to bail out or help bail out some of those European countries, in particular Ireland, in particular Greece, makes some on the right of British politics worry that we may be on the hook as well for helping them out financially.

And you'd have to add to that as well. I think, you know, sometimes people forget this, that David Cameron wins in 2010, but he doesn't win outright. He has to go into coalition with the Liberal Democrats. And as a result, there are a whole lot fewer jobs for Conservative MPs who are expecting to be on the government front bench. And to be honest, a lot of them are pissed off and looking for a way of reminding David Cameron that he owes them. And one way of doing that is by joining these kind of Eurosceptic rebellions in Parliament after 2010. So in 2011, 2012, you get these really big internal rebellions on the part of Conservative MPs, and that plays some part in persuading David Cameron to hold a referendum. That, and the fear that UKIP will outflank the Conservative Party on the right.

David Cameron then tries to do, in a way not unlike Tony Blair, tries to have his cake and eat it, sort of talks tough, does things that look like he's Eurosceptic whilst not fundamentally altering Britain's relationship with the EU. And in the end, he's unable to play that game. He has to call an in-out and up-down referendum. unable to play that game, he has to call an in-out and up-down referendum. Yes. I mean, I think the feeling in David Cameron's inner circle is that this is coming down the line anyway. This is something that they are going to have to promise anyway. Now, I'm not sure I agree with that, but that's the feeling. And they may as well meet trouble halfway, if you like. So in other words, they may as well take the initiative and control the situation

rather than a referendum being forced upon either Cameron or a future prime minister. Now, not everyone within Cameron's inner circle agrees. And interestingly, his greatest political friend and closest ally, George Osborne, the chancellor of the Exchequer, is fundamentally opposed to a referendum because he thinks it's a risk not worth taking with the British economy, with Britain's relationship with the European Union in general. Michael Gove, who of course comes out to help lead the Leave campaign during the referendum, is also opposed to holding a referendum because he thinks it will split the Conservative Party and therefore thinks it is a bad idea on those lines. But in the end, Cameron is persuaded actually by William Hague, of all people, that a referendum is the right way to go. It will kind of settle

the argument for a generation. They believe obviously in their favour. And it's a way of, if you like, shooting Nigel Farage's fox as well. But as we know, that isn't in the end what happens, in part because Cameron places a great deal of stress on his ability to renegotiate our relationship with the European Union prior to the referendum. But he doesn't really get very much out of the European Union, particularly on migration, which is, of course, the real sore point. Many of us said at the time if cameron had come back and said i've managed to negotiate a deal where we can get blue passports back instead of the red ones then um that's eye-catching eye-catching top line might have been enough well i mean i mean that's

a that's a very good in some ways i mean cameron completely mishandled those negotiations what he should have done was do a great deal of if if you like, intel work beforehand, decided what he was actually going to practically be able to get out of the European Union, and then declare that those were his objectives before he negotiated, and therefore would be able to come back with a deal that said, you know, that he'd met all his negotiating objectives, but he didn't do that. Well, and also the problem was that Eurosceptics, there were very few specific things that he could negotiate on. I mean, friends who worked at the time said, European leaders were like, look, David, how can we help you? And he's like, you know, it seemed to be that there was no firm, as you say, there was no firm

idea of what he needed to get in order to satisfy those rebels. No, I mean, all that he could have done was to perhaps get more commitment on the part of the european union to allow us perhaps to limit welfare payments um to you know to to european union citizens moving to the uk but the problem was that all that cameron wanted would have actually meant going against the you know the principles of the europe Union, in particular on freedom of movement. And that was non-negotiable for European leaders. The other thing I'd have to say is that there was, as a historian, I think you might be interested in this, there was this

feeling all the time that somehow Germany in particular, Angela Merkel, would kind of ride to our rescue at the last minute, promise David Cameron something that would make a difference. But in the end, for all that she was, in some senses, a bit of an Anglophile, Angela Merkel was a European leader. And for her, the integrity of the single market, the integrity of the European Union was more important than holding Britain into Europe. Unlike Waterloo, the Germans are not going to gallop onto the battlefield at the last moment from the east to save the day. Exactly. Maybe it goes all the way back to Blucher, you might be right. David Cameron loses the referendum. Just quickly on the referendum,

