Employee Survival Guide® - Racially Hostile Work Environment: Locke v. Wayne Griffin Electric, Inc.

Episode Date: January 3, 2026

Comment on the Show by Sending Mark a Text Message.Fear doesn’t need a signature to spread. When eight nooses appeared at a sprawling Amazon distribution center build in 2021, the electricians who found them weren’t employees of the site’s most powerful entities—yet they asked the courts to hold those entities liable. We pull the thread from first discovery to legal breakthrough, explaining how a judge used “deliberate indifference” to bridge Section 1981’s steep intent requirement and why control, not payroll, now defines responsibility on complex worksites.We map the power structure: subcontracted electricians, a general contractor with sweeping site authority, and a distant property owner. You’ll hear how evidence got discarded, warnings went unheeded, cameras missed the hotspots, and a walkout signaled that the workplace had become unsafe. Then we dig into the legal engine room: why Title VII couldn’t reach non-employers here, how Section 1981 can, and the Second Circuit’s framework requiring substantial control over both the environment and the likely harassers. The court found that the general contractor’s OSHA-backed safety duties and operational command created the control necessary to apply deliberate indifference—transforming a pattern of inadequate responses into plausible intent. Amazon, by contrast, stayed outside the liability zone due to its contractual distance and lack of daily supervision.Along the way, we confront a painful twist: allegations that the federal probe pivoted toward the victims themselves. That detail raises urgent questions about institutional trust and the real cost of speaking up. If you manage risk, work in construction, practice employment or civil rights law, or simply care about how power structures shape safety, this deep dive offers a clear blueprint for accountability and practical takeaways for prevention, investigation, and enforcement.If this conversation helped you see the law—and workplace safety—in a new light, follow the show, share this episode with a colleague, and leave a review telling us where you stand on deliberate indifference and control. If you enjoyed this episode of the Employee Survival Guide please like us on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn. We would really appreciate if you could leave a review of this podcast on your favorite podcast player such as Apple Podcasts and Spotify. Leaving a review will inform other listeners you found the content on this podcast is important in the area of employment law in the United States. For more information, please contact our employment attorneys at Carey & Associates, P.C. at 203-255-4150, www.capclaw.com.Disclaimer: For educational use only, not intended to be legal advice.

Hey, it's Mark here, and welcome to the next edition of the Employee Survival Guide, where I tell you, as always, what your employer does definitely not want you to know about, and a lot more. Welcome back to the deep dive. Today, we're descending into one of the most compelling, painful, and frankly, groundbreaking legal battles we've encountered in years. Absolutely. This is where civil rights law smashes headlong into the high-stakes, you know, volatile environment of a massive multi-employer construction site. And it forces a confrontation over corporate liability when the harassment is persistent, severe, and crucially anonymous. That's absolutely right.

Our sources today send are entirely on a landmark U.S. District Court ruling, specifically, the motions to dismiss filed in Dornal Locke at all via Wayne J. Griffin, Electric Inc. at all, filed in late 2025. And this isn't just about the facts, which are horrifying on their own. No, not at all. It's about a fundamental reevaluation of who is legally responsible when race-based hostility permeates a workplace, especially when the victims are not employed by the major corporate entities with the deepest pockets. Right.

Our sources make it clear that the core legal focus here is what lawyers call an issue of first impression. It really is. We're talking about pushing the boundaries of non-employer liability under one of the most powerful yet restrictive civil rights statutes on the books. 42 U.S.E. Section 1981. That's the Reconstruction era law. It guarantees all persons the same right to make and enforce contracts regardless of race.

