Dan Snow's History Hit - The Fall of the Soviet Union

Episode Date: August 23, 2021

In August 1991 there was an attempted coup in the Soviet Union as communist hard-liners sought to re-establish the dominance of Soviet rule in Russia and its satellite states. The coup attempt collapsed after three days and it eventually led to the collapse of communism. Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary on 24 August and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR suspended the activities of the party on 29 August. Following this, later former soviet states declared their independence which has radically reshaped the world in the decades since. To help understand the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its consequences Dan is joined by historian and holocaust survivor Peter Kenez. 

Some things just take too long. A meeting that could have been an email, someone explaining crypto, or switching mobile providers. Except with Fizz. Switching to Fizz is quick and easy. Mobile plans start at $17 a month. Certain conditions apply. Details at fizz.ca. Hi, everybody. Welcome to Dan Snow's History. On the 19th of August, 1991, 30 years ago, there was an attempted coup in the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev was temporarily imprisoned as hardliners sought to re-establish the dominance of authoritarian rule in the Soviet Union and its satellites. The coup failed after three days and it eventually led to

collapse of communism, disintegration of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev resigned as first secretary of the Communist Party on the 24th of August. On the 29th, the Supreme Soviet suspended all activities of the Communist Party. Days later, Soviet states declared independence. Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. And that, I think we can all agree, has got some fairly, fairly important enduring consequences for all of us today. That is a story that has not yet come to an end. And to talk about that collapse of the Soviet Union, I've got the very brilliant Peter Kanish. He's a historian. He specializes in Russian Eastern European history and politics. As you'll hear in this episode, I didn't want this to be the focus, but he was born in Hungary and he is a Holocaust survivor. He survived as a child. And so we do at the end,

talk about his experiences. So he's someone who has lived through extraordinarily traumatic history himself. He's a emeritus professor at the University of California. So I talked to him over on the West Coast and he gave me such an interesting and thoughtful take on the collapse of the Soviet Union 30 years ago this month. If you wish to deepen, deepen your engagement in history, and I can understand why you'd want to do that, go to historyhit.tv. You don't have to believe your eyes. Historyhit.tv. You get 30 days free now if you go and check it out. It's a history channel, folks, where there are hundreds of history documentaries for history fans,

watched by tens of thousands of people. It's great fun with a small subscription to keep the whole thing going, and it means we can make real history shows for real history fans. Please go and check it out, historyhit.tv, you get 30 days free if you sign up now. But in the meantime, everyone, here is Peter Kanish talking about the fall of the Soviet Union. Enjoy. Peter, welcome to the podcast. Thank you for asking me. Okay, this is a big question. Did the Soviet Union collapse under its own internal contradictions

because of economic forces, commodity prices, things like that? Or was it external pressure and resistance that led to its collapse? Well, we can say with some assurance that the Soviet Union collapsed not because of a great uprising, because the people were dissatisfied with what they had and then rebelled and then overthrew the regime which oppressed them. But actually, Lenin formulated that what you need for a revolution is not so much that lower classes cannot tolerate their oppression, but those who are in position of control cannot do it any longer. And so I always thought that the crucial moment of the collapse of the Soviet Union was when Karbachev at one point said to Shevardnadze,

which means it is impossible to live like that. So my explanation of the collapse of the Soviet Union is that those who were in control did not believe in the justice of the regime which made it possible for them to oppress. That is, Gorbachev, who is a crucial figure, did not believe in the justice of the cause any longer. What he wanted to create was what was called at the time socialism with the human face. And that turned out to be utopia. What I'm saying is that the regime disintegrated rather than brought down by a popular uprising. And that I think it's easy to demonstrate.

Now, what were the cause of the ultimate disintegration? I suppose it's the impossibility of reforming the economy and maintaining the existing system, the nationality question, which pulled the country in different directions, and ultimately the disintegration of institutions above all of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. So, I mean, this was a process which ultimately failed. Gorbachev, to me, is a very attractive character in as much as he wanted to bring together a democratic form of socialism. And this is, to me, an attractive proposition. It's too bad that it was not possible. And it is, as far as I can see, still not possible.

