Dan Snow's History Hit - Who are the Houthis?

Episode Date: February 7, 2024

As Houthi missile attacks on shipping in the Red Sea continue, we turn to the past to answer the all-important questions - who are the Houthis, and what do they want?Dan is joined by Baraa Shiban, a Yemeni human rights activist and Associate Fellow with the Royal United Services Institute in London. Following the Houthis' coup in September 2014, he participated in rounds of negotiations with the rebels. Still, he was forced to go into exile due to his criticism of their human rights abuses. Baraa explains the history that created this Islamist organisation, their ideology, and what its goals are.Produced by James Hickmann and edited by Dougal Patmore.Discover the past with exclusive history documentaries and ad-free podcasts presented by world-renowned historians from History Hit. Watch them on your smart TV or on the go with your mobile device. Get 50% off your first 3 months with code DANSNOW sign up now for your 14-day free trial.We'd love to hear from you! You can email the podcast at [e-mail] can take part in our listener survey here.

Hi everybody, welcome to Dan Snow's History Hit. As I record this in the first week of February 2024, US and UK aircraft have struck Houthi targets in Yemen and in turn a British merchant vessel has been struck by a drone whilst transiting that stretch of ocean off the Yemeni coastline. The war in Yemen, which as you'll hear has been rumbling on for decades, has now drawn in the world's superpower and its allies. This podcast, folks, is the story of Yemen. This is a story that you will recognise. It will seem quite familiar, I think, because it's a story of globalisation. It's a story of the march of Western economic, political, social ideas, and of a deeply conservative religious backlash that those

ideas can engender. It's also a tale of declining empires, of ambiguous successor states jostling for position. It's a story of local politics intersecting and being manipulated by regional powers and even world powers. It's a story of the blight of civil war, of those civil wars sucking in their neighbours until the conflict widens and deepens. And above all, perhaps, it's the story of unintended consequences and how decisions taken in distant corridors of power can unleash misery and humanitarian catastrophe in unexpected places. Today, as I record this, Yemen is divided by the Houthis who control about a third of the territory, but two-thirds the population.

And the other third of Yemen, which is controlled by, well, a mixture of local warlords, people backed by the Saudis, and those backed by the United Arab Emirates. Before October 2023, and the horrific attack on Israel, and the violence, the war that has followed in Israel and Gaza, the Houthis were actually pretty unpopular. They were authoritarian, they were deeply conservative, and well, they're incompetent. They couldn't run a state. But not for the first time in history, in a foreign war, they spotted an opportunity. Their bellicose support for the Palestinians has neutered their opponents in Yemen, it's incurred the wrath of America, and that has proved to be a domestic

PR coup. Joining me on the podcast now to talk me through the history of Yemen is a man who was once fully immersed in its turbulent politics. A man who is now an associate fellow with the Royal United Services Institute in London. His name is Barah Shiba. Barah is not just an academic, a scholar, a writer. He has lived this story. He's lived it on the front line. Following the Houthi coup in September 2014 in Yemen, he participated personally in rounds of negotiations between different groups in Yemen, but eventually was forced into exile

due to his criticism of Houthi human rights abuses. We're very, very lucky to have him on the podcast to tell us more about a story that we need to know about. T-minus 10. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. God save the king. No black-white unity till there is first and black unity. Never to go to war with one another again.

And lift off, and the shuttle has cleared the tower. All right, thank you very much for coming on the podcast. When we talk about Houthis, are people talking about a geographic, an ethnic, a religious, ideological proper noun? What does the title indicate? Okay. The Houthis is an armed theological and transnational ideological movement. The name originates from the founder of the movement. His name is Hussein al-Houthi, and that's how they became known in Yemen and abroad. But they use the word Ansarullah, which means the partisans of God. But nevertheless, the important part of the Houthis is they have a transnational ideology. And that's the element that they do share with the Islamic Revolution of Iran, which simply states is they

do not like the US-led regional order in the Middle East. And the second thing they also share with Iran is they do not see the Saudi regime as worthy of being the custodians of the holy mosques. So that in terms of what do they have in common? They started in the northern province of Saada, that's in North Yemen. In North Yemen, the predominant Islamic sect, if you'd like, is called Zaydiism. Now, in terms of religious theology, they're actually much closer to mainstream Sunni Islam, including the mainstream school of thought in Saudi Arabia. They're actually much closer to Saudi Arabia in terms of Islamic jurisprudence than they are with Iran. The issue is when it comes to their political, you could say political ideology, and how they view their foreign policy. And that's where they come very close to Iran. Now, talking about Zaidism, Zaidism started in Yemen in 1893. It

