Dan Snow's History Hit - U.S. Interventions in Latin America and Beyond

Episode Date: January 12, 2026

For over 200 years, American presidents have repeatedly justified intervention as 'protection' - from the Monroe Doctrine of the 1820s, Teddy Roosevelt at the turn of the 20th century, to Richard Nixon and George H.W. Bush during the Cold War. America has a long history of using formal, informal, military and economic power to influence and exert control in its neighbouring countries and beyond. Dan is joined by Professor Daniel Immerwahr, historian and author of How to Hide an Empire: The Greater United States, to explore the ways in which America has shaped the political landscape in the western hemisphere for two centuries. They examine the parallels and differences of historic interventions like the 1954 coup in Guatemala and the 1989 invasion of Panama with the events of today.Produced by Mariana Des Forges, edited by Dougal Patmore.Dan Snow's History Hit is now available on YouTube! Check it out at: https://www.youtube.com/@DSHHPodcastYou can also email the podcast directly at [e-mail] up to History Hit for hundreds of hours of original documentaries, with a new release every week and ad-free podcasts. Sign up at https://www.historyhit.com/subscribe. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Welcome, everybody. Welcome to the podcast. Donald Trump has embraced the Dunrow Doctrine. Off the back of that extraordinary Special Forces raid, the exfiltration of the Venezuelan leader Majuro, he's talked about US interventions in Cuba, in Mexico, Colombia, even Greenland. Trump's State Department posted a picture of Trump, sort of asserting that the Western Hemisphere was the USA's Hemisphere. Others' supporters have been posting cartoon images of Trump,

Trump towering above the Americas, dominating the continents, which is so fascinating, a direct echo of early 20th century images of Uncle Sam bestriding the Americas, as previous generations of US policymakers flex their muscles in North and South America. Because folks, you must be bored of me saying this on the podcast, but none of this is new. We have seen those same cartoons. Just even the expression Dunrow Doctrine, it's a witty historic play on words. it harks back to the famous Monroe Doctrine. Now that was a, well, it began as an idea, really,

the musings of that president Monroe in the 1820s, with an eye on the Spanish colonies of Central and South America, a little bit of British activity here and there as well. Monroe gave a clear signal that Europe's time for interfering in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere were at an end. This theme was enlarged upon by subsequent presidents. It became the famous Monroe Doctrine, the idea that the Western Hemisphere was the United States of America's sphere of influence.

And for the last 200 years since Monroe, the US has expressed that commitment in a number of different ways. It's tried invasion, a fair bit. It's annexed territory here and there, like Puerto Rico. It's deposed plenty of governments. It's snatched a couple of leaders like Noriega from Panama in 1989 or Majuro from Venezuela just a few days ago. it has tried to kill others like Castro many, many times. The USA has long been drawn, it's long been interested in exploiting the abundant natural resources of its southern, well, and its northern neighbours. But Donald Trump and his advisers are happier than most

to be forthright in their discussion of that. So I think this is a really good time to talk about the USA and its different approaches to ruling, controlling, influencing, coercing its neighbors. I'm very lucky to have Daniel Emmervar on the podcast. He wrote the very successful How to Hide an Empire. He is the Bergen Evans Professor in the Humanities at the Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences at Northwest University. He's a fantastic historian and communicator, and he's going to help us understand how the USA seek to take care of business in its own backyard. The Thomas bomb dropped on Hiroshima. God save the king. black white unity till there is first than black unity.

Never to go to war with one another again. And lift off and the shuttle has cleared the power. Daniel, thank you so much coming on this podcast. Absolutely, Dan. It's a pleasure to be here. Now, I don't want to be tough on the USA here. I think it's nearly every country in the world is forged in the heat of conquest. Britain certainly is France, Spain, Germany, Russia, China. But you do see in the birth and growth of the USA, don't you? This is a project of conquest,

of expansion. Yeah, absolutely. So the United States starts out way smaller than it currently is. So you have that sort of familiar image on your mind of what it looks like on the map. It was nowhere near that size. And it is only through a series of wars and purchases that it sort of fills out that familiar shape. And it's not just that it is pushing away its imperial rivals, European powers to do so. is also dispossessing native nations within the borders that it claims from those European rivals to the point where even when it is purchasing territory, as in the case of the Louisiana purchase, the United States is fighting tooth and nail from many parts of that ground. They beat the Brits. They buy a chunk of territory of Napoleon. They invade Florida. They are

