Dan Snow's History Hit - The Surrender of Japan

Episode Date: August 12, 2025

On the morning of August 15th, 1945, Emperor Hirohito's voice crackled over Japanese airwaves to announce the unthinkable - the surrender of Japan. Today we delve into the complex story behind that surrender, examining Japan's fierce military code, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria.We're joined by Dr. Evan Mawdsley, historian of the Second World War, to unpack the final days of the Pacific War and explore what might have happened if Japan had not surrendered.Produced by James Hickmann and edited by Tim Arstall.Join Dan and the team for a special LIVE recording of Dan Snow's History Hit on Friday, 12th September 2025! To celebrate 10 years of the podcast, Dan is putting on a special show of signature storytelling, never-before-heard anecdotes from his often stranger-than-fiction career, as well as answering the burning questions you've always wanted to ask!Get tickets here, before they sell out: https://www.kingsplace.co.uk/whats-on/words/dan-snows-history-hit/.We'd love to hear your feedback - you can take part in our podcast survey here: https://insights.historyhit.com/history-hit-podcast-always-on.You can also email the podcast directly at [e-mail].

Hello folks, Dan Snow here. I am throwing a party to celebrate 10 years of Dan Snow's history hit. I'd love for you to be there. Join me for a very special live recording of the podcast in London, in England on the 12th of September to celebrate the 10 years. You can find out more about it and get tickets with the link in the show notes. Look forward to seeing you there. Sometimes, when you roll your own joint, things can turn out a little differently than what you expect it. Maybe it's a little too loose. Maybe it's a little too flimsy. Or maybe it's a little too covered in dirt because your best friend distracted you and you dropped it on the ground. There's a million ways to roll a joint wrong, but there's one roll that's always perfect. The pre-roll. Shop the summer pre-roll and infuse pre-roll sale today at OCS.ca and participating retailers. On the morning of August 15th, 1945, 80 years ago, a voice crackled for the first time

over the Japanese airwaves. Families gathered round the wireless had never heard this voice before. Only a sliver of imperial subjects had done. But it was one that belonged to someone that every single one of them knew. It was the voice. of Emperor Hirohito, he was announcing something unthinkable, the surrender of Japan. After years of brutal warfare in Asia and the Pacific, the Second World War there was finally drawing to a close. You're listening to Dan Snow's history, and in this episode I'll ask, how did it all come to this? What made the Japanese Empire, with its fierce military code, It's powerful armies remaining across much of Southeast and East Asia.

It's deeply entrenched, oft-repeated determination never to surrender. What made it lay down its arms? I'm going to delve into the complex story of Japan's surrender. There's the atomic destruction of the cities of Oshima and Nagasaki. There's the Soviet invasion of the Japanese Empire in Asia, in Manchuria, and the prospect of invasion of the home islands themselves. In this case, defeat had many fathers. I'm also going to ask in this episode what would happen if Japan hadn't surrendered.

We're going to explore the plans that the Allies had in place for a full-scale invasion and what that might have meant for Japan and the world. I'm happy to say we're joined by Evan Maudsley. He's the former Professor of International History at the University of Glasgow and a historian of the Second World War. and he's going to help us unpack the final days of the Pacific War 80 years ago and those fateful choices made on all sides that shaped the course of modern history.

Enjoy. T-minus 10. The Thomas bombs dropped on Hiroshima. God save the king. No black white unity till there is first than black unity. Never to go to war with one another again. And lift-off and the subtle has cleared the power. Evan, thank you very much to come back on the podcast.

Thank you very much, Dan, for inviting me to come back. Can you give me a sense of what Japan's war effort was capable of, or indeed what the Japanese people were experiencing through the summer of 1945? Was Japan on its knees? It's important to see this situation kind of from a broader point of view than just the Pacific. I always think of it as the Asia-Pacific War. There's a lot more going on than I think we often think of, or American audiences think of. In many ways, yes, the Japanese warfare is going badly.