believed in creating a ruling dynasty. And to simplify it for the listener, there are certain families in Yemen who claim that they have direct lineage to Prophet Muhammad and therefore they have a divine right to rule. Zaydiism for many centuries really created a social caste system because of this belief of this, you know, there are certain families,

there are certain group of people and this social caste system. Because of this belief of this, you know, there are certain families, a certain group of people, and this social caste system kind of divided Yemenis into different social classes. And that's where they can part away from the new constitution and the republic ideas of Yemen. The second thing, which is very important, is the Houthis meet with Iran in terms of also their regional policy. And that's why they've managed to create this relationship and constantly have grown closer and closer to Iran as the time moves on. Let's now go back into a slightly deeper past. In the world of the caliphate, in the world of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, was Yemen just part of the Arabian Peninsula or was there distinctive Yemeni culture, government, identity within the Arab world? Yemen was part of the Ottoman Empire, but it had its own autonomous authority. So the rulers, especially in North Yemen,

authority. So the rulers, especially in North Yemen, were considered to have their own form of governance. So a specific arrangement between them and the Ottoman Empire gave them some autonomy. The south was a British colony, especially the southern city of Aden. And that's why it is not easy just to compare the Houthis with the old monarchy, although they do inspire some ideas from that system. And of course, they do gain support from some of the people who feel that they've lost their privileges during the Republic, when Yemen became a Republic. And that's why they draw the attention of a certain group of people who believe that with a Houthi-dominated Yemen,

this social class, who claim that they have direct lineage to Prophet Muhammad will have more privileges and rights compared to how the situation is for four to five decades of Yemen's republic. Yes, we should say. So we just quickly fill people in. Aden had been a British possession since the 1830s. It's not unlike Singapore, Gibraltar, Hong Kong. It was a sort of little enclave, little maritime enclave to protect sea routes and allow British trade, international trade to stop in a kind of protected British administered port. But the rest of Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula are still under Ottoman overlordship. But what happens when the Ottoman Empire collapses at the end of the First

World War? So the Ottomans reached an agreement with the Imams. And that's basically the rulers who, again, they inspire their political ideology from Zaidism and believe that they are direct descendants of Prophet Muhammad, that they will be the new monarchs for Yemen. Zaydiism also, very importantly, the imam, or in other words, the ruler, is not accountable to the public, according to Zaydi's school of thought. He's accountable to qualified scholars who are also descendants of Prophet Muhammad. Yes, you've got a, you know, we call it theocratic, Muhammad. Yes, you've got a, you know, we call it theocratic, oligarchic monarchy established after the First War, 1918, ruling over much of what we would now call Yemen, right? Yeah, especially North Yemen. Yeah, especially North Yemen, British powerful in southern Yemen and

Aden and its hinterland. We should say Aden was one of the wealthiest ports. I mean, it was a cosmopolitan trading entrepot, one of the key kind of nodes of this globalising commercial system. Yeah, so Aden was a wealthy city, and even the people in Aden did consider themselves as subjects of the British Empire. However, because the whole region in the 1950s and 60s were enclaved in what many would call is Arab nationalism and the fever of revolutionary ideas led ultra left-wing communists who became the rulers in South Yemen. And Yemen was split between North, which is now a republic, and South, which is also a republic, but very, very communist in terms of its policies and economic model also. communist in terms of its policies and economic model also. And so you've got a monarch ruling over much of today's Yemen. Is he in a kind of uneasy relationship, but largely peaceful relationship

with the British colony of Aden down in the south? What's the aim of that Yemeni monarchy through these decades? The Yemeni monarchy since you could 1918, had more of, I would say, workable relationship with the British Empire in terms of defining where the borders of his state is. And although he got involved into clashes and fightings with King Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia. Eventually, they reached an agreement into defining where the border would sit. However, Yemen, in terms of the population, were extremely isolated. They didn't know what was happening in the outside world. He feared foreign influence so much that he decided to have a very centralized form of government and watch closely every single detail that happens in his monarchy. The general education was basically Zaydi's school of thought. There were very, very limited number of schools. Very few people were even allowed to travel.

