Dan Snow's History Hit - The Bombing of Nagasaki

Episode Date: August 9, 2021

The second atomic strike on the city of Nagasaki is less well known than the one a few days earlier on Hiroshima, but was it more influential in forcing the Japanese to surrender? To find out who exactly ordered it and why Dan talked to Harvard's Frederik Logevall. He discusses the debates that rage between historians as to whether Nagasaki was necessary and how much pressure there was for a third bomb. On the anniversary of the strike, it is a conversation with powerful contemporary echoes.

Hi everybody, today is the 9th of August when this podcast is first broadcast and today in 1945 at 11.02 Japanese time, the second nuclear bomb ever deployed on the battlefield, thankfully the last so far, blew up above a tennis court in the north of the city of Nagasaki in Japan, very close to the Mitsubishi Steel Arms Works and the Nagasaki Arsenal. The bomb had been dropped 47 seconds earlier by a B-29 US bomber called Boxcar, which immediately turned away and made for Okinawa and arrived with sufficient fuel only for a single approach. Large parts of Nagasaki lay in ruins. 7 500 employees in the mitsubishi munitions plant something like 6 200 were killed outright estimates for deaths on the ground nagasaki

vary wildly from 20 000 to perhaps 80 000 and obviously to the deaths caused instantly by the bomb had to be added many over the following days and weeks from radiation poisoning, from collapsed buildings, fires, and other injuries sustained. The radius of total destruction was about one mile. Last year was the 75th anniversary of the Nagasaki and Hiroshima bombings, of course, and we got Fred Loggevald on the podcast. He's a good friend to Pod. He's been on several times. He's a Pulitzer Prize winner. He is a Swedish-American historian. He's based at Harvard University.

And he's written extensively about Kennedy, but also the decisions made towards the end of the Second World War and how those would impact the Cold War. This repeats that podcast on the anniversary of Nagasaki, talking about the lesser known of the two nuclear strikes in the Second World War and how it affected the outcome of that war and some

of the controversies around whether or not the bomb should have been even deployed in the first place. You can listen to other back episodes of this podcast if you become a subscriber to History Hit. You go to historyhit.tv. It's our digital history channel. We've got all the audio on there, all the back episodes of this podcast. We also have lots of TV documentaries, hundreds in fact, hundreds and hundreds of TV documentaries on there. It's a special TV channel just for history fans. It's the Netflix for history, folks. You're going to absolutely love it. Head over there now and get a month for free when you sign up, historyhit.tv. But in the meantime, everyone, enjoy this podcast with Fred Lagovale. Well, thank you so much for joining me.

It's a pleasure to be with you. How much do the military and civilian authorities in the US know about the damage that had been done to Hiroshima? What was the immediate after-action appraisal of Hiroshima? You know, it's a little bit unclear, I think, in the, or at least let's say that it was mixed in terms of the understanding of the damage done. And I think in particular, the civilians in Washington on the 6th of August, certainly, and even the 7th and the 8th of August, were in the dark. Maybe that's putting it a bit too strongly, but certainly didn't have a good handle on the amount of destruction caused. And I think that will ultimately contribute to a sense that one

should proceed with the second bombing. I think military authorities closer to the scene had a better grasp of things. But even they, my sense is that even they took the better part of a day or even two days to fully assess the scope of the damage. It's so interesting. People now assume an atomic bomb, a nuclear bomb is the most awesome decision that any prime minister or president or monarch can take. Back then, was there a tussle at what level that authorization should be granted? Did theater commanders sitting in the Pacific think, well, this is just another bomb? It's like any other kind of munitions we have. We don't need the president's or anyone else's permission to use this. Was there a little tug of war going on?

You know, there is surprisingly, I think, little tug of war. In fact, maybe one would say there isn't any at all. On the 25th of July, so this goes back, you know, 10 days or so, the administration had granted authority and Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, had signed off on the use of the weapon against Japanese targets. And then it was really a military decision at that point. So Truman had given his assent on the 25th of July. Stimson had done the same. And it's really Leslie Groves, the Lieutenant General who had been the head of the Manhattan Project and retained, to my mind, a surprising degree of autonomy and authority here, who then makes the decision. It's also worth noting, I think, that we know that the most senior members of the government, so here I'm talking about George Marshall, the army chief of staff, Henry Stimson,

