Piers Morgan Uncensored - "Israel Is DESPISED!" Trump's US-Iran Deal Threatened By Hezbollah Strikes

Episode Date: June 16, 2026

So far, the US-Iran agreement has given both sides the cover to declare victory while somehow satisfying nobody. The inclusion of Israel and Hezbollah in the agreement - surely at Iran’s insistence - means it will also be in constant danger of collapse. But with the US and Iran now committed to ending the war, Uncensored looks at the big picture. What has been achieved, if anything? And how will it reshape the region? Piers Morgan asks president of Eurasia Group, Ian Bremmer, international affairs scholar, Jeffrey Sachs and professor of political science Robert Pape. 00:00 Introduction 01:00 Ian Bremmer interview begins 01:42 Is the Iran peace deal a ‘failure’ for Donald Trump? 02:25 ‘This is not a deal to be proud of and is likely worse than Obama’s’ 08:39 Will Israel go it alone in the war with Iran and how would America react? 10:27 The position of the gulf states in the wake of the agreement 12:52 What is the outcome of the war for the US? 15:51 Ian Bremmer reacts to Elon Musk becoming a trillionaire 18:58 Will the Republicans lose the house and the senate? 22:32 Jeffrey Sachs interview begins 26:44 Sachs’ view on the outcome for Israel, the Middle East and China 31:29 The impact of war on the long-term trends in energy 34:44 Robert Pape interview begins 34:54 Robert Pape on the lack of clarity in Trump’s deal 37:55 “This piles more and more pressure on Donald Trump” 42:12 Robert Pape outlines the signs of an endgame in the Iran War Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

The Iran deal that we made is going to bring a lot of success to the world. I think we're celebrating too early. This is not a deal to be proud of. They never get a dime of American taxpayer money, ever. Full stop. There's going to be more and more pressure on Trump to pay up. Israel will do everything possible to undermine this agreement. We're heading into an incredibly contentious 60 days.

Open warfare can break out at literally any moment. So far, the US-Iran agreement has given both sides a cover to declare victory while somehow satisfying absolutely nobody. The inclusion of Israel and his Boller in the agreement, surely Iran's insistence, means it will also be in constant danger of collapse. But with the US and Iran now committed to ending the war, or seemingly so, we're going to look at the big picture. What has been achieved, if anything, and how will it reshape the region? Well, joining me in the studio here in New York, actually, is Ian Bremmer. a New York man and president of Eurasia group. Well, I would say welcome, but I'm coming to your city.

Welcome, Pierce. Great to see you in person. I have you in my homeland, absolutely. Are you into the World Cup? Absolutely. I'm going to see France and Senegal. Yeah, I can't wait. I think it's great that we're hosting it.

It's fantastic. It's great, and I think the U.S. have a good team, so you could have a good little run. They might make a bit of a run. And who knows what the hell of the Iranians are going to do when they're here. It's going to be interesting. Well, and there is a chance. Iran play America in the World Cup,

which would bring everything, every part of the world geopolitics to one eventuality. This deal, which is due to be signed on Friday, I can't think of anyone better place to answer a simple question. Is this a failure by Donald Trump? Yeah, yeah, it is. I mean, look, let's first say that you and I, and almost everyone in the world,

should be happy that the straight is about to reopen. Yes. That is, it is the singular cost. of massive economic pain globally. It's affected the UK, it's affected the EU, it's affected the US, though not as much, frankly. But everybody is getting hurt, and we need this thing back open.

So it was utterly unnecessary that we went through all of this, but given that we have, I'm certainly pleased that we have this news. This is better than another week, another month, of more fruitless negotiations. Are we going to end up with a deal which is at best the same as the Obama deal, albeit with a slightly different wording,

and at worst, potentially a little bit worse. And, of course, the subtext of that is that Trump ripped up the Obama deal said it was the worst deal ever done. And yet here he may be through political and economic expediency having to do something very similar. At best. At best.