Most of the Japanese Navy has been destroyed, and the Americans are now really under close approaches to Japan. On the other hand, most of the Japanese army is intact and is in China. The Japanese hold most of China. They hold more China in 1945 than they held in 1944. they still hold most of Southeast Asia. They still hold the Dutch East Indies and they hold Malaya, although they've lost Burma. So in some respects, although things are going badly from the Japanese point of view, one might think we shouldn't see it as being absolutely at the end of all possibilities.

And also the Japanese have been trying to rearm rapidly to deal with the approaching Americans and possibly the approaching Russians. So they've expanded their army in 1944-1945, and in the spring of 1945, they begin expanding the army in the homeland from about 12 divisions to 60. So there's a lot of expansion going on. You have to remember that although the war ended with Hiroshima, Japan wasn't being seriously bombed until March of 1945. And in fact, Japanese aircraft production peaks in September 1944.

So there are a number of reasons why the Japanese think that when I'm not, not really at the absolute end of our possibilities. Yeah, I was going to ask about that because there's so much discussion isn't there around the Allied strategic bombing campaign on Germany and whether or not it disrupted the German war economy. That debate presumably exists for Japan as well. I mean, how seriously were Japan, Japanese factories, munitions, production? How significantly they were affected by the enormous firebombing attacks on Japan's

cities through the summer of 1945? The Japanese population was being very badly affected when the bombing campaign really began in the spring of 45. The original campaign, which began in June 44, wasn't very successful because it involved how to do bombing and wasn't very accurate. In 45, they went back to what the British had done, which was large area bombings, which affected a lot more civilians. The idea was by doing that, you could indirectly affect things like the aircraft industry, but they were actually quite difficult. But I think they were coming towards the very end of the war. You know, this all kind of comes together. March, April, May, 45 is when the bombing really begins. The big Tokyo

raid takes place. So until that time, it could be somewhat more optimistic. I think things really begin to fall apart at the summer of 45. Okay. And oil, presumably, the whole thing began, if you like, because the Japanese home archipelago has not got enough indigenous oil. Am I right in thinking that because most of the merchant fleet's been destroyed by the summer 45, so Japan presumably isn't getting much oil? No, I mean, because Japan had no oil. And as you say, they went to war largely for things like oil and rubber, which they could get from Southeast Asia, the whole point of the American war effort, to some extent, has been cutting those lines of communications with the south. So, yeah, they're running low on oil, especially for aircraft, is a big dilemma.

The Japanese Navy was very badly damaged in a series of battles, but even if it hadn't been, they didn't have enough oil to sail. That's why they did one-way missions, because there was no way of getting back. There wasn't enough fuel for that. So that's desperately bad. Japan has some coal, but not an awful lot, and there's problems of getting rice and other things. So any defensive Japan will have to be done on a fairly primitive level. It won't be the kind of high-tech warfare that the Japanese did very well in 1941 and 1942.

So it's interesting that the Japanese situation is, if you look at a map of Asia and the Pacific, that some policy makers could think there was a sort of salvageable position there, but it's getting quite rapidly worse. It's changing month to month and it's getting significantly worse through the late spring summer of 1945. Yeah, so if you were a Japanese general, you know, you might think that actually things aren't that bad. If you were a Japanese admiral, you'd probably feel a lot worse about it. Yeah, yeah. But the army were important politically, certainly in 1945.

And as you say, the army actually doing reasonably well in China, which many of them would have regarded as the sort of main theatre. So that's interesting. Yeah, plus the Japanese think, you have this Japanese spirit, which gives us an enormous edge and a readiness to sacrifice, which the West don't have. Yes. You know, when you're talking about national spirit, I say this is a Brit, when people start appealing to just innate national spirit, you know, there's no plan. You know, there's no plan. Okay, so you mentioned admirals and generals, and I think you've given a sense there of this diffuse nature of Japanese decision-making.

Who's in charge of Japan? Is it the emperor? Who's making decisions? Who's thinking these things? A general point I'd like to make to start with this, that Japan is not a totalitarian state, is almost the opposite of totalitarian state. You could argue that Italy and Germany were aspiring totalitarian states, and you could say that Russia was a totalitarian state in that it was highly centralized.