talking about George Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, Truman himself, Dwight Eisenhower, had misgivings of a certain nature, stronger in some cases than others. And yet, obviously, they were not strong enough to cause them to say, now, wait a minute, is this something we want to be doing? That, I think, applies to the first bomb on Hiroshima, but even more so to the second bomb on Nagasaki. Nagasaki, I always think, is the overlooked bomb, and yet arguably is the one with the more strategic effect. I don't know. Is that the case? I think that it is. And of course, this is a bone of contention among historians, and perhaps will be for all time. but there is a very large question here about, and it's a counterfactual question, which I happen to believe have great

utility for historians. Certainly, I use them in the classroom all the time. I ask what-if questions. Would it have been the case that the Japanese would have surrendered without either bomb? I think the prevailing historical sentiment is that that's probably not the case, that the Japanese would have surrendered without either bomb. I think the prevailing historical sentiment is that that's probably not the case, that the hardliners were still very much in control. But maybe a more germane question and a sobering question is, was the second bomb necessary? Keep in mind that on August 6th, we have the first bomb on Hiroshima. On August 8th, the Soviets declare war, invade Manchuria, and it's on the 9th that this second bomb comes.

Is that remotely enough time for the Japanese, faced with the first bomb and then the Soviet entry, to make a decision about whether to surrender or keep going? That, I think, is a very large question. When we're looking at the targeting of Nagasaki, it seems to me, from what little I know, it was chance. It was about weather and it was about a list of targets, potentially. I mean, was there anything particular? And actually, the bomb wasn't even dropped on the centre of Nagasaki, was it? So it didn't seem to have the sort of incredible, well, the careful, the painstaking thought about where exactly that bomb should be targeted that you see with Hiroshima.

It was not considered to be the target. Kokura was going to be the target that morning. And in fact, the B-29 intended for that to be the target. Weather issues primarily caused them to shift. And Nagasaki became the target. But it was a kind of a chance. It had not been considered, certainly in the spring. It's in April and then in May when the first discussions about targets occur. And again, Groves is, I think, a key figure in all of this.

Nagasaki doesn't figure into the equation at all. For one thing, it had been subject to conventional bombing, and U.S. planners wanted to avoid places that had experienced a lot of conventional bombing because they wanted to be able to see how the damage differed with the nuclear bomb. Nagasaki also wasn't ideal in terms of its topography, in terms of its location, and so it was, relatively speaking, a kind of last-minute decision. You mentioned that U.S. civilian authorities had cleared the use of atomic weapons, but were they cc'd in the decision about which cities to hit in this second strike? They were not. And civilians really didn't factor into this decision at all. factor into this decision at all. Truman and the rest of the civilian leadership had signed off on the 25th of July, effectively ceding this authority. And I think there's a powerful argument that has been made by at least some historians, that if you had kept this decision under civilian control, that is to say the second bomb, where

to use it, whether to use it, and when to use it, some historians have suggested there's a very good chance that it would not have been used for some of the reasons we've already discussed, that they would have sensed or they were sensing that you have not given the Japanese enough time. The emperor is clearly beginning to rethink this. Maybe it's time for us now to throw in the towel, to surrender. And so the argument is that civilian control here would have made a critical difference. My own personal view is that that's correct. Based on my reading of the evidence, there was ample opportunity here,

even if the time was relatively short, for civilian leaders to intervene and say, no, we're going to hold off. We're going to see what happens in the coming days. It's only the 9th of August. We're shutting this down. Therefore, after Nagasaki, do the civilians have to rein in the military men? Were the military men planning a third bomb? Yeah, I mean, there wasn't a bomb available yet. I think the case is that by November, there were going to be nine or 10 bombs available, maybe 11, but they were certainly being produced as quickly as possible. But it's telling to me that I think it's on the 10th of August or maybe the 11th, Truman, the President of the United States, Truman himself

basically suspends presidential authorization for the use of more bombs because of concern about civilian casualties. So this speaks at least somewhat to my mind to the notion that Truman had misgivings. I think even before the use of the first bomb, he was more nervous than he wanted to let on about this and what the implications were. But the fact that so quickly, on the 10th or 11th of August, he basically says, from now on, there's going to be explicit, and I'm paraphrasing, but from now on, there's going to be explicit presidential authorization before we use more bombs. That says something important.