There's a fact that you and I are having this conversation and they've announced that they've signed the deal electronically, we still haven't actually seen the text. Why not? Senator Lindsey Graham saying, oh, this is a great, great job by statesman J.D. Vance. Why isn't he saying it's a great job by Trump? Because the people that are close to this understand

that this is not a deal to be proud of. This isn't something where the Americans come out looking strong. Also, keep in mind, the original Obama deal was a deal that had many signatories, friends of Iran, enemies of Iran, that had leverage to help ensure that actually the Iranians kept their end of the deal or else, that the inspectors would actually go in, that the low-level

enrichment would stay a low level of enrichment. This is a deal by the United States by itself. And so if the Iranians feel like they have more leverage with other countries going forward, their willingness and ability to get out of this deal, especially against the Trump, who knows what the consequences of re-engaging in military action, is very significant. And then going forward, the deal that we're talking about today, that every, when saying is so wonderful, this doesn't involve the nukes at all. Well, that's the point. And of course, they're looking to get a commitment out of Iran. We will not develop a nuclear weapon. That's the same commitment that Obama put in the

original deal. Correct. The wording is there. The wording is there. The wording was there. The U.S. walked out unilaterally. The deal fell apart. My overview of this war, and it's been pretty much my view from the very start, is that Benjamin Netanyahu sat in the White House Situation Room as the New York Times reported at length, with the head of Mossad joining remotely. And they painted a picture to President Trump. If you decapitate the head of this regime, the whole thing collapses from within. Then the people rise up and they'll all be too distracted to notice what's going on with the Australia full moves.

I still believe that that's what happened, that Donald Trump bought into it. He decided to go with the Israelis. and they did the first bit, the decapitation bit, but in the end replaced one Ayatollah with his son, who's more hard-lides. So where's the win there? Clearly the regime did not collapse from within. It's still there, still in charge.

There's been no uprising by the people for a number of reasons, but nothing at all, not even on a scale of what we saw in January, which has nothing to do with the war. And, you know, there is an argument which some people have put to me that a little bit like when NATO attacked Kosovo and other examples, examples like this, that when a country comes under attack, people that hate their regime often hold their nose and rally behind them a little bit because they're being attacked. So it could almost have the opposite effect of what you hope.

But there was this asymmetric element to the whole thing of the control of Australia for Moose, which the Iranians may not have even realized the power of until they did it, and then suddenly saw they could have everyone over a barrel. They always knew it was a possibility. The geography is hardly new. but they also understood that if they took a step like that, that the likelihood that their leaders would get killed was high. So then their leaders get killed, they break glass, they pull emergency lever, right?

I mean, so look, I agree with you that Prime Minister Natanyahu and the head of the Mossad were arguing strongly for this, as they have been with previous administrations. But I also think to only frame it that way and not also mention the profound, success that Trump had just had in Venezuela. I think that's a big part. His experience with the Iranians where on two occasions he hit them hard.

The first time, after did ther in quite a bit in his first term, when he assassinated Qasem Soleimani, and the Iranians talked big, did nothing. Second time when the Israelis go in last June, 12-day war, Trump stays on the sidelines, sees how well it's going. He goes in, he hits,

the Iranians do nothing. So I think we also need to recognize Trump was extremely confidence, was sort of on a heater, as you will, and was ready to double down. And I think that BB caught him at the right time. Pete Higgseth caught him at the right time. There were people internally,

they were also saying, you can do this, sir. And the people that didn't want him to do it, like the head of the Joint Chiefs, Dan Cain, were they were not willing to be as strong in telling him how badly this could go because he didn't want to hear it. And they're not going to get as much access next time around

if they're pushing back. He's not taking inbound criticism and edgewise commentary the way he did when he was much less confident, knew in the job his first term. So I think all of those things play. The Strait of Hormuz, Donald Trump said yesterday was going to be reopened immediately. Then they rained that back and said by the end of the week after the signing, even that. Now, J.D. Vance's language was, well, it may take a bit of time, the 60 days or whatever. We're not really sure quite what's going to happen there. the prediction markets, polymarket users,

seem confident that traffic will return to normal illustrate by the end of the month, say there's a 30% chance of that, a lot of money going in. Normal. Does that mean 100% of the... Well, return to relative normality. I'd like to see how they define that.