And quickly Yemenis, what they would describe is they felt they were locked in the Middle Ages. And while some other monarchies today, when you talk to people from Egypt or you talk to people from Iraq and Syria, they kind of romancize and have good memories about the monarchies that they had because it reminded them of modernity. It reminded them of prosperity. That wasn't the case in Yemen. of modernity. It reminded them of prosperity. That wasn't the case in Yemen. It was the era of extreme poverty, extreme levels of illiteracy, hunger, disease, and so on. And it was only after Imam Yahya, the first king of the monarchy, who lost the war with King Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia, that he decided he needed to modernize his military, his army. And he started sending military officers to study abroad, mainly to

Iraq and Egypt. He didn't know actually those officers would come back inspired by revolutionary ideas and Arab nationalism and be inspired by Nazism at the time. The first king was killed, then his son came into power, and he stayed again for close to two decades, before again, another revolution by the military again, succeeded this time to remove him from his power and his dynasty. So as you say, kind of Nazirite, Republican Arab nationalism, monarchy being swept away. But unlike, say, Syria, you get a pretty brutal civil war in Yemen. Is this 1962 to 70? Yes. So Yemen then got plunged into a brutal civil war. The imam, who's the monarchy and the monarchists, funded by Saudi Arabia at the time because they themselves were afraid of revolutionary ideas and Nazism spreading to Saudi Arabia.

And from the other side, you have the new, you could say, Republican forces backed by Egypt. And Nasser of Egypt committed so much resources into this war. And Nasser of Egypt committed so much resources into this war. And one time he deployed more than 60,000 of his troops to come and fight inside Yemen. And that's why how Yemenis approach Abdel Nasser is different. They think that they owe him a lot and they are in debt to him. Because if it wasn't for that level of commitment and deploying all of those resources, they would never have been able to get rid of the imam and the monarchy. Despite Nasser, of course, was himself an egocentric and thought of himself as he's going to be the new leader for the entire

Arab world. So you have a situation not unlike several other fronts in the Cold War, You have a situation not unlike several other fronts in the Cold War, both superpowers, their proxies fighting a kind of proxy war. It's going on in Southeast Asia. It's happening now at the tip of the Arabian Peninsula. The Republicans eventually win in 1970. But how does that conflict affect this British protectorate that's clinging on in the south of what is now Yemen, the colony of Aden? Yeah. So Britain, during the civil war in North Yemen, actually supported the imamates.

They supported the monarchists because they were fearing that Nasser was plotting to actually start another revolution in South Yemen and specifically to get them out of Aden. in South Yemen, and specifically to get them out of Aden. And indeed he did. He started receiving delegations coming from South Yemen, and they started another front in the South, fighting the, you could say, like the provisional government that were, you could say, appointed by the British Empire. And the fighting continued until Britain eventually decided that it was time to leave. And it was coincided with a number of states gaining their independence from the British Empire. And eventually Britain left. I think it was in 1968 or 69. So towards the end of the 60s, Britain, as it is doing elsewhere, retreats from empire in Aden, having invested in a kind of notorious campaign, quite a lot of effort and military and

financial effort to hold on to Aden. What follows the British protectorate, the British colony in Aden? What followed actually was, so there was a front called the Arab National Front, but there was also the extreme leftist group who did not like the idea that the Arab National Front were kind of the incumbent government. them. And then a new communist party known as Yemen Socialist Party came into power and heavily being backed this time by the Soviet Union. And then delegations started to go in, not just in terms of military delegations, also in terms of education. Many Yemeni students in the south received their university education in Moscow and it started an era of communism and Soviet-inspired republic in South Yemen. Wow, so you've got the only communist state in the Arab world at that point, so that's South Yemen. That's not going to go down very well with the more conservative reactionary, the monarchists, I guess the forebears, the Houthis in North Yemen,

right? So you've got extraordinary diversity of opinion of groups working within Yemen over the last few decades. Yeah, so by the time the communists were in charge of South Yemen, the North was a republic, but mainly closer, I would say, to Egypt, inspired by Arab nationalism. I would say, to Egypt, inspired by Arab nationalism. But in their mind, both parties were seeking to unification, because that was the main idea behind both revolutions that happened in the north and in the south, that they are seeking unification. And it was one of the goals that was set by Abdel Nasser himself. He had promised the Yemen that he would seek a unification between North and South Yemen. And that's indeed how both parties were aspiring and worked towards. Despite, of course, in between, they had several rounds of conflict and it was an era of turbulence, not to mention also in the Communist Party itself, there were deep divisions,

