Dan Snow's History Hit - The Second Reich

Episode Date: January 18, 2021

On 18 January 1871 as the Siege of Paris raged a couple of miles away King Wilhelm I of Prussia was proclaimed Emperor of the German empire in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles. It was the most dramatic possible beginning to a new imperial project in the heart of Europe. The German Empire was instantly a major power on the continent and quickly developed global ambitions. Dan talked to Katja Hoyer about the events leading up to its founding and what it meant for German and the world. 

Douglas Adams, the genius behind The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, was a master satirist who cloaked a sharp political edge beneath his absurdist wit. Douglas Adams' The Ends of the Earth explores the ideas of the man who foresaw the dangers of the digital age and our failing politics with astounding clarity. Hear the recordings that inspired a generation of futurists, entrepreneurs and politicians. Get Douglas Adams' The Ends of the Earth now at pushkin.fm slash audiobooks or wherever audiobooks are sold. Hi everybody, welcome. Welcome to Dan Snow's History hit. This episode is first broadcast on the 18th of January 2021.

You know what that means? It's exactly 150 years since one of the most extraordinary pieces of pageantry in modern European history. 150 years ago, on the 18th of January 1871, the siege of Paris was raging just a few miles away. King Wilhelm I of Prussia was elevated to emperor. He was promoted to emperor. He was proclaimed emperor. Not just anywhere, as you'll hear in this podcast, but in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles. That's like a French person being promoted to emperor of the French sitting in the Palace of Westminster in London. This was the beginning. It was the start

of the German Empire, the Second Reich, as people call it. And the next 80 years would be one hell of a ride. I got to tell you, one hell of a ride. We're going to have a couple of podcasts on this. This is the first. We've got the very brilliant Katja Heuer. She's a historian and she has just written a superb history of the German Empire, the rise and fall from 1871 to 1918. We got carried away talking about this. We could talk so much about the birth of this empire that we actually, I need, she needs to come back on and talk about the rest of it. She's so awesome. We just chatted away about this extraordinary sort of seismic shift in in european uh politics the political geography of europe in the second half of the 19th century if you are interested in 19th century history we've got loads of programs available on history hit tv and of course if

you're history teachers that you're listening to this podcast now because of our lockdown learning shows we've got another one out this week by the way mark morris talking about the middle ages quite broad but you're gonna love it um remember history hit tv the auto the january sale is still on so if you use the code january you get a month for free and then you get the first three months after that for just for 80 off the ticket price so it's pennies we're talking cents we're talking pennies um so please do go and check that out it's four months for less than the price of a cappuccino. Not that we're buying cappuccinos anymore, but it's four months for not very much money. And I hope it's of use to history educators out there as well as people that just love history, which

isn't everyone. Some just don't know it yet. Please go to historyhit.tv, use the code January. In the meantime, everybody, enjoy this episode with Katja Hoyer. Katja, thank you so much for coming on. Thank you for having me on. How do we think about Germany in the early 19th century? Was it, I think, as Metternich once said of Italy, just a geographical, or was it a more political entity? It certainly didn't exist as a political entity, but the sort of pushing out of Napoleon, the collective effort that was made by the German people from when the Prussian king basically called them to arms in 1812, created a sense of sort of togetherness and camaraderie,

I think, that lasted as an idea into the mid-19th century. And so there was certainly a sort of togetherness and camaraderie, I think that lasted as an idea into the mid-19th century. And so there was certainly a sort of bottoms-up approach, if you will, from the people themselves who pushed for further unification whilst the elite sort of still resisted that. That's not to say that people already felt German in the sense that they would have said to somebody else they are German, they would have still said, I'm Bavarian, would have still said I'm Bavarian or I'm a Rhinelander or I'm a Berliner. But nonetheless, that was a rising sentiment throughout the 19th century that there ought to be some sort of political construct to represent the sort of burgeoning sense of nationhood. I think we just need to have a quick dogleg there to talk about nationalism,

