Dan Snow's History Hit - The Commanders: Rommel

Episode Date: March 2, 2026

In the sands of North Africa, Erwin Rommel became a battlefield legend. His bold manoeuvres and audacious tactics captured the imagination of friend and foe alike. But how did he become that commander? Does he deserve his reputation for tactical brilliance, and how should we think about his legacy today?This is the first episode of our "Commanders" series, where we dig into the lives and decisions of five legendary WWII commanders. To guide us through the story of Rommel, we're joined by Saul David, historian and author of "Tunisgrad: Victory in Africa".Produced by James Hickmann and edited by Dougal Patmore.Dan Snow's History Hit is now available on YouTube! Check it out at: https://www.youtube.com/@DSHHPodcastSign up to History Hit for hundreds of hours of original documentaries, with a new release every week and ad-free podcasts. Sign up at https://www.historyhit.com/subscribe.You can also email the podcast directly at [e-mail]. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

It is the early hours of the 24th of October 1917. A small detachment of an elite German mountain battalion waits for first light to creep over the ridges along the Isonzo River. Fog lies thick in the valley, clinging to the water and muting sound and vision. The faint smell of poison gas lingers in the air. A platoon commander gives hushed orders and reassures his men as they wait for the battle that's to come.

They can hear the sound of artillery ships. screaming overhead. The young platoon commander is called Irwin Rommel, a hardy young officer, who has already earned himself a reputation for daring on the Western Front. Now he finds himself in the rugged mountains of northeastern Italy, facing the Italian army along the infamous Izonso Front. Eleven times the Italians have tried dislodge Germany's allies,

the Austro-Hungarians, and 11 times. They have failed. Hundreds of thousands have died in the attempt. The Italian front is an important reminder that the trenches of France and Belgium certainly did not have the monopoly on futile slaughter in the First World War. Here, like on the Western Front,

the two sides are dug in along trench lines facing each other. But here, those lines run along the ridges of towering mountains. The weather is even worse than it is. in Flanders. Fighting has deteriorated into a brutal, attritional slog. For many, it's a struggle to simply survive. Both sides have found it impossible to dislodge one another, and the casualty lists grow and grow. But now this young German platoon commander, Romel, and his stormtroopers, are going to try something different. They specialize in a new kind of fighting.

Not the massed assaults that we tend to think of until this point of the First World War, but targeted infiltration, small, motivated units, moving fast, bypassing strongpoints and attacking from behind, something perhaps more akin to modern day special forces than the regimented over-the-top charges of 1914-15. These Strosstruper, stormtroopers,

have already proved their worth against Germany's in places like France, Romania, and now the German High Command has sent them to break the stalemate here and relieve their beleaguered Austro-Hungarian allies. When the artillery bombardment finishes, no time is wasted. Rommel's men are already climbing, slipping through gaps in the chaotic, battered Italian front line. Resistance is uneven. Some units defend stoutly, they even try to counterattack towards the sound of gunfire. wait for orders that will never arrive. Communication breaks down as messengers are killed and telephone

wires cut. In several areas, Italian commanders are uncertain whether they're being attacked from the front or the rear. Romel thrives in this environment, in this confusion. By daylight, his platoon is well behind the Italian forward positions. There, Romual does not wait for orders. This will become something of a trademark vehicle. With a handful of men, he strikes an isolated outposts, Overwhelming them with rifle fire, flamethrowers and grenades. He comes from unexpected directions. He uses the terrain to his advantage. Entire units surrender to his comparatively tiny force.

He seizes a key position at Kolarvara Bridge, taking an entire regiment. Rather than lose his momentum, Rommel leaves guards with the prisoners and pushes on. Ahead rises Mount Matajer, snow-dusted, steep. He doesn't have any explicit orders to take it, but Romual understands instinctively its importance. If the Germans take Matajja, they can force the complete collapse of this stretch of Italian defences. For two days, he and his men advance almost continuously. Climbing, flanking, bluffing. They eat little, they sleep less.

Italian units surrender in batches, sometimes without firing a shot, convinced that a much larger force has surrounded them and cut them off. By the 27th, Matajer has fallen. Romual's small force has captured over 9,000 Italian prisoners and dozens of guns. He's lost only a handful of men himself, mostly wounded. He would late describe his actions in precise technical language he would obsess over angles of fire and timings and equipment, but this battle at Caporetto was much more than just a technical achievement for Romual. It changed his life. It filled him with conviction.

He was now certain that audacity, speed and psychological shock could negate the overwhelming firepower of this industrial age. He could win spectacular victories in the attritional age of trench warfare. On the ridges of the Azonzo Valley, the myth of Irwin Rommel had begun to take shape. In the long and contested history of the Second World War, few German commanders, I think, have inspired as much fascination and debate and discussion as field-martial Irwin Rommel.

Tis admirers, he was always the desert fox. He was brilliant and he was daring, and he was relatively chivalrous. He fought with speed and imagination, always against formidable odds. To his critics, well, he was a good tactician, but he was elevated far beyond his strategic abilities. He was a vital cog in the monstrous Nazi war machine, but when his reputation has been washed, it's been burnished by myth and propaganda and post-war necessity.

So who really was Irwin Rommel? How did his life and experiences shape his command style, and how should we judge his legacy? Just how good was he? This is the first episode in our Commanders series, where we dig into the lives and decisions of five legendary World War II. two commanders. We're going to cut through the myth. We're going to really look at what shaped

their styles of command, what they did right, what they did wrong. From daring gambles to meticulous planning, we're going to ask whether victories were earned through brilliance, calculation, or luck? And indeed, we'll be asking the bigger questions, do their reputations hold up to scrutiny at all, while there are any turkeys among them? We'll be releasing a new episode every Monday, so make sure you hit follow and check back in for those. For now, I'm very pleased to say that joining us to kick-start this series and dig into Rommel is a great friend the podcast, Saul David, is a broadcaster, historian, author most recently of the fantastic of Tunis Grad victory in Africa. Let's get going. Owen Rommel was born in 1891 in the town of

Heidenheim in southern Germany. Part of what was known as the Kingdom of Wurttemberg. Now we have to bear in mind that Germany around this time had only been in existence for. a very brief period. It wasn't really a kind of uniform nation state in the modern sense. It was more a sort of federal empire. It was 20 years old and it had been made up of a patchwork of monarchies and city-states of very different histories. And Vurttemberg sat firmly within that structure. So each state like Vurttemberg had its own court and bureaucracy. And when Rommel was born, he was technically a subject of the king of Vurttemberg as well as the citizen of this new German Empire. Now, Rommel did not come from traditional military aristocracy, the sort of Prussian