there was a period of assassinations and killings within the leadership of the Socialist Party. And it reached its peak really in 1986 when the Communist Party literally broke down into two main fronts and they killed each other in the streets of Aden. The number of civilian casualties reached in just 10 days to more than 20,000. of Aden, the number of civilian casualties reached in just 10 days to more than 20,000. That basically broke the Communist Party in the south and eventually gave the North Yemen, and by this time it was led by President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had come to power in 1978, the better edge. He was at an advantage to start negotiating with the Socialist Party to push them towards unification. And both parties were able actually to reach a final agreement, heavily backed also

by the Arab League and by the Arab countries who were also aspiring that Yemen, North and South Yemen would be going forward and moving towards unification. Eventually, all of those efforts culminated in the 1990 unification of North and South Yemen. So this divided product of the Cold War, like we might see in other parts of the world, is reunified in 1990. What is the character then of the state that emerges? Is it much more like the sort of republican, nationalist north? the sort of republican, nationalist north? So the new republic that emerged in 1990 adopted for the first time pluralism, so allowed for the creation of political parties. It also allowed for the freedom of press, so it was no longer the one-party system, the general environment started to open up and the general vibe across Yemen was very, very positive. The other important character is that they agreed to an open market

economy rather than the economy that was adopted in South Yemen, which is a communist model. that was adopted in South Yemen, which is a communist model. With the creation of political parties, a new party emerged called Al-Haqq Party, or the Party of Truth, that basically were composed of traditional, I would say, Zaydi scholars who seek to have a presence in the new republic post 1990. One of the critiques of this new party was the father of the current leader of the Houthis, Badr al-Din al-Houthi, who criticized the Zaydi scholars of adopting republic ideals and denouncing the principles of Zaydiism. There were efforts by significant Zaydi scholars to unify the voices and his son, Hussein al-Houthi, was elected to parliament in 1993 and stayed in parliament until 1997. But eventually he decided that he's going to leave parliament, being inspired by Iran,

and he himself, him and his father, traveled to Iran, coming back with Khomeinist ideas this time. And so by leaving parliament, you're saying rejecting the whole concept of engagement with parliamentary republicanism, just there shouldn't be parliament. Exactly, yeah. So he started to adopt more Khomeinist ideas. And at the same time, a number of Zaydi figures were establishing a movement, more of an educational movement called the Believing Youth. And the idea was basically they feared that Zaydiism under the modern republic would go away. And therefore, in order to preserve that, they created summer schools, summer camps, to attract people from North Yemen to send their sons to go and educate during the summer in an attempt to revive the Zaydi school of thought. Now, while the believing youth were moving on from one year to another, divisions started to appear at the top leadership of the

believing youth, because Hussein al-Houthi was selected as part of that leadership, and he started to push the movement towards adopting a Hezbollah model. He's calling for the group to become more militant. A number of tribal and senior figures, even within Saleh's own party, that's the president of Yemen at the time, were warning him, actually, there is a form of a militant group, similar to Hezbollah, is being created in North Yemen. He ignores it at the beginning, but eventually they clashed with units of the Yemeni military at the time. And tensions kept on going until 2004, when the first war between the Houthis and the central

government erupted. And that started a series of conflict from 2004 all the way until 2010, six rounds of conflict. And actually in the last one, Saudi Arabia itself intervened, backing Ali Abdullah Saleh and the central government. And presumably from 2003 onwards, the whole of the Arab world, those preaching anti-Americanism, those preaching against the creeping global order that appears set on putting down Islam, on subjugating Arabs, that receives a shot in the arm because of the American and Western intervention in Iraq. And so I presume that plays into the Houthis' hands at that point. It does definitely. So in Yemen, there was an interesting period because it was the rise of anti-Americanism, I would say, in the region as a whole following the Iraq invasion.