And there was a center that controlled everything or attempted to control everything. The thing about Japan is it's kind of very dispersed. Everyone likes the emperor or, you know, worships the emperor. But the kind of civilian control over the armed forces is very limited. In theory, the emperor is in charge of everything, both the civilian side of things and the military side of things. But in effect, it means there's no center. There was a lot of inter-service rivalry during the war. There were debates about how the economy would run that couldn't be resolved.

and there was a highly authoritarian political system, but it was nothing like what was attempted in Europe or in Russia. It wasn't democratic, and it wasn't very efficient, but it was at least a lack of centralization that was important, almost dysfunctional, in fact, in terms of making decisions. One issue is there someone who can be seen as the dictator, and that was, I think Tojo was the person who featured heavily in Western propaganda, but Tojo gets removed in July 1984, when the Japanese Lus Saipan, he is ancient history after that. There's a kind of caretaker prime minister after that, but he's not particularly powerful. The Army High Command, the minister of the Army General Anami, and the chief of the Army General Staff, General Umetsu,

are both powerful, but, you know, the Army is not as strong as it was. They're quite inflexible about not surrendering, but their power is not limited in the political sense. There's no one politically, including the emperor, who is ready to stand up to them. It's a big debate about Hirohito and what his role was. Did he have a responsibility for the war? Was he a war criminal in the same way as the generals were? And of course, the odd thing about the Japanese war is that the emperor survives the war and is in place for decades after that. This was not unconditional surrender. And I don't want to get into what we can say about the emperor's responsibility. What I think he was coming around to in 1944-45 was some kind of negotiated peace.

but he wanted a negotiated peace from a position of some strength. In some respects, in terms of fighting the Americans, it's been one defeat after another. So from that point of the invasion of Okinawa in April 45 is for him very important. You know, let's defend Okinawa, let's fight a full-scale battle there, including, you know, mass kamikaze attacks, fighting to the death for the island, you know, in the hope that we'll get a victory of some kind. And the Americans and the Allies in general will then decide that, okay, we will negotiate, some kind of peace at the end of the war, it won't actually be a surrender. It won't be our victory, obviously, but it's going to be something where we survive. The problem is that the

Allies are saying that we want complete control over what happens politically, and we can't tell you what it's going to be. So the Allies, that unlike the Iraq War, perhaps, think the militarism in Japan is so deep-rooted that there can be no peace in East Asia until the Allies have physically gone in and reordered the Constitution and stamped it out, just like they want to stamp out Prussian militarism in Europe. Yeah, yeah, I mean, it's regime change. I mean, I think that's the point. And it goes back to the Casabanko conference in 1943 with unconditional surrender. It goes back to the Cairo conference in November, 1943, when the Chinese become involved, but makes clear that any post-war settlement will mean Japan giving up all its overseas gains, not just Manchuria, not just what it's gained in the course of the war from 1941, but also give up what it got from Russia in 2004, 1905, and what it got from China in 1890. from the Sino-Japanese War when Japan got Formosa, Taiwan, as part of his territory.

All of that has to go. And then when they talk about politics, they're really saying, well, yes, in effect, the country has been led by war criminals for the last five to ten years. They have to go. That's the entire ruling elite, and it might be the emperor. But that's what is not made clear. It's quite tricky for the Americans, at least maybe for the British as well, that although propaganda was mainly aimed at people like Tojo, you know, clearly the emperor was seen as

being a figure of hatred, someone who, you know, featured in propaganda as an enemy of the allies, it was very hard to say, okay, we want unconditional surrender, but the emperor can stay. You know, that's not really regime change. You want conceivably, not just the generals and the admirals, but also the emperor. The problem, again, who's making peace are the generals and the admirals? So it's like, you know, Turkey's voting for Christmas. If they approve the final Allied de Maris, is the Pashten Declaration in June 45, which basically says they all have to go. We have to get rid of the entire elite and introduce a democratic Japan, whatever that is. And then the elite, unfortunately, the ones holding the reins. Is that present? Okay. So very, very few people in the United States of America, including the vice president, we now know, knew about nuclear weapons, the nuclear program. So what is the plan in the naval staff, in the war department? What is the plan for how to defeat Japan?