So the precise question the court had to wrestle with, and the one you, the listener, really need to grasp, is whether employees of a subcontractor can successfully sue a general contractor. Or even the property owner. Or the property owner, right. Yeah. Can they be held accountable for failing to prevent repeated, severe acts of race-based harassment by unidentified third parties on a site they manage. And that's the whole game, because the key mechanism they are trying to use to hold these non-employers liable. A mechanism typically reserved for, say, universities or housing authorities,

is the deliberate indifference standard. Deliberate indifference. We're going to be saying that a lot today. We are. So our mission for you today is to understand two things. First, how the demanding intentional discrimination standard of Section 1981 can possibly be applied to corporate non-employers at a complex sprawling work site. And second, how that concept of deliberate indifference, which is essentially inexcusable systemic inaction, becomes the necessary, sometimes the only proof of that discriminatory intent. Exactly. We're dissecting a legal decision entirely defined by the concept of control. Who truly held the power on that specific construction?

site to stop the racial terror. Okay, let's jump right in. Let's start with the facts on the ground because they are chilling and, I mean, they're critical to establishing the severity of the hostile environment claim. They absolutely are. This case takes place at a massive commercial construction site. The location was a new Amazon distribution center being built in Windsor, Connecticut back of the spring of 2021. And it's vital to clearly establish the contractual roles, as this whole chain dictates the liability analysis later on. Right. So who are the players? The plaintiffs are five electricians, Dornal Locke, Jose Nivis, Elvin Gonzalez, Jamal Weber, and Deannis Lisporus. These are black and brown men, and they were imported by the electrical subcontractor,

Wayne J. Griffin, Electric, Inc. or Griffin. So Griffin is their direct employer. They're the ones signing the paychecks. Right. Then you had the two corporate defendants at the center of this specific non-employer liability debate. Yes. First, you have R.C. Anderson, LLC. They're the general contractor, or GC. The G.C. So they held the keys to the site, managed the entire schedule, and oversaw all the other subcontractors. They're running the show day to day. They're running the show. And second, you have Amazon.com, Inc., the ultimate property owner. The big name. The big name. And while the plaintiffs did have claims against Griffin, their direct employer, that's analyzed under traditional hostile environment law. The real question, the issue of first impression is whether Anderson and Amazon had a legal duty to protect them. Even though they didn't sign their paychecks. The source material also provides some crucial context about the layout and the trades involved. It tells us that the Griffin electricians, overwhelmingly men of color, were typically the second trade to enter the building. Right. They followed the iron workers, floor to floor as the enormous structure was framed.

So there's a physical proximity there that's important. It sets the stage. The iron workers were employed by a subcontractor that was based in Texas, and the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that these specific workers were known, for wearing clothing and displaying insignia associated with the Confederate flag. And that's not just a stray detail, is it? No, it's a specific documented allegation used later by the court as circumstantial evidence when discussing who the likely perpetrators were. Okay, so this alleged link between the ironworkers and a symbol of racial hostility

then bleeds directly into the horrifying harassment chronology. It does. It defines the sheer repetition of the symbols, eight nooses in one month, as an argument for the defendant's deliberate indifference. Eight in one month. We are talking about a terrifying, concentrated campaign of intimidation that begins in late April 2021. The first documented discovery occurs on April 27th.

And what happened? Plaintiff Elvin Gonzalez returned from his lunch break and found a hangman noose hanging from the ceiling in his assigned work area. He immediately took a photograph, which is a crucial piece of evidence that survived. It is, and he reported it to his own and management, and crucially, to Anderson's safety team.

And what happened in the immediate aftermath of that first report is, frankly, it seems like an immediate and textbook example of how not to handle a crisis. It makes their intent appear questionable from the start. Well, the documents reveal a shocking failure. Anderson's safety team took a report. They called the Windsor police. But then before detectives arrive later that afternoon, they inexplicably disposed of the news. Wait, wait, they threw it away.

They destroyed the evidence of a potential hate. crime. That is the core allegation. A hangman's noose is arguably one of the most potent symbols of racial terror in American history. It's a violent, explicit threat of death directed at black and brown workers. So by destroying it, they severely hampered the police investigation from the get-go. Completely. It prevented detectives from collecting the noose, checking for prints, or performing any kind of forensic analysis. That sounds less like a simple mistake and more like an attempt at, you know, corporate mitigation, trying to make the problem go away quietly. Exactly. And the allegation runs even deeper, suggesting a deliberate policy of concealment.