And while the United States attempted to actually focus its effort on al-Qaeda, so al-Qaeda operatives didn't have much of a breathing space. The other groups did, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, and of course, like the Houthis in Yemen. Now, at the same time, from 2003 onwards, Yemen also itself was going frustrated, especially Yemen's civil society, were going frustrated with the president at the time, who was, like any other dictator, was centralizing power under him, appointing his relative in key military institutions. And so those were going side by side. You have civil society, a democratic, you could say, movement composed of many different groups from the left to some Muslim Brotherhood groups, and they're calling for more

democratic engagement, they're calling for elections, they're calling for more parliamentary oversight over the president, while at the same time, you have this insurgency, preaching anti-Americanism, preaching conspiracy theories about the Jews and so on, all going side by side. theories about the Jews and so on, all going side by side. And that eventually culminated in 2011, when the Arab Spring happened. And for the first time, kind of those two forces, those two groups decide to unite, despite having totally different objectives. And that's not unlike Egypt and Syria as well, an unholy alliance. Yeah, yeah, you could say an unholy alliance. And actually, I do remember at the beginning of the protests in the Arab Spring, we had a very left-wing, the least to be said about him, he's a communist figure, who actually

started encouraging the civil society, the youth, the women, that they need to have talks with the Houthi rebels because they are anti-establishment. They are rebels. They are not afraid of taking on arms and fighting the corruption of the central government. The main movement who started the Arab Spring in Yemen went and talked to the Houthis and then the Houthis agreed to join the protests and call for the removal of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the president at the time. You're listening to Dan Snow's History. We're talking about the history of Yemen, all coming up. I'm Matt Lewis. And I'm Dr. Alan Orjanaga. And in Gone Medieval, we get into the greatest mysteries. The gobsmacking details and latest groundbreaking research.

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Find out who we really were. By subscribing to Gone Medieval from History Hit. Wherever you get your podcasts. Just quickly going back a little bit to the wars between Salah, the president, and the Houthis. Why are the Houthis so hard to defeat? Is it something to do with their geographical homeland in that particular part of Yemen? I mean, the Saudi army, air force are very advanced. They had American kit, the Yemeni military constantly being bested by the Houthis. What was going on there? Okay. In order to understand what was happening, you need to go a little bit also back to the 90s. The Houthis in their first creation, when the believing youth were conducting their summer camps, they were actually funded largely by Ali Abdullah Saleh,

the president at the time. And the reason is because following the 1994 civil war between the Socialist Party and the General People's Congress, al-Salih's party. The main opposition party after that was al-Islah. This is more of a traditional congregation of Muslim Brotherhood figures, you could say, with tribal figures. It's more of like an alliance of conservative, a conservative alliance. And he feared that actually al-Islah is gaining momentum and he needs to push back on their narrative. And in the north of Yemen, in order for Islah not to have more political dominance, he started supporting the believing youth as kind of the basic principle of divide and conquer. Following the 2004 wars with the Houthis, the first two wars were,

you could say in military terms, were quite successful for the government side. They managed to largely defeat the Houthis, destroy their military capabilities. The founder of the Houthi movement was killed in 2004. But starting from the third war, because as I told you, the military was divided between the traditional actors in the military and the newly appointed family members of Saleh, Saleh decided to play another divide and conquer. He thought that if his enemies or opponents within the military were engaged and busy in this conflict in the north of Yemen, eventually they would be weak. And that would pave the way for his son to be his successor. And rounds of conflicts kept happening between the Houthis and the central government.

But actually, they're not fighting a unified front. government. But actually, they're not fighting a unified front. And that's the similar situation what happened even after the Saudi-led coalition intervened, because you don't have a unified front while the Houthis have one military structure that have a very strict hierarchy. And Iran, from its side, doesn't support multiple factions within the Houthi movement. It supports one group, one faction. The military structure is much more, I would say, efficient compared to the other side. So Saleh is the leader of Yemen. He's playing three-dimensional chess here and predictably it doesn't work out. He's removed from office. So Saleh was removed in office as part of an initiative that was led mainly by Saudi Arabia, but it was known as the Gulf Corporation Council Initiative, the GCC initiative,

and a resolution by the international community, a Security Council resolution. It basically gave Saleh immunity from prosecution in exchange for him stepping down from power. And then all of the groups who participated in the Arab Spring or even the other groups who didn't participate should meet in what is called the National Dialogue Convention to draft the new constitution of Yemen. Salah, although he had this face-saving exit, let's say, he did feel humiliated during the Arab Spring and thus started a very, I could say, another unholy alliance with whom this time?