I mean, normality would have been, of course, what it was like the day before the war started. Yeah, that's what I would say. I think there's virtually no chance of within 30 days those numbers being... I don't understand why Iran would just completely open again. Well, it's going to take time. I mean, first of all, you've got a lot of ships that are actually stuck, and that's going to cause, you know, sort of a level of just undoing that is going to be a

matter. We think within 30 days, assuming this gets done on Friday, within 30 days, you'll have half of the ships going through. And I'll take that as a win. I think, I just want this over. The massive stumbling block, it seems to me, is likely to be Israel, stroke, Lebanon, stroke, Hezbollah. Because... Who are not signatories to the deal. Correct. Right. And that matters, given that the Iranians are saying that that's a part of the deal. Of course. Of course. So,

you can see a situation where Hezbollah just continue to attack Israel with rockets. Netanyahu, under huge pressure internally, not least from members of his own government, Ben Gavir, Modrich, and others really pushing up. Also, Laksh's supporters in the north of Israel, who he is losing them every day. Correct. And he has an election coming in October.

So there's a lot going on here. But, you know, I could see a situation where Israel just decides, no, we're not doing this and goes on their own. Is that plausible that scenario? Yes, it is. Now, I think that there is, it's one thing if Hezbollah starts striking because we know that that's an order that's come from Tehran. It's not plausible that Hezbollah is acting autonomously in that way. And that the Iran, the Israelis then hit back directly against Hezbollah sides in Iran. the south of Lebanon.

I think that that would, it would upset people. It might delay the 60 days on nuclear discussions, but it would not derail the ceasefire. I think if the Israelis were to engage in direct strikes against Beirut, or if the Israelis were to say, this is Iran hitting us, we're going to hit Iran, then we're in a different place. What place are we then in?

I think that then at a minimum, you have an opening of Iran, Israel, direct warfare, and what the Americans do and don't do to provide support for Israel becomes an extremely important question at that point. Where are the Gulf states in all this? I'm reading a lot of stuff that, you know, in a way, they've never been more united

with Israel and America against a common enemy of Iran, but I suspect that's not as simple as that. I don't think that's the case at all. I think that that is true for the UAE. I have never seen the UAE so engaged. I've spoken with UAE leaders. They tell me we have learned who our true friends are in the region.

They're providing us all the intelligence. We are fighting with them. We are defending with them. We have the same views on what needs to be done to Iran going forward. And that is Israel. What about Saudi and Qatar, for example? Very different. I think that the Saudis are not.

There's zero chance. Remember, Trump was playing with the idea that, well, the Saudis really need to join the Abraham. Of course, there's no chance they're going to do that, given where Israel presently is. in Gaza and in the West Bank. Also, I think the Saudis, look, the Emirates left OPEC. And they left OPEC because the Emirates see that long term, you've got basically captured, stuck assets. And they're in the ground, and they don't want limitations on producing it.

They want to produce as much as possible. Get it out. Get it on the market because they're going to diversify into alternative energies, as fast as they possibly can. Saudi Arabia did not want them to leave OPEC. Saudi Arabia is going to be the anchor of a Muslim alliance in the region. They're the most important, they are OPEC. They're producing at high level, high quantity, very low cost, and they will be the last people in the world doing that.

They have an alliance with Pakistan. The Emirates have an alliance with Israel. The Saudis have a Pakistani nuclear program that they have in part paid for. They have 13,000 Pakistani troops and an air force on the ground in Saudi Arabia. They are aligned increasingly with Turkey. They're aligned increasingly with Egypt. The Saudis have 35 million people in population. They have an Arab street.

The Emirates have 10 million people. Only one million are actually Emirati. They're not a Muslim country. They're a global city-state. They're a family-run conglomerate and a very successful one, but they're two very different models. So going forward, I actually think that the Gulf is not one. Gulf. I think it's two different gulfs. And in fact, I think the Saudis are going to be much more interested in doing a China and Pakistan broker deal with the Iranians. And I think the

Emirates will have a much harder time with that. Where does this leave America post the war? Stronger or weaker than they were before? Well, I mean, it's clearly weaker. I mean, and it's not so much the cost. It's more that the Americans went into this war by themselves. And they're taking, you know, air capabilities, naval capabilities out. of Asia, out of Europe, to have more capacity in the Middle East. Again, they're doing it without asking permission, without be coordinating with the allies. So allies of the United States around the world look at America and say, you're very unpredictable.

You've just caused massive damage to our economies. You're unreliable. I was just in the Dominican Republic two weeks ago. You didn't think I was going to mention that. I did not. All of 11 million people in that country saw all their CEOs, spent a lot of time with their president, who I like a lot. And his popularity went from, by the way, he's on the right, ideologically, and he has a really good relationship with Trump.