that nationalism that you mentioned, because nowadays, I think nationalism exists in the shadow of the 20th century, the mid 20th century, where for most of us, we regard it as a bad thing. But back then, it was a kind of progressive, almost, there was a proto-democratic essence to it, wasn't there? Yeah, you're absolutely right. The term nationalism has now completely, well not completely, but certainly partially shifted in the meaning that it's taken on. So in the 19th century, it's very much a liberal movement. In fact, the largest political party when Germany begins to exist in 1871 calls itself the National Liberals. And this is maybe something that seems a bit odd to us today. But that's absolutely right. something that seems a bit odd to us today. But that's absolutely right. People saw nationhood and nation states as sort of bastions against, you know, arbitrary royal rule, in effect. So

basically, people thought that if a nation state is there, and it exists, it would sort of safeguard the rule of law against the monarch. And from that respect, the same was true for Germany. So where people lived, say, in Prussia or in Bavaria and were still under the sort of direct rule of their monarchs, the idea was that if Germany could be made into a nation state with a constitution and a legal framework, that even the sort of elites would have to stick to that. So as you say, it's very much a sort of middle class movement. The middle classes are growing in confidence during this time, mainly due to industrialization and other sort of economic movements. And it's actually very much coming from that social class. You know, there's a push for further unification and

nationalism. So nationalism was a way of taming mad kings and dukes. But was there an ethnic dimension to how do they define who should be in a nation state? Yeah, and that's very much the debate that people are the German people are having amongst themselves at this point in time, it seems that the most common sort of denominator that people name at the time is language. And so you quite often get this expression as people name at the time is language. And so you quite often get this expression as far as the German tongue is heard. Now, the problem with that is, of course, that that throws up questions of, you know, which area should actually be in it, even though they're currently part of other territories.

So, you know, look at Alsace as a perfect example of that sort of under, you know, French dominion, but largely German populated still at the time, it throws up questions about what to do with Austria. I mean, this sort of Prussian-Austrian dualism that you see at the time is politically completely at odds with, you know, the sort of definition of Germans as those that speak German. And so, yes, there's a sort of sense to try and work out how do you define a people? Is it by language? Is it by ethnicity? Is it by culture? There's by no means a sort of consensus on that, not even in the 19th century. But most people agree on the language factor rather than ethnicity at this point.

That's beginning to shift a little bit later throughout the German Empire, that there's more and more of a sense of sort of being ethnically German being the deciding factor. How do you know if you're ethnically German? It's a tricky thing to do, isn't it? I mean, in many ways, those sort of societies that spring up in the 1890s, they're known as Völkisch societies or ethnic societies, claim a sort of universalism to that that just doesn't exist.

So, you know, they sort of sit there and sing german songs and wear traditional german garb supposedly whatever that means and sort of pretend that there is a sort of common ethnic origin of all germans when of course historically there's absolutely no grounds to to that what i find fascinating about this period is you have all these kind of middle class nationalists clamming for integration yet when unification comes it feels like quite an old script feels like the ancien regime it's that it's the prussian monarchy conquering people isn't it are there two contradictory forces at play here yeah there is a there is a bit of a of a conflict there but also this idea that the sort of prussia conquered the rest is only partially um the case

i mean it certainly is. Wars, of course, involved, and that's a great part of my book as well, to argue that it was the wars that forged it. But certainly the way that Prussia gets the southern states on side, so Bavaria and Baden and the areas south of the River Main, which are Catholic and very, very reluctant to join any sort of union with Protestant Prussia. It's not so much by force, but

it's actually by this idea that they're fighting side by side against the French once more. So it's an interesting mix between pressurising the smaller states into Prussia, with for instance war against Denmark,

but then also almost coercing and convincing and cajoling with the larger states. And in the end, of course, the Franco-Prussian war is the sort of triggering factor. But that doesn't take away from the fact that Otto von Bismarck, the architect of this entire project, the Prussian minister-president, is quite acutely aware of the fact that this is also a people's movement and that he does have to acknowledge that by setting up a parliament. And this is why you end up

with this weird construct whereby you've got a fairly strong monarchy and a system at the top that is very much dominated by the elites. But then you've got the Reichstag, the top that is very much dominated by the elites. But then you've got the Reichs, like the German parliament, which is elected by universal male suffrage, which is still extraordinary at the time.