Juncker's that dominates the German officer corps at this time. His upbringing was solidly middle class. His mother came from very mild nobility. His dad was a schoolteacher. Even so, at the age of 18, Rommel was able to sign up for officer training. Now, you might be forgiven for thinking that in this deeply militarized empire and steeped in the traditions, the hierarchy of this Prussian military, that his sort of unassuming background might be a problem, but it was to prove less of an issue than we might think. His soul to tell us about it. I think there's a bit of a myth that the only people,

even in the Prussian army, were aristocrats. A big chunk of them were, and an even bigger chunk in the cord elite, and that was the famous general staff. But in reality, the German army for a long time, or German armies, by the way, putting it down for a long time, had had middle-class officers. It had to, you know, the demographics insisted that would be the case. And also there were lots of

technical arms like the artillery, the engineers, eventually we're going to get armor, not quite yet, pre First World War. And as a result of all of that, you needed people with education. They didn't just typically have to come from an aristocratic background. And so people like Rommel were, and not least because Rommel did have on his mother's side a bit of minor nobility, people like Rommel were fairly typical in the Vertonberg army at that type. It's one thing getting a commission, it's another being an outstanding officer. That's the big question, Mark, that's going to be placed against anyone, including Rommel. So he ends up his good old infantry, though.

Poor bloody infantry. Apparently, he's very good of mathematics, but he wasn't outstanding as a student academically. And also, you know, as we've already discussed, he didn't come from the absolute top draw and therefore wasn't able to choose where he was going to go. He went into the poor bloody infantry, the Verteberg infantry. But, you know, this was good grounding for him, frankly, Dan, because if you can prove to be an outstanding junior officer in the infantry, particularly in combat, that's really going to stand you in good step. In 1912, Rommel completed officer training. He was commissioned to the 124th Vertemberg Infantry Regiment.

So look, let's take a step back here, look at the broader picture of Europe. As you know, 1912 is all about to happen. So the German Empire found in 1871, it had a lot of catching up to do. It was surrounded by great empires. Britain had begun industrialisation decades before, and it now ruled over the largest empire on the planet. Germany's ancestral foe, France, was expanding rapidly on the global stage, big empire in North Africa, Southeast Asia elsewhere, even if it did face some issues at home. Russia to the east controlled giant swathes of territory and could bring to bear massive resources. So by the 1890s, the leaders of Germany had determined that they needed rapid industrialisation and they need to expand their military, not only to survive, surrounded

as they thought they were by enemies, but to buy German membership of this great power club. Germany wanted to be a player. It would pursue a policy of Weltpolitik, world policy. It wanted to become an imperial superpower. It had great advantages. It had, coal, had iron, German industry exploded, the steel mills of the Ruhr and the Zah valleys, churned out vast quantities of steel, and railways were carved across the empire, transport raw materials and goods, and brilliant universities, trained chemists and engineers and physicists who would work hand in hand with industry. At the same time, that industrial might was harnessed to further the military.

Hardware was pumped out. Fantastic state-of-the-art battleships, artillery pieces, but also things like belt buckles for infantry. All able-bodied men were required to serve in the Imperial German army. So that means that Germany could mobilize millions of men with military experience at short notice if there was war. Those same railways that they'd built to transport industrial goods could also rapidly move troops across the empire. And that gave Germany a great advantage. It could move troops from land frontier to land frontier very quickly. The German general staff became masters of logistics. They dominated train timetables and they planned all sorts of war scenarios. War plans of incredible details were drawn up in anticipation of a future conflict.

One thing this new Germany is particularly proud of was its Navy. That would really be a token of its status on the world stage. Now, you only have to look at a map to see that Germany didn't need a cutting-edge navy to defend itself against France and Russia. But they still wanted the Navy because this is an era in which global trade, colonial influence, diplomatic prestige, well, that's all inextricably linked to sea power. The German Emperor, Wilhelm, had always been jealous of his British first cousin. King Emperor George V, who presided over the most powerful navy on the planet. The Royal Navy had allowed the British Empire to project power to the furthest reaches of the planet. And the theory went that if Germany could build a fleet strong enough to challenge the raw navy,

then Britain might be scared of Germany. It would avoid confrontation, or it would treat Germany with respect as an equal. So that's the picture, really, by the time Owen Rommel joins the Wurtenberg infantry in 1912. Germany is a massive continental empire. It's got an extraordinary military machine that seems to be permanently poised for war. It's got a fleet out there in the North Sea and the Baltic that's giving the British nightmares. And just two years later, in 1914, all that machinery roared into motion. For a young ambitious officer, being shaped by the martial culture of the German Empire,

war couldn't have come at a more perfect time. This was a real opportunity, and it's fascinating the speed with which he grasped it with both hands. I think one thing you have to say about him, physically he wasn't huge, Dan. He's a relatively small, relatively slight bill, but he's very hardy. He's tough and he's incredibly brave. He always had been from a young boy getting into little tussles with schoolmates. He would never allow, you know, someone who appeared to be physically bigger to get the better of him. And that was a lesson he absolutely brought to his career as a young soldier. As a young platoon commander, if he saw a problem immediately ahead, he went straight for it

personally. You know, he didn't send his men ahead of him. He actually would go for it himself. I mean, I suppose the initial encounter right at the beginning of the First World War, this is August 1914. When he first comes into contact with the enemy, French troops, he's leading a scouting troop ahead. There are only three guys with him. And they come across a group of French soldiers who aren't actually expecting them. They take them by surprise.

And instead of calling the rest of his platoon forward, he goes straight for them, orders the three guys with him to open fire. And they take a number of them prisoner. And that is just absolutely typical rummel. He's not going to wait for support. He is going to take an opportunity, and he is going to act very aggressively in any situation he finds himself in. Now, Saul, a lot of paper has been, a lot of ink has been spilled,

a lot of blood has been shed by historians like you on this subject of decision-making in the German army compared to other armies in World War I. Was he encouraged to do that? You know, are these young, well-trained, highly motivated, physically fit, young lieutenants, being allowed to make decisions, perhaps given more authority, more decision-making than their equivalence in other combatant nations at this point? Definitely. Comparatively speaking, there we have to say, Dan, you can absolutely overdo the point. And I'll give you an illustration when he does overdo it. And there were many

instances, actually, and we'll see this later on in his career as he climbs the ranks. And of course, he has more men under his command, where he will go off, you know, like a bullet of gate without necessarily informing superiors. And there's one classic example of that in early nine. when he is effectively ordered to take his troops forward in an attack that is not intended to be pressed particularly firmly. He sees an opportunity, he breaks into the first kind of bit of the defences and just keeps going. This again is against the French and finds himself in a position where he's way behind enemy lines, but with only a relatively small number of troops with him. Now, what he was hoping is his superiors, the other company commanders, the other people in his battalion

are going to see the situation he's in, and they're going to come and support him. Their argument is he's gone out on a limb, and it's up to him to extricate himself, which he does incredibly effectively, partly by being aggressive initially and then by pulling back and getting all his men back. He's very disappointed at the way everyone else has behaved within the battalion. They think he's really gone out on a limb and has put him and his men under threat. So you can see in that one example, Dan, that there were limits to younger officers and certainly NCO. There was a tradition even in the Imperial German army of them using a certain amount of initiative, but you could take that too far.