In this month of Dan Snow's history, we're talking about the atomic strike on the Japanese city of Nagasaki. More after this. Land a Viking longship on island shores. Scramble over the dunes of ancient Egypt and avoid the Poisoner's Cup in Renaissance Florence. Each week on Echoes of History, we uncover the epic stories that inspire Assassin's Creed. We're stepping into feudal Japan in our special series, Chasing Shadows,

where samurai warlords and shinobi spies teach us the tactics and skills needed not only to survive, but to conquer. Whether you're preparing for Assassin's Creed Shadows or fascinated by history and great stories, listen to Echoes of History, a Ubisoft podcast brought to you by History Hits. There are new episodes every week. And that's so fascinating because what was presumably a bit of an ad hoc decision by Truman has now become fundamental to nuclear deployment and strategy, I presume, in every nation to this day. I mean, there's nowhere in the world, I'm guessing, do army commanders have delegated authority to use nuclear strike, I'm guessing. I think that's exactly right. And it's a very important point. and i think you can date that norm and as you say i think it's to my

knowledge now uh universally uh the case i think you can date it from again a day or two after the nagasaki bombing and truman's directive and maybe I'm speculating here, but maybe it indicates that he and Stimson and Marshall and other principal lieutenants grasped right away that if the first bomb was justified, after all, it's a military weapon, the Japanese are not surrendering, we're going to use it. I think already, right away, he is wondering about Nagasaki and what they have just done. And then, of course, we get to the Korean War, the anniversary of which is this summer as well, in 1915. You've got MacArthur kind of wondering whether he should be allowed to use nuclear bombs without that kind of explicit presidential

approval. So this is such an important period of five years. I think it's a really good point. And I also think when we get to Indochina, which is, I've done a lot of my research and writing to this point on Vietnam. And we know that in the spring of 1954, when the French are about to lose at Dien Bien Phu, there is at least some contingency planning on the American side for the use of tactical nuclear weapons to try to save the French position. So they would be used in that case against Viet Minh positions. And of course, didn't happen. And I think Eisenhower, president at the time, was never that close to using those tactical nuclear weapons. But the point you're making is exactly right. With respect to Korea, and periodically later in Vietnam,

there was at least some thought given to use. Now talk to me, the aftermath of Nagasaki, does that sharpen, does that increase to the point of irresistibility, the pressure on the emperor to surrender? Yeah, I think it does. Here again, broad, maybe that's not the right word, deep historical debate over the years that I think is still ongoing. And you have excellent historians debating this issue. When is it that the emperor decides that there's no option now but for Japan to surrender? If the Americans will agree to keep the position of emperor, then we can proceed, we must proceed, etc. And I think it's still a live debate.

There are those historians who say that it's the Soviet entry on August 8th that is really what drives the Japanese to their decision. Others will say, no, I think it's actually the second bomb that is necessary for this, that neither the first bomb on Hiroshima nor the Soviet entry was by themselves sufficient, so that you still see on the 8th of August, according to this interpretation, hardliners in Tokyo, amazing as it may seem, saying, you know, we're going to get better terms if we have one final decisive military victory somewhere, then we can get better terms. In other words, they may be agreeing that some sort of negotiation is imperative, but now is not the right time.

And it requires the second bomb for that to happen. You know, I don't know where I come down on this. I guess I've already indicated my skepticism about the use of the second bomb, which I guess means that I'm inclined to say that if you hold off and you see what happens within Japanese decision making on the 9th, the 10th, the 11th, I'm guessing, based on what I've seen at least in terms of the evidence, and we have more Japanese evidence than we used to have, that you're going to get the same outcome in relatively short order, meaning that that bomb was unnecessary. Did Truman and Marshall and any of the men involved with that decision, did they ever come to show any doubt later in life, do you think? show any doubt later in life, do you think? You know, I think they were fairly careful about this. And I think they probably felt, as maybe anybody would, I don't mean to condemn them for

this, but I think they were reluctant to say very much in later life. I think that it's clear that Stimson, again, the Secretary of War, was plagued by afterthoughts and to some extent, maybe even regrets about what he had helped to bring about. I think Truman felt that as well. Truman insisted with just a little bit too much emphasis that the bombs, both of them, were necessary to forestall an American invasion of the Japanese home islands, which might have cost half a million American lives or something of that nature. I suspect he probably knew that that was not going to be required. And then Eisenhower, we know, we have some pretty recent evidence, as soon as a couple of weeks after the, or maybe a month after the Nagasaki bombing, Eisenhower said at a social function that he wished that the war

