Tech Won't Save Us - Trusting Tech Billionaires is a Recipe for Disaster w/ Douglas Rushkoff
Episode Date: December 8, 2022Paris Marx is joined by Douglas Rushkoff to discuss why internet visions of the 1990s were wrong to ignore corporate power, how the dot-com boom was like a Ponzi scheme, and why we desperately need to... stop elevating tech billionaires.Douglas Rushkoff is an author and documentarian who studies human autonomy in a digital age. His most recent book is Survival of the Richest: Escape Fantasies of the Tech Billionaires and he’s the host of Team Human podcast. You can follow him on Twitter at @rushkoff.Tech Won’t Save Us offers a critical perspective on tech, its worldview, and wider society with the goal of inspiring people to demand better tech and a better world. Follow the podcast (@techwontsaveus) and host Paris Marx (@parismarx) on Twitter, and support the show on Patreon.The podcast is produced by Eric Wickham and part of the Harbinger Media Network.Also mentioned in this episode:An excerpt from Survival of the Richest was published in The Guardian.Paris was recently on the Team Human podcast to discuss Road to Nowhere with Douglas.Support the show
Transcript
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Instead of taking an almost psychedelic trip together as a society, we used digital technology
more like steroids or speed in order to double down on extractive corporate capitalism. Hello and welcome to Tech Won't Save Us. I'm your host, Paris Marks, and this week my guest
is Douglas Rochkoff. Douglas is an author and documentarian who studies human autonomy in the
digital age. He's the author of many books, including most
recently, Survival of the Richest, Escape Fantasies of the Tech Billionaires. You might have heard me
talk about it on our recent episode with Dave Karp. Douglas is also the host of the Team Human
podcast, which I appeared on a few months ago to talk about my book and had a fantastic discussion
with Douglas about it. I'm very excited to have Douglas on the show because he's been writing
critically about the tech industry for quite a long time. And I feel like this most recent book
of his, Survival of the Richest, not only digs into some of these escape fantasies of the
billionaires, you know, as they look at the consequences of the societies that they're
creating and try to find escape routes instead of actually solving the problems that they are creating. But it also
digs into the broader mindset of the tech industry and the people who are on top of it, and how
things went so wrong from those kind of early ideals around what the internet and these tech
companies were actually going to do to society. And I feel like in some ways it's also Douglas
is able to reflect on these things as
he's been writing about them, commenting on them, watching them unfold over these past couple of
decades. So I really enjoyed the book. And I was very excited and happy to talk to Douglas about
it, to dig into it with him, to draw some parallels between the things that he was observing early on,
you know, as the internet revolution, so to speak, was taking off and these
companies were being formed in the dot-com boom period, and then linking that up to things that
we've been seeing more recently, both in the tech economy, but also among these really wealthy
people who have benefited from that explosion of capitalist wealth creation that followed the internet and how their
interventions are moving society in the exact wrong direction and giving us the wrong solutions
to any of the kinds of problems that we actually need to solve, that we actually need to deal with
if we're to build a better world. So I hope that you enjoy this conversation. I certainly really
did. And I encourage you to go pick up Douglas's book because I think you're really going to enjoy it. If you like this
conversation, make sure to leave a five-star review on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. You can
also share the show on social media or with any friends or colleagues who you think would learn
from it. And if you want to support the work that goes into making the show and having these
critical conversations every week, you can join supporters like Jess from the United States by going to patreon.com slash tech won't save us and becoming a supporter.
Thanks so much and enjoy this week's conversation. Douglas, welcome to tech won't save us.
I'm so glad to be here.
I'm so excited to chat with you. Obviously, you had me on your show team human a few months ago,
and we had a great discussion about my book, but also, you know, topics far beyond that. And
honestly, it was like one of the conversations that I most enjoyed going and talking about the
book because, you know, it branched so far off into these other things that you've been working
on that I've been writing about. And so I'm just excited to have you on the show so we can have a
wide ranging discussion as well about your work. Oh, me too. Totally. I'm as in case you don't know,
I'm a fan of you and what you do. So for me, it's like a extra special thrill to actually do this
with you. Thank you very much. It's so kind to hear from you, of course, after I've read a number
of your books and I've been following your book for so long, too. So thank you. So here's here's
where I want to start. You know, obviously obviously the book gets us into these escape fantasies of billionaires that
people get really excited about and think are really interesting.
But before we talk about some of that, I want to kind of step back and ask a broader question
because I feel like the book, you know, in some ways is also a reflection on the experiences
and the work that you've done over the past number of years, writing about these topics,
looking at the tech industry, looking at these influential figures who are shaping a lot about
how society works right now. And so I wonder from your vantage point, how you've seen the
tech industry evolve over the years and whether your thinking on it has changed over that period
too. Yeah, it's interesting. You know, when I read the book for the audio book, which I don't know
if you've done the audio reading of your own books, the whole thing takes on a different quality for the writer
because now you're saying it out loud. And when I read this book out loud compared to the others,
I realized it was a stealth memoir, that this really was my journey through the cyber culture
from what seemed like the beginnings to me anyway in the late
80s, right through to where we are now. And I would say it's less the story of my changing
attitudes towards a thing that was happening, but the way the world shifted under my feet.