And basically, driving this wedge deep into the enemy line without support was perceived by his superiors as being a little bit irresponsible. Even if his bravado got him into hot water with his superiors, in the trench of the Western Front, Rommel built himself a reputation for boldness, initiative and courage. He led from the front. He exposed himself to danger alongside his troops. he'd demonstrate an instinctive grasp of manoeuvre warfare, even in those trenches, try and outflank your enemy, try and exploit surprise, press attacks relentlessly. By 1915, he had the Iron Cross.

He'd earned that medal, both first and second class, I should say, and he was made a company commander in an elite new unit that specialised in mountain warfare, the Alpine Corps. And I think we can say for certain is that Romwell cared about his men. Casualty's always going to be inevitable, but his operating principle was that the more certain, the more bold you are in your military actions, the fewer casualties you'll take. And during some larger scale operations in 1917, he would test this strategy to its limits. In 1917, Italy was an especially bad shape. Since 1915, the Italians had joined the Entente,

the Allies, Britain and France and others, and its army had launched 11 offensives against the Austro-Hungarians along the Asso River. These battles gained little ground and cost enormous numbers alive. I mean, if you think the Western Front was bad. Honestly, these other fronts, I think actually they're worse. Over 700,000 combined casualties by most estimates for a total advance of just a few kilometres. Morale was fragile, units were depleted and overextended. Leadership was sort of rigid and disconnected from reality at the front. Now, many of you will be familiar with the trench warfare in France and Belgium. And this is similar, but worse in a way. Imagine trench warfare, but among mountain peaks at altitude, the end.

Facing is particularly exhausting. Extreme weather rolls down on you in seconds to blind or freeze you. Shell blasts and thousands of jagged shards of rock careening into human flesh. The Esso Front was just a nightmare, even by the stands of the First World War. And the Austro-Hungarians were also desperate and overstretch, and they asked Germany for help. And Berlin agreed, but with conditions. Instead of just maintaining that grinding slog, the Germans wanted a decisive blow, a new kind of attack, Fast, ruthless. Caporetto was chosen as the weak point. Their plan relied on infiltration. So rather these mass infantry assaults, you'll be familiar, they thought about deploying

specially trained mountain units that would slip through weak points and push deep into the enemy rear, causing confusion and panic and eventually collapse. Now this is Rommel's signature. This is in his wheelhouse. That offensive began on October 24th, 1917. German and Austro-Hungarian forces struck, Under cover of fog, they use poison gas. Instead of just taking on Italian strong points, Romel went straight, he used his playbook. He sort of ignored really how things were unconventionally. He advanced wherever resistance was weakest.

He scaled steep slopes the Italians believed they were impassable. He split his force into small groups. He took advantage of the Italian's rigid command structure, which meant that when Italian units were cut off and outflank, they often just surrendered because they weren't receiving instructions anymore. And they didn't realize how many men had actually surrounded them. it might only be a handful. And Rommel never stopped to consolidate.

He just kept moving and moving and moving. His most famous action came at Mount Matajor, a dominant peak overlooking the Italian rear. With fewer than 200 men, Romel advanced for hours through broken terrain, bypassing enemy positions, striking for unexpected directions. By the time the Italian defenders realized the threat,

Romual's troops were already behind them. And over the course of the day, Italians just became completely demoralized. The enemy's behind you, you assume that the situation has collapsed. Entire units surrendered. Some estimates, but the total figure of captured Italians as high as 9,000 with some 80-odd artillery pieces, guns taken to boot.

By contrast, Rommel's forces probably took a couple dozen casualties, dead and wounded at most. It's astonishing. And here's that principle on full display. Act swiftly, violently, decisively, act spontaneously, and your men will be better off for it. For his efforts, Rommel was awarded Germany's second highest honor, Paula Merite or the Blue Max. But with Rommel, you always have to check yourself and ensure you're not straying into myth.

The truth is that those achievements were about circumstances, they were about Italian weakness as well as his own brilliance. So the lessons that he took from the first world were I think possibly they might hinder him as much as help him when he took on a different kind of foe, like the famous fighting British general, Bernard, Monty, Montgomery. Here's Saul again. What's interesting about Rommel is that in the First World War, I think he was very fortunate in the theaters he fought in. And you could argue the same thing in the Second World War. So he fights in the mountains a lot, and there are fewer defenders. It's easier to hide in the folds of ground.

I mean, if you're thinking about the Western Front with these two massively entrenched with a lot of artillery support facing each other, that's where Monty gets most of the experience. And that's where Monty learns that firepower is everything. That's not to say that Romel doesn't consider firepower important. He does, but he considers important in as far as you bring fire to bear on a particular point and then you infiltrate. So those lessons that he's learned in the First World War, in the nature of the fighting that he was involved in, particularly in the mountains, he is going to bring into practice in the

Second World War. He's going to bring them into practice both as an armoured commander, but also when he actually gets into the desert. So in 1918, as you know, the First World War came to an end, Germany lost, for those who you don't know. I'll spay the gory details, but from 1918 onwards, Germany went through a very painful period of upheaval. The economy would collapse, unemployment run rampant, militias roamed the streets, coups took place, multiple coups, and this chaos would set the stage for the next global conflict. Most importantly for our story, the German army, the Reichs Fair, was drastically reduced in size. Rommel, like many officers, was forced to accept what he felt was an unjust and humiliating defeat.

Over the next few years, he would have to adapt from the lofty heights of mountaintop victories to the monotonous slog of military life in a much smaller army during peacetime. I think the simple fact that he's been selected as one of the 100,000 members of the Reichsphere, remember at the end of the First World War, Germany was forced to reduce its armed forces

to just 100,000 strong for the army. And that meant that an army that had been millions at the end of the First World War all of a sudden had to shrink to this tiny size. And they were very choosy about who they selected as their officers in particular for this reduced diamond. He was one of the chosen people. But inevitably, during this peacetime period, it took a long time for him to get promotion. I mean, by 1931, he's finally promoted major, and he's already 40. So we love to think of this Vundekindich. You know, he'd done extraordinary things in the First World War, but there's a relatively slow process of,

of promotion and sort of getting on in his career, because that was the nature of the interwar military. Now, things are going to change after Hitler takes power, of course, when the German armed forces gets expanded exponentially. But up until that point, it's relatively tough sledding for him. And, you know, he gets some experiences in his structure in infantry tactics. He eventually gets promoted to lieutenant colonel in charge of this Yeager battalion in about 1934, but it's been a slow gradual process up until then, and he hasn't really had an opportunity to put a lot of these principles which he has learned in the First World War yet into practice. In January 1933, the leader of the Nazi Party, Adolf Hitler, became Chancellor of Germany.