But it is an attractive utopia. Socialism with the human face. In this respect, his comrades were the Hungarian Imre Nagy, 1956, Dubček of 1968, and Gorbachev. These are the three people

who wanted to maintain socialism as they saw it, a system which can be reconciled with democracy, and that did not work. What's so interesting hearing you say that is you think about the contemporary world in which you have all sorts of authoritarians clinging to power against seemingly extraordinary odds, the Assad family in Syria, the Russian today. They believe in the justice of their cause. That's right, North Korea. So that's the key dip. That's obviously China. And it's allowed them to weather far more apparent obstacles and headwinds than Gorbachev

faced in the late 80s and early 90s. Yes. You have to believe in the justice of your cause to be successful as an oppressor. Now, people have no trouble convincing themselves of all sorts of nonsense, but decent people cannot do it, and they fail. Lukashenko is not decent.

But then, Gorbachev, what quirk of fate allowed someone who lacked a sense of the legitimacy of their own cause to reach the very apogee of the Soviet empire in the late 80s? What does that mean? Was that just luck? Or was it a product of a wider malaise, a wider loss of confidence? Yes, indeed. There was increasing recognition that changes will be necessary. And Chernenko, who preceded Gorbachev, was clearly incapable. And Andropov, who preceded Chernenko, recognized the necessity of changes and put Gorbachev forward and supported him. Now, how important personalities are in how events turn out, it's practically impossible to say. It is impossible to disintegrate.

How significant Gorbachev was, I don't know, but I think we can say with such assurance that that regime, as it lasted, could not go on any longer. The economy was in shambles. You could not maintain an economy which is cut off from the world, where there is a planned economy in which prices don't mean anything, where economic inefficiency is non-existent, where factories are not closed down, which are inefficient because you cannot have unemployment. This just could not continue in the end of the 20th century.

Something got to give. And so there was a recognition on the part that you need changes, but how far those changes can go. Now, there was a recognition that the changes will be painful. There cannot be changes without suffering. That is, closing down factories will be harmful. Stopping support of prices will create misery for a large segment of the population.

And indeed, this is what happened in the Yeltsin era, where economic reforms, radical economic reforms were introduced, and it created an extraordinary suffering. The 1990s in Russia were a period of dreadful decades when life expectancy fell, where alcoholism reached remarkable proportions, where people lived in misery, and this was a high cost. Now, it always interested me how come the Chinese managed to avoid all that. Why is that China succeeded when Russia did not succeed? The Chinese did succeed. I mean, they did get rid of a Marxist economy. Really, China is not a communist system in any meaningful way. China is an autocratic regime where free enterprise flourishes,

where there are billionaires. I understand there are as many billionaires in China as there are in the United States. Now, how come that the Chinese managed to do it and the Russians did not? Here I am on weak soil. The Chinese like to work. The Russians didn't like to work. The Russians were infected by European liberalism. Europe was too close. That is when Gorbachev said to

Givernadze, it is impossible to live like that. It was because basically he was a European. Chinese have a different tradition. They have a different history. And that history matters. Russian history mattered and Chinese history mattered. So you could do things in China which you could not do in Russia. And so China flourishes and the Russians are not doing very well by any standard of measurement. I have hope that economic, further economic reforms will be introduced in Russia. Corruption will be reduced. There will be a development of a middle class which will demand to be treated as normal human beings should be treated.

I have hopes, but hopes not for the very near future. For the very near future, I don't have much hope. Coming back to, you mentioned infected by European liberalism. So was that an element? The Americans like, say, George Bush, H. W. Bush won the Cold War because the Soviet Union collapsed. What were the factors from outside Russia? Was it the images of McDonald's and Levi's and pop music and people having fun and it's of apparent freedoms of the West. Was that an important factor in this Soviet collapse? I do think so. I do think so that as long as Russia could live as a separate entity, as it could in the 1920s and the 1930s, but the outside world could be shut out. The regime had a degree of stability and legitimacy,