fighting indigenous peoples the whole time. Then you got the Mexican-American War. This is a dynamic empire in the 19th century. wildly so. By the end of the 19th century, the United States looks nothing like it looked at the start of the 19th century. Explain to me how the American government sold that. They were saying this was something different to these kind of European emperors, were they? Not all the time, interestingly. So especially by the end of the 19th century, the dominant strain in politics is the United States is a big boy and can sit at the big boy's table. And to do that is to be an empire, just like Britain, just like France. And that's what we've been doing the whole time in the West, the leaders say, and that's what we would like to do overseas as well. So there is a kind of vacillation in the United States, because on the one hand, it had been a colony. So a lot of its founding documents have an anti-colonial or anti-imperial animus.

On the other hand, it does a lot of violent expansion. And so throughout the 19th century, you see leaders trying to figure out exactly how to talk about it. But often they're fairly proud of the expansion part. And there were some pretty big plans. I mean, why stop on the Rio Grande? weren't there ideas about absorbing really, really significant further parts of, for example, Mexico in the 1840s and 50s? Why did it stop where it did in terms of its kind of lower 48th shape? Yeah, the pattern that you tend to see is that U.S. leaders want lands, but not densely populated lands, because what they want to do with the land is fill it with white settlers.

And so when the United States wins a war with Mexico and occupies Mexico City, it has the option of taking, much of Mexico as it wants, including some people are talking about, take all Mexico. And what you see instead is a sort of carefully curated border that gives the United States as much of Mexico as it can get with as few Mexicans, the idea being that it doesn't want heavily populated territory that would then have to incorporate those people into the country. It just wants the space that it can then fill with its own people. Tell me about the Monroe Doctrine, because this is something that is being talked about a lot at the moment. And this is 1820s. This is a long time.

time ago. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, so first of all, Dan, I need to correct you. We now call it the Donro Doctrine. I heard. Yeah, the very exciting development in the United States. Okay, so the Monro Doctrine is one of the most massively misunderstood things in U.S. history, including its title, we call it a doctrine as if it had had any kind of force or had been intended as such. It is three non-sequential paragraphs in a equivalent of a state of a union address, an annual message to Congress in which the United States or the President of the United States articulates a principle that it would be great if European powers didn't interfere any more than they already have done in the Americas. There's no enforcement mechanism. It's not a law. It's not voted on.

It's just a kind of articulation of a we would like it if this didn't happen. But it doesn't push Europe out of the Americas. You're still as colonies in the Americas. And it also doesn't do the thing which Donald Trump is really excited about, which is it doesn't give the United States any particular power over the rest of the Americas, and it wasn't intended to. Sounds to me, Daniel. The Monroe Doctrine might be your version of Magna Carta. It didn't really matter at the time, and hardly anyone noticed it happening, but it's that it's imbued later on with all these generations of people talking about it, suddenly has this thing of great power.

Right. It takes a while before anyone calls it a doctrine. And I think a big moment is in the 20th century when one of the more jingoistic and bellicose presidents, Teddy Roosevelt, then said, okay, actually the real implication of the Monroe Doctrine, he then said the thing that Trump got excited about, is it's not only that European powers oughtn't to meddle in the Americas. They oughtn't to do so because that is the job of the United States. The United States has a right to, quote unquote, protect the Americas from European interference, which might involve, I don't know, running their customs houses or something like that. Okay, and Daniel, that's interesting because that's Roosevelt. That's the early 20th century when

this project of filling in the map of what we now call the lower 48 states. So New England, down to Florida, cross to California, up to Pacific Northwest. That's sort of largely complete by that point. So is Roosevelt now pivoting? Is they thinking, okay, so what's next? What's going on in the neighborhood? Yeah. So it takes a while not only for the United States to assemble all the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle to click them into place to generate the familiar silhouette of the country. That takes into the 1850s. Then it actually takes a while for those places to be effectively under U.S. control because they are under native control into the late 19th century.