The plaintiffs later learned that this April 27th incident wasn't even the actual first news. There was another one before that. Yes. A cement foreman had already found and reported a news to R.C. Anderson three days earlier on April 24th. But Anderson kept this crucial prior incident quiet. Okay. So if Anderson knew on April 24th that a news had been. found and then fail to inform the trades or the police, and then they destroyed the second piece of evidence on the 27th, that instantly elevates their failure from negligence to something much closer to the intentional standard section 1881 requires.

Legally, that prior knowledge is everything. It instantly puts Anderson on notice that this was not a one-off prank, but a dangerous escalating pattern. So any response they have after that has to be judged against that knowledge. Their subsequent delayed and inadequate response must be judged against this heightened awareness of the existential threat to their minority employees. And the attempts at damage control were clearly demonstrably ineffective. Completely. On April 29th, two days after Griffin Management met with the electricians and read a statement prepared by Anderson, a statement the plaintiff's described as tone deaf because it didn't even mention the news.

It did not. And after that meeting, the harassment surged. This is the peak, right? the moment the hostility became undeniable. Yes. Five more nooses were discovered that single day. And what's absolutely critical here is the location. The complaint alleges these five nooses were found in areas where only the ironworkers,

the group implicated by the Confederate insignia, had been present. So circumstantial evidence is pointing directly at a single trade, a single subcontractor, that is supposed to be managed and controlled by R.C. Anderson. Precisely. And the response from the targeted employees was amazing. immediate and devastating. The electricians decided to badge out and go home for the day. They walked off the job. They did. They were clearly signaling that the work environment had become intolerable and unsafe. The work starped because of the terror. And yet even after that

massive walkout, the harassment did not cease. No, it continued. Two more nooses were found on May 19th and May 26th, bringing the staggering total number of nooses found at the Windsor site to eight. Eight over the span of a single month. That repeated targeted intimidation occurring on a site over which Anderson claimed complete managerial control is the factual foundation of the claim that they were deliberately indifferent to a hostile environment. Before we leave the chronology, we have to loop back to the concept of prior knowledge from 2017. The plaintiffs specifically alleged a precedent that should have taught Anderson and Amazon a serious lesson years earlier. Yes, this is a huge point. Plaintiff Dornal Locke had previously encountered a nuisance in it

in 2017 at a different Amazon construction site in Bloomfield, Connecticut. And that site was also managed by R.C. Anderson. Also managed by R.C. Anderson. By introducing this fact, the plaintiffs were arguing that both Anderson and Amazon were already on notice about this particular form of racial terror occurring on their work sites well before 2021. They had a history. So they should have had a playbook for how to handle this, but the response in 2017 sounds just as bad as 2021.

According to the complaint, the response from Griffin, R.C. Anderson, and Amazon in 2017 was essentially negligible. When confronted by the workers, Griffin H.R. was quoted as saying, and this is painful. Without photos, there isn't much we can do. It's just word of mouth. Even though 18 electricians claimed they had seen the news. Exactly. The company has eventually distributed a generic memo more than a month after the incident claiming everything was resolved. This really highlights the bureaucratic impulse to deny and mitigate. But the source material provides this incredible anecdote that acts as a perfect counterpoint, showing what meaningful non-corporate action actually looks like in that moment. It's a key detail. It involved the Domatic Foreman Domatic was a conveyor belt subcontractor at that Bloomfield site.

That foreman acted instantly. What did you do? He gathered his workers, held up the noose, which was made from his team's electrical wire, and angrily threatened to personally eff you up if they used. used his wire for such purposes. That's raw, immediate, and effective communication. It's not a sanitized HR memo. It's a direct threat of consequence.

And it worked. The contrast is stark. The foreman achieved immediate deterrence through personal authority and moral outrage. This is contrasted with the cold bureaucratic response the Griffin electricians received in 2021, a corporate statement read aloud that failed to acknowledge the severity of the threat. So the plaintiffs argued that the failure to act decisively in Windsor, given the lessons they should have learned for the 2017 incident and the immediate escalation in 2021 was not negligence. It was an intentional failure.