It would seem to me that there are several plans on how to defeat Japan, although I was saying there was disagreement in the Japanese government. There's also disagreement in the American government and the armed forces as well. I'm not myself totally clear on who knew what about the atomic bomb. In fact, everyone, even people designing the bomb didn't necessarily know it was going to work until the summer of 1945. So it's a very unclear, obviously a very interesting factor in the war. The army seemed to feel that an invasion of Japan was necessary. There was no way of winning the war without an invasion. And General Marshall thought that the American population would not tolerate a protracted war

into the late 1940s, you know, rather than having invasion. I think Admiral King probably thought that blockade would have been another way in which the war could have been won and would not have involved the same sacrifice of American lives. It would have been not very good for Japan, but that would have been another way. I think the Army Air Force also thought that strategic bombing normal, not normal, but, you know, heavy incendiary attacks could continue. This is kind of like, you know, with Vietnam bombing Japan. pan back into the Stone Age, possibly that was another alternative idea. But on the whole,

I think that President Truman had come around to accept the idea that there was going to be an invasion. And the intention was that in November of 1945, which is actually a few or four months after August, that would have been an invasion of the southern Japanese island, Kyushu, supported by the bases that have been gained in Okinawa. And that it would be in the spring of 1946, that the main landings in Japan would be made in the area around Tokyo. So, Kanto Plain, that would bring the war to an end. So that's what a lot of the argument is about, would that have been an exceptionally bloody campaign. Remember that had the war gone on much longer, there would have been quite a large British contingent in the invasion of Japan. I mean,

there was already a large British task force cooperating with the Americans in 1945. There would have been elements of bomber command and also the British army. I like your comment you made a little while ago about the American Army Air Force, thinking they might be able to win it from the air, because after all, ever since the invention of aviation, there's no war that an aviation practitioner hasn't thought could be won through bombing alone. So that stretches all the way back 80 years. I think it was true both in Europe and in the war against Japan,

that the possibilities of bombing were exaggerated, but they did have a lot to do with strategy. In the end, a lot of Allied strategies getting air bases either in China to bomb Japan or in the Pacific Islands to bomb Japan. that kind of drives things. But yeah, I would agree totally about aviators. I'm not sure the admirals are much better, but I think it's always a kind of quick fix with that. There are all kinds of moral issues as well, obviously. And you mentioned that it would have been very bloody for the Americans, but the Allies and also for the Japanese people, as the fighting on Okinawa pointed

out, and we've got a separate podcast that you can go and listen to on the Battle of Okinawa and just how pulling that was, for everyone involved, including the enormous civilian population who suffered terribly. But this is where we switch track to the atomic option. It's obviously a gigantic subject, but just give me a sense of the Manhattan Project. When does that, well, it begins. It's Genesis in Britain, really, and then that British effort is amalgamated with that of the Americans. What about 1943? Yeah, well, in practical terms, 4243. Yeah, I was just in Berlin at the historical museum doing a kind of what if exhibition. And one of the what ifs was what if the American who dropped the atomic bomb in Germany first rather than on Japan. And I think it's probably

fair to say that the atomic bomb was developed in case the Germans themselves, who were quite hot on nuclear physics, were able to develop their own atomic bomb. So I think that was the key thing. But they just think about this exhibition in Germany, what they argue was that the bridge at Romagin is really, very important. The fact that the Allies were very quick to capture the bridge at Ramaghan. That's the bridge across the Rhine. Across the Rhine, yeah. If they hadn't captured that bridge and the war had lasted longer, then it would have been August or September, November, and 1945, the war would still be going on. The atomic bomb would have been operational. And the Americans were looking at possible targets which they could use in Germany.

How far one can push that? I don't know. What I would say was that the atomic bomb wasn't developed to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That's what happened. And anyone who's seen any of the films about the Manhattan Project will know that there was a lot of debate about what to bomb or where to and what the ethics of that were. In fact, the actual atomic attack on Hiroshima was, in effect, a decision to kill 70,000 to 100,000 civilians in one event. The argument then becomes, well, yes, that was terrible, but would the alternative have been worse?