And at the moment when it looks like the United States has assembled a lot of that territory, pacified its own territory, then there is a debate which Teddy Roosevelt plays a part, which is what is step two or what is phase two. And some people argue, there's a very influential argument at the time associated with a guy called Frederick Jackson Turner, that the act of expanding and the act of confronting Native people, in fact, has been so constitutive to the U.S. character, to U.S. politics, that it would be a political loss to have no more frontier. And Turner isn't exactly clear what, you know, he says, well, maybe this just means that we're entering a new phase. But for people like Roosevelt, the answer is, oh, we need to make more frontier. And so first there's a kind of burst of colonization that includes Puerto Rico, the occupation of Cuba, the annexation of the Philippines.

And then there's also a kind of interest in other forms of control. And those are the things that Roosevelt is talking about when he articulates the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Okay. So, yeah, look, you just mentioned a full annexations. This is empire. This looks a lot like what the British are doing. And so the Americans at that point are like, we can get into that game.

Our founding documents don't kind of force us down a different path. They're quite explicit about this. And they have a kind of moment where they have to think, well, what did we mean by those founding documents? Clearly, they shouldn't limit our ability to annex the Philippines. And so you have people like Roosevelt saying, okay, yeah, these Republican principles are important, but they were always implicitly just for white people. Like they can't possibly apply more broadly. Look what we've been doing to the Apaches.

You know, like we clearly didn't mean it then. So the United States kind of figures out a way to racially bound its founding principles. Well, they always kind of had been racially bounded, but to explicitly do so, so that it can proudly take in colonies and start to emulate Britain. And yet, there's also a different kind of American imperialism, which is actually, as you say, we don't really want to take control of vast tracts of land with lots of tiresome people in it who need roads building and schools building and expensive insurrections putting down. So talk me through this other type of American control in this hemisphere.

Yeah, so we often call that informal empire. And the idea is that it doesn't have the formal trappings of empire. You don't run someone's flag down the flagpole and run yours up, but you have effective control. So it's all the substance of empire without none of the officialities of it. So part of that happens when the United States annexes the Philippines and gets into an incredibly bloody war in order to put down Filipino nationalism, a war that kills hundreds of thousands of people. a war that seems as if it kills more people than the U.S. civil war. And after that, even jingoists feel bruised and start to see that there might be a virtue in a different kind of control. And so right after the United States has annexed a number of places, including the Philippines,

it starts to engage in what historians call dollar diplomacy or gun bullet diplomacy, which basically involves the United States, taking effective control of a number of countries. around the Caribbean, but not annexing him. Is that by building a canal, building a port, and then effectively controlling the economic vitals of the country without having to actually... Oh, no, no. Let's be clear. It's by sending in the Marines.

Oh, okay. That's step one. Yeah, yeah. You send in the Marines in the case of the Dominican Republic, which is the country that Roosevelt had in mind when he was declaring the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. You send in the Marines and you seize the customs houses. And so there is a lot of occasions where the United States takes control of the foreign policy of a Caribbean or Central American state, takes control of the military, takes control of the

economic policy, but is kind of happy to allow local politicians to deal with local political issues and officially hasn't annexed those places. So they kind of take the bits that they want? They take the bits that they want. Yeah. So the customs house, just so people are clear what we're talking about the trade. Yeah. I don't want to get too brash here, but unlike stealing tankers as they're arriving and leaving

from a certain, you know, Venezuelan ports, for example. Yeah, that's exactly right. You can see the things that Trump wants and the things that Trump doesn't particularly want. I don't think Trump is eager to govern Venezuela. I think Trump wants control of oil sales and oil production in Venezuela. And if you can have that, he would let the rest go hang. And to be clear, that does place Trump within along an ancient American tradition? Yeah, that's true. Trump looks a lot like presidents around the, like, like, 19th century, early 20th century. So you've got the brutal, formal empire, the attempt to control territory, insurgency,

savage, counterinsurgency's expensive, morally corrupting, going on the Philippines. They're the First and Second World Wars, which are, in many ways, couch as anti-imperial struggles. Do they deliver the same blow to those ideas of formal empire in the US that they do say in Britain and France and the Netherlands, right? Yeah, World War II, it doesn't end formal empire, which is still technically ongoing. And it certainly doesn't end the bulk of colonial arrangements immediately. But it really does do a number on formal empire. And if in 1930, about one in three humans on the planet is colonized by 1965, it's more like one out of 50. So there's just a massive change. And that has a lot to do with World War II. And that happens in the United States too. So World War II, it doesn't exactly lead to. It's a little complicated how they relate. But But right after World War II, the largest U.S. colony, the Philippines gets independence, and then two other large colonies, Alaska and Hawaii. They don't get independence, but they become states, which had been elusive for them for a while.