And that conflicts and contrasts with each other for the next few decades, to the point where by 1914, they're very much at loggerheads and a stalemate ensues because the interests of both of those groups diverge so much. But let's go back right to the end of Napoleonic Wars. We've got the Prussians left as a major player within the German speaking world. Yes, certainly the largest one. And because basically at the Vienna conference in 1815, so after Napoleon was beaten and when Europe was sort of redistributed, Prussia gains the Rhineland.

And that gives it, at the time it wasn't really, I don't think understood just how much power it would give Prussia, but because they gain all of the coal and iron ore deposits there, kind of all of the ingredients for industrialization, they sort of shoot ahead the ingredients for industrialization, they sort of shoot ahead as an industrial power very, very quickly throughout the rest of that half of the 19th century, and thereby effectively they become this super state. Okay, so what's the key moment here? Is it the showdown with Austria, its kind of regional competitor? Yes, I mean, Austria had for a long, long time due to the Austro-Hungarian Empire been the sort of leading German power, if you will.

That begins to shift a little bit during the Napoleonic Wars simply because of Prussia's contribution to that. So Prussia had prior to that gone through a number of military reforms and actually set up a military force that was far more efficient than perhaps was justified by the size of the state previously. And because they fought side by side with Britain, the Prussia gained a new sort of prestige in Europe, particularly in the estimation of the British after 1815, and so was beginning to be seen as one of the major European players. But Austria was still the more powerful one of the two. But due to that acquisition of the Rhineland, effectively Prussia becomes an industrialized nation very, very quickly, whilst Austria remains fairly agrarian and sort of almost anachronistic, I would argue, by the mid-19th century and is falling behind very, very quickly. But that dualism had to be solved one way or another.

Eventually, we would take leadership and ownership of this loose confederation of German states that existed then. And so Prussia took the opportunity to not only wage war against Austria, but also to bridge that territory in the Rhineland that it had gained and its territory in the east, because they were split basically down the middle, by waging and starting a war over this kind of complicated Chalicevich-Holstein question that you mentioned earlier. By attacking that area where basically Austria had a staked interest, they triggered a war with Austria knowingly and so effectively it ended up in in both of those conflicts once and for all establishing

Prussian domination so by the fact that they effectively annexed Liesbik and Holstein and beat Austria very decisively and very quickly that question was settled and you end up with this huge northern block, the North German Confederation that is dominated by Prussia and is sort of like a forerunner of the Second Reich. Is there an alternative history here? I mean, I always think, why did Saxony and Bavaria, these ancient, once mighty states, why were they not able to withstand pressure from the north, from Prussia?

Yeah, I mean, it's an economic thing, for one thing. So the smaller states are certainly feeling, you know, the Prussian sort of domination and threat here. And they know that by the way that Bismarck had, you know, what he'd done effectively to Schleswig and Holstein. But if you're one of the smaller states, then, you know, you've pretty much got a choice. that if you're one of the smaller states then you know you've pretty much got a choice you can either align yourself with the southern bloc and and hope that that will remain free of Prussian control or go with Prussia but sort of staying by themselves for the smaller states was was not really an option anymore Saxony is an interesting example because basically Prussia argued in 1815 they wanted the whole of it annexed to itself and it was only due

to the intervention of the other foreign powers that that didn't happen but it did get partitioned and Prussia basically ended up getting parts of it and so as a result of that Saxony was severely weakened. Bavaria is a bit of a separate case since they are basically quite a large and populous state themselves and as you say, a sort of longstanding European power. And so Bismarck knows perfectly well you don't wage war against them, because if you do that, they're never going to integrate into this new pan-German state. So it has to be done voluntarily, and hence why there's this kind of option to wage war against others.