For many Germans, they felt that they had been disadvantaged by the end of the First World War, by the Treaty of Versailles. They thought about the turmoil that had followed, and they believed that the Nazi party offered something powerful. National revival. There'd be economic recovery. There'd be a return of national pride. There'd be strong leadership. And massive, state-funded public works rolled out. Unemployment was reduced. And it was further reduced by a rapid program of rearmament. Romel, a career army officer, World War I veteran. He was not immune to that appeal. In 1937 he published a very interesting book called Infantry Attacks. I read at university and it's great. And it's a detailed study of his First World War experiences, especially the infiltration tactics he had mastered at Caporetto.

And the book was significant. It attracted lots of attention from military thinkers around the world. But most importantly, it put him in direct contact with Adolf Hitler. Hitler admired bold, aggressive commanders, men who embodied speed and surprise and offensive spirit and doing things unusually. And Rommel's style fit that image perfectly. I wouldn't be at all surprised if Hitler secretly envied Romel for so completely embodying his image of a modern German battlefield commander. It's something that Hitler would love to have been seen as. Romul, in turn, was impressed by Hitler's apparent political boldness,

Germany's recovery, and like many officers, he just appreciated the restoration of military spending, of prestige. He liked the fact the army was growing, more opportunities for him. And it seemed to eradicate some of the memory of, Germany's defeat, which was a source of frustration, sadness, embarrassment for him. He's a great fan of Hitler's. He's not alone in that, of course. He has a very vaunted reputation from the First World War. But also, he's well known, even in the 1930s in command of his Yeager battalion, as a very aggressive commander, a man, he drills his troops relentlessly.

A man who is not interested in admin per se, he's perceived to be a man of action. At the same time, he's a admirer of Hitler, because like many officers of that time, there was a sense that Germany had been stabbed in the back at the end of the First World War, whether that myth was true or not. They certainly believed it. Germany hadn't been utterly defeated on the field, was so the argument. Therefore, other elements, the socialists in Rommel's mind, Hitler, of course, you know, conflated the socialist with a Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy. But nevertheless, the idea that a leader would come in who would rejuvenate the army, would make Germany great again, would carry out a series of bloodline,

conquest, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Anschlis with Austria, even, and this did make people nervous, it's true, even the deal that was done to get the Sudetenland in the end of 1938. And at this point, he'd already come to Hitler's attention. He was actually working as an instructor at the War Academy in Potsdam in Berlin. Hitler was aware of him. He'd met him the year before, and he was given what was considered to be quite a prestigious post, which was a posting from the war ministry attached to the Hitler Youth Organization. Now, he didn't last long in that position, but he was given command of the Fuhrer Escort Battalion, both when Hitler went into the Sudaten land, with all the cheering German Sadatans in the end of 1938, and also in

1939, when he enters Prague after the bloodless capture of the rest of Czechoslovakia. So for those two moments, you could see that there was favour from Hitler, but also from Rommel. There was a sense of Hitler is a man of destiny, leading Germany to greatness, and at that point, he was all in as a supporter. As a mutual respect grew between the two men, Rommel increasingly threw his lot in with the Fuhrer, even as Nazi anti-Semitism stepped up a gear with the outbreak of the Second World War and became impossible to see beyond.

Now, much has been made of Rommel's stance on anti-Semitism. He never formally joined the Nazi party, but as a senior Vermat commander, you can't be considered as anything other than complicit in the crimes of the Nazi regime. At the beginning of the Second World War, he's promoted to Major General. So he's gone from Major in 1931

to Major General in 1939, and he's on his way, but it's the posting he gets that's significant. He's given command of Hitler's field headquarters at the start of the Second World War. So for the whole of the Polish campaign, he's in charge of the escort battalion and the whole administrative arrangement around Supreme headquarters, where Hitler goes, he goes.

And they have a chance during this period, during the whole of the Polish campaign, to have a lot of personal conversations. He's very admiring of what Hitler does. He gets a sense of Hitler has a real kind of feel for war. There are a number of people sort of suggesting that maybe Hitler, with his experience from the First World War as a corporal, really didn't know what he was doing. You leave that to the professionals. Rommel, who'd never been a member of the general staff, of course, didn't agree with this.

He absolutely felt that Hitler did have something. He's going to change that view later on. But at this stage of the war, they were relatively close. And the question marks start coming at this stage down as to what did Rommel know and when. Did he know, for example, of some of the darker aspects of what was happening in the Polish campaign? The answer to that, in my view, is probably not at this stage. He is going to find out about it later. Of course, in the wake of all the armies going into Poland. You've got the Einzatz group and who were carrying out terrible atrocities. But it's probable at this stage that he certainly was aware of the anti-Semitism in Germany. He didn't personally agree with that. He did believe so we think that there was a Jewish problem,

but only insofar as Jews within Germany weren't necessarily loyal to the state. They had loyalty to their own community. And he felt that was slightly problematic. But he certainly wasn't a virulent anti-Semite. And he certainly wasn't a supporter of. of the more violent acts like Crystal Nacked in November 1938. You listen to Dan Snow's history at this war coming up. So Rommel's opinion on the Jews is a little bit ambiguous in the late 1930s, but his stance on war is anything but. This is the man who'd stormed the peaks of Caporetto,

and with the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, he wanted to be back on those front lines. I mean, on the one hand, being so close to Hitler was a privileged position, you know, he could see the campaign unfolding. But he also wanted to take part and being in charge of Hitler's Supreme headquarters was not really giving him an opportunity for any action. So a couple of months after that, he puts in for a posting. Is there any chance I can get my hands on one of the armored divisions? There were only 10 at that time, Panzer divisions. So these were much sought after posting. And importantly, of course, Dan, he had no armored experience. So the chances of him getting

it were relatively scanty if he hadn't had such a close relationship with. with Hitler. Apparently, he was turned down initially, but Hitler interceded, and he's given command of the seventh Panzer Division. And as soon as he takes command, you see the classic Romel fingerprint being put all over this division. You know, it's an armored force that has a Panzer Regiment. It has Panzer Grenadiers in support that effectively armoured infantry. It also has a reconnaissance battalion. But this is a formation that's designed to be used as a striking force. And those are exactly the lessons that Rommels learned from the First World War. So he can't wait to get into action.