But it was certainly not a simple decision, and it was not an easy decision, and it was not necessarily a moral decision. I'm not going to attempt now to argue for or against dropping the atomic bomb, but certainly it did involve 70 to 100,000 civilian deaths in one event. Was there an element of the United States wishing to prove to the Soviets that had that technology, you know, some of that other kind of 3D chess that comes into it? What's your sense around the decision that was made to drop that bomb? One of the things about the bomb, of course, is that it existed.

So therefore, you couldn't uninvent the bomb at that stage. You couldn't say, well, there was some alternative. I mean, I think certainly some people in the American government probably saw this as a kind of demonstration. I think more it was a sense of, well, what can we do to shock the Japanese into surrendering? And, you know, at one level, that's what works. You know, does that, in fact, have the effect? It gives the emperor the power to intervene. But I'd stress that really, you know, the bomb has dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945,

and peace is made on the 15th of August. I mean, no one is actually very, in Japan, it's very clear about what's actually happened. you know, Truman gives a kind of public discussion of what the bomb is, you know, what it can do, and that does filter through to the Japanese. But, you know, if you're an army commander commanding an army in China, this doesn't necessarily have that much of an effect on you. You know, you don't really see, well, what's actually happened? I can't see it. Americans have been bombing us for six months. What is the difference between that and now? And the Americans probably don't have a lot of atomic bombs. You know, maybe these two bombs are all they've got, and that's when they've dropped

them, there's no further thing. I mean, that's kind of why I think the Russian invasion is also important in that when the emperor eventually does say that we're going to make peace, and that's on the 15th of April, and he has this broadcast called the rescript, which is a kind of proclamation by the emperor. He says that, well, they dropped this terrible bomb on us, so we have to bring the war to an end. He didn't actually say we were surrendering, but he does say we're bringing the war to an end, and to do that, we have to stop fighting. Clearly, the bomb is used as a reason, for coming to making peace. But it's actually the first of two different

re-scripts that the emperor issues. The second rescript is one that he sends out on the 17th of August two days later. And that one is saying kind of more at the Japanese army in Southeast Asia and China and everywhere else saying, look, guys, Russians have now entered the war. They entered the war in the 9th of August.

You know what that means. That's why we have to surrender. So he was really saying in that statement to the army that the Russian entry in the war is actually more important. We hope the Russians might act as kind of intermediaries. That clearly isn't going to happen. The Russians have invaded us. We can't defend Manchuria.

So really, it's all over. And we have to cease fighting. But again, the whole idea that the emperor ends the war, but doesn't surrender. De facto, he is surrendering. But in effect, he's just bringing the war to an end. You listen to Dan Snow's history talking about the surrender of Japan and the end of the war or coming up. This episode is sponsored by the OCS Summer Pre-Rroll Sale.

Sometimes when you roll your own joint, things can turn out a little differently than what you expect it. Maybe it's a little too loose, maybe it's a little too flimsy, or maybe it's a little too covered in dirt because your best friend distracted you and you dropped it on the ground. There's a million ways to roll a joint wrong, but there's one roll that's always perfect. The pre-roll. Shop the summer pre-roll and infuse pre-roll sale today at OCS.ca and participate. retailers. Hello, cherished listeners.

This summer I'd love for you to accompany me on a history lover's holiday vacation around Europe. On the podcast throughout August, I'm going to be showing you Europe's most iconic historical hotspots. I've got a special series. You'll be glad to know, Dan Snow's Guide to Europe. We've talked to local experts. We're going to be exploring Notre Dame in Paris.

We're going to be talking about Napoleon there as well, obviously. We're going to be walking the streets of Pompeii. We're going to be getting there. adiator's eye view of the Coliseum in Rome. We're going to be unraveling the mysteries of the Minoans on the island of Crete. Let me narrate your historic summer on this podcast. Just hit follow. You'll never miss an episode. Let's talk quickly about that Soviet invasion. It's difficult for people perhaps to get their heads around the fact that technically the Soviets and the Japanese state of neutrality existed between those two countries,