Seems the better way to do it. But even after they defeated France in the Franco-Prussian War, and Bismarck sits down with them in 1870, once the French defeat is on the horizon, and tries to negotiate a unification with them, Ludwig, the Bavarian king, is still very, very reluctant to join. In the end, Bismarck resorts to writing a letter himself, pretending it's from Ludwig, and sends it to the Prussian king. And that letter basically says, yes, fine, I'll join the union. And to keep Ludwig quiet and basically make sure that he doesn't reveal that this letter

was actually written by Bismarck, he bribes him. And that's basically the way that that worked in the end. He was sort of half convinced that you ought to join due to the Franco-Prussian war, but not quite. And it's Bismarck's bribe in the end and Bismarck's conniving that gets the Bavarians on side. And you see that to this day, there's a strong separatist sort of movement in Bavaria still now, and certainly a very, very strong sort of local identity. sort of local identity. Yeah, you mentioned industry there, and I just want to pause before we talk about the famous Franco-Prussian war, or of course the big guy, the big guy Bismarck himself. And I want to ask about technology.

As I'm talking to you, I'm just wondering like how important is the industrial transformation of the 19th century to the building of a super state? You know, it's not an accident that like Russia, the US, Germany come in. Their cohesion is facilitated by technology, isn't it, by railways. I mean, if you think of Bismarck's vast Prussian army armed with its super accurate rifles that won those stunning victories over the Austrians, does the German super state owe a lot to technology?

Yeah, that's absolutely right. And is is naturally in a position to exploit that very well so you've got these sort of large flat plains in the in the north that are almost completely flat so this allows for instance very quick railway building from um the prussian rhineland over to to the sort of prussian heartlands in the east very very easily equally from the way you've basically got the resources in the Rhineland and in the Ruhr to build railway tracks from there to the ports in the north, to Hamburg and to Wilhelmshaven, for example, and those kind of big port towns, that's also very straightforward.

And so this allows very, very easy trade routes and links between where the resources are and where the consumers and where the workers are. And so you begin to see that even before unification, that in this sort of North German sphere of influence that Bismarck had built up, the forces of industrialization are at work. And that links back to what we were saying earlier about the middle class is pushing for unification. They are benefiting from that hugely. They're gaining vast amounts of money

due to these kind of industrial sort of empires that they build out for themselves. And they want unification. They want common currencies or a common currency. They want a common market. They want a common banking system so that they can basically trade across the German lands very easily

and move resources and people and goods across more easily. So the economic side is certainly a very, very strong factor in not only the unification process, but also why Germany ends up being a sort of European superpower pretty much straight away after it unified. Yeah, and I guess the attempt to turn Austria or all the sort of sprawling Habsburg lands into a cohesive state was quite hamstrung by its geography. Yes, I think that's a key point. Bismarck himself always argued it was also a cultural thing. So when he was still pushed on the fact that whether there's kind of greater Germany, this Grossdeutschland solution with Austria in it wouldn't be the way forward. land solution with Austria in it wouldn't be the way forward. He is supposed to have said something along the lines of he doesn't want to shackle his trim Prussian ship to the kind of

sinking old and trundling Austrian one, because he sees it as a, you know, not just economically, but also culturally and otherwise as an old and aging power that's on the decline. That's partially to do with the fact, as you said, that it's a very sprawling territory. Also, access to the seas is, of course, very tricky for Austrians, hence why all of the struggles in the Balkans to get access to trade links and trade routes. But also because it had existed for such a long time, its structures had simply begun to sort of grind down and bureaucracy was a big issue, whereas Prussia was seen as a sort of new, modern and more efficient, if you will, you know, to use the old cliche,

sort of more efficient power with a kind of Protestant work ethic to match, as Bismarck himself certainly would have argued. work ethic to match, as Bismarck himself certainly would have argued. You're listening to Dan Snow's History Hit. I've got Katja Heuer on talking about the German Empire more after this. Land a Viking longship on island shores, scramble over the dunes of ancient egypt and avoid the poisoner's cup in renaissance florence each week on echoes of history we uncover the epic stories that inspire assassin's creed we're stepping into feudal japan in our special series chasing shadows where samurai warlords and shinobi spies teach us the tactics and skills needed not only to survive but to conquer whether you're preparing for assassin's creed shadows or fascinated by history and great stories listen to