He trains with these men. He's very fit. He makes sure everyone knows what they're doing. He trains incessantly so that they can move in close formation. But already from this early stage, you're getting the sense that someone, even though he's a divisional commander, actually wants to be up close to the scene of the action with the individual bits of the 7th Panzer Division. He's never going to remain back in the rear like a normal major general would. I suppose the most famous incident. I mean, it's well known, you know, the Blitzkriek campaign, the use of the Ardennes, the arrival

at the Mers River. But the key thing is how quickly can you get across the Mers River? This was the big barrier. If they can break through the French defences on the Mers River and get into the rear, then Blitzkrieg has a chance, which is you drive these armoured formations deep into the enemy rear, causing the sort of dislocation he'd done with infantry in the First World War. But you've got to get across the Mers River first. was a major obstacle. The French are defending it from the far side. And when he arrives,

or at least the 7th Panzer Division arrives at the Mears River, remember at this stage, Dan, a number of Panzer Divisions are arriving at the river at the same time, and they all got the task of getting across, which is the first division across? It's the 7th Panzer Division, mainly because Romul himself takes personal charge of the crossing. He goes right up, he directs the crossing of infantry in small rubber dinghies. He goes across himself. There's a counterattack against one of the bridgeheads. The E personally directs and manages to fight off. Then he goes back across, gets the panzers to cross over a pontoon bridge a little bit further

north. And then at that stage, he's able to lead the Panzer Division forward in cahoots with other Panzer divisions into this stage of Blitzkrieg that is going to prove so devastating. So he is right at the tip of the spear. And there's already a belief by some within the 7th Panzer Division that he's putting himself in too much personal jeopardy. If he gets killed, we lose, you know, the commander. And in any case, even if you take the individual elements of a Panzer Division, the commanders of those elements wouldn't necessarily have been right up at the front. And yet, as the divisional

commander, he was in that position. So on the one hand, he's making a real difference, but on the other hand, he's acting in a way that is likely to take him out of direct communication. He's disrupting the chain of commander. That's something he's going to continue doing. even though he becomes more senior core commander, army commander, and even army group commander later on in the war. Rommel's 7th Armour Division appeared to be unstoppable. During the invasion of France, they advanced so quickly that their own high command,

often apparently didn't know where they were, let alone the bewildered allied defenders. Their speed, in fact, earned them a nickname, the Ghost Division. They would come out of thin air and then just melt away at a moment's notice. During the advance on Sherberg, the division famously covered 150 miles in just 24 hours. It was a record for armoured warfare. I'm sure Genghis Khan's cavalry beat that, but a record for modern armoured warfare. The French garrison surrendered just two days later. As he had during the First World War, what he'd do is he would bypass strong points. He wouldn't

attack them directly. He left pockets of resistance to be cleared out by following infantry. Instead, he focused on outflanking, on disrupting enemy communications, rear areas, sowing complete confusion and terror. On the 22nd of June, an armist was signed with the French, and Rommel cemented himself in as really the rising star of the German military. But with advantage of hindsight, there's still just a lingering question. To what extent that these success is Rommels? Was he brilliant as a commander? Or was this question of technology, of operational doctrine? Was this the high watermark of at the apex moment of this kind of what we call blitzkrieg warfare? I think it's a bit of both. I mean, there's no question.

that other Panzer divisions were doing remarkable things. But the division that was generally gaining the most ground was the seventh Panzer Division. It was the first one across the MERS. It had the record that the number of miles covered in a single day. It was responsible, almost single-handedly, for cutting off and capturing the vaunted 51st Highland Division, the subject of my very first book, where I first came across Rommel. And although he was perceived to be someone in Hitler's favour, and therefore he only got to be. the job as a result of that, he certainly did by his performance, live up to the hype, as it were. And the end result of all of this is that he ends the French campaign, which of course is a total

destruction of not only the French army, but also the B.EF, which is forced to withdraw from Dunkirk as the most famous divisional commander in the German army. And the only one to be granted, you know, sort of personal audience with Hitler as a result of all of that. And, you know, if you think that the more senior commanders like von Rundsted, a colonel general, von Hoth, and various other characters, Kluger, are much more senior in rank than him. There was already at this point a kind of sense of this guy's getting far too much attention, a sense of jealousy, as you can imagine, among the other senior commanders. Rommel's meteorite rise under way, and the jealousy of his colleagues wasn't going to stop him.

Meanwhile, hundreds of miles away in North Africa, things were also in motion. So Hitler's ally, the Italian leader Mussolini, had declared war on Britain, and he hoped to profit from, well, he assumed, was the imminent German victory in Europe. So he wanted to seize Britain's possessions in North Africa and sort of rebuild the Roman Empire of the Mediterranean. In September, Italian forces in Libya, which they already controlled, invaded, British controlled Egypt, but who went badly. In December, the British launched Operation Compass, which is an astonishing counter-offensive, it just shattered and humiliated the much larger. Italian army. Within weeks, tens of thousands of Italian troops were captured, large amounts of equipment had been lost, and the British had advanced deep into Libya. Far from conquering North Africa, Italy's North African position was close to total collapse. They were about to be conquered,

and Mussolini urgently requested German help. Now, Hitler was not enthusiastic about this at all. He was, by early 1941, only interested in the Soviet Union. North Africa is a side show, It's a distraction. But the problem is he couldn't let Italy's position collapse completely. If Libya fell, Britain would gain prestige, and it would threaten southern Europe. It would destabilise the axis. So Hitler agreed to send a limited German force, the Deutsche Africa Corps, the DAK. And the plan was, and this might sound familiar, it would be an elite, hard-hitting force

of tanks and infantry who, through speed and excellence and sheer violence would deal a decisive blow to the British. they would shore up the Italian defence. Rommel's battlefield exploits in France had earned him Hitler's respect and admiration, so it was to Rommel that he turned to now to strike this decisive blow. With the prospect of this detached command to get his teeth into,

no one to answer to, Rommel was raring to go. This is perfect for him, really, isn't it? Partly because the train, you know, the great expanses of North Africa are going to give his particular form of mobile warfare an opportunity to play out, but also because he's so separate from the immediate chain of command. I mean, it's interesting during the whole of the North African campaign, he's technically

under the command of the Italians. But he also has this line of appeal all the way back to the OKW, that's the Armed Forces High Command and at the apex of that Hitler himself. And he certainly uses it. So if, for example, he's given an order by the Italians like he was when he first arrived, in North Africa, really to bail them out of a hole. The Italians have been roundly defeated by the British, driven all the way back to Tripoli. I mean, there's a real danger they're going to be forced out of North Africa itself. Africa Corps goes the other way with Romel attached. There's only two divisions to begin with, and only one of those has arrived by the time Romul begins to take immediate action when he arrives in Tripoli. He's effectively told by his Italian commanders,

just act on the defensive. Let's just shore up the ship. And then we can and consider once we've built up supplies and we've got more of your troops, both of your divisions over, to actually take the initiative. Well, he doesn't pay any attention to that at all. He immediately rounds up any of the forces he can, including some of the motorized Italian forces, and takes the initiative against, it's lucky for him, a British and Commonwealth force that is not the force

that had just defeated the Italians, mainly because a lot of those veteran troops have been sent to Greece. This is a much less experienced force. It's strung out. it's not well led and it's perfect fodder for his type of aggressive action, which in astonishingly short period of time, just a few weeks, manages to retake all the ground that's just been lost and recover the whole of Siren Acre, which in effect means that Libya, the original Italian colony, is now back under Axis control.

