Dan Snow's History Hit - The Anglo-Zulu War

Episode Date: January 22, 2020

Saul David - historian, broadcaster and author of several critically-acclaimed works of fiction and non-fiction - comes on the show to discuss the most brutal and controversial British imperial conflict of the 19th century: the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879.

Hello everyone, welcome to Dan Snow's History Hit. I am in South Africa, I've just climbed Table Mountain on the way to a special History Hit project that you're going to be hearing about soon. And I thought I'd rest up halfway through the journey with a little ascent of Table Mountain, a beautiful thing, looking down on the azure waters of the Atlantic, Robin Island, where Nelson Mandela was kept prisoner. The Castle of Good Hope, built by the Dutch. The fort now lying at the heart of Cape Town. What a historic city. Lying beneath me as I climbed up. This podcast does have something to do with South Africa because this podcast is a conversation with Saul David, Professor of Military History at the University of Buckingham, a best-selling author, legendary broadcaster, TV presenter. And we talked about the Zulu Wars, a book he wrote years ago, but a subject that has continued to define his career and gain implaudits. And we talked about

the remarkable Anglo-Zulu War that was raging this month in 1879. One of the most famous defeats and one of the most famous victories in British history, as you'll hear about coming up. This podcast will be broadcast on History Hit TV. It's the new digital history channel. You can go over there. You use the code POD6, P-O-D-6.

Very straightforward. You get an offer no one else has access to. Only podcast listeners have access to this offer. You use the code POD6. You get six weeks for free. You can watch our recent documentary on the streets of Birmingham with Carl Chin talking about the reality of the Peaky Blinders story,

who those men were, what they were really like. You can go on, you can watch anything, in fact. You can watch hundreds of hours documentary. If you use the code POD6, you get six weeks free. And between you and me, you can watch the whole thing in six weeks. I mean, you can sail across the Atlantic with Christopher Columbus in six weeks and discover the New World. You can invade Normandy in 1944

and decisively defeat the German armies in northwest France in six weeks. There's a lot that you can do in six weeks. You can do a lot of living in six weeks. So use the code POD6, get six weeks free of history hit. Enjoy it. You can watch Saul David, lots of other stuff. But before you do any of that, here is the man himself talking about the Anglo-Zulu war.

Enjoy. Saul David, Mr Zulu War, welcome. Why did Britain find itself fighting the Zulus in the 1870s? Good question, because officially the British government had no intention of fighting the Zulus. And the timing is important, 1879, towards the end of 1878, early 1879, which is where most of the tension in South Africa that leads to the start of the war is building up. And the pro-consul in South Africa is warning the British government that there may be trouble ahead. British government, in the meanwhile, is saying to him, whatever you do, we don't want a war in South Africa. Why? Because they're already fighting one in Afghanistan, which is broken out. And frankly, the Afghanistan war, which, of course, was fought chiefly to prevent Russian influence there, is, as far as we're concerned, in strategic terms, far more

important. So this relatively minor war against a warlike nation, but a nation that we didn't really see as a serious threat to us strategically in Southern Africa, was something the British government wanted to avoid. So you might ask the question, why did we fight it? Well, we fought it because the pro-consul out there, a man called Sir Bartle Frere, had been sent to South Africa with one job, which is to confederate the various British colonies that existed there, Natal and Cape Province, but also the Boer Republics, if he could. And they were going through the process of attempting to take over those Boer Republics. But also any native, any African, black African polities that might get in the way. Now, this didn't

specifically mean that Zulu land had to be taken over, but they had to be wary that it could cause a problem. But the exact timing, as I've already explained, was one that the British government were not interested in fighting a war there because they were already fighting in Afghanistan. But Bartle Frere had other intentions. And the reason he was able to get away with making his own decisions is because of this time gap that you had in the late 19th century between information coming from London and getting to South Africa. Three, four week journey for messages to get there, even by steamship. There was a telegraph part of the way, but it didn't go the whole way. So he was able to use this time gap really to ignore official instructions and to effectively

launch a war of aggression against the Zulus. And the Zulus have been sort of mythologized as this incredibly martial empire. How much of that is true? What was the nature of Zulu society? It was very militarized. A lot of it is true. They've been described as the Black Spartans, and I think that's pretty accurate, actually. It's interesting, the original Zulu tribe was only relatively small size towards the end of the 18th century. And I suppose, as a lot of people know, the key figure in the rise of the Zulu nation, key figure in the rise of the Zulu nation, which was really a question of dominating the tribes around them and subsuming them into this greater Zulu empire, I suppose you would call it, was Shaka, one of the early kings. And what he did is develop a new military system which completely