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All right, Katya, we've tiptoed around Bismarck for long enough. Is this an example of old-fashioned great man theory of history? Are we watching one man bend history with his ambition, his will? I mean, would this have happened without this giant of a statesman? He certainly made it happen in 1871. It's an interesting fact that Bismarck himself still said in 1868 that he doesn't think that German, or didn't think that German unification was possible within this century. So he actually still said, you know,

over 30 years before the end of that century that he didn't think it was possible. And it's when the opportunity opens itself to have another war against France, and also to make it so that the French would attack rather than Germany attacking, which is crucial. It's this defensive nationalism that he uses, that Bismarck himself grasps the opportunity against the expressed wishes of his king, Willem I, who's very, very reluctant and sceptical about the whole thing. So yes, I do think there is still an example here of one person, one individual, having a huge amount of influence over the way that history developed in this case. I mean, there had been Franco-Prussian tensions before, and without those, you know, Bismarck

would have had very little room to manoeuvre. But for him to then go in with this sort of infamous episode of the Ems telegram and provoke that war himself by his own words, with his own pen, if you will, is an example of his own actions triggering a huge chain of events that, you know, lead to even bigger developments afterwards. Yeah, talk me through, it's complicated, isn't it? Talk me through how the bellicose French emperor, Napoleon III,

who was Napoleon's nephew, Napoleon's first nephew, I think, how Bismarck managed to sort of trick him into declaring the war that the French thought they wanted, but actually they seriously did not want. I mean, it should perhaps be said that Bismarck knew Napoleon III very well. He'd been posted to Paris as the Prussian envoy prior to unification. And there he met Napoleon and spent a lot of time with him. So he knew him psychologically. He knew the French very well and knew sort of what he needed to do to trigger a sort of emotional backlash to actions from Prussia.

Nonetheless, having said that, he did need a specific thing to happen for that to work. And so what happened was that the Spanish throne became vacant. And there were various different candidates for that. And one of the people that came into question was a German candidate. And so whilst he didn't have a particularly strong claim to the throne and the Hohenzollern family, including Wilhelm, King of Russia, said, actually, no, that's probably not such a good idea because he knew, of course, that the French would,

the very last thing that they wanted would have been to be surrounded by Hohenzollern monarchies. Despite all of that, Bismarck starts his little sort of intrigues and encourages the Hohenzollern prince to make a claim for that throne. Not in the full expectations that that would fail, but he knew just how much the French

would respond to that and how many anxieties that would trigger. And so this pushed the French in a situation where they basically had to say, you know, do this and we will respond to that. And so one thing effectively led to another. In the end, the French in a situation where they basically had to say, you know, do this and we will respond to that. And so one thing effectively led to another. In the end, the French sent their ambassador Benedetti over to Prussia to try and resolve

the situation. And Willem himself was perfectly happy to resolve that situation and tell the ambassador that he had no designs to put Hohenzollern on that throne and go home and be safe sort of thing and he does all of that talks to Benedetti and then gives the transcript of that conversation to Bismarck to refine and because Bismarck was very very good with words and a very experienced diplomat you know he gives it to Bismarck to sort out instead of smoothing out the words and making them more diplomatic, Bismarck sharpens the wording of that telegram significantly, and basically makes it look as if the king had just flippantly dismissed Benedetti out of hand, and then sends that telegram back to France,

and not only back to the diplomats who maybe could have buried it somewhere and kind of tried to ignore it. But he sent it to the French press as well. So it got released immediately. And he did all of that on Bastille Day. So it couldn't get any more provocative. And Bismarck knew perfectly well what he was doing there. And at that point, it was out with the French public. It was out on Bastille Day.