This failure to exercise the control they possessed is what opens the door to the legal challenge. Exactly. And that leads us directly into the legal tightrope walk of Section 1981. It does. Okay, let's unpack this high legal hurdle. We are dealing with Section 1981, a bedrock civil rights law, but one that demands a very high level of proof to prove a violation. especially against a non-employer. That distinction is the entire axis on which this case turns.

Section 1981 prohibits race discrimination that impairs a person's enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of contractual relationship. For the plaintiffs, that contract is their employment agreement with Griffin. Right. Now, a quick question that some listeners might have, why couldn't the plaintiffs just rely on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? That's the classic hostile work environment statute, and it requires a lower burden of proof, typically simple negligence. That's a great question, and it highlights the difficulty of the case.

Title VII is fantastic for suing your direct employer, Griffin. But Title VII generally does not allow an employee to sue a general contractor or a property owner, these non-employers, for a hostile environment. Unless they could prove they were a joint employer. Right, unless they could prove the non-employer functionally acted as a joint employer. The plaintiffs didn't have sufficient evidence for that link with Anderson or Amazon. They needed a statute that covered contractual impairment regardless of the direct employment relationship, and that's Section 1981. But Section 1981 comes with a huge catch, right? That crucial requirement that makes it so difficult to prove against a non-employer.

Yes. The plaintiff must allege and prove the defendant had intent to discriminate on the basis of race. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that Section 1981 requires purposeful. discrimination or racial animus. That's a massive legal barrier. It is. So Anderson and Amazon, in their motions to dismiss, they leaned on this. They said, look, we didn't hang the nooses.

We aren't racist. We didn't purpose this discrimination. Our mere failure to stop it is negligence at worst. And negligence is not intent under Section 1981. Precisely. They're arguing that without showing a manager harbors racial animus and actively directed the harassment, the case fails. The question then becomes, how do the plaintiffs overcome this hurdle when they are suing non-employers for anonymous acts of harassment?

Right. Actually, certainly didn't order. That's the insurmountable gap. That seems insurmountable. And this is where the legal innovation comes in. The attempt to bridge that gap by introducing the deliberate and different standard. Correct. The plaintiffs successfully argued to adopt this standard, which acts as a proxy for intent. It's a standard borrowed from civil rights statutes in contexts where the defendant has control but isn't the direct perpetrator. specifically, Title IX's in education and the Fair Housing Act. Let's define that simply for the listener. Instead of proving that the corporate officers wanted the harassment to happen. Which is almost impossible. Right. They're trying to prove that the corporate response to known severe harassment was so inadequate that it becomes functionally indistinguishable from intent.

Exactly. Under the deliberate indifference standard, liability can be found when a defendant's response to known discrimination is judged as clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances. That phrase clearly unreasonable is key. It is. It comes from Supreme Court precedent. If the harassment is severe, known, and the response is clearly unreasonable, the court allows the inference that the entity intended the harassment to continue, or at least intended for the hostile environment to persist. Inaction, when you have the power to act, becomes an intentional choice. That makes profound sense. The failure to act decisively becomes the evidence of intent. But the court needs a solid legal just, justification to import a standard from, say, a school bullying case or a landlord-tenant case into a construction

site liability case. And that justification is found in the Second Circuit's highly influential on bunk ruling in Francis v. King's Park Manor, Inc., known as Francis II. And what did Francis II establish? It established the framework. It laid out the substantial control requirement. Deliberate indifference can only support a hostile environment claim if the defendant exercised substantial control over two things. The context of the harassment, the environment, and the harasser, the perpetrator. Okay, so controls everything. And the France of the second case itself dealt with the landlord. When the court looked at that landlord-tenant setup, what do they find? They concluded that

the level of control was generally too low to satisfy the standard. Well, think about it. An employer has the authority to monitor, schedule, require specific conduct, investigate misconduct through mandatory interviews and impose immediate discipline suspension dismissal transfer. A landlord, however, can't monitor a tenant's daily life, can't force them to submit to interviews, and can't just kick them out without a lengthy legal process. So the court established a clear spectrum of control. At one end, you have the employer with near total control. Right, where liability is relatively easy. And at the other end, you have the typical landlord with minimal control over the harasser, making liability very difficult.