I mean, he doesn't have a, he doesn't have a melee relationship, but a quite good one. And his popularity went from 70 to 55 percent over the last several months, because inflation for a country that has big subsidies for importing all of their oil is a huge problem. Why? It's not his fault. It's purely the United States deciding to go into this war. And there are leaders around the world. There are not just five or ten. There are literally over 100 leaders around the world that feel exactly the same way. If you think that this is a problem for Trump in the midterms,

or Trump and the Republicans, or Trump in his popularity politically in the U.S., that's tiny ball compared to how the rest of the world that's taking it in the teeth feels on the back of this decision. We've got the G7, obviously, this week. Geopolitically on the big global scale, Has there been a shifting sand here this year, particularly in terms of America's relationship with Europe? Completely.

And I mean, yes, on Iran, of course. Yes, on this woe-begotten Greenland issue. Yes, on trade. Yes, on Russia, Ukraine. And the Americans pulling back from providing any direct support as the Ukrainians are fighting courageously and well, as you and I have both watched and talked about. And most recently, you know, the issue that I think is dominant. dominating G7 conversations right now, is the United States government deciding to tell, put export controls on Anthropic and not allowing them to export their latest model fable to anyone, not, I don't care who you are as an ally. And, and the Europeans so worried that the Americans have a kill switch for any critical technology that they can just shut it down. Doesn't matter how important is to you. And you will have no say. You'll have no influence. You'll have no input. And the Europeans, the French have Mistral. It's a rounding error in terms of its

net value compared to anthropic or open AI, the Europeans are panicked about this. And they're right to be. They're right to be. So I think the transatlantic relationship is under an enormous amount of strain right now. Elon Musk, a trillionaire. Yeah, yeah. A good thing, a terrible thing? Well, first of all, as an American, I'd much rather Elon be in the U.S. as a trillionaire

than in China. And the Europeans aren't making any trillion. Is he a force for, I mean, the argument for him is, he's obviously a genius and incredibly driven, and he's built these amazing companies which do a lot of really good things. I mean, NeuroLink and SpaceX and Tesla. You can see a narrative of doing good for the world, right? And the Russians would still be winning if it wasn't for Elon. Right.

Yeah. The downside is what he does with his platform X, and in particular how he wields his 240 million followers. at the moment, he's been very actively engaged, for example, in the UK, amplifying the far right, Tommy Robinson. AFT in Germany. Restore, AFT in Germany. And that is, many think, a malevolent use of his power. Doge was unsuccessful. One of the most unsuccessful things Trump did, certainly domestically, meant to cause efficiency.

Ended up, the U.S. is spending a lot more money, and the things that were shut down were not strategic and caused problems. And a lot of people probably dead around the world. I mean, Ebola, much less effect in responding to it because of things that the Americans have unilaterally shut down. You throw the baby out with the bath water, that's bad. Look, on balance, I am not someone that has a problem with someone starting a company and building extraordinary wealth. The amount of jobs created, the amount of economic gains created, those things are fantastic for humanity. But I will tell you, I worry that in my country right now, the number of Americans that feel that way is, far, far smaller than when I was younger.

Not because they don't like people being rich, but because they think that they no longer have opportunities themselves. They see that the U.S. is shutting down, whether it's funding for public schools or challenges on your pension, your Social Security, we're not going to have enough. But these guys seem to have access to power, spent $250 million more than anyone else on the election,

and he's standing next to Trump all the time and getting all sorts of subsidies, government contracts, and the rest. people don't feel like it's okay. They think that a billionaire is a policy failure because they don't think they can become one. And we used to have a country where 90% of Americans thought they could make it to the top 10% if they just worked hard.

They knew they kids could. And that's what attracted immigrants from all over the world. We no longer have those numbers. We used to have class mobility numbers that were the highest of the entire OECD, The U.S. now has less class mobility than the Brits. Then the Brits, you guys have the House of Lords, for Christ's sake, right? How is it possible that the Americans now the best indicator, the best predictor in the United States compared to other OECD countries of whether a child will become wealthy is their parents' wealth?