It was an open slap in the face, if you will. And Napoleon III had no choice. He was an open slap in the face, if you will. And Napoleon III had no choice. He was internally under a lot of pressure in any case. So there had been Republican movements threatening the monarchy in France in any case. And he saw this as the only way out to save himself and his monarchy in France. And so this provoked the Franco-Prussian war and war was declared, importantly, by France on Prussia. Land a Viking longship on island shores, scramble over the dunes of ancient Egypt and avoid the Poisoner's Cup in Renaissance Florence. Each week on Echoes of History, we uncover the epic stories that inspire Assassin's Creed.

We're stepping into feudal Japan in our special series, Chasing Shadows, where samurai warlords and shinobi spies teach us the tactics and skills needed not only to survive, but to conquer. Whether you're preparing for Assassin's Creed Shadows or fascinated by history and great stories, listen to Echoes of History, a Ubisoft podcast brought to you by History Hits. There are new episodes every week. Douglas Adams, the genius behind The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, was a master satirist who cloaked a sharp political edge beneath his absurdist wit.

Douglas Adams' The Ends of the Earth explores the ideas of the man who foresaw the dangers of the digital age and our failing politics with astounding clarity. Hear the recordings that inspired a generation of futurists, entrepreneurs and politicians. Get Douglas Adams' The Ends of the Earth now at pushkin.fm slash audiobooks or wherever audiobooks are sold.

The Prussian army performs brilliantly, certainly initially anyway, in the sort of conventional period of the campaign. Is Bismarck responsible for that excellence as well? I would argue, and I don't think that's overly controversial, that the French were never in a position to win that war. They were just completely outnumbered. They had this sort of almost, I would say, paranoia about Germany having two things for every one thing that they had. So this basically was sort of the rule of thumb that the French had applied previously. This goes for people, resources, military, everything.

And so they were simply outnumbered and it was difficult to see how they could have won that war. The reason why it's very quick and decisive is not due to Bismarck, absolutely not. Bismarck was not, despite the fact that he wore military uniforms in public with a passion, he was not a great military thinker or military man. The man that did make his mark here is Helmut Moltke, the elder, as he is known, the uncle of his perhaps more famous or more infamous nephew, Helmut von Moltke, confusingly as well, who will lead Germany into the First World War. But Helmut von Moltke, the elder, was a great strategic thinker and also a moderniser in terms of the armed forces. So one of the things, for instance, that he introduced was an idea of flexibility within

the command structure, so that commanders lower down the chain, basically, were able to take the initiative as and when they saw the need to and were able to lead wars much more flexibly, if you will. So that's certainly one of the reasons, but also just the sheer fact that Germany just had an overbearing force at this point, collectively, as all of the German states pulled together, certainly played the key role, I would argue. Yeah, the second phase of the war, the one that gets overlooked, I mean, that gives Bismarck a nightmare, doesn't it? As the French people rise up in a kind of popular mobilisation

that very much presages the wars of the people's wars of the 20th century. Yeah, and also the way that Paris ended up the 20th century yeah and also the the way that that paris ended up kind of under siege almost in the bombardments that happened there so people i mean because the frank or passion war is such a uh kind of short and comparatively localized war when we when we compare it to the first world war people often forget that you know there was also horrible suffering involved in that, and also atrocities that were committed there. People also often forget the resilience that the French people showed in fighting back, something that gravely annoyed Bismarck, and why in the end ordered the scaling up of the bombardment of Paris. But yes, that's certainly an element in it.

Bismarck did, however, know that even if the war drags on a little bit longer, the sort of nationalist sentiment that would ensue from the feeling that people were involved in this war, emotionally and physically, would help him forge that German state later. So the more that German people felt that they had to sort of rally together and fight really hard against this sort of hated enemy and traditional enemy. Bismarck even called it a hereditary enemy, the French. He was sort of saying that that would be a perpetual thing. And I think so the drawing out of the war into the latter phases was not necessarily politically a bad thing as far as Bismarck was concerned.