That's the framework. The core task in the lock case became deciding where the general contractor, R.C. Anderson and the property owner, Amazon, fit on the spectrum. Are they closer to the employer or closer to the landlord? And the complexity is intensified because the perpetrators remained unidentified. R.C. Anderson couldn't use the ultimate employer lever firing the individual because they didn't know which ironworker was responsible. That's the legal challenge for the plaintiffs. However, the court recognized that while anonymity is a hurdle, it doesn't absolve the entity with control. So what does their duty become? If the harasser is anonymous, the defendant's duty shifts from specific punitive action against an individual to comprehensive

systemic protection of the environment. Their responsibility becomes increasing security, surveillance, and enforcement against the class of likely harassers, essentially locking down the environment they control to prevent recurrence. Which is exactly what the plaintiffs argued Anderson failed to do, despite having the authority. Precisely. Here is where the distinction becomes concrete. R.C. Anderson, the general contractor, fought hard, arguing they were merely a manager, not an employer, and therefore lacked the necessary control.

They did. Yet the court denied their motion to dismiss. Yes. The court found that the allegations provided a plausible inference that Anderson did have substantial control, placing them squarely closer to the high control. employer model defined in Francis II. How so? The reasoning hinges on Anderson's contractual and legal duties, right? Showing they had authority over the context and the class of potential harassers.

That's it exactly. Let's start with the functional control. As the general contractor, Anderson was the singular entity overseeing and directing all subcontractor activities on the site. They ran the whole operation. The schedule, the logistics, the flow of material, physical access to the building itself. This structural control over the entire operational context is the first pillar supporting substantial control. They were the master of the job site. And the second pillar, which seems even more important in this specific context, is their explicit responsibility for safety. Not just contractually, but legally mandated safety.

And this is the legal maneuver the plaintiff's brilliantly leveraged. It is. Anderson had explicit responsibility for workplace safety under its contract with the Scannel Amazon entity. But more critically, they had duties under state and federal law, specifically OSHA, 29 CFR, Section 1926.20. Okay, for the general listener, what does that specific OSHA regulation actually mean for a general contractor on a site like this? It mandates that the G.C. has a shared responsibility to ensure that no laborer is required to work in surroundings or under conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to his health or safety. And historically, that means things like fall protection, trench safety, or electrical hazards, physical things. Right. The genius of the plaintiff's argument is that they define the persistent threat of nooses as an imminent safety hazard, a condition dangerous to their health, safety, and mental well-being.

So if Anderson is legally responsible for preventing physical hazards like a beam collapse, the court inferred they are plausibly responsible for preventing racist symbols that represent death threats and create a clear, mental and emotional health hazard. Precisely. And to fulfill this shared duty, Anderson must have the right to monitor subcontractors, investigate misconduct, and require remediation. That right is the definition of control. Anderson's authority to maintain a safe physical workplace translated into the required control to maintain a safe racial workplace. But let's go back to the unknown identity of the perpetrators. Anderson argued that if they don't know the harasser's name, how can they control them? The court didn't need them to name the

individual. It acknowledged that the nooses were almost certainly hung by authorized workers' employees of subcontractors under Anderson's direct oversight. And they use that circumstantial evidence, the five nooses found exclusively where the iron workers have been working. Yes, to infer that the perpetrators were a subgroup of a subcontractor who was answerable to Anderson. That is the critical distinction. Anderson couldn't fire the individual, but they could suspend the entire ironworker subcontracting company or demand the removal of specific personnel or require increased monitoring of that specific team. Absolutely. That structural ability to influence the harasser's employer satisfies the substantial control requirement. So the court established that the

deliberate indifference standard was warranted. And now the focus shifts to the clearly unreasonable test. Was Anderson's actual response so poor that it effectively encouraged the continuation of the harassment. And the court found a litany of failures. Let's break down the evidence of their clearly unreasonable response, starting with the immediate failure regarding the first news. The first failure was the destruction of evidence. After the April 27th news was reported, Anderson's safety team disposed of it before police could collect it. That just seems incredible. This intentional removal of physical evidence of a hate crime, whether motivated by panic or by PR concerns, legally hindered the investigation and made the environment less safe.