That's not America. That's not what this country stands for. Put your little crystal ball on. Midterm elections. To the Republicans lose the House and Senate? Clearly they lose the House. They lose the House easily. easily. Senate's going to be very, very close. Trump's made a big mistake in supporting Paxton and Texas. You remember, he lost the Senate for the Republicans after losing the presidential

election, said Georgia, the state of Georgia, it's been rigged, and they had two special elections for the Senate. And he said, don't even shell. Don't go. And so consequence, the Democrats took both of those seats, flipped the Senate. Because he obviously didn't care about the Republicans if it wasn't about him. He's doing it again. So, I mean, the Democrats benefit from the fact that Trump doesn't seem to care about the midterms very much. Having said that, the Democrats also have vulnerabilities in some of these states. You've seen all the flap about Graham Platner in Maine, won the primary, but has a lot of hair on him in terms of whether or not people are going to turn out.

So I think you've got to take four seats to swing the Senate. That is a very, very significant climb. But Trump's approval ratings right now around 38, which is the lowest of either of his two administrations, it will help that this agreement, if it holds, holds. Because gas prices will go down and people see that every week when they're pumping up, their big SUVs. It's expensive. It's the big reminder. It's the big reminder. But he is so far underwater in November is coming soon. I think that the Senate is close to a coin flip. I don't think anyone has a, if it's not a coin flip, it's 40, 60 or 64. And in January, 29, around January, the 20,

21st, who's in the White House? That's going to be 25 people running from the Democratic side. One of the Democrats? I don't know. I don't know. I think that, I think right now, first of all, it's way too early. People, when you asked folks at this stage before Obama was elected, people didn't even mention Obama as a name.

When you asked people this early before Trump's first election, no one thought Trump was remotely plausible, right? So I think we don't know who that person is going to be. I know that technology is going to be an incredibly important issue. Backlash. I think corruption is going to be an incredibly important issue. Backlash. I suspect that the Democratic candidate will be more from the left than the center.

And I think that the right is going to be wide, wide open. It's who Trump wants, but it's also, like, if you're JD Vance today, very difficult position to be in, how do you avoid being Kamala for Trump? Right. I don't know how you do that. I think it's hard to do. And also whether Trumpism itself as a theme survives Donald Trump himself as president. I know.

And I think it does, but I don't think it's Trumpism. No. Right? Like, from I see Tucker Carlson and I see him talking anti-corruption. I see him talking about Epstein. I see him going after Israel. I see a whole bunch of America firstism that Trump kind of gave up on. He's still on the border security.

I can see Tucker Carlson. I can see him running. I can see him becoming president. It is not implausible. It is not implausible. Anything can happen. Ian Brama, one thing's for sure. You will be a constant source of wisdom for me as we try and straddle these complex international issues.

Thank you very much. It's nice seeing you in person. Go England. I hope we have a good cup. I hope you do very well America until you play us. And I hope we back to you. Fair enough. And just get revenge for what happened 250 years ago.

Because trust me, we ain't celebrating that quite like you guys. Well, you're not having the UFC on the right outside 10 Downing Street. Yeah, no one's doing that, I assure you. earning effigies of George III, trust me. Good to see it. Good see it. Joining me now is the International Affairs scholar, Jeffrey Sachs. Jeffrey, welcome back to Unsensitive. Great to be with your peers. Thanks a lot. Where are we with this deal, do you think? So many competing views about it.

My gut feeling is that Donald Trump was just desperate to get out of this Iran war. It has spiraled way out of his control and that he'll just do anything it takes to extricate the United States from it. What's your reading? I think that that's exactly the right reading. This was supposed to be a one-day affair, February 28, 26. They would kill the Supreme Leader, decapitate the government, take over Iran, and we'd all live happily ever after. That was the Netanyahu Trump delusion. It failed, and since then, we've been basically in a situation where The United States could not impose its will. Iran has retaliatory capacity until this moment.

The world energy crisis continued as long as this debacle continues. And I agree with you, Trump wanted out. And I think with a very fragile, fragile basis, we might just get out of it. Israel will do everything possible to undermine this agreement. It already has started with new attacks in southern Lebanon. But Trump wants out, and he's been uncharacteristically clear with Mr. Netanyahu in recent days and hours not to screw it up. I mean, we've got two elections coming this fall. One, the US midterm elections, which Donald Trump would have been acutely aware,

were becoming a massive problem because a lot of pressure from his Republican Party to sort this mess in Iran out before it caused even more political and economic damage. But you conversely have the elections looming in Israel in October, where Netanyahu is really unpopular, right to the point he's judged on what he's doing to defend national security in relation to what he's doing in Lebanon or Iran or wherever it may be, which many people believe is one of his motivating factors

in continuing to be so aggressive on that stage. Do you think that's accurate? Do you think that the political expediency for both men here has played their part in reaching this point now where they have, have to potentially go their separate ways? Well, I think Trump was accurate when he said a few days ago and then confirmed the quotes that were made by Axios that he told Netanyahu, everybody hates you now.