I guess in the short term, but surely in the long term, creation of a savage enmity between the Germans and French was not great. The relationship by the side of the Rhine would poison European and world politics for generations. That's absolutely right and Bismarck was acutely aware of that. So when they'd won the war and there was a huge nationalist outcry there about annexing Alsace and Lorraine, the two provinces, French provinces, Bismarck urged caution. He actually said that he doesn't think that that's a good idea, simply because he knew that this would perpetuate this conflict with France forever. Like I said, he knew the French very well. And he argued even then that this would create a sort of revanchism movement in France that would

never die down and it would never lead to normalisation between the two nations. So he argued it's not worth it over the Germans that lived in Alsace to risk that sort of European stability that he would seek to build after the war. And so he himself was very, very aware of that. But equally, once nationalist outpouring was so great that he had to go with it and basically ruthlessly annex Alsace and Lorraine. He accepted that the French would be an enemy for a long time and was trying to build a European complex network of European alliances that would isolate France and allow Prussia to be, and Germany basically under Prussian leadership, to be accepted as a power by the other nations,

but without French consent, if you will. So Bismarck was quite aware of that problem. Yeah, I always remember, was it Bismarck who advised Wilhelm II, never let Russia drift back towards a French alliance, keep France isolated? Yes, although you would have done well, perhaps. I mean, the main thing that people here always argue about is the reinsurance treaty with Russia that Germany had signed with Russia about not going to war with each other, which Wilhelm lit laps. But in fairness to Wilhelm and Bismarck's successor as Chancellor Caprivi, Bismarck never disclosed the fact that he had actually made that treaty with Russia. It was so secret because Austria wasn't supposed to find out about it. He hadn't even bothered telling key people at court that.

Caprivi, his successor, effectively found out when it was almost too late and there was no chance to get that back. So in many ways, Bismarck perhaps could have helped to stabilise the legacy of his own reign to some extent, certainly more than he did end up doing. Katja, I can't believe I'm taking so much of your time. We're only really at the beginning here, because we've got to the founding moment, the birth of Germany in France, in Versailles. Yeah, absolutely. So when this Franco-Prussian war is won and Bismarck realises full well that the German states will only rally together and hand over a sort of German crown to Wilhelm, the Prussian king, if he can use that moment of glory, of victory, of the sort of basking in the nationalist aftermath of the war. And so he decides that the best venue to exploit that is not in Germany, not anywhere in the German lands, because that would have given whichever state he had chosen a sort of upper hand in the unification process. So it had to be a place outside of Germany. And what better place to choose than the very heart of the French nation, if you will, the Palace of Versailles.

or the Palace of Versailles. The other thing was that the Palace of Versailles itself, in the Hall of Mirrors, has got a huge ceiling painting on there, which glorifies the annexation of German lands by previous French kings. And so in many ways, Bismarck, that irony didn't escape Bismarck, that they were sat there under anti-German ceiling paintings and celebrating the making of the German nation right at the heart of the French. And the ceremony in itself is quite an interesting one, because it was largely attended by military personnel and, of course, by the German aristocracy

collectively, by the German princes, who'd all come together. But, you know, what we were saying earlier about it being also a people's movement,'s no sign of that at the at the proclamation at assai people are gathered outside the palace but again that's that's prussian troops and and troops representative of the other german state but it's entirely a military show and you won't find civilians anywhere inside and that's quite an interesting element of that. Bismarck himself wears uniform as well on the occasion. So there's no sense that a civilian sort of construct is being created here. It's all very much a show of military and aristocratic power. And again, Bismarck deliberately does that in the hope that it would reassure the collective German aristocracy

that he was not trying to build a sort of republic that would that would kick them all out of power but that he was in fact trying to set up a state that would ensure their power into the future. I mean it's been a very successful unification hasn't it I mean it's survived fascism catastrophic defeat partition occupation and yet Germany a version of Germany endures I mean what happened in the decades that followed the founding that helped create such firm foundations? I think one of the, it's both positive and negative collective experiences, I think, that forged Germany together so that, you know, sort of stayed together for such a long time. I think on the positive side, the experience of what Germans