With the Houthis. So Salah hooks up with his nemesis, the Houthis, the person whose leadership he's tried to kill and has killed. He joins up with them against his successors. Exactly. And the Houthis tried to position themselves as the main opposition force, you could say, to this new pledging government. And Saleh and his loyalists also trying to position themselves as being an opposition force to this new government. But Saleh still has huge control over the military. He didn't lose his influence. And he's extremely wealthy compared to his opponents. And thus started another round

of conflict between splinters of the military units fighting the Houthis, but this time being backed by Saleh at the same time. And that's why they couldn't stand for long. While we were in the national dialogue, and I remember being in the national dialogue, we were meeting the Houthis. The Houthis had a strategy of doing everything at the same time. Being participants in the national dialogue, discussing with Yemeni political parties and civil society the democratic future of Yemen, while at the same time being in the north of Yemen, an insurgency, fighting military units. If they didn't succeed on the military front, they are participants in the north of Yemen, an insurgency fighting military units. If they didn't succeed on the military front, they are participants in the national dialogue, so they're still a main

political actor. But if they do succeed, then they would become eventually the new rising power in Yemen. So they are having their cake and eating it. How does that process come to them? Because the Houthis do eventually capture the capital Sana'a, don't they? Yeah. So before that, there was an important period between 2012 to 2014 that saw the rise of Iranian backing to the Houthis. The Yemeni public were being more aware of weapon shipments being seized by the Yemen Coastal Guard. The United States itself announced in 2013, helping the Yemeni Coastal Guard to seizing weapons coming from Iran. And the level of engagement from Iran and Hezbollah became, I would say, more daring and more public.

At the same time, the Houthis were trying to recruit people from the Arab Spring movement, the people who were not very happy with Saleh getting immunity, not very happy with the outcomes of the Arab Spring. They started taking youth, young youth activists from the squares and protests to go into conferences and workshops in Lebanon and Iran at the same time. Who would be receiving them in Lebanon and in Iran are Hezbollah operatives, who they phrased it as the Conference for Islamic Awakening, as they call it, but it was basically helping the Yemeni youth to draft their demands and their aspirations for what do they want in their country.

But the main reason is that they were doing a vetting process of who can move basically to the next stage to go and meet IRGC operatives in Iran. It's a long process of many people and Houthi operatives flying in that period between Lebanon and Iran. Eventually, this culminated in September 2014, when the Houthis managed actually to storm the Yemeni capital. And the Yemeni military basically was watching as Houthi militants come into the capital and started taking on their positions and occupying state institutions inside the capital Sana'a. The Saudi Arabians have now got a nightmare scenario. Their key regional competitor, Iran, is not just now threatening them from across the Persian Gulf, but has placed its clients or its

allies in power in Yemen and to Saudi Arabia's south and east. So for the Saudis, this feels like this is now a two-pronged attack. They have to respond. Yeah, but also one of the reasons that Saudi Arabia was seen as being slow in its reaction, it's unable to make decisions quickly. King Abdullah was in the late of his reign. He was very old. And in general, the situation inside Saudi Arabia was kind of confining them from taking quick actions. And eventually King Abdullah died in early 2015. But he was succeeded by King Salman. And most importantly, by the new Saudi defence minister was his son, Hamad bin Salman. Now we know him as MBS. And he sees himself as a man of action.

Exactly. So MBS sees himself that he should not wait until Iran is basically encircling them from all sides. But also on the Yemeni side, Iran kept denying for a long time that they had any involvement with the Houthi movement or that they were backing them militarily and have clear links with Houthis until the Houthis managed to take control over the capital in September 2014. The Houthis started to have open discussions with Iran. They started flights between Sana'a and Tehran, despite we have very, very few Yemenis living in Tehran. They opened more than 14 flights a week. They announced that they're now going to establish economic ties with Tehran. But most catastrophically, I would say, they announced military maneuvers by the border with Saudi Arabia. They were saying,

basically sending a message to the Saudis, we're not really afraid to hit if you try to do any reaction. This does not set well with the new defence minister, MBS, and he decides that he needs to act and back the Houthi opponents. It's so interesting how this is another example of people talk about client groups or states doing the will of a regional power or superpower. But actually, it's often the case that the client ends up taking the regional power along with them, and they don't stick to the script as it's laid out in some distant capital city. they don't stick to the script as it's laid out in some distant capital city. Yeah, I mean, the core conflict in Yemen is a really civil conflict. It's a civil war. Now, you do have regional players, of course. But the essence of the conflict is the president of Yemen