Everybody hates Israel now. This is true. But this is Netanyahu's doing, of course. So I hope we see the end of Netanyahu's political career in their elections. I think that it's very likely that Trump will soon be a lame duck president in the United States in the sense that the Democrats will win at least the lower House of Congress. And all eyes will immediately turn to 28. And Trump's own ability to stay clear of scandals, crises, and Congress will also be brought to an end.

So I think for both politicians, this was a terrible debacle, probably worse for Netanyahu. This was his dream war. As he told us at the very beginning, at the first day, this was his dream war for 40 years. He tried to talk every American president into it. Trump was the only one gullible enough to fall for it. Trump fell for it, and the disaster is on both of them. Where does it leave the Middle East, Jeffrey? Well, it leaves the Middle East in a kind of limbo.

Everybody understands the United States is no real security for the Gulf country, certainly. Iran remains with a powerful military, a technologically sophisticated military, an ability to launch hypersonic missiles, to protect itself, and to retaliate against Israel. So this is a change. And of course, I think Israel is, of course, despised by just about every single country in the world. And a recent Pew survey has shown that. They have earned it themselves. When it comes to the United States, Trump is pretty much despised, almost.

everywhere in the world as well. And the sense of the United States as a real ally has disappeared even in Europe, but I'm sure that in the Middle East, they're trying to figure out what the hell to do. And of course, there's no question that because of this, the place of China, the place of Russia, the place of other regional powers will be stronger. And the sense of the United States as a very powerful, rather erratic, politically unstable, one of many countries rather than the global power is now, I think, the reality for everybody with their eyes open. In other words, the days of the U.S. being the unchallenged dominant power, which was always true in Washington's eyes, but was also to an extent true in many other eyes, this war has accelerated the end of that idea as well. Is the big winner in the end from this Iran War China?

China is, as we could see, again, very cautious, very stable. They have their own interests without question. In the midst of all of this, Trump went to Beijing and basically heard a lecture from Xi Jinping, and after he heard the lecture, he basically agreed with the lecture. He left Beijing saying he doesn't want Taiwan to do anything unsettling, much less to declare independence. He doesn't want a war with China. And he also has held in abeyance the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. In other words, we also saw the limits of American power vis-a-vis China in the last two years.

Last year, the U.S. tried a trade war against China. It lasted about 24 hours before China matched and raised, the met and raised the U.S. moves, and the U.S. back down. China had too much leverage, the rare earths and other leverage. So the U.S. lost the trade war. The summit that took place showed the limits of power there. The events in Ukraine are showing the limits of American power in Eastern Europe. The events in the Gulf are showing the limits of power in the Gulf region. Now, mind you, the U.S. remains a very powerful country, a rich one, one that has a lot of sway.

But it is not the world's unipolar power. It's not the world's hegemon. and the limits of American power, I think, are now very clearly in view. And to my mind, this is very realistic and just fine, by the way, because so much of the damage in the world was U.S. wars of choice that created a mess. And maybe the U.S. will reconsider next time someone comes in and says, hey, why don't you try a one-day war with us? maybe they'll have a little bit more self-restraint.

Where are we with energy? Because I don't think most people outside of the kind of, you know, really hardcore, knowledgeable energy experts were quite aware of just how much of the global energy the Iranians had potential control of. And now, of course, everybody does, including the Iranian regime, who realized that it became their most. potent weapon was the control of Australia for Moose, particularly when coupled with letting off a few missiles at their Gulf state neighbours. Obviously, if they want to, they can pull that lever whenever they see fit. What happens to global energy in light of that? I mean, are you going to see countries like Saudi and states like Saudi and others now try and create a separate place outside of Australia for Moose to try and do business? I mean, what, what?