And compounding that was the concealment of prior knowledge. Right. They suppressed the fact that the April 24th news had been found and reported three days earlier by the cement foreman. By minimizing the scope of the problem initially, they failed the duty of heightened response that the situation demanded. When you know there have been multiple incidents and you only report one, your subsequent response looks deliberately slow. Exactly. Okay. Failure number three. the failure to investigate the prime suspects after the surge on April 29th. After five nooses appeared in the ironworkers specific area, Anderson apparently failed to conduct any focused investigation targeting that implicated trade.

And the court didn't mince words here. No, it didn't. It said by failing to investigate the potential involvement of the iron workers and their employer, a group they had the contractual power to pressure Anderson, can be deemed to have encouraged the hanging of yet more newses. That line deemed to have encouraged that's the legal link between inaction and discriminatory intent, isn't it? It is. It means the court sees the failure to exercise control as an intentional choice to permit the hostile environment. And the fourth, most telling failure, was the security camera response after the seventh noose. The site was closed for a day, but only for the plaintiff's own subcontractor, Griffin, to install security cameras. Yes. And the allegations detail why the plaintiffs viewed the.

this as a farce, a purely cynical move for optics. Why? The cameras were allegedly either never turned on or if they were, they were positioned improperly. They were pointed at walls, doorways, and other areas, rather than inside the structural dones where the nooses were repeatedly hung. It's a performative response. The appearance of action without any genuine intent to remediate the threat or catch

the perpetrators. It was a visible insult to the victims. So when you put all these failures together, evidence destruction, concealment of prior knowledge, failure to investigate the prime suspects and performative security measures, the court had little difficulty concluding that Anderson's response was clearly unreasonable. And this secured the key finding. The claim against R.C. Anderson survived the motion to dismiss. Their inaction, in the face of known and escalating racial hostility, satisfied the high intentional discrimination element of Section 1981 because they possessed the structural control

to stop it, but failed to use that control decisively. So the general contractor is in the hot seat. Now we turn our attention to Amazon, the property owner, who is the furthest entity removed on the contractual chain. Right. And unlike Anderson, Amazon's motion to dismiss was successful. This requires us to understand exactly where the line of substantial control ends. The court determined that the allegations against Amazon were insufficient to infer the necessary level of substantial control required by the Francis II standard. They were the economic driver behind the project, but not the managerial supervisor.

Let's first clarify the contractual distance because it's convoluted. How removed was Amazon from the plaintiff's day-to-day employment? Let's take a quick break. It's Mark Kim. We have a new product for you. It's called the Employee Survival Guide or Employees Survival.com. And it's a site that you can obtain PDF products that I've created myself. It's spending too many hours, way too many, researching and writing about it.

For example, the Performance Improvement. plan or beating them. And the second one about negotiating severance negotiation agreements to the most important topics that we see in terms of the web traffic and podcast traffic we have. So check out Employeeservival.com and see if this can try to help you and you don't need an attorney to use it. Thank you. to R.C. Anderson, the general contractor, to Scannel, the developer hired by Amazon, and then finally to the Amazon entity that owned the property. The plaintiffs were essentially a great grandchild on the contract family tree. So Amazon successfully argued that the only

contract they were directly involved in was with the developer, Scannel. And they successfully argued that the plaintiffs were not direct third-party beneficiaries of that contract. Which is crucial. Section 1981 targets contractual impairment. If Amazon can legally firewall itself from the underlying employment contract, the Section 1981 claim falters. They demonstrated that the contracts showed a clear intent not to benefit the plaintiffs directly. Beyond the contractual distance, what were the minimal factual allegations the plaintiffs could actually bring against Amazon regarding site control? They were very limited. Plaintiff's core allegations were, first, simple property ownership.