And so the U.S. still has today five inhabited territories. Puerto Rico is the largest, but it doesn't seek to expand its power by and large by claiming large swaths of land. The United States has an enormous amount of power, and it doesn't generally try to express that power or expand that power by seizing acres. This is Dan Snow's history here. More after this. Tell me about, I mean, it's obviously a huge subject, but there's sort of troubled history

of particularly central and South America and U.S. imperialism there after the Second World War and how the U.S. would make itself felt in those regions to achieve its aims. Okay, so imagine that the United States is interested in some level of control. but also imagine that it doesn't want to take over colonies. Doing that is going to be a bad look for the Cold War. Doing that is going to lose it a lot of legitimacy in the global south. It's going to be hard for the United States to say that it stands for freedom when it is sending in the Marines and running its flags up the pole. So what you see in the United States, and particularly in its so-called backyard in Central America and Latin America more generally is a sort of carrot-and-stick approach.

So states that are compliant with the United States will get aid and they'll particularly get military aid. And then states that defy the United States are likely to find themselves on the wrong end of a coup attempt. So over the course of the Cold War, the United States tries to intervene illegally to tilt an election or just overthrow our government 64 times. And it succeeds 25 of those times. Wow. So it's almost once a year. Yeah, it's fairly constant. And I mean, it's not just happening Latin America. It's happening all over the globe. And it puts every leader in a very weird binds because if you are compliant with the United States, you've blocked a danger on one side, but you almost certainly will piss off your populace because you will have to do things that are politically unpopular, like just send tankers for free to the United States. So you've got a problem at home. If you defy the United States, that might gain you some political legitimacy and popularity. but then you've got a problem with the United States. And you see this kind of bifurcation where people have a really hard time holding the middle, and you tend to get like hard right-wing or hard left-wing authoritarians, because it's just the presence of the United States making political demands on weaker countries again and again creates an enormous amount of political instability.

And what are U.S. aims here? Do they tend to be economic and inner focus or political, or maintaining a strict anti-communist stance in the kind of political sphere? Or is it about oil in Venezuela, fruit companies elsewhere, making sure that American investments are protected and against nationalization, that bogey man? Yeah. So I think there are two kinds. Some interventions do seem motivated, at least in part, by there is this resource in this country

and it's being nationalized and we would like to prevent it from being nationalized or reverse its recent nationalization. So we're going in. And famously, that happens in Guatemala. It happens in other places as well. But the United States is also interested in this system. So even in places where there seems to be little immediate economic benefit, like what resources is the United States going to get from Vietnam compared to how many lives it loses

in Vietnam? And when you look at a place like Vietnam, you're not looking at just a rich set of resources that have to be stolen. You're looking at the United States wanting to maintain its credibility, wanting to show that at the end it will dig in its heels again and again and again until it gets what it wants, which is a way of kind of protecting its power in other countries. and in some ways making it easier for the United States not to have to intervene every time because people will see what's happening in Vietnam.

They're like, oh, that is a lot of napalm being expended. I don't want that to happen to my country. You mentioned Guatemala there in 1950s, and I think that's such an interesting example. There's a powerful U.S. corporation, the United Fruit Company, local elected president sort of threatens their stranglehold. And then the U.S. launches this, we'd now call it a kind of Putin-esque disinformation campaign, psychological warfare, like a mixed form of warfare that we think is terribly modern, but feels like it was what was going on in the 1950s?

Yeah, so it's a coup attempt, but the question is, how do you do a coup? How do you actually pull that off? What you have to do is, ideally you want a sort of critical mass of people thinking, or people in power thinking, this is going to happen, and since it's going to happen, I better be on the right side of it. So that's every coup is just like always this game of like, are we feeling like government's about to fall right now, or are we feeling not? And sometimes you see them sort of vacillate and, you know, someone president resigns and then unresigns.