revolutionized warfare in Southern Africa. Prior to Shaka taking control of the Zulu nation, tribes would often fight each other in southern Africa, but rarely to the death, as it were. They would make a bit of a show. One or two people might be killed. One side would give in and the other side would take over. You'd take a few captives. But it was, I mean, I'm exaggerating a little bit, but it was relatively benign. This war of destruction that the Zulus became very adept at was the brainchild of Shaka. And he created a new method of fighting, not only new weapons, the short stabbing spear, the Asagai Ikla, Ikla as it was known, very bad pronunciation, I'm sure. But to use this short stabbing spear, you had to close with the enemy. And so he devised

tactics, the so-called horns of the buffalo, in which you would surround your enemy and annihilate them. And clearly, it's hard to see one. And yet the tactics are so similar, from literally down to the throwing of the spears at the beginning of the battle in the same way that the Romans would throw their javelins, to closing and using the short implement to annihilate the opponent. And that's pretty much what the Zulus became very good at. And as a result, they took over an enormous swathe of southern, southeast Africa. And what, in terms of their development as a state, are they in danger of competing with the European polities down there? Well, that was the perception. Interestingly enough, up until 1879, they'd pretty much been,

you know, peace with the Zulus. That wasn't to say that the Zulus were peaceful among themselves and other tribes in the region, but it was to say that they recognised that the British were an existential threat and they'd better keep on their side. So yes, there were one or two border incursions, which were exaggerated and used for the benefit of the British to justify, I suppose, the war. But probably if we're being honest, you'd have to say, was it likely that even a confederation of Southern Africa would have put up with such a dangerous, organised military force right on its border? Probably not in the long term,

but the decision to deal with the problem in 1879, when the Zulus had no intention of going to war with the British, was the decision taken by Basel Freire alone. So the war of aggression begins, a British force moves in, a little bit arrogant? Very arrogant. Arrogance, underestimation of the enemy, poor reconnaissance, an unwillingness to take even minor precautions. So what lies behind all of this? Well, very much a feeling that we had the edge over them in terms of technology, which was true. We had some very good firearms, breech-loading firearms at that time. But it's also a numbers game. And we weren't going to put anything like the same number of troops in the field.

So our best hope of defeating the Zulus was by getting them to fight on our terms. Lord Chelmsford, the British commander, makes one big mistake. He's fought a war just a year earlier against the Cape Frontier tribes. And it was really a question of trying to find these guys because they played ambush and run tactics. And it was really difficult to pin them down for some reason. And it's hard to know what that reason was, Dan, because he had a lot of intelligence from people who knew how the Zulus fought and explained to him what they were going to do. He thought it was going to be similar in Zululand. It's a question of finding them and bringing them to battle, not a question of making sure we don't get taken by surprise. And so when Chelmsford with the central column, his plan is to invade by multiple different directions. But

he originally thinks they're going to be five columns. In reality, only three cross the border. The plan is for all those three columns to meet at Alundi, the Zulu capital. And Chelmsford is pretty confident that the Zulus are not going to take on any of these columns before then. Why? We'll never know because Zulu tactics are aggressive. They can march an awful long distance in a relatively short period of time. They can go from one bit of the country to another and take you by surprise in very short order. And why Chelmsford had managed to convince himself that they won't fight and we need to winkle them out, we'll never know for sure. But undoubtedly, that was his conviction.

And so not only did he invade with an inadequate force of about 5,000 soldiers in his central column, he then makes the double mistake of splitting it and marching off with part of it on a wild goose chase based on some very faulty intelligence to try and track the Zulus down. Meanwhile, the Zulus are in a completely different place. That is the main Zulu MP, the main Zulu army. And it's got its eyes on the camp he's left behind with about 1,700 soldiers defending it at Islamwana. So we get the first cataclysmic battle of the war on the 22nd of January, 1879, just 11 days after Chelmsford's crossed the border. And it's one of the great defeats in British, but also European colonial history.

Yeah. You know, we could think of three or four that might compare. The retreat from Kabul in 1842, the Battle of Maywand in Afghanistan, which will take place a year later. Addoa, I suppose, the Italians against the Ethiopians towards the end of the century, and Islamwana. And that's it. This is a cataclysmic defeat because it was unexpected, because the Zulus take no prisoners, and pretty much everyone they caught in that camp is butchered because of the way they opened the belly so that the ritual disembowelment of their enemies, which was for spiritual reasons rather than an atrocity per se. But nevertheless, you can imagine when you come across a battlefield in which people have been butchered in that way, it's a pretty horrific