can achieve together economically, for example, has certainly played a huge role. So there's an immense amount of pride in industry, in companies such as Siemens and AEG and BASF and all of those kind of economic giants that are beginning to be set up in the late 19th century. And also the progress that is made with it, so the technological advances that are being sort of uncovered at the time, all of this plays into this kind of ideology that collectively together, Germans can sort of achieve great things. And I think that was also, you know, part of the arrogance that ensued from that also was what led to the belief in victory in 1914. And then on the other side, and I think perhaps the more powerful side,

you know, you were saying despite the two wars, they stuck together. I think it's because of them. I think the First World War certainly works as a sort of catastrophe, if you will, of the German Reich, and that all Germans go through that together, experience defeat and humiliation and catastrophe and death together and camaraderie as well um which i think plays a huge role in molding the nation together because it creates a sense of you know we've done this together and we've gone through all of that together it's interesting

that when the french try to incite a partition in Germany after the First World War, at the end of the First World War, thinking that this is surely the moment when the Catholic Rhineland and the Catholic Southern states, who had long held their suspicions about German unity, might be persuaded to just break off and form their own countries. And that's very, very quickly shot down by those regions, despite the fact that they'd kind of despised Protestant overlordship over them for so long. So I think the catastrophes of both of those wars certainly play a huge role as well in moulding the German people together. But what about the years that followed the founding moment? What happened to unify

disparate parts of this new Germany? Well, I think under Bismarck, certainly. Bismarck did a very clever thing in that he realised that if Germans are fighting in a conflict with something or someone, they'll sort of rally together and that will create a sense of unity. And he was acutely aware that you don't perpetrate this conflict externally because of Germany's kind of rather dangerous position in the center of Europe and being surrounded by foreign powers. And so he decided to perpetuate that conflict internally. So he picked on one enemy after another, starting with the Catholics, for example,

in a sort of culture camp movement against them, which was supposed to value all the Protestants together. Then he ditched that, got the Catholics back on board against the Socialists, and made them an enemy, and he called all of these groups Reichsfeinde, enemies of the state. And sort of this idea that Germany was still at war, still in conflict with someone,

certainly helped rally the people together. Wilhelm II absolutely despised the idea when he came into power in 1888 of Germans fighting each other and had this somewhat naive idea that he would be the focal point and he would be the inspiration for everyone to embrace their German-ness. And so that conflict had to be perpetuated externally as opposed to internally. And so he not only started building an overseas empire of sorts, it was the third largest by the time that Germany gets to 1914,

but he also perpetuates the conflict by creating a certain degree of competitiveness and animosity towards Britain, for example, in the naval race, but also against the French when he's stoking up problems in Morocco and elsewhere. And so this idea that Germans would be rallied together in the face of conflict, I think, is a pervading one throughout the entire existence of the Second Reich. Well, there's so much talk about here that we've only really done the birth of the Reich. Come back on. Let's talk about its adolescence, its midlife crisis, and its full-blown difficult old age. Tell us all about the book.

So the book's called Blood and Iron, after Bismarck's famous speech, Blood and Iron, the Rise and Fall of the German Empire, 1871 to 1918. And yes, we should mention the famous phrase. Go on, tell us about the famous phrase. to 1918. And yes, we should mention the famous phrase. Go on, tell us about the famous phrase. He was arguing that Germany would only be unified by blood and iron, meaning war, and was quite acutely aware that it would take foreign conflict to be able to mould this kind of German empire into one piece. And I chose that title because I do think it's an idea that you see weaved kind of into this German narrative, certainly into the narrative of the Second Reich. And ironically, of course, the German Empire starts in blood and iron and ends in it as well when its downfall is caused by the First World War. Thank you so much for coming on the podcast.

Yeah, thank you for inviting me. It was good to chat to you. It's good to chat to you. Hi, everyone. Thanks for reaching the end of this podcast. Most of you are probably asleep, so I'm talking to your snoring forms, but anyone who's awake, it would be great if you could do me a quick favour.

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