So what the United States is trying to do in Guatemala is send in troops. Obviously, that's going to be the main act of destabilization, but then create such a sense of panic and inevitability that it will bring the government down. And then officials in Guatemala will be like, all right, the government is clearly fallen and I'll cooperate with the new one. And so part of that is that it has this kind of high powered radio station outside of Guatemala called Radio Swan. and it just starts blasting like disinformation during the coup, including coded messages to non-existent battalions. The fish will rise tonight, you know, like Pedro was in the house. These mean nothing, but they sound like their orders to battalions that are about to invade.

And it's all a way of just creating a sense of confusion and fear that will ultimately lead the relevant people to resign or the relevant people to decide, okay, I'm just going to side with the United States. Yeah, because the Venezuel example recently is interesting because although Trump, can be unpredictable. Everyone does seem to agree that what he doesn't want to do is put boots on the ground. So he's assembled this vast amphibious strike force off the coast of Venezuela, but that, like you're describing, it seemed to be the kind of destabilizing way to freak out Venezuelan decision makers. He's not expecting his bluff to be called on for him to have to land 15,000

men on a beach in Venezuela and risk the terrible casualties and the blowback that might resolve. Yeah, I mean, warfare is always like that, right? You kind of hope that you can, to use the term of another U.S. President, shock and awe the enemy into just surrendering. Because you don't want to have to fight to every last man. That's going to be exhausting for everyone. You want shows of force and you want decisive, scary, surprising acts. And I think the White House has, especially in the last decades, become very entranced with the idea that it might solve its political problems with air strikes, that we have such power to, as the U.S. military sometimes puts it, put warheads on, foreheads and to just target exactly the right people that the United States could do these so-called surgical strikes, could come in do exactly what they want and leave. That's the fantasy.

I'm not sure that that's the reality. That was also the fantasy of a recent U.S. President George W. Bush. That was how he envisioned the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq going, and instead they led to bloody, prolonged, expensive occupations. Let's finish off Guatemala, because you do get a pro-US regime. Yeah. The interests of the fruit company are protected, but does he fall foul of the process you're describing, which is his inhabitants, think he's sold out to the U.S.?

Yeah, yeah. So, I mean, the guy who comes in, he'd been trained by the U.S. military. I mean, part of military aid is that a lot of foreigners actually have sort of trained on U.S. basis. He's a colonel called Carlos Castillo Armas. And according to Richard Nixon, who's the vice president at the time,

Castillo Armos, had told him, him, tell me what you want me to do, and I will do it. And that looks like a massive win from the perspective of the United States. What more could you want? What more fawning puppet could you want? Just tell me what you want to do, and I will do it. The problem is, those people are really bad at governing. Those people are really bad at holding onto power because Theo almost doesn't hold on for that long. And the story of Guatemala is not the story of just an stable, popular, prosperous regime. It's the story of the cycles of repression and violence and insurgency. The post-cue history of Guatemala is just a really tragic one.

But actually, that's true in a lot of countries. There's a political scientist called Lindsay O'Rourke who just looked at what happens to countries after the United States tries to overthrow the government. And the answer is they are more likely to clash with the United States. They're more likely to have a subsequent coup, and they're more likely to engage in massacres against civilians, all because of that dynamic of. of you either have to please the United States or you have to please people who are very pissed at the United States. And it's really hard to find a stable ground between those.

Yeah, you wouldn't want to be in the shoes of the current ruler of Venezuela, the successor Maduro in Venezuela. Delci Rodriguez, what is she going to do? Yeah, and you hear it coming from both sides, right? On the one hand, she seems to be telling the United States, you know, it's okay. You don't need to take me out too. I'll just do what you want. But then it's quite clear that within Venezuela, the position of the regime has to be. This is a great, outrage. And, you know, I can't believe that this happened and we're decisively opposed to this. I don't know how long she's going to be able to keep doing both those things. We should quickly mention Panama because the Panama Canal was something that Trump talked

a lot about in his early months in this second term. It's got a little bit more quiet now, although it's been mentioned again more recently. Panama's an interesting one because the U.S. paid for and constructed this gigantic infrastructure project, the Panama Canal. In doing so, was that annexed territory or was it licensed or what was its relationship like with the government of Panama while that was going on? Yeah. So first of all, let's just do a little geography. The Panama Canal goes through Panama. So the Panama Canal Zone is just a belt that goes from one side of Panama to another side. So to have any foreign power controlling the Panama Canal or the Panama Canal zone is basically to make Panama discontinuous that you would not be able to get from one

part of Panama to another because you'd have to pass through this belt, the Panama Canal Zone. So what was it? Yeah, so the United States, through a series of political machinations, managed to gain control of the Panama Canal Zone. It never technically annexed it, but it operated it with such uncontested control and on such a powerful lease that it was virtually as if the United States had annexed it and to the point where the United States would include the Panama Canal Zone in the U.S. census. It was largely felt to be part of the United States, even though it was just a notch below technically a territory.