at the time, who came to power after the Arab Spring, President Abdurrabo Mansour Hadi, he literally called for Arab intervention. He was saying that the Yemeni government needs the support of its Arab neighbors to push back the Houthis. And he managed to escape Sana'a, the capital, which was now under the Houthi control, and go all the way into the southern city of Aden. And a civil war actually erupted in Yemen before even the Saudi-led coalition started its campaign. Now, in the midst of all of this chaos, it's a very chaotic period, early 2015 in Yemen, Saudi Arabia eventually decides that now they have a pretext that they are going to respond to the call of the legitimate government of Yemen. They hold a meeting at the Arab League and say that they are now going to

respond to the request of the Yemeni president and announce a coalition led by 10 countries, but mainly it's Saudi Arabia is leading the effort to hit back the Houthis, but not just the Houthis, the Houthis and Saleh, because Saleh now is an ally of the Houthis. Yes, that shape-shifting former president Saleh, who's jumped ship and allied himself to the Houthis, what a remark, well, a survivor, I suppose you could say. And the main thing we should say at this point, we should remember that war has been, continues to be, a humanitarian catastrophe for the people of Yemen. Yeah, so the Saudis do mainly an aerial campaign, and they focus so much on launching airstrikes throughout Yemen. And another thing they did is that they limited the number of ships going into

the Yemeni ports, and that resulted into prices of food staples in Yemen going up the roof, and what the international community would today describe as a humanitarian disaster. In end of 2015, they managed to push the Houthis out of the southern city of Aden, and out of a number of southern provinces. Who comes into the mix is Saudi main ally, the United Arab Emirates. And they start creating another force, this time composed of mainly Yemen southern separatists, backing them with weapons, funds, and so on, that eventually created divisions within the Yemeni government's camp. They're supposed to be united, but actually they're divided between groups that are funded

by Saudi Arabia and groups that are funded by the United Arab Emirates. On the other side, you have the Houthis, who are now fighting on multiple fronts, but Iran doubles down its support to the Houthis. But unlike them, they don't support multiple factions. They support one group. And the Houthis eventually managed to unify all of the forces that are under them under one command. And even when Saleh eventually was getting tired of them, sick of them, he decided to defect and leave this alliance in 2017.

It took them only four days in December 2017 to kill him and get rid of him, eventually becoming the only undisputed power and rulers of North Yemen. Let's move forward to just earlier this year, for example. What proportion of Yemen, as we look at on a map, would be under Houthi control? So in terms of the area, they control 30% of Yemen, mainly northern and northern western Yemen. But they control the majority of the population. There have been a lot of movements of people moving from one place to another. But you could say roughly two thirds of the population. There have been a lot of movements of people moving from one place to another, but you could say roughly two thirds of the population, you could say close to 60 to 65% are under Houthi control,

you know, live in Houthi controlled areas. And how is that rule characterized? The Houthis have limited interest in governing. They do not see themselves as an authority that is accountable to the public. They haven't been paying public salaries since really mid-2016. They think it is the duty of the United Nations and the international community to do so. It's a very repressive regime. Since the day actually they became in charge, they've jailed hundreds of journalists. Many of them actually died under torture in prison. They banned political parties. They closed all media outlets. making videos of them, for example, blowing up the houses of Yemeni villages and towns to spread fear. That's the main reason why a lot of people wouldn't dare to pick up and fight them,

because they're afraid of the consequence. They rely so much on the element of spreading fear and propaganda to crush any voice of dissent, not only on just the political opposition side, Not only on just the political opposition side, but also the social aspect. The Houthis have restricted the movement of women in the workplace. They actively have done more restrictions banning, for example, university students from holding graduation parties. They have done measures to ban women who are working in NGOs from traveling without male guardians. They've implemented strict implementation of their imputation of Islamic Sharia law. And it's composed of a number of, the least to be said, are religious fanatics who think that they need to pursue harsh measures if they want to reach a victorious result.