What will be the practical reality of this war? Well, I think the fundamental longer-term trend is to accelerate the fundamental move away from coal, oil, and gas to wind hydro-solar nuclear power in some cases, given all the complexities of that issue. But the idea is that for years, many people said that the move. away from fossil fuel was important to save the planet Earth. Then, because of China's advances in technology, more and more countries came around and said, you know, it's actually cheaper. It's not just grid parity. It's actually cheaper to go with larger solar fields, for example, because China had knocked down the price so dramatically. Now there's another argument in the I hear it everywhere, actually, in the last weeks, which is that it is now a matter of national

security to use one's own sunshine coming in, to use one's own wind, maybe to tap into the hydropower of the next door neighbor and so forth, but not to rely on the long distance transmission or trade in fossil fuels. So there's a national security argument. that has been added to all of the other arguments. And I was on a call today in Asia with the several governments and multilateral development institutions, talking about the accelerated move to basically renewable energy

as the backbone for a lot of East Asia. This is going to happen. That's a longer term proposition, But I think a lot of governments are, even in recent weeks, turning their attention to what can we do to harness our own energy sources. Yeah, I think you're right. Jeffrey Sachs, always great to talk to. Thank you very much. Pleasure to be with you. Thank you. Well, join me with his analysis on the U.S. Iran deal is Robert Pap.

He's the professor of political science. Robert, welcome back to Unsense. Thanks for having me again. What is your take on this apparent resolution to the Iran War, which we're going to see signed and sealed, according to President Trump on Friday? I think we're celebrating too early. I understand why we want to celebrate early. This has been incredibly painful, and it looks like more pain is coming, and we like that relief. But the fact of the matter is we're heading into an incredibly contentious 60 days. This is a period of time where open warfare can break out at literally any moment. And for a whole variety of reasons, this can be because of Israel.

This can be because Iran doesn't get its $12 billion. And these are multiple reasons. But the biggest issue that I think is being left out of the analysis here appears, is the stakeholder of the shippers. The people who have to take the risk are basically being left out of this whole conversation. And they're now coming to the floor at the New York Times giant story about this,

not a surprise. They're saying, we're not going. So it's one thing for you and me and everybody else to sit here and say, oh, sure, those ships, just go ahead and take that risk. You know, 14 of them have been killed, by the way, all right, already. So we need to understand. They've been bottled up, essentially, in solitary confinement virtually for, what, 108 days now?

So let's understand the idea that they're going to do this. And what do they want? They want an ironclad promise from Iran, not Donald Trump. Nobody trusts Trump on this. They want not the UAE. They want an ironclad promise from Iran. They're not going to get killed. Or when they go in and out, Iran's not just going to bottle them up again because Israel is going

after has what are all those reasons that you just went through with your other guests. The bottom line here is everybody is celebrating too early. We are not at the end game. And I'm glad to tell you when we know we're going to be at the end game. I've been modeling this for 20 years. We're at the middle game of the escalation trap. And this is a point where the two sides don't even agree on what this MOU means. They say they initialed it, but they're talking out of, they're making it quite clear they

don't agree on what it means. And then over time, peers, what's going to happen is Iran's leverage is going to grow because you see over the next 30 to 60 days, the world is still going to draw down those oil inventories because it's going to take 60 days before the ships actually get the stuff to the refineries. So that means by the time the 60 days are up, all those cushions are at zero peers. That's what we're facing. And Iran's leverage will grow. And what has a lot happens when states leverage grow, typically they want more. And there's more that Iran is likely going to want that they're already signaling. Yeah, I mean, I just think that's inevitable. Because the rage, you know, we were told that Donald Trump said back in March,

that the only deal that will be acceptable is total surrender by the Iranians. Well, obviously, we're a million miles from any total surrender. You've got the slain Ayatollah's son, who's more radical than his father, who we believe is still alive and will be taking over from his father. You then had the same regime you had before, albeit they've lost a few people, but they've replaced them pretty quickly.

The people seem to still be under the control of the regime, hence the lack of any uprisings or protests of any significance. And this crucially, as you've touched on there, the Iranians have realized suddenly the enormous power and potent weapon that the Strait of Hormuz represents. And as long as it represents 20% of the world's energy flow through this tiny area next to Iran,

then they're going to wield enormous power. And they know that. And they also know that Trump and Netanyahu are facing elections, which may decapitate their political power anyway. So there's no incentive for them to do anything quick. Why would they? Nothing in their history. It took Obama two years to do his deal with them. The idea this is all going to be over in 60 days is for the birds.