So this is one of those gray areas, sort of formal, informal empire. And yet Trump talks about it a lot. So at what stage does the U.S. grip on that sort of loosen? Yeah. And first of all, I want to clarify, there's a lot of places where the United States has control, but not sovereignty. The Pannamont Canal Zone is a place that looks really close to sovereignty. It's sort of like Guantanamo Bay in our regard or many of the U.S. military bases.

So, yeah, it's interesting that Trump was seeking to reclaim the Panama Canal Zone. That's not the only thing that he's asked for. He's sought to annex Greenland. He's talked about making a state of Canada. He talked about taking an ethnically cleansed Gaza and building it out, but it would be also owned by the United States. And all of this is a really startling reversion to the kind of politics that you and I were just talking about, the 19th and early 20th century forms of politics.

And it's a startling reversion because although the United States has sought to throw its weight arounds, it's had numerous designs on numerous countries, the idea of actually claiming, conquering or purchasing in some way annexing another country, that has really been off the menu for U.S. presidents in every kind of relevant sense for decades. It's not something they have talked about, but it's also, I think, not something they've sought. Panama is an interesting example as well because I remember we were all obsessed to. with the case of Noriega, who was a sort of shadow leader in Panamani. And perhaps not wholly unlike the Venezuela example, he was removed and sent for trial in the U.S. Not quite a snatch operation, but not a million miles off in the 1980s.

No, it was a bloodier operation and involved more sort of urban street fighting. There's debates about how many people were killed, but 500 to thousands would be, you know, a reasonable thing to think. So it was a messier operation in that sense. But it had the kind of pattern that I think Trump is hoping for, which is the United States went in, got its guy, brought the guy to trial, and left. And that was it. You know, and then swore the new guy in on a U.S. military base in the Panama Canal Zone as it happened. And I think Trump is hoping that Venezuela will look like the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama rather than, say,

the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. All of which makes me feel that while some people have been ringing their hands about how just this is such a departure. The USA is abandoning the rules-based international order. Something like Trump is acting within the mainstream, if you like, of US strategy in its quote, unquote, its own backyard. Yeah, I think there are two differences. One is the difference in how Trump discusses it, because part of the rules-based order was that you had to make some sort of reference to the rules, that this was an example of rules following, not of rules breaking. So even actions that seemed like aberrations were not challenges to the whole system or we're not tearing up of the rulebook. And Trump seems completely uninterested in making

that kind of argument. So when he gave his astonishing press conference, he started out by saying, well, you know, this is because Majoro has broken some laws and we're going to try him for those laws. But then immediately unbidden, he just started talking about oil. We want their oil, our oil, as he called it. So all of that kind of part of the rules-based order seems to be out the window. And then, although Trump has only talked about occupying Venezuela to get its oil industry back on its feet, at the same time he is demanded to annex Greenland. And that is different. In the past decades, presidents have not sought to colonize territory. And that does feel like a real departure within the liberal international framework. Daniel, what a great place to end it. Tell everyone what your brilliant book is called.

How to Hide an Empire, a History of the Greater United States. Fascinating stuff. Thanks going on the podcast. Great. Thanks for having me. Well, thank you so much, Daniel, for coming on the podcast. I really enjoyed that conversation. We're going to be watching what happens very closely. Over the next few days, weeks and years, I expect. And if there's any other history that you're looking for help to understand, to have explained right now, then please send us an email.

I will be on a Nile Felucca, sailing gently the length of Egypt, for the next few weeks. But thanks to the wonders of modern communications and thanks to the fact that producer Marianne DeForge is manning her workstation in Swinging London, we will be able to see and respond to all of your wonderful ideas. So thanks for sending them in. Thank you, of course, for listening. We'll next be chatting with you on Thursday. When we're going to be doing something a bit different, I'll be telling you the story of the Dam Busters raid, Operation Chastas. You want Special Forces missions. I got one right here. We do it all in this show. for now.