despite Hitler's efforts to get Japan to enter the war, to invade the USSR from a different direction, which could have been game-changing, the Japanese decided not to, and it's only with the end of the war in Europe that the Soviets decide they're going to pivot to the east and invade Japanese possessions in northern China, that kind of Manchari area. It's before that. I think that they've agreed in 44 that they'll go into the war. once the European war ends, and then they agree with the Alta Pact that they'll do it three months after war ends. So, yeah, they have an interest in that. But yeah, it's important to bear in mind that Japan and Russia signed a neutrality pact in the spring of 1941. And they adhered

to that right the way through. I mean, the Japanese were tempted from time to time. But what they did do was they allowed a very large amount of Lendez shipping to go through what were in effect Japanese waters to Russian ports in the Pacific. So there was this position where Russia was, it wasn't doing a lot for Japan, but it was certainly Japan was doing a lot for Russia. The Japanese were aware that they had to keep Russia sweet. There was a danger. By the time you get to the winter of 1942, 43, it's pretty clear that the Russians aren't going to lose the war against Germany. And by the time you get to the summer of 44, the Japanese are advancing very rapidly. One thing, by the way, we haven't mentioned, which is actually quite

important, is that in May, 1945, Germany is defeated. Until that time, the Japanese was is slightly different. Okay, the allies are now fighting two wars in two different places. Now, with Germany gone, it's now the entire world fundamentally, you know, Russia, America, Britain, and China all against Japan. It's a tough game to play. The Soviet invasion of Manchari is fascinating, isn't it? I mean, it is like the Soviets have had their warm up. They've defeated the Wehrmacht in Europe, and they just turn around and employ those same deep penetration, massive artillery, vast numbers of men and tanks. And it's just an absolute route, isn't it? I mean, it's a complete disaster for the Japanese. I mean, the problem has been that the Japanese have been thinning out

the defense of Manchuria for the last three or four years. You know, in 1944, they're moving lots of divisions into the Pacific or back to the homeland. That was the cream of the Japanese army. The Japanese army throughout the 1930s has only one enemy, and that's Russia. Russia is always seen as the most dangerous enemy. America, in terms of the Japanese army, is not seen as a serious threat. Britain isn't seen as a serious threat. China isn't seen as serious threat. Russia really is. Russia is re-arming. Russia is industrializing. We fought a war of Russia in 1905. So it's a very dangerous thing. They are very aware of that, even in 44-45. They never underestimate the Russian army in the same way that the Germans do, because the Russian army actually fights

fairly well in 1905. I know it's defeated. Nevertheless, it's not totally defeated. And Russia is very big and very powerful. But when the invasion comes, I mean, it takes a long time to move forces from Europe to North Asia. You know, there's only one major rail line, and it's harder than you might think. But there's over 100 divisions by the time they actually get going. And unlike the Japanese army, they're used to fighting a war of movement. So when it does start, the Japanese army is overwhelmed. It also results in 600,000 Japanese soldiers being captured by the Russians and put into POW camps at the end of the war. It's a much bigger event than is often thought. It would be wrong to see it as Stalin being opportunistic. The Americans are very keen that Russia joined the war in the

Far East, that is, especially before the atomic bomb works. Given its intensity, you know, over a million and a half Soviet troops, 5,000 tanks, 600,000 Japanese, given its intensity in scale, it's got to be one of the shortest wars in history. I mean, it's a good pub quiz question, that the Soviet-Japanese War of 1945 is absolutely astonishing, isn't it? It's over in the space for a few days. Because, as you said earlier, on the back of Nagasaki, Japan is out of this war. Yeah, it's actually interesting. In scale, it's kind of like the German invasion of Poland in 1939 in terms of the number of troops involved. In fact, the number of Russian casualties is about as high as Polish casualties were in 1939. It wasn't just a walkover. There was a lot of

fighting, especially in the eastern part of Manchuria. But in the West, the Russian just swept through. This, again, maybe possibly American trucks. I never fail to mention Studebaker when I'm talking about World War II. But it certainly meant this, the possibility of advancing rapidly across terrain, which the Japanese thought was impassable. I wouldn't see it as opportunistic that the Russians have been worried about Japan for a very long time. And, you know, when Stalin does rearm or begins this massive industrialization program and modernization of the Red Army in the 1930s, it's with Japan in mind. And so we, have the Japanese surrender. It's a little bit difficult, isn't it? Because there must have been