That's right, peers. And just take this one more step further. What that means is the Ls on Trump's back are going to add up and keep going. You see, Iran, again, they said they want their $12 billion. Then they're $24 billion. J.D. Van said, oh, no, no, no, you can't have it. Well, they're going to keep demanding, and they're probably not going to give the shipping companies the assurance they want here. So what that means is Trump, there's going to be more and more pressure on Trump to pay up, either or the Guitary's or the UA to help Trump pay up. Then if Trump pays that, there'll be more pressure for Trump to pull his forces out because as the deputy prime minister of foreign minister, excuse me, of Iran has made very, very clear in the last 24 hours.

What they want is U.S. forces out, you see. This isn't just about a little bit of more money now. This is about Iran on a trajectory to gain power. I believe Iran is using negotiations, peers, as a power strategy here. They're not trying to get out and get peace. They're trying to get power. And I think that they are heading in that direction. And what that means is more and more else for Trump.

So does he just then accept that he looks a weaker and weaker over time? What does Trump tend to do when he looks weak? He goes and kills somebody. Okay, he lashes out. We've seen this. He wants to trend or wrong. And this is going to be a real test for this escalation trap in the next two months because the glue that has the pressure to keep returning,

us back to the warfare is that fear of looking like the loser, that big loser. And what does Trump have as the card to play? He's losing now, has become quite clear here as time has gone on. So what is his card? His only card is really the use of force, which he goes to quite often. Yeah. And of course, at the same time, you know, it's already a very unpopular war. The first war in modern times with the American people in a majority are negative against it, and have been since the start, and that number's only increased. And the people that have been cheering Trump on the loudest, the neocons on the right in America, the Israelis, they're now beginning to get angry with him for what they see as a bad deal that plays into Iran's hands. So Trump's personal

popularity is likely to get more and more unpopular, I would think, because, you know, because even people that have been supporting them the most are turning on it. So how you would know, peers, we're getting to the endgame of the escalation trap. How would you know that? And this is important for our troops, if nobody else, is that we're actually withdrawing our forces. So remember, we put in the biggest armada here since the 2003, Iraq War. So we moved a whole lot of forces to the Middle East. That's Air Forces, Naval Forces, 10,000 ground forces that are,

dedicated to actual ground combat missions. Well, once those start to come out, like take out the 5,000 Marines, the 5,000 airborne troops, move them out of theater, once the aircraft carriers go back to other oceans, once the destroyers start to leave, this is how you would know that the end game is truly there. And this is going to be a real problem, because if Trump does that, then who's going to claim victory, the Iranians. That's what I mean by the problem of this going forward domestically for Trump. And I don't mean with Democrats and I don't mean with independence, half of MAGA, as you well know, is not going to be happy saying they're going to back Trump, even though he's a loser on the Iran situation. That's a lot for this going forward. That's why I believe Trump's been

bouncing back and forth. One day he talks peace, another day he talks bombing. Some days he does be, someday he does bombing. Why is that? I believe it's his domestic political base of MAGA is divided, so Trump is divided, and I don't think MAGA is going to unify over the next couple of weeks or a couple of months. In fact, Iran is likely to push its margin of advantage that's gaining, as I said, and it's going to make it even harder for this. So I think, and by the way, one more point, all the oil execs, we had a big meeting at the University of Chicago last week, they're all telling me that as these oil inventories run dry, and this would be, even if the straits open today, fully, what's going to happen is the price of oil is going up

anyway at the end of July and beginning of August. So this idea that it's just a downwards trend like that, this is not taking seriously the end of the oil inventories, the demand that always goes up at that time of year, hurricanes, the things that already come up, that's what they're already. projecting here. And Iran, this is all mana from heaven for Iran. This is Iran's growing leverage, because what that means is in that situation, come early August, you disrupt this for just a few days here, even if you can get it going. And oh, my goodness, this is where things get really shaky, because we're out of the cushion. We've used up the gas in the spare gas tank. We had a spare gas

tank, we used it, and now when you run out in the desert, there's nothing to go to. Yeah, and we haven't even mentioned the fertilizer aspect to the Strait of All Moose, and the impact that will have on the food chain as the summer months approach.

It's going to be quite a ride to watch. Robert Payne, thank you very much for David, joining me. Thank you for having me, Pierce. Peter's Morgan-on-Sense that is proudly independent. The only boss around here is me. If you enjoy our show, We ask only one simple thing.

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