it was pretty close. Then it wasn't. sort of a week when the whole thing melted down and and leave took a sort of a command a commanding lead which they held to get over the finish line and the polls show that was probably the only point of the last 40 years that that week it was brilliant they climaxed exactly the right point um which is you know what they say about all kind of great sporting achievements that you've just got to you just got to be the best on that particular day. What caused that last minute surge? Was it nefarious Facebooking and digital marketing? People were a bit more naive to it than we are now.

Or was it just effective, good old-fashioned campaigning? I mean, I think it was in the end down to the Leave campaign. It was incredibly well executed. There was also a division of Labour there. So in some ways, Nigel Farage got a lot of the real kind of foaming Eurosceptics on board, while Conservative Brexiteers, particularly Gove and particularly Boris Johnson, who was honestly probably worth two or three percent to the Leave campaign, helped get, if you like, the less radical Eurosceptics on board as well. It's also true that Dominic Cummings was able, not through I think nefarious means, to get a lot of people

to come out and vote who didn't ordinarily come out and vote in general elections in order to give Cameron and the government a bit of a kicking, in order to perhaps express their frustration at years of, as they saw it, being ignored. Although I don't want to, I guess, reinforce the sometimes, I think, false narrative that somehow the referendum was won by kind of the losers of globalisation or the left behind. I mean, they were a factor, but quite frankly, so were a lot of very comfortable leavers living in the south of the country, most of whom owned their own houses, many of whom were retired or on the point of retirement with fairly healthy pensions, and for whom, therefore, leaving the European Union wasn't anywhere near as much of a risk as it was for most working people. risk as it was for most working people. So there were all sorts of reasons, you know, in some ways, you know, to use that social science phrase, it was kind of overdetermined. When you look back at it, there are so many reasons why Leave won that referendum. Had the Remain campaign been better fought, that might have made a difference. Had Jeremy Corbyn,

the Labour leader, actually campaigned as hard as he should have done for Remain, that might have made a difference. Had Jeremy Corbyn, the Labour leader, actually campaigned as hard as he should have done for Remain, that might have made a difference. Had it not been led by David Cameron, who was at that point fairly unpopular, that might have made a difference. And it's my belief that if David Cameron had actually said to his cabinet, instead of, you can campaign for whichever side you like, but actually said, if you're going to campaign for Leave, you will have to get out of the cabinet, then actually, he might well have held Boris Johnson and Michael Gove into the cabinet and therefore into the Remain campaign. And I think, you know, had he been able to stem the flow of Conservatives opting for Leave, I think he would have stood a far better chance

of actually holding Conservative voters into the Remain side. You're listening to Dan Snow's History. We talk about the history of Brexit. More coming up. I'm Matt Lewis. And I'm Dr Eleanor Yonaga. And in Gone Medieval, we get into the greatest mysteries. To be continued... of friends, murder, rebellions, and crusades. Find out who we really were by subscribing to Gone Medieval from History Hit, wherever you get your podcasts. Then one of the great twists of fate, the Remainer, Theresa May, becomes the Conservative Prime Minister charged with leaving the European Union. And she says Brexit means Brexit. He resigned straight away. She took over. She had a very slim majority, which she then went and made even slimmer by running a disastrous election campaign.

But what challenges did she face as she tried to execute Brexit? Well, Theresa May sees Brexit through the lens of her job as Home Secretary. So she sees it as all about immigration, that vote. And so she decides that we must have what at the time was called a hard Brexit. In other words, we can't stay any longer in the single market. We also have to leave the customs union. And by doing that, I think she's legitimates in some senses, the hardest of hard Brexits. And that means that those who would otherwise probably have pressured her for a hard Brexit rather than a soft Brexit, whereby we stayed in the single market,

we stayed in the customs union, actually then felt able to argue for something even harder, which was leaving without a deal. So she had a bunch of Conservative MPs who were prepared actually for us to crash out of the European Union unless we negotiated an even harder Brexit than the Brexit that Theresa May wanted. So an even more distant relationship with the European Union than Theresa May wanted. And the fact was, because she lost that election, she no longer had a majority in Parliament. She could be held to ransom by, you know, 20, 30 Conservative MPs. That was the case.