Second, Amazon's presence on the site through its centralized technology hub called Denmark. Denmark. Yes. And third, Amazon temporarily closing the site for one day after the eighth noose was discovered. That sounds like a weak link for substantial control. It was. The court agreed that these limited allegations failed to infer the substantial control needed over the persons who hung the nooses or the circumstances of the construction work. Okay, let's break down the court's analysis on Amazon's role.

What about the Denmark technology hub? Doesn't having employees on site give them control? The court found that Amazon's limited presence at this technology hub, which dealt with tech logistics, not construction management, lacked an apparent nexus to controlling the work areas or the trades causing the harassment. So just having some corporate employees there for their own operational purposes doesn't automatically translate into supervisory authority over independent construction workers. Not at all. especially in unrelated parts of the building. What about the most dramatic action Amazon took shutting down the site for a day after the 8th news? That seems like the ultimate exercise of authority.

Even granting that Amazon, as property owner, retained and exercised that right, the court concluded that this isolated, crisis-driven act did not prove Amazon had substantial day-to-day control over the workers or harassers, generally. So it was an exception of the rule. Exactly. Amazon did not direct the daily flow of subcontractors, Nor did they oversee their disciplinary behavior or safety compliance. Those were the responsibilities they delegated to R.C. Anderson. So Amazon successfully pointed the finger back at the general contractor, arguing that Anderson was the designated entity responsible for safety and supervision under their contract.

Exactly. They leaned on Connecticut premises liability law. This law establishes that a property owner's duty to subcontractors' employees is limited. Unless the owner actively stepped in and assumes broad suit. supervisory authority, the owner generally does not have a duty to protect workers against misconduct by third parties. In simple terms, Anderson was the site manager, holding the clipboard, directing traffic, and responsible for the physical and environmental conditions. And Amazon was the remote investor who hired the manager. That's the core difference. It is. Anderson had functional control. Amazon had abstract ultimate control that was too remote to satisfy the deliberate indifference standard.

The court concluded there was no other basis for imputing liability to Amazon. This ruling, denying dismissal for Anderson while granting it for Amazon, has massive implications. It doesn't just decide this single case. It effectively draws a clear, functional hierarchy of accountability on massive multi-employer work sites. It creates a new blueprint for liability in these environments, and that is the key takeaway for anyone managing risk or working on complex projects. So let's break it down. Level one, the direct employer, Griffin, faces traditional Title VII and 1981 liability as the high-control, easiest path to accountability. Level two, the general contractor, R.C. Anderson, is now definitively placed in the category of having substantial control.

And that control is derived from their contractual and legal safety responsibilities. That OSHA mandate, combined with their oversight of all trades and access control. And because they hit this control threshold, they're judged by the deliberate indifference standard. And that standard is the break. through. It means if a GC knows about severe, persistent racial hostility, their choice to offer a clearly unreasonable, performative, or delayed response becomes grounds for intentional discrimination under Section 1981. And level three, the property owner, Amazon, is the lowest tier. They retain insufficient control. Unless the owner inserts themselves into the daily management and actively assume supervisory authority, they are largely shielded. Their ultimate economic control is not the same as the functional control required to apply the deliberate indifference standard. That's right. This ruling forces us to reconsider how intentional discrimination under Section 1981 is proved in modern, multi-layered corporate structures.

It's no longer about proving racist internal memos. It's about proving corporate choice. The court acknowledged that applying the deliberate indifference standards successfully means that systemic, calculated inaction, where the defendant possessed the substantial power, to stop the harassment, satisfies that requirement of intentional discrimination. So it allows victims to hold the entity accountable based on their behavior after the initial event. Yes, rather than requiring proof of animus before the event. So if you are a general contractor, the court is essentially saying, if you have the power to stop a campaign of racist terror on your site and you choose to destroy evidence, conceal prior

incidents, or institute a camera farce. Then that choice to permit the impairment of the victim's contractual rights is a discriminatory choice. It's the intentional failure to meet a reasonable standard of conduct given their established control. It is. This is a critical legal bridge because it bypasses the difficult task of proving that individual corporate officers harbored racial animus. Instead, it focuses on the corporate entity's failure to deploy its documented power for remediation. This ruling essentially raises the stakes for general contractors. across every multi-employer work site in the country. You can no longer delegate away your safety responsibility,

physical or psychological, just because the victim isn't on your payroll. That OSHA requirement for a safe workplace translates directly into civil rights liability. So what does this mean practically for construction site management going forward? It means GCs must fundamentally change their risk management strategy.