which in the modern world, and of course, especially today, but even in the 1980s and 1990s, Russia could not be cut off from the rest of the world, and that mattered. It's not what Reagan or Bush did or did not do which really mattered is the very existence of a liberal outside world which undermined people's faith in themselves, what they were doing. And Gorbachev talked about our common European home. Now you cannot imagine a Chinese leader talking about our common European home. And that mattered. That is, the West mattered, not because of what it said, but for what it was. So no, Reagan did not bring down the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union collapsed because it was based on principles which at the end of the 20th century

were inappropriate for the needs of the moment. Times change. Something which you could do in the 1920s, you could not do in the 1990s. Another exogenous factor is, I guess, Eastern Europe, which was sort of part of this Soviet Empire, but at slightly more arm's reach than places like Ukraine and Georgia. It's interesting to me that the German collapse at the end of the First World War was presaged by a collapse of its allies in South and East Europe. Is that important as well in 1991? Is this important that Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary would have required

military repression to keep them in that Eastern Bloc? Yes. yes. But again, the paradox of Gorbachev, who goes to East Berlin, and he stands for liberalism against the Ullrich regime. And indeed, in 1956, for example, Khrushchev's reforms made the Hungarian Revolution of 56 possible, of the reforms made the Hungarian Revolution of 56 possible in the sense that, well, if Khrushchev can denounce Stalin, then so can we. Times change, and what is appropriate in one historical moment is not appropriate in another. But we're talking about the significance of Eastern Europe.

Yes, Eastern Europe required investment, military investment, which the Soviet Union could barely afford. And indeed, what was going on in Poland and what was going on in Hungary demonstrated the disintegration of the regime. Interestingly, less in East Germany, and to say nothing about Romania. and to say nothing about Romania. But Poland first and then Hungary second demonstrated the disintegration of the bloc and the pull of the West. And well, as I say, what it comes down to is the ideology of combining socialism with democracy,

socialism with the human face, as they called it. And it is our loss that this turned out to be impossible. You listen to Dan Snow's history. We're talking about the fall of the Soviet Union. More after this. Some things just take too long. A meeting that could have been an email, someone explaining crypto,

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a Ubisoft podcast brought to you by History Hits. There are new episodes every week. Were there voices within the Soviet hierarchy who said, yes, this has a military solution, we can reimpose order on our satellite states in Eastern Europe? Well, this is indeed the 30th anniversary of that historical moment, This is indeed the 30th anniversary of that historical moment, the so-called Putsch, August 19, 1991, when, in effect, those people who were devoted to the old regime and opposed to what Gorbachev stood for, wanted to return to the old,

which would have necessitated the use of military force. And that was not possible. The regime was disintegrating. The coup was not a serious danger. The people who organized that coup had no force behind them. But also there was no force behind Gorbachev or Yeltsin. What we see is disintegration. It's not that there were strong forces against one another. It's not that Gorbachev stood for something and he was opposed by a conservative cabal. The institutions were falling apart. The Communist Party, there were debates within the party. Now, you cannot have a communist party when there are internal disagreements. I mean, that's not a communist party any longer. So what I'm saying is that we must look at it ultimately as disintegration rather than a revolution. Not that the Soviet

people rebelled against the regime and overthrew it and brought in something which they deeply desired. That's not the way things go. What we see is disintegration, disintegration, disintegration. In this respect, I think 1917 is very similar. 1917, it's not that there was a strong Communist Party which overthrew first the Tsarist regime and then the liberal regime of Kerensky. Everything just fell apart.

Is the slightly disturbing lesson of the Soviet Union in 1991 for the Chinese, for the North Koreans, for the Syrians, is the disturbing lesson is that as long as you can hold a governing coalition together, as long as you can maintain your morale as an elite, you can stave off that disintegration? Depends on the moment, depends on the circumstances. And well, as you say, Syria and Belarus and North Korea are prime examples. But Cuba is falling apart.

There is no equivalent of Lukashenko in Cuba. And so, you know, the Cubans now have cell phones and they listen to what was going on in the rest of the world. And that's not going to work in the long run. Speaking of the morale of the ruling class or the ruling cadre, I'm reminded, was it Louis Philippe in 1848? He says, the problem with republics is they can shoot people. Yes.