sight, albeit it took the British almost two or three months to get back to the battlefield. So terrified were they. And Chelmsford is quaking in his boots after this battle for two reasons. One, because he suddenly realises that the Zulus are a serious proposition. And two, because he's terrified he's going to lose his job. Is it a night attack they make on the British camp? It's very early in the morning. So they've hidden in a valley about four or five miles away the night before. They're waiting there. Can you imagine the discipline? 20,000 Zulu warriors hiding in this valley, this hidden valley. Now, if Chancellor had done his job, he'd have had scouts out all over the place and they would have noticed this,

but he didn't. Overconfidence. They had pickets out around the camp itself at Isamwana, but not that far away. There'd been some very dubious scouting done. As I've already mentioned, he was given faulty intelligence. so while that imp is hiding in that and and um staying overnight in that valley he actually leaves the camp that same night going on this wild goose chase he's already sent out an initial force he's told that that initial force has engaged some zulus actually it was only a relatively small force of zulus um to this day we're not certain the historians aren't certain, whether or not this was a deliberate fake by the Zulus. A lot of people believe it was. It might have been. The

sources are a little scanty on this. But what is not in doubt is that they managed to divide not only once but twice this army so that, as I've already said, 1,700 soldiers are waiting in the camp. And what's significant about those 1,700 soldiers is about 1,000 of them are British troops and the other 700 are a mixture of colonial troops and African auxiliaries. And some of the latter do not put up the toughest fight, probably not surprisingly, actually, because they're very poorly armed and they're up against their mortal enemies who are in enormous numbers. Land a Viking longship on island shores, scramble over the dunes of ancient Egypt, and avoid the Poisoner's Cup in Renaissance Florence. Each week on Echoes of History,

we uncover the epic stories that inspire Assassin's Creed. We're stepping into feudal Japan in our special series Chasing Shadows, where samurai warlords and shinobi spies teach us the tactics and skills needed not only to survive, but to conquer. Whether you're preparing for Assassin's Creed Shadows or fascinated by history and great stories, listen to Echoes of History, a Ubisoft podcast brought to you by History Hits. There are new episodes every week. And so it's a battle, but I mean, it's pretty quick, is it? Well, actually, no, there is a moment during the battle where they almost hold out. I think the key to the battle is the fact that the British send out their defensive position too far away from the camp.

What they should have done is laggard the camp, used the wagons. They had enormous numbers of wagons there. They should have laggard and used that as a fortress. But, of course, they're taken by surprise. They don't expect the attack. The attack takes them completely by surprise. And by that time, this is the other interesting thing about the battle. The tactics they use for the battle are tactics which have been prescribed by Chelmsford at

the beginning of the war, which is that you're to send your infantry a certain distance away from wherever your lager is, and you're to use the native auxiliaries and the mounted troops on the flanks. And that's exactly what they do. But the problem is, such as the sheer numbers of Zulus, not only encroaching and driving this force closer and closer to the camp, but also finally the horns of the buffalo meet behind, and therefore it's entirely encircled. But the Zulus are not using firearms. They have some firearms, not very effective. Their method is really to fire them once and throw them away. What's interesting is the follow-up battle which takes place that same day at Rourke's Drift. By that point, they've got a lot of the firearms off the British who they've killed. They kill almost

all 1,000 British soldiers at Islamwana to a man and take their weapons. And some of those Martini-Henry breech-loading rifles are used by the Zulus at Rorke's Drift. You mentioned Rorke's Drift. Irrelevant skirmish or great moment of imperial apotheosis? A little bit of both, but definitely more of the former. Rorke's Drift was very handy for Chelmsford and the British government and the Queen and anyone in authority back in Britain to diminish the impact of Islamwana. So you've got on the one hand this appalling disaster. You've got on the other hand this heroic last stand. Which one are we going to hear more about? Obviously the second one, because by bigging up the second one,

you somehow allow the consequences of the former battle, which should have been serious, not only for Chelmsford, who should have been sacked immediately, so incompetent had he been, but also arguably for the British government too, back home, arguably would have fallen if it hadn't been for Rorke's drift. So Rorke's drift is tremendously important. Chelmsford knows this immediately, and he's writing reports exaggerating the significance of Rorke's drift.

Rorke's drift has saved Natal. That was the argument. Complete nonsense. The Zulu king, Chichwayo, had given his MPs orders not to cross into Natal for the very good reason that he knew there would be serious consequences as a result of this. Natal was never in danger, but the MP commander, who was actually commanding the force at Islamwana that doesn't actually fight. So this is the reserve at Islamwana. He wants to get on the action. He's seen the destruction of the British army at Islamwana and he wants a piece of the action himself. He's told that there's this storehouse at Rorke's Drift. OK, it's across the Buffalo River, but only a few yards. There was never a danger to Natal proper. They want to capture this supply station, basically, and take away some booty.