Is he up at the front in this campaign? He's always at the front. This is an extraordinary thing about Rommel. I mean, it's a miracle he's not killed. But his feeling is, you go there personally, he moves around in an armored car or a storch. I mean, he'll fly overhead. There are instances of him in the North African campaign looking down from the storch, radioing down to his subordinate commanders and saying, if you don't get a move on,

I'm going to come down and make you get a move on. So he, on the one hand, had this all-seeing eye when he was up in the air. But on the other hand, and this is not always entirely to his credit, he would drive his arm in car right to the point of the attack, forcing people forward, encouraging them, organizing petrol supplies, trying to eke out. And because this was a big issue all the way through the North African campaign, supplies, there's often been an accusation that he didn't pay any attention to logistics. He did pay attention to logistics, but he paid attention to taking risks even more so. And that meant the supply people who

were under him were literally tearing their hair out because they knew that the more successful he was and the more ground he gained, the harder it would be to supply those troops. And the more danger he would put those troops in. It was that constant battle, really, between him thinking, well, you can defeat an enemy by getting deep into their rear and his staff officers knowing actually those troops have got to be resupplied. So we got the friction here between Romual's audacious, Starlight Command and the hard realities of warfare. Sure, motivation and innovation will achieve great feats on the battlefield. Rom will prove that in spades,

but at some point, the laws of gravity apply. Soldiers succumb to the same factors that limited armies for centuries. You need lots of, well, everything, stuff, particularly modern armies. You need sleep, you need food, you need fresh water, you need bullets and grenades and petrol,

replacement parts. Even hardened veterans need that. I mean, they need socks and new boots. As Romul pushed further into the desert and chase the Brits around North Africa, the more stretch and tenuous and fragile these supply lines came, and his army's fighting ability suffered as a result. His neglect of those logistics is the most commonly cited criticism against him.

I suppose is that fair, though? What was other options? Can a case be made that this was the only route open to him? You know, Saul, I really go back and forward on this subject, and particularly reading your book Tunis Grad, that was such a fantastic account of this campaign and its finale. But in a way, was Rom all right? because he faced overwhelming odds.

There were plans afoot for another massive Anglo-American Anglo-Alii landing in northwest Africa. The Italians and the Germans were really up against it. Was Rommel right to just see if he could throw Hail Mary, see if he could punch the other guy in the teeth and hope that they collapsed? I mean, how do you now judge his performance right across that first year and a bit of his North African campaign? Up to Alamein? I think he probably was right, Dan. I think you've hit the nail on the head that the longer the war goes on, particularly, I mean, the clock is ticking, particularly after two major events in 1941. That, of course, is Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, but even more importantly, Pearl Harbor at the end of 1941, which brings the Americans into the war. The clock is ticking from that point onwards. I mean, I've told the story of what happens when the Americans actually get to North Africa in late 1942. So it's that window of opportunity. that he tries to take advantage of

and almost pulls off the really improbable trick of getting all the way to the Suez Canal. Remember this, Dan, after the fall of Tobruk, which he's been trying to achieve for the previous year, and he finally manages it in June 1942

and begins to advance into Egypt and on towards Alexandria and Cairo. People in Cairo are burning papers. They're thinking the games up. They're thinking he can't be stopped. He's going to get all the way here. He's going to take the Suez Canal and he's going to cut us off from our vital oil supply lines in the Middle East. So he does come with an ace of actually getting there before the Americans can bring their power to bear.

And I think it must have been incredibly frustrating for him. You can see this in his writing in the next year or so that what he saw as a real strategic opportunity, not just getting to the Suez Canal, but actually advancing through the Middle East all the way to the Caucasus, was a real missed opportunity because he was never properly resourced. I mean, it's interesting that the number of resources that are put into Tunisia, when the game is effectively almost or technically already up, if he'd been given the year before, he almost certainly would have succeeded in getting to the Suez Canal.

And he almost gets there anyway. I think if there's a question mark is that he keeps batting his head against the brick wall after he's been initially repulsed from Egypt, after he's been initially repulsed from the Alamein position, and that's at the beginning of July. And yet he keeps trying to batter his way through when it was probably clear that that wasn't going to succeed and effectively it's downhill all the way.

By July, his forces were exhausted. He made a botched final attempt to defeat the British for good. He tried to encircle them, Alam Haifa, and that assault stalled near a place called El Alamein. But it would be the later, famous, celebrated battle of El Alamein. Alamein that would prove the final nail in the coffin for the German war effort in North Africa. That battle took place in October, and it took place where Rommel's army suffering from serious problems. There were chronic fuel shortages, overstretched supply lines. They were running all the way

back to Tripoli. He was completely reliant on sea transport from Italy, which was very, very vulnerable to the Royal Navy. He had fewer tanks and fewer men than the British and their allies. Meanwhile, that British 8th Army under Bernard Montgomery was reorganised, it was revitalised. Monty had built up an overwhelming superiority in men and tanks and artillery and airpower, you name it, every aspect of warfare. By October, the British had only twice as many troops, more than twice as many tanks, and hugely superior artillery and logistics. They had far more stuff.

The result was a set piece grinding assault, and ultimately weight of numbers won the day. The Axis line broke, a long retreat across Egypt and Libya began. And to make matters worse, the defeat at El Alamein coincided with Operation Torch, which saw more than 100,000 fresh allied troops land on the northwest coast of North Africa and the French colonies of North Africa. From that moment on, German hopes in North Africa have been dashed for good. The question I think is, could Rommel have done anything differently? His issue was twofold. You mentioned the material resources the enemy have against him,

but they're also up against a very effective commander, probably for the first time he's coming up against Britain's A team, as it were. I don't think he really does have an opportunity to change things because he is up against the guy who's very well prepared. He's got a well-thought-out plan. And when that plan doesn't entirely go as he hoped it would, he adjusts on the hoof. And that's another thing Monty was very good at. And people think he's very informed. flexible. He has a plan and he sticks to it, not a bit of it. He's constantly changing his plans on the hoof, but always bringing to bear his advantage in firepower, particularly artillery, anti-tank guns and tanks. And slowly but surely, Rommel is ground into the dust at Alamein.

And it's only really thanks to him that the army gets away, that is, his Panzer Army, gets away with any resources, because of course, Hitler famously wanted him to stand fast. It's an order he exceeds to for 24 hours and then actually, takes it on his own initiative to order a retreat, which, by the way, is something Hitler never forgives him for. I mean, interesting enough, by the end of the year, he flies to see Hitler and the Walshler headquarters and tells him the gains up in North Africa. He could see that by the end of 1942, and he was absolutely right. Hitler's not prepared to accept that, not least because he has to support Mussolini, and so they pour more and more troops into a theatre that is going to result

in one of the biggest disasters for the Germans in the Second World War, and that was not. Ronald's fault. There's a Dan Snow's history. There's more on this topic coming up. In late 1942, the Allies were advancing from both directions. You've got Montgomery's Eighth Army coming from the east, and then from the west you've got American and British forces who'd landed in Morocco and Algeria. And so German forces in Africa are now facing a two-front war. As Saul said, the German High Command continued to pour troops into the region.