And when she failed to kind of do their bidding, in essence, the Conservative Party got rid of her and got someone who would give them the kind of Brexit that would satisfy those so-called Spartans in the European research group who'd made Theresa May's life such a misery. It's interesting, isn't it, that one of the options was just get a deal where you just basically pull down the EU flag and keep everything

else in place and say, there you go, you got your Brexit, lads, shut up. Well, that would have been, I mean, in some senses, that would have been the softest of soft Brexit. And had Theresa May been a less tribal conservative politician, she could have, you know, quote unquote, reached across the aisle, said, look, 48-52, it's not an absolutely massive majority for leave. You know, surely there is some room for us, you know, to do a kind of cross-party deal on this and, you know, pull the country together. But she just wasn't capable, either as a kind of personality or a tribal politician, of doing that. of doing that. And as we've now seen, Brexit morphs into attacking the UN, the Convention on Human Rights. So Brexit becomes something else. For the Spartans, for the diehards, they're always going to be tilting at some egregious infringement of our sovereignty. Yes, yes. And going back to Ken Clarke, famously a Europhile Conservative MP, you know, now a veteran, he said, you know, the trouble with feeding a crocodile buns in order to hold it off is when you run out of buns and, you know, you have to go on to something else. And you're exactly right. You know, having got Brexit done, they're now talking about getting out of the European Convention on Human Rights.

So there will always be something because for that strain in conservatism, it's about rolling the revolution forward, if you like. We couldn't even begin on this podcast to go through the various extraordinary moments in Theresa May's tenure with meaningful votes and the backstop, the famous backstop. Oh, you're giving me post-traumatic stress disorder, you've been talking about it.

I remember going on the telly at one point, and people would just say, well, Britain's an island. And you would say, well, Britain maybe, but the UK, which is the sovereign state in which we're a part, is not an island. We have a land border with the EU. And just the look of complete bewilderment would come for about 10 seconds, and they'd remember, oh, okay, I see, yeah, Northern Ireland. And so Northern Ireland became this ticking point right because to to have a reasonably hard Brexit would have meant a hard border between Britain and the Republic of Ireland and a hard border

ran counter to everything that had been negotiated during the ending of the troubles the peace process in Northern Ireland so you had these, you had two things pulling directly opposite directions. Yes, exactly. And Theresa May's solution for this was actually to, in effect, keep the UK in the customs union, albeit not, you know, formally. But for some Conservatives, that was complete anathema. So you have Boris Johnson coming in and promising not to do that. And also promising, of course, that there would be no border between the rest of the UK and Northern Ireland in terms of trade, which was clearly nonsense. But it was nonsense that a lot of Conservative MPs wanted to believe at the time. It was the perfect storm of the parliamentary arithmetic. So no strong majority for any party.

And just a very, very difficult, divisive subject, meant that we were sort of locked in this terrible stalemate. How did it get resolved? Well, it got resolved by the Conservative Party getting rid of Theresa May, electing this kind of, in case of emergency, break-glass candidate, Boris Johnson. Boris Johnson, in some sense, he sort of dared the parliament to block Brexit. And then when it did, on the grounds that it wouldn't allow Boris Johnson to do a kind of no-deal Brexit, he managed to engineer a general election, at which point the Conservatives won a famous victory. And he was able to put forward a Brexit withdrawal agreement with the EU that had the

agreement of the EU, who by that time were pretty fed up and just wanted to resolve the issue. And of course, had the agreement of a newly resurgent Conservative Party, most of whom, you know, were grateful to Boris Johnson for winning them an 80 seat majority. grateful to Boris Johnson for winning them an 80-seat majority. kings and popes who were rarely the best of friends murder rebellions and crusades find out who we really were by subscribing to gone medieval from history hit wherever you get your podcasts um he did so by denying the existence of the border in the sea. I remember at drinks parties in Northern Ireland, he stood there saying, I promise you, as Her Majesty, as the First Lord of the Treasury, there will be no border in the RSC.