And I read about the sad tale of the final remnant of the Jewish community was chased out of Sana'a by the Houthis after well over three millennia of Jewish presence. Yeah, the issue is the Houthis have a lot of animosity towards the Jews and the Jews in general, including the Yemeni Jewish community. And they actually, since the second war back in 2005 and 2006, they expelled them from the villages in North Yemen. But a number of them came and settled in the capital Sana'a. But when they took control, they had to leave. They imprisoned their main rabbi for many years and imprisoned a number of Jewish families and then gave them a choice that either they leave or they would remain in prison. Eventually, and unfortunately in March 2021, the last Yemeni Jewish family left

Yemen. They are Yemeni and they have been living in Yemen for more than almost 3,500 years. And they have been living in Yemen for more than almost 3,500 years. Vikings, Normans, Kings and Popes, who were rarely the best of friends, murder, rebellions, and crusades. Find out who we really were by subscribing to Gone Medieval from History Hit, wherever you get your podcasts. The interesting thing is the events of the last quarter of 2023 with the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. What effect did that have on the Houthis domestically in Yemen? And how has that changed their attitude towards, for example, Britain and America? Well, I always say they didn't change their attitude.

They always had their attitude towards the UK and the US. But they're unable to galvanize, I would say, the public around them for this cause, because the Yemenis are not interested in fighting the US or the UK. The plight of the Palestinian people is something that is very close to the Yemeni people. It is one topic that all Yemeni groups, despite of their divisions and even conflicts and fightings, unifies all of them. So what's better cause to distract the public attention from your failure to govern inside than creating this enemy abroad? And what's bigger enemy than the United States, the superpower of

the world, and its main ally, the United Kingdom. Many people forget to mention this, but only days before the war in Gaza started, there were mass protests in Sana'an, in the cities that the Houthis control, calling on the Houthis to start paying salaries and meet their obligation as a governing authority. And the Houthis carried a heavy crack and meet their obligation as a governing authority. And the Houthis carried a heavy crackdown, arresting hundreds of people that even Amnesty International had to issue a statement calling out Houthis' brutality. When the events happened in Gaza, that was a convenient cause that the Houthis can now use to silence any opposition voices inside. Today, if you protest against the Houthis in Sana'a, you're not calling for your salaries. They would call you an Israeli sympathizer

or a supporter of the US and the UK. And that's why it's very convenient for them to keep on this rhetoric. That's fascinating. So war in Israel-Palestine has been a great opportunity for the Houthis. In your opinion, how much damage, how potent have allied attacks on the Houthis been over the past few weeks? And are they compensating for the advantages that the Houthis see in maintaining their stance? The Houthis are not really concerned by the strikes that are launched by the US and the UK. Yes, they have destroyed some of the military capabilities, destroyed some, let's say, missile launch pads, but they can replace that. And Iran has established a very effective smuggling network that can provide not just to the Houthis, but all of its allied groups in the

region. That's the first aspect. The second is the Houthis know that the US and UK are limited with their response. So in reality, they're not threatening the Houthis' position of power inside Yemen. The Houthis are not afraid of losing territory as a result of these airstrikes. So they can afford going on, even if it means that occasionally these strikes will destroy some capabilities, but those are replaceable. Wow. So the advantages that the Houthis see from their full-throated support for the people of Gaza and their opposition to the British and American, the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages, which is attacks on Houthi military installations. Yeah. And just last week, they started to mobilize a number of their forces to fight

the positions of the Yemeni government inside Yemen. The problem that the Houthis have is that although they've managed to reach now a form of understanding with the Saudis, that the Saudis would leave, they're still only in control of 30%. And they don't control any of the Yemeni provinces that are rich with oil and gas. So at one time, they're still not 100% secure in terms of their control over North Yemen. And they think they're worthy of controlling the whole of Yemen. They need to expand their military control over the rest of the Yemeni provinces. If you have a combination of propaganda and recruitment against the US and its allies, because now the Houthis are fighting the imperialist United States. They want to use that to basically end any possibility

of a conflict that would erupt inside Yemen, that would make them lose the gains that they have made in the last decade. gains that they have made in the last decade. Bara, thank you so much for coming on and trying to explain to this idiot the intricacies of Yemeni politics and diplomacy and conflict over the last 100 years. I really, really appreciate that. Thank you so much. Thank you so much. It's very complicated, I understand, but I hope it was a little bit more clear now.

You've made it extremely clear. So thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you so much. you