Had they arrived earlier? Well, he'd have. who knows what had happened, but now it was bit pointless. Romual was telling them that defeat was inevitable. These German troops were being airlifted into Tunisia. Now, Romual did have some advantages here. He suddenly had shorter supply lines from Italy to Sicily and into Tunisia. He also had Tunisia's rugged terrain, which helps his defence. The American troops going up against him, while inevitably, it's the start of the war for them. They were inexperienced, and he was able to inflict a bloody nose. At the Casserine Pass, the Americans took sharp losses, but ultimately this didn't really matter much. The game was up. In March

1943, Romel, who was personally exhausted, he was in poor health, he was recalled to Germany, officially on medical leave, but in reality, well, in reality, he'd been pulled out before the inevitable defeat. The North African campaign was lost. By May, the Axis forces surrendered. Around 250,000 German-Italian troops went into captivity. Rommel would never return to the desert. Back in Europe, well, things had changed. lot since the heady days of the invasion of France. Germany was now firmly on the defensive.

The Soviet Union was pushing west after Stalingrad. The Allies invaded Sicily in July 1943. Italy was teetering on the edge and would soon attempt to switch sides. Hitler needed capable commanders to help him defend his empire in Europe against the inevitable Anglo-American invasion in the West. Romual's reputation made him the obvious choice. In late 1948, Romual was appointed inspector of coastal defences. Later, command of army group B, which was responsible for defending northern France and the low countries against that Allied invasion. He was tasked with stopping what everybody knew was coming. Now, this would not be easy. The Allies had an overwhelming superiority, particularly now, you know, they had the American military, industrial power behind them.

The superiority in everything, AirPAT, naval forces, troop numbers, industrial production, you name in. Romel knew Germany could not win a prolonged battle of attrition in France. He believed that the invasion had to be defeated in the first few hours, on the beaches. The Allies had to be thrown back into the sea, prevented from landing really in the first place. And to do this, he came up with a plan. His plan, and it was a sensible plan, because it was the only plan that could have worked, was to defeat the Allies before they actually land. So defeat the Allies on the beaches. You don't let them get off the beaches. And the only way he's going to be able to do that is if he's given enough counter-attacking power, and that's effectively panzer divisions. And at this stage of the war,

there are 10 panzer divisions in France. There's a big argument between him and the commander of the panzer forces, von Schreppenberg, as to the strategy for using these panzers. Romel wants them to be available, and therefore close to the coast. Von Schrevenberg wants them all kept in a central sort of reserves so that they can then be deployed. But Romul knows that Allied air power is not going to allow them the time and the opportunity to just deploy and get to the beaches. And even if there is the time, they're probably going to get there too late. So they need to be close to the shoreline and they need to react immediately. Well, the end result is a kind of hash. It's a halfway house. Hitler allows him to have three Panzer Divisions. He allows the other army commander Blascovitz,

who's really in charge of the Atlantic coast to have another three, and the remaining four are kept in Central Reserve. And the outcome of all of this is that on D-Day itself, there's only a single Panzer Division, the 21st Panzer Division, available to counterattack, and it doesn't counter-attack in time, partly because Rommel's not there and not able to issue the necessary orders.

Is it true also that there were further hold-ups on the 6th of June because of various decisions that Hitler had to make whether those panzers could be unleashed on the beach as well? Yeah, well, what seems to... to be clear, is that Rommel had the authority to use the Panzer divisions that he already had in his area of operations. But remember, his area of operations included the whole of the Pad de Calais. So some of the Armoured divisions were up there. That's why there was only one available for D-Day. And really, it's the speed with which you can get the panzers held in reserve in the center of

France quickly to the beaches. And it was this kind of classic delay. Those panzers aren't released until the afternoon of D-Day. And of course, they're not going to get into position for another 24 hours. So these crucial first day, first 48 hours are lost, partly because Romulus, as I say, wasn't physically present until the end of D-Day, and partly because Hitler's refused to release the Strategic Reserve without his say-so. He's not even woken up, by the way, on D-Day until about 10 o'clock in the morning. People are terrified of waking him, and when he is woken up, he's not immediately aware of the danger. He's still thinking the Pad de Kale is where the real problem's going to come. By D-Day, by the summer of night.

Is it possible for any German general to shine? It's just staving off the inevitable, you know, the greatest assault in the history of warfare against Third Reich from three different directions. Yeah, you'll have little moments, I suppose, where there's an opportunity to win tactically in a relatively small area, but certainly as an army group commander, which Rommel is by 1994, there's very little opportunity, but certainly by 1944 when Rommel's an army group commander, there's no chance of winning a campaign. They're up against it. There's going to be a grinding attritional warfare. What's interesting about Rommel is he realizes very early on in North Africa the Games Up. He also realizes very early on in northwestern Europe that the Games up and tells Hitler on the 16th of June. That's just 10 days

into D-Day that basically we need to do a deal with the Western Allies because we can't hold them. They've got air superiority. They're bringing in more and more supplies. We're never going to wipe out the bridgehead now. It's too late. This is going to be a war of attrition. We cannot win. We need to do a deal with the Western Allies. And so at least we can save Berlin from the Soviets. I think that's his thinking. On July 20th, 1944, with Germany on the ropes, a bomb exploded at Adolf Hitler's headquarters, his wolf's lair. The explosion was meant to kill him, but it narrowly failed. In the weeks that followed, thousands were arrested and executed, including several hundred conspirators. And among the names mentioned in torture chambers across his empire, as party to the

conspiracy, was one Irwin Rommel. As Saul said, throughout June, early July 1944, Rommel had repeatedly urged Hitler to recognise reality. The war must be ended before Germany was utterly destroyed. But Hitler had refused to listen. He insisted on holding ground all costs in fighting on, Rommel became increasingly frustrated and pessimistic. And this is where, well, his position became a little complicated. There's a lot of confusion about this. We have a crucial meeting between Rommel and Hitler and also von Rundstedt. Romel, by the way, has been persuaded by Rommel that they can't win in the West and they both need to suggest to Hitler that they need a political solution.