Shooting is very important for the stability of the regime. Yes, the willingness to do it. Right. And he didn't have the willingness to do it. You have to believe. You see, we have trouble accepting that those wicked people actually believe in the justice of their cause. It seems to us that they are just hypocrites.

They really managed to convince themselves. Lukashenko believes that what he's doing is good. And Assad believes that he is holding together a regime and that's good. How can people do that? How can normal people believe that what they are doing is good? But they do. There are very few hypocrites. And with the Soviet Union, you see the satellite states in Eastern Europe break away. You also see component parts of the Soviet Union, of the original Tsarist Empire of Russia, break away, what determined how far and how fast that breakup would go? Why didn't other parts of

the former Soviet Union break away? I think that as long as there is a strong central power, nationalism of the subject people does not flourish. But once there is a sense among the Estonians and Lithuanians and Georgians and Armenians that the center of power is disintegrating, then nationalism suddenly acquires great strength and great force. This is again what happened in 1917. The regime collapsed, and so the separate parts of Imperial Russia suddenly recognized that we are Armenians, we are Georgians, and we are Estonians and Latvians and so on and so forth. And this happened again in 1988, 1989. And after all, that's where the first shooting, you may remember, took place in Georgia, and

then in Lithuania. And then all was the result that the center is not functioning. There is no central power. And suddenly people became Georgians and suddenly they became Armenians and suddenly they became, what have you, Romanians in Moldova.

And the previous notion that we have succeeded in developing Soviet patriotism, and I am a nationalist Soviet suddenly fell apart. Then people realized that, well, actually, I'm Georgian. Again, disintegration. Everything follows from disintegration. The economy, the institutions, the nationalities. It seems to me that these are the three relevant factors. The economy, institutions, primarily the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Komsomol, and then the nationalities.

And ultimately, we have seen the result. I mean, we are now in a different situation. Tell me about the importance of Afghanistan in this collapse. Was Afghanistan primarily an issue of confidence in those institutions, again, the morale of the ruling cadre, or was there a direct economic and military impact that made the Soviet project unsustainable? Well, I mean, it's a peculiar situation because the Soviets did not impose Najibullah on Afghanistan. However, the Soviets supported Najibullah. And when the Taliban was

about to overthrow their regime, they did not want to create a precedent in which a Soviet-time regime can be overthrown. And so they militarily invested in maintaining Najibullah's regime in which they failed. And this is a particular moment we should remember the American support for the Taliban, because from the American point of view, getting rid of the Soviet supported Afghan was a good thing. Now it turned out to be it was a mistake. However, that takes us in a different direction in our conversation about the American role in Afghanistan.

But yes, of course, that was a blow. And of course, Chernobyl was a blow. And really, returning from Afghanistan was the first really major military setback for the Soviet Union in the course of its existence. They had not suffered an under-conquerable reverse, where they had to give up Soviet support, the Soviet-style regime, as they did in Afghanistan in 1988. And it was a blow. It was a blow to the prestige of the Soviet Union, the prestige of the Red Army.

And Chernobyl was also a blow. But these are all components of this general disintegration where nothing works. You introduce sensible reforms, such as limiting the sale of the alcohol. And it turns out that much of the finances of the Soviet Union were based on the sale of alcohol. So nothing is going the way it should.

Everything is falling apart. We should just quickly dwell on the alcohol. Whenever I'm in Russia today, I get told by Russians, they say, you people in the West, you think it's all high politics and you think it was the space race and you think it was Afghanistan and, you know, cruise missiles. But actually, it's because Gorbachev tried to restrict alcohol. And whenever a Russian regime restricts alcohol, it falls almost instantly. Well, actually, the Tsarist regime during the war, the First World War, also introduced Exactly. And then that created an enormous hole in the Tsarist budget.