Of course, there was a border in the RSC. So there was quite a lot of things that needed sorting out. Boris Johnson did not, in some ways, did not deliver the ultimate Brexit. No, surprise, surprise. A lot of the promises he made couldn't actually be honoured. In the end, there did have to be this border between the rest of the UK and Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland was treated separately. So in effect, Northern Ireland gets the best of both worlds,

as some Conservative politicians have incredibly... Yeah, it's a Freudian mistake. ...actually praised it for, that right so they're they're sort of both in the the customs union not in the customs union in the single market not in the single market and the rest of britain has to cope with the fact that you know we've cut off our nose in some senses to spite our face and we have left our our biggest partner. And therefore, you know, our growth, at least according to most economists, you know, is going to suffer as a result in the long term as well as in the short term. And we still haven't yet executed all the provisions of our Brexit agreement,

as people will know about this recent, very recent furor about checking goods. That's right, because, you know, there are all sorts of frictions involved, you know, once you become a third country in the jargon. And, you know, we're not willing, because we realise that the, you know, the knock-on effects of that will be so bad for the British economy to actually institute all the kind of customs checks that should go on. In the end, we will probably have to, although there is some hope that, you know, were we to get a change of government at the beginning of July, that it can in some ways perhaps mitigate some of those frictions by pursuing what some people refer to as dynamic alignment. So, in other words, if the European Union makes changes in regulations on goods and services, that we make the same changes.

We will mysteriously decide to do the same thing. Yeah, yeah, strangely enough, yeah. But actually, most economists will tell you that unless we actually go as far as to join the customs union and perhaps even the single market, we simply can't get the benefits of membership by being outside. Yeah, correct. Where's the British public on this now, Tim?

Are people who wanted Brexit thrilled? And have people who didn't want it come to terms with it? Or have people discovered surprise, surprise that actually Brexit, it wasn't Brexit itself, it's just that it was the journey. It was the journey, not the destination. The people who are angry at the status quo are still angry, and Brexit hasn't helped. What's going on? Well, I mean, if you look at the opinion polls, you can see there's now a majority saying that Brexit was a mistake. You can certainly get a plurality, if not a majority of people to say that they would like Britain to rejoin the European Union. Now, that doesn't necessarily mean that these kind of leave and remain identities that people built up over the course of the kind

of Brexit shenanigans have gone away. Actually, they are still there. But what you have to say is that quite a lot of Brexiteers have left the electorate, not to put too fine a point on that, either via cremation or burial. And there are a whole bunch of people who have come into the electorate who didn't get a chance to vote because they were too young. And that demographic change has actually contributed quite a lot to the apparent change of heart that you see in opinion polls. That's not to say that there hasn't been any change of heart, but it's relatively marginal. Very few remainers have changed their mind, it has to be said. But there are a few leavers who have changed their mind, it has to be said, but there are a few leavers who

have changed their mind, partly because of the economic consequences of Brexit, and to some extent, but to a far lesser extent, because they see that actually it hasn't managed to see Britain control its borders. And some of those, I guess, will be voting for reform and Nigel Farage in this election. Are there new opportunities, a new constitutional relationship with Europe that in some ways has fulfilled the desires and aspirations of Brexiters? I think in the end, demography and demand will mean that there will be pressure built up on governments in the future to get a closer relationship with the European Union, either by rejoining completely, although I think some members with the European Union, either by rejoining completely,