This is inverted commas, effectively, you need to start talking to the Western Allies. Now, that doesn't go down well. Hitha totally shuts them down at that meeting at Margavall at the end of June. And it's as a result of this that I think it coalesces in Rommel's mind as July unfolds, that Hitler is a major obstacle to staving off a disastrous defeat for Germany. He needs to be removed. I think there's a kind of sense in Rommel's mind. Maybe it can be done bloodlessly. Maybe I can take responsibility by opening. He tells some his subordinates. There's a possibility he's going to open the Western Front. In other words, order his men on the Western Front to lay down their arms and let the Western Allies through and obviously technically get to Berlin. Just how Hitler's going to be toppled in that context, nobody knows, presumably Rommel's going to be captured by the Western Allies. But he's going to open the floodgates. That's very much in his mind that Hitler needs to be stopped one way or another. But I don't think he ever comes to terms with the possibility, although Spiebel, his deputy,

is absolutely right at the heart of the bomb plot that they need to assassinate Hitler. That is one step too far for Romel, and I don't think he ever goes to that point. Under interrogation, several conspirators had mentioned Romual's name. That's a Nazi leadership. This did present an issue. Rommel was very popular, in large part of because of the massive propaganda campaign that the Nazis had been happy to build around him. And so all that made a public trial quite dangerous. Hitler could not risk turning a national hero into a symbol of resistance. So a different solution

was chosen. On October 14, 1944, two generals arrived at Rommel's home and they gave him a choice. Either he would have to stand trial before a people's court, which meant humiliation. He might be tortured, he would be executed. His family could also suffer consequences, or he could take poison quietly. His family would be spared, he'd receive a state funeral, his reputation would be preserved. He's in an impossible position. He's effectively been denounced by one of the officers who was directly involved in the plot. That's Hophaca, who was chief of staff in Paris at the time. So he's not on his staff, but Hophagher has basically implicated him unfairly, in my view. But what is clear in Rommel's own mind is that his behaviour was treasonous. So he can't really see

any way out of the option, basically. Either you come to Germany and we try you, or you take your own life and your family will be spared being drawn into the consequences for a traitor. It was to save his family from the consequences of what he, I think, believed in his own heart to have been treacherous or traitorous behaviour, that he accepts the deal and he felt it was a good deal. I mean, you've got this heart-rending moment where he has to tell his family, first his wife and then his son, Manfred, who's on leave at the time. This is what he's going to do, but he undoubtedly does it for the benefit of his family. And a sense that there was no way out for him at that stage. Romual chose to take his own life. He took cyanide in a staff car

outside his home. The regime announced that he died of wounds sustained an air attack and he was given a full military funeral. The truth would only emerge after the war. So particularly in Britain, where the memory of his jewel with Montgomery in the Western Desert is so imprinted on the popular imagination, particularly in Britain, he is regarded as this great master tactician. Does he doesn't of that reputation? I mean, would his fellow generals in the head of the Wehrmark, would they be angry that we selected him to talk about in this series about great commanders the Second World War? I think he could fairly be described as certainly one of the greatest German commanders of the Second World War, arguably the greatest commander of the Second World War,

but he did have flaws. He was someone who sometimes took himself out of the communications loop, which is relatively unacceptable even for a divisional commander, certainly for a core commander, army commander and an army group commander. And there were times in his career in North Africa, for example, the famous race to the wire, where he goes completely incommunicado, and there are real consequences for the forces fighting under him. This belief that aggression is always going to win out

is not necessarily the case in warfare. Sometimes you have to take stock, you have to pause. Yes, aggression generally is a good thing, but not at the expense of all other factors, you know, how strong the enemy is, what the intelligence is, what your supplies are. And he definitely had some weaknesses in all those aspects. But on the other hand, he did win some astonishing victories in North Africa. He was never given the opportunity,

as we've already discussed, to do that again in the Normandy campaign. He'd done outstanding work as a divisional commander. In the back of my mind, my feeling is that he probably was at his absolute height as a core commander. But a core commander is not going to really do it when you think about the greatest commanders of the Second World War. So I am slightly conflicted on that front, but I'm also slightly conflicted on the idea that he was very much whitewashed as a good German at the end of the Second World War, because as I've already tried to explain, he was very close to Hitler, it was a great admirer of Hitler. Yes, he finally fell out of love with Hitler, but only when he perceived that the war was being lost. And by that point, he was under no illusions that some

pretty bad things had been done in Germany's name. He wasn't personally responsible. He tended to fight a relatively fair war, the war without hated in his expression in North Africa. And it's absolutely true that if he was given a distasteful order in his view, he ignored it, the so-called commander order, where you execute anyone who's an allied soldier, who you capture, who's operating behind the lines. We just ignored that. A lot of commanders were captured by his forces and they weren't executed. So he fought fairly, but he was also someone who wasn't able to detach himself from the Hitler regime until it was clear that Germany was losing the war. This is not a moral decision for him. This is a sense of the whole houses coming crashing down.

And that's why I think you have to distinguish him between some of the people involved in the bomb plot, of course, most famously, the man who actually planted the bomb himself, who did have moral crimes from 942 onwards and felt that Hitler actually needed to be removed by force. and Roble never actually comes to that point of view. So there are question marks in portraying him as the poster boy of the good Germans in the Second World War. I think his reputation is overdone in that sense. I think it's slightly overdone as a military commander,

yet he did have outstanding talents, and he did produce some outstanding results. Saul, you produce outstanding results. Thank you very much for coming back on the podcast. It's always such a huge pleasure, buddy. Cheers, Dan. Great to chat. So, how should we judge Irwin Rommel? Unquestionably, a gifted battlefield commander,

particularly at the tactical and operational level. His instinct for movement and surprise and used new technologies and to keep morale high, placed him among the most effective combat leaders of that period. And yet, he also had his limitations. He struggled with logistics and coordination and the broader political dimensions of war. Morally, well, his legacy is complex,

or perhaps not so complex really. He might not have been a Nazi ideologue. He didn't participate in war crimes on the scale scene elsewhere, but that's not so much for Nazi generals. There was persecution of North African Jews on his watch. He certainly served a criminal regime. He benefited from its crimes. And he only distanced himself from it a bit

when defeat became inevitable. In post-war years, though, Rommel sort of became useful. Germany was seeking respectable military, traditions. The allies were eager to separate professional soldiers who they were now allies with as West Germany joined NATO to stand against the Soviet threat. So the allies built up these so-called professional soldiers from out-and-out Nazi criminals. The myth of the good German general grew up, and we still live with that today. I think perhaps the fairest assessment is this. Erwin Rommel was

neither an out-and-out villain or an out-and-out hero. He was a very capable soldier. He was a very capable soldier. He was shaped by, but also ultimately totally undone by the system in which he served. He was a brilliant commander. He headed blind spots. He's remembered for not to tell he fought, but for the uneasy questions that his career still poses about leadership and loyalty and responsibility of a serving officer in wartime. Thanks for listening to this episode of our commanders series, folks. Next Monday, we're going to turn to Bernard Montgomery, Rommel's nemesis, you might say. Britain's most famous World War II commander. Make sure you hit following your podcast player and it will drop into your feed automatically. See you next time, folks.