So you have to be careful about that. By the way, today, we tend to overestimate the extent of Russian alcoholism. It has declined, believe it or not. Well, certainly, my entirely unscientific and anecdotal experience is that Russian alcoholism is alive, or Dees knows alcoholism while in Russia is alive and well. But yes, so that was an error. Gorbachev, he tried to restrict alcohol sales. Yes, again, you know, it's so Gorbachevian that you root for the guy. I mean, it's a good idea to make them suffer less from alcoholism, but then it turns out to be a utopia.

I find Gorbachev a very winning character, a tragic figure, who to this day, I just read about him when I was talking, that he still believes in the combination of democracy and by socialism, which he means a greater degree of social equality and a functioning economy. So he has not repudiated anything. That's not the way it goes.

Will Barron Now, after 30 years, historians can start to form judgments on these. What did the collapse of the Soviet Union mean for the world? Peter Green Well, everything is constantly changing. I mean, now we have an enormously powerful China, which is doing very well. They succeeded in creating an economic system, which is functioning.

And the Chinese work, I mean, the Chinese, what they have accomplished, I believe, is really the great story of our age. The change that occurred in China, as far as the life expectancy, as far as female equality, as far as public health, literacy concern, is just something extraordinary. I mean, I would have trouble thinking an example in world history, but such a transformation took place in such a short time.

Now, is the Chinese regime attractive? No, it's not. But that's another issue. And I wish that my Russians would have achieved something similar, but they failed. Before we go, can I ask about your experience? Because you're a Holocaust survivor. Yes, those were exciting days.

Everybody is a survivor because those who are not survivors are Yes, those were exciting days. Everybody's a survivor because those who are not survivors are not here to tell their story. Of course. So there is a paradox is built in. Everybody's a survivor. How old were you when the war came to an end in 1945? And in 1944, well, I was seven years old

and I remember walking in front of the Hungarian Nazis with my arms raised. One of my favorite memories. And do you remember being liberated or what freedom felt like? Oh, yes. This was on January 17, 1945, when I saw my first Russian soldier and I loved them. And to this day, in spite of all my studies, I have a warm spot in my heart for Russians. How did your family fare? My father was taken the very first day when the Germans occupied the country. It was on March 19th, 1944.

My father was taken on the 20th of March. And that was the last time I saw him. And I know what happened to him. He was taken to Auschwitz with the first group, survived Auschwitz, marched ultimately to Buchenwald. And he was alive on the 1st of April and Buchenwald was liberated by the American army on the 10th of April. And other relatives?

Nobody survives on my father's side of the family. My mother survived. I had scarlet fever, and for a while a red piece of paper was put on our door, and the Hungarian Nazis didn't want to come in and be infected. I really had scarlet fever. It was not a pretense. By the way, all described lovingly in a little autobiography, which I wrote, which is called Varieties of Fear. How has that childhood experience affected you, do you think? Were you able to put that trauma behind you? Or has it been with you all your life?

behind you or has it been with you all your life? No, no, no, no. Well, of course, we don't know what made us what we are. And what I can say is that there are innumerable number of circumstances which creates us for what we are and how significant my particular experience in 1944 in how I was formed, I cannot say. I don't want to overestimate it. I don't like to think of myself that I am the product of the Holocaust. It's not my life. But, of course, it's part of my life and so much else. Being in England is also part of my life. That was also an experience which formed me.

Well, thank you for sharing those stories. Peter, thank you very much indeed. I've taken so much of your time. I really appreciate that. Not at all. You may have noticed I like to talk. Well, we're very glad to have you talk. All right.

So thank you very much indeed. Of course. I feel we have the history on our shoulders. All this tradition of ours, history as i tell you all the time i love doing these podcasts they are the best thing i do professionally i feel very lucky to have you listening to them if you fancied giving them a rating review obviously the best rating review possible would be ideal it makes a big difference to us I know it's a pain but we'd really really be grateful and if you want to listen to the other podcasts in our ever

increasing stable don't forget we've got Susanna Lipscomb with Not Just the Tudors that's flying high in the charts we've got our medieval podcast Medieval, the brilliant Matt Lewis and Kat Jarman. We've got the ancients with our very own Tristan Hughes. And we've got warfare as well, dealing with all things military. Please go and check those out. Ready to get your pods. Some things just take too long. A meeting that could have been an email,

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