They must have rapid response protocols that prioritize investigation and remediation over-reputation management. Destroying evidence is now not just poor crisis management. It's a legal liability magnet. GCs must ensure they have clear contractual levers allowing them to impose immediate and severe penalties, including termination,

on subcontractors whose employees are credibly implicated in racial harassment. Even if the individual identity remains unknown. Yes. Their authority must be used decisively. Whereas for Amazon, the property owner, the lesson is that their legal structure effectively insulated them. They remain the remote economic driver. And unless the plaintiffs can produce evidence that Amazon managers were actively directing the iron workers or scheduling their shifts, evidence that shows Amazon stepped over the line from passive owner to active site manager, the court will respect that traditional separation.

The economic power is not the same as the functional supervisory power. This case clearly defines that line. It does. This deep dive into Locke v. Griffin highlights the brutal reality of multi-employer, liability when hate invades the workplace. The key takeaway is the hierarchy of control. The general contractor's functional authority oversight safety translated into the necessary control threshold for Section 1981 liability because their inaction was deemed clearly unreasonable. Conversely, the property owner was dismissed because their relationship to the day-to-day chaos

was too remote. The mere presence and ultimate economic authority did not equate to the necessary substantial control. This case is far from over for the plaintiff. and R.C. Anderson. But the legal framework is now set. Before we wrap up, we have to return to a detail revealed in the source documents that speaks volumes about the pervasive nature of racial hostility and the system's reaction to victims. It is a devastating detail. It underscores the immense personal risk the plaintiff's took simply by seeking justice. The plaintiff's amended complaint included highly specific and frankly heartbreaking allegations regarding the post-incident investigation. Specifically, they alleged that after the managers from Griffin and R.C. Anderson met with

the FBI. The federal investigation began focusing its attention and its scrutiny on the very victims who reported the harassment rather than the perpetrators. The complaint details that an FBI agent, Special Agent Ron Offutt, interviewed the plaintiffs and according to the record, suggested that they, the victims, had planted the nooses themselves. Why? What was the alleged motive? To get reassigned to higher paying rate jobs. So the plaintiffs were subjected to polygraph tests. They had their cell phone seized. They were treated like perpetrators of a hoax rather than witnesses to a hate crime. The complaint states the plaintiffs described being terrified and living in fear of the FBI because the investigation remains open to this day. This specific element of victim blaming, where the

system meant to uncover racial hostility, ends up turning its focus and its scrutiny on the black and brown men who reported the initial violence, is a crucial, tragic piece of the story. It has to inform our final assessment of this entire ordeal. So here is the final provocative thought we leave for you to consider. The managers of Anderson and Griffin were the ones who met with the FBI. And immediately afterward, the investigation focused on the theory that the victims themselves planted the nooses. A stunning turn of events. Given that pattern, what does it imply about the corporate management's underlying intent

and the risk the victims face, when the system meant to provide security is allegedly steered by the defendants to persecute the plaintiffs. It's a chilling question. This chilling factor, this lingering fear long after the physical threats have ceased, is the ultimate price of corporate indifference. That is the insidious nature of unresolved systemic hostility. Thank you for joining us for this deep dive. We hope you feel thoroughly informed about the complex implications of this landmark ruling on corporate control and civil rights. If you like the Employees Survival Guide, I'd really encourage you to leave a review. We try really hard to produce information to you that's informative, that's timely, that you can actually use and solve problems on your own and at your employment.

So if you like to leave a review anywhere you listen to our podcast, please do so. And leave five stars because anything less than five is really not as good, right? I'll keep it up. I'll keep up the standards up. I'll keep the information flowing at you. If you'd like to send me an email and ask me a question, I'll actually review it and post it on there. You can send it to m-C-A-R-U-Y at C-A-P-C-Law.com. That's capclaw.com.