had been ended without the use of the bombs. And so I think there are these misgivings, certainly after the fact, and a recognition on the part of the senior officials that this was a terrible, terrible weapon that had been used not just once but twice. We've briefly touched on this, but what were some of the other, in terms of protocols, you mentioned the terrible weapon. Quite early on, what were some of the safeguards put in place? mentioned the terrible weapon quite early on what was some of the safeguards put in place was there an understanding that this this had given mankind a new level of destructive capability um is is it treated in the same perhaps cavalier way that you might treat the development of a new a new rocket system or a new tank or or quite quickly do you see them building what we've some of us come you

know people sort of call the sort of nuclear monarchy you know like this this all of the protocol and and uh systems around the use of nuclear weapons yeah i you know i'm not quite clear dan on when these measures come into uh into place uh and um i i can say this pretty early on as as we said, as early as August 10th or 11th, Truman, I think, came to the realization that from now on, we are going to have explicit authority for any bomb that we use against the Japanese. This is three or four days before word comes down of the Japanese surrender. So this is when he's thinking this thing might go on for more weeks, maybe even more months. And I think that sets in motion,

maybe this is all I can tell you in response to this question, it sets in motion an imperative that I think is going to be held by the United States and by future nuclear powers, the United States and by future nuclear powers, including the Soviets beginning in 1949, that you're going to have lots of safeguards and that this is a weapon that really cannot be used at all lightly. But in terms of the particular steps and the particular mechanisms that are put in place, I'm not sure exactly when those come in. Just on a last question, you mentioned the Soviets. How important do you think the Soviets were as an audience for dropping these bombs? Do you think American planners were focused on the defeat of Japan, or was there an element of sending a message to the Soviets? I think there's no question there was also an element of sending a message. You know,

there's a phrase for this, Dan, as you may know, called atomic diplomacy. And for decades now, historians have debated how important was atomic diplomacy. What the phrase basically means is that, as you say, a key audience here was always the Soviet Union and Stalin. And that Truman at Potsdam, and even before he went to Potsdam, he had just become president in April. So he was brand new at this. He was a neophyte. FDR had not actually shared much with him at all about foreign policy, much less the Manhattan Project. We know that Truman and some of the people around him saw here an opportunity to

send a message to the Soviet Union. We already have, I think, the emergence of what will later become the Cold War. And no question in my mind that this is at the very least a kind of bonus. There are some historians who go further and who say that, in effect, absent the emerging Soviet threat, the United States would have been slower to use even one bomb, never mind both of them. I'm not sure I'm willing to go that far, but this kind of geopolitical motivation for the use of the bomb, looking in particular at Stalin, it's definitely part of the equation. Somewhere in the causal hierarchy for using the two bombs is the Soviet dimension. Well, thank you so much for coming on and talking about those events 75 years ago. I'm very excited

you're going to come back on the podcast soon in the fall because you've just written a new book tell everyone what it's called yeah it's called um jfk it's a it's it's um in the the american uh subtitle is coming of age uh in the american century i think the british edition penguin viking is jfk volume one short and sweet and uh would love i really look forward to being on with you about it. It's, as they say, a life and times biography. And in particular, what I try to do is to contextualize the rise of this extraordinary American political figure. And I argue for the importance, among other things, of World War II. and the period in which his father is ambassador to Britain and is an appeaser, strong supporter of Neville Chamberlain. And I show how little by little Jack Kennedy separates from his father on how to respond to the totalitarian threat

and how to respond to both Nazi Germany and Japan. And then I take the story from there. Well, I can't wait. It's going to be great. So thank you for talking today. And I look forward to talking next time as well. All the very best. My pleasure. Thanks for having me on. history, our songs, this part of the history of our country, all were gone and finished. Thanks, folks, for listening to this episode of Dan Snow's History. As I say all the time, I love doing these podcasts. They are the best thing I do professionally. I feel very lucky to have you listening to them. If you fancied giving them a rating review, obviously the best rating review possible would be ideal. It makes a big difference to us. I know it's a pain, but we'd

really, really be grateful. And if you want to listen to the other podcasts in our ever increasing stable, don't forget we've got Susanna Lipscomb with Not Just the Tudors, that's flying high in the charts. We've got our Medieval podcast, Gone Medieval, the brilliant Matt Lewis and Kat Jarman. We've got The Ancients with our very own Tristan Hughes. And we've got Warfare as well, dealing with all things military. Please go and check those out. Ready to get your pods.