concerned that diehard Japanese generals elsewhere in what was still a very far-flung empire would fail to get the message from their imperial palace. Was there some nerves around that? Yeah, I think they were worried about that. They were worried about POWs as well, that POWs would be massacred if people didn't make peace. So it was very important that the emperor was on board, I think. Because on the whole, the one thing which everyone kind of agreed about was the emperor that was a central figure, a godlike figure who they had to adhere to. That wasn't entirely the case, and the emperor was always wary about using his power. Maybe partly he agreed with the program, you know, with the wartime program.

But I mean, by 1944-45, he was an intelligent man. He realized that they were going to lose the war, or they weren't going to win the war. And unlike the generals, he had a more realistic view and he had less to lose. but certainly he was important. That's also very important after the war. I mean, I think the idea of keeping the emperor is important, both for getting the peace and the right kind of peace, but also for transforming Japan from this kind of militarist mess

in the 30s and 40s into something that was really quite close to a functioning Western-style government. As the Japanese flag came down across this great empire, former European colonial troops returned, the Brits to Hong Kong, the Brits to Singapore, the Dutch, the French to Indochina. But Japan's astonishing disruption of 1941, 1942, it changed Asia for good. I mean, that European powers would never fully reestablish themselves. Yeah, it's extremely important, I think.

There's the Dutch Empire, the French Empire, the British Empire. They don't survive that. In some respect, Singapore, for the British, is more important than almost anything else that happens in Europe. not than Dunkirk, but it certainly spells the end of British power in the Far East eventually, but also the rise of American power in the Far East as well. So from that time, the power of the European empires, and Europe in general, declines massively. Also, the post-war period in Asia is really very interesting. In China, the Allies insist that Japanese troops stay in place to maintain order.

There's a long time where the people holding things together, both in Japan and, say, in Indonesia. Japanese are also important in Vietnam for a while, you know, and holding things together. So what goes on is really remarkable, but also what happens in China especially, but what I think is the strange thing about all this is that it's not expected. You know, it's not expected the world end the way that it does. You know, all of a sudden, the war ends in like two weeks because of an event that nobody knows about. You know, it's not really, it's that which brings the war to an end. The Japanese just capitulate. There's no long-term fight to hold their possessions in East Asia. Once the emperor says war has ended, everybody accepts that. And there's

nothing really in place to deal with that. No one's got occupation plans for how will we deal with China or whatever. And they kind of, for example, they improvise with what they're going to do about Korea. They decide quite rapidly to divide Korea. Korea was part of Japan at that stage, to divide Korea into two zones very quickly. They have to send troops into Russian troops and American troops to do that. But it's not done with any long-term invasion clear-cut plans in place. So I would stress that that period in Asia, when Japan suddenly surrenders in this as a power vacuum, is a really very interesting one. Certainly is, and we can talk more about it in the years to come for all the 80th anniversaries of the big events. Well, thank you so much

for listening to me and asking questions that were really decisive in trying to understand what's going on and how things seem to the Japanese. Well, thank you very much, Evan Motley, for coming on. thanks very much for listening everyone before you go i'll tell you that ever at the cutting edge the bleeding edge of what's new and exciting after 10 years of the podcast you can finally watch on youtube we are moving fast and breaking things here folks our friday episodes each week will be available to watch on youtube and you can see me you can see what we're talking about i'd love it if you could subscribe to that channel over there just click the link in the show notes below and you can watch it on your phone, your tablet, or even a TV,

or even a giant cinema movie screen if you have one in your underground layer. See you next time, folks. This episode is sponsored by the OCS summer pre-roll sale. Sometimes when you roll your own joint, things can turn out a little differently than what you expected. Maybe it's a little too long. loose. Maybe it's a little too flimsy. Or maybe it's a little too covered in dirt because your best friend distracted you and you dropped it on the ground. There's a million ways to roll a joint wrong, but there's one roll that's always perfect. The pre-roll. Shop the summer pre-roll

and infuse pre-roll sale today at OCS.ca and participating retailers.