although I think some members of the European Union will be a little bit wary about that. They don't want us in again as another awkward partner. But I think there are clearly other routes that we could pick. So if you look at the Norway model that was obviously encouraged by some Brexiteers at the time of the referendum, it is possible to be, you know, in a customs union and or a single market with the European Union without actually being a member. The downside being that, of course, you don't have as much say on the regulations or the legal system as you would have if you were a full-blown member. So I think, as you say, both the kind of gravity model of trade and in fact, you know,

concerns about the US abandoning its defence role and diplomatic role in Europe mean that we are likely to move closer to the European Union, not necessarily, you know, fully rejoining it, at least in the short term. But I think it's inevitable that we will end up being closer than we are at the moment. A strategic allied partner is surely where we're going to end up. I always thought that if Trump wins the next election and Putin clings on to power in Russia, the European army was a big boogeyman in the referendum campaign. People said there'll be a European army, you know.

And I believe that in 10 years after that referendum, in 2026, we might all there'll be a European army, you know. And I believe that in 10 years after that referendum, in 2026, we might all be screaming for a European army. Well, you're the military historian, not me, Dan. So maybe I'll defer to you on that one. I wouldn't, Tim. Okay, last question then. So we've rehearsed the ways in which the economy did suffer, that the checks on goods coming in and out

has been a bit of a drag on the economy. Is there any way, do you think it has had a positive impact on a measurable part of life in Britain? In a word, no. I mean, I wish I could come up with something, but, you know, I've racked my brains, just as obviously a lot of Conservative politicians have racked their brains, and just as a lot of Conservative-supporting politicians have racked their brains, and just as a lot of conservative supporting newspapers have racked their brains. But the only two things they seem to have come up with are something to do with alfresco dining, on the one hand. And to be honest, I've even forgotten the second one.

So, you know, it's very noticeable that in this election, the conservatives spent no time at all in crowing about Brexit or talking about the benefits of Brexit. And there's a good reason for that. There are none. On that bombshell, Tim, thank you very much for coming on the podcast. What's your latest book, Tim Bale? My latest book is The Conservative Party After Brexit, Turmoil and Transformation. But I'm also going to be writing one on the general election and we may have another i mean if the opinion polls are correct we may have another conservative leader so you're the expert in the conservative party so help me with the math here david david cameron's 2010 how many leaders are we going to end up with by the end of this calendar year do you think in the last so 2016 so 2024 so eight, we're going to end up with... Well, it'll be something like six, won't it, I think. Six and eight. And that is, I mean, that's a record.

I say this as someone, I'm now desperately checking the 1780s, but I'm pretty sure that's a record, isn't it? Yeah, I mean, you know, you might have to go back to the 18th century or maybe possibly the 19th because people died a lot more frequently in office then. Well yeah I was going to say none of those but none of those importantly none of

those are from death or illness so that that really is remarkable isn't it? No political death but not biological death. So plenty more for you to write about buddy. Absolutely. And actually okay well while I've got you here Tim in the UK at the moment we got a reform from a right-wing party for the first time in a long time our political system does not encourage minor parties and particularly not on the right not for a long time the Conservative Party oldest political party on earth do you think it can see off this challenge or does this does this feel like a like a moment for the Republican Party in America moment where actually it could become monopolized, taken over, annexed

by an outside force almost? Well, I mean, in some ways, I don't think it will be taken over by an outside force. I think it will be taken over from the inside. Whether Nigel Farage in the end sort of becomes part of that, I think will be an interesting thing to watch. I mean, I think the Conservative Party has enough, you know, radical right-wing populists within it to, you know, further the transformation I talk about in the book. So not unlike the Republicans, my confusing question. So not unlike the process of the Republican Party in the States. Yeah, I mean, I think in the same way that the Republican Party

has now become the MAGA party and the party of Trump, I think it's perfectly possible to imagine that the Conservative Party will become, you know, the party perhaps of Nigel Farage or perhaps of Kemi Badenoch. But I think, you know, there are sufficient numbers of populist radical right-wingers within the Conservative Party to move it even further in that direction. Thank you very much, Professor Tim Bale. you