So it's really a relatively insignificant skirmish. That doesn't diminish the extraordinary heroism of all the people involved. I mean, they were really up against it. About 140 soldiers at Rorke's Drift, about 25 of them wounded. So you've only got just over 100 fit soldiers against 3,000 to 4,000 Zulu warriors. But unlike Islamwana, they are in a very effective defensive position, which they've had time to construct because word has come back to them from some of the few survivors at Islamwana that Islamwana has fallen and the Zulus might be on their way. You mentioned the British government falling. I mean, it was a remarkable time in the 19th century because you had these crumbling imperial frontiers with people like Chelmsford taking it upon themselves to invade this territory. And then

the government in London dealing with the consequences, massive political fallout potentially, and governments falling as a result of this. Yes, and the context of the 19th century in terms of imperial escapades needs to be understood, which is that generally speaking, British governments did not like wars of aggression. They didn't even want to take extra territory for most of the century. What was generally going on is what was the same thing that was happening in South Africa for the Zulu War, which is that local pro-consuls and generals were making decisions on their own because they wanted military glory, because they wanted it, because they had a security problem they wanted to solve or perceived a security problem. It was very rarely policy at the centre that was encouraging these imperial escapades. So

you could argue that for the Israelis government to have fallen in 1879 would have been pretty unfair considering it didn't want the war in the first place. But nevertheless, the war had been fought in its name, and it had been fought incredibly badly. And then you've got Honours. Then, of course, the British flag has been disrespected, so you've got to go and make amends. Yeah, and Chelmsford's interesting because he's effectively protected by the Queen. He's a former aide-de-camp to Queen Victoria, and she insists that he stays in command for long enough to redeem his honour. And he does that by pretty much disobeying orders,

because a replacement is eventually sent out, Woolsey, who's one of the great British soldiers of the 19th century. Woolsey's desperate to get in on the action before it's over. And Chelmsford is desperate to end it before Woolsey arrives. And he manages that by fighting a pretty one-sided battle at Alundi, which is just outside the Zulu capital, in which he's created a defensive formation, learned all the lessons from Islam and it's pretty much a bloodbath, a one-sided battle. So he somehow redeems his honour, but certainly not in my eyes. But even as late as me researching and writing this book, you will see a lot of differing accounts about Chelmsford's responsibility and whether or not he got his just desserts. He was made Lieutenant Governor of the Tower of London. And he died playing billiards in his club at the age of 78 in 1905.

You know, none the worse, really, with his reputation. Lucky man. What about the Zulus? How hard is it to hear their voice? It is quite tricky, actually. A lot of the main players died in the war. There was no, of course, tradition of written record in the Zulu culture. It was all oral. But nevertheless, we do have a lot of accounts from some of the Zulus who did survive and fought in the war that were then later on written down by Europeans.

This is always a tricky process for a historian to have to decide how accurate they are. Are they telling people what they want to hear? Despite all of that, when you cross-reference what was going on and who was doing what to whom, you can conclude that there are a number of good accounts. There are a number of first-hand accounts of senior Zulu commanders during the Battle of Islamwana in particular, but also Rorke's Drift and the other battles. And so we do get a little bit of a sense of what the Zulus were trying to achieve and their actual physical experience of battle. I mean, there's some pretty gripping and grim accounts of the Zulus breaking into the camp and finishing off the remaining white soldiers. And they're pulling no punches in their descriptions

of what they do. And Zulu people after, are they annexed? Are they subjects for a Majesty Queen or is it a sort of a client state set up? It's complicated. What they initially try and do is not annex Zululand, but they break it up into separate chieftain ships, one of which they allow Chichwayo, who's originally taken captive and sent down to Cape Town, even visits Britain at one point and meets Queen Victoria. But Chichuayo goes back and takes control of one of these chieftain's ships. And this is never going to end well. And of course, they start fighting each other because they've really been set up by the British to do that.

And eventually, after a few years of more bloodshed, the whole thing is taken over by the British. So ultimately, it's annexed. That was not the original intention. But of course, they have to do it, I suppose, in the end, just to keep the peace. So David, thank you very much indeed. The book is Zulu. People are still buying it. How many years ago did you write it?

2004. So we're not far off. Well, it's coming up to 20 years now. You wrote it as a student. I wish hope you enjoyed the podcast just before you go bit of a favour to ask I totally understand

if you don't want to become a subscriber or pay me any cash money makes sense but if you could just do to me a favour it's for free. Go to iTunes or wherever you get your podcast. If you give it a five-star rating and give it an absolutely glowing review, purge yourself,

give it a glowing review. I'd really appreciate that. It's tough weather, the law of the jungle out there. And I need all the fire support I can get. So that will boost it up the charts. It's so tiresome. But if you could do it, I'd be very, very grateful. Thank you. it's so tiresome but if you could do it i'd be very very grateful thank you