I guess for me, it's a story of there was this tremendous, if unsettling or destabilizing potential for digital technology to really change the way we engage with one surrendered to the needs of the traditional marketplace. I'm less amazed by how things have changed than by how steadfastly they've remained the same. almost, not to get too druggy, but instead of taking an almost psychedelic trip together as a
society, we used digital technology more like steroids or speed in order to double down on
extractive corporate capitalism. So the original set and setting, to use Timothy Leary's words, the original set and setting for the digital trip was collective imagination and challenging authority and asking new questions. interactive storytelling, and even questioning identity and gender in fun, crazy, playful ways,
and how that was replaced by a set and setting of extraction, control, domination,
the good old ones that we've had the last 500 or so years, and then looking at where that took us.
And I feel like it's the story of how we went from this good trip into a really bad trip of paranoia and apocalypse fantasies.
And in some ways, the people who are most successful in the digital media environment are suffering the most with that horror show.
Yeah, it's the narrative in the early
part of this kind of transformation as the internet is emerging is so different, as you say, is so
kind of focused on the opportunity and the liberation and what have you that is going to be
offered by these technologies by moving in this direction. And it is interesting when you when you
when you say it, you know, I was just thinking i had just looked at my first real book it was called siberia that i wrote in 1992 that was canceled in 93 because they thought
the net would be over by the time it came out you know that one and and i was like and it's a very
um it's not an optimistic but it's a very open-minded appraisal of this new thing that
was happening you know the mondo 2000 era reality hacker, are you serious? You
know, very early Apple, gee whiz, wonder, West Coast thing. But at the very end of the book,
I say, you know, there's this new magazine coming along called Wired that is sort of reframing this
digital renaissance as an economic revolution. And I feel like there's a window of opportunity for us kind of peace,
love, human nature, loving people to seize the opportunity of the net. But if we don't,
there's a very alternative history that we may live. And I was trying not to be too scared,
but I was like, huh, there's this thing on the horizon. There's an alternative road we
may go down, which will be really scary. And I was already at that point saying, you know,
what will it be like if we're using an internet where marketing could reconfigure itself in real
time based on how we're behaving? And we'll each end up with our own feedback loop of personalized
social control. That would be a dangerous place to go.
You know, so I was already wondering that it could happen.
Phew, it's a good thing we avoided that dystopian.
Yeah, thank God. I warned everyone and we avoided it. Yeah.
Yeah. It's interesting, though, because when you look back at that moment now, and certainly
you discuss this a bit in the book, what do you make of that kind of framing of the Internet?
Because as you discuss in the book and as is probably familiar to a lot of the listeners of the podcast, a lot of those narratives around, you know, the potential transformative effect of the Internet and of the digital environment and what have you is also seized on by those people who want to promote kind of the economic vision of the internet and what it could
give to us as well. When you look back now on those narratives of the internet as kind of
liberatory, as offering us these different experiences, do you think that they were
naive in what they potentially offered or what they saw as being possible to, you know, through
this technology? Was it always kind of set in stone that the way that
we went was one where the market kind of took over the internet and vastly commercialized it,
just as though it takes over every other part of our society?
Yeah, I mean, there were multiple forms of naivete. You know, the easy one was John Barlow
came along and wrote the Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace. He was a grateful dead lyricist. He was cool with everybody. We didn't know he was Dick Cheney's roommate in college and campaign advisor. it's like oh and when he came along and said you know governments of the world get off our
internet we don't need you this is our space what we didn't realize was if you get rid of government
then you create free reign for corporations to come you know and government really had cast
itself as the enemy this was the moment there was something called operation sun devil where they
had raided the homes of little 14-year-old hackers who are,
you know, trying to break into AT&T to see how the systems work. They were not
cyber espionage terrorists. They were curious children getting handcuffed and, you know,
dragged into jail. And it was like, we were mad at them. We were mad at Tipper Gore, Al Gore's wife,
who was doing a parental advisory and trying to shut down. Everyone thought that cyber would be
used for child porn. And this was all bad bad and babies are going to see naked people on the internet or,
you know, God knows what they were really worried about at the time.
But it was a lot of fear mongering or moral panic was going on. So it seemed like, yeah,
government, get out, FBI, we don't need you. So that happened. But on a more complex level,
and this is more to your work, what we knew was we were
breaking the monopolistic control of Rupert Murdoch and William Randolph Hearst. The whole
read-only mediascape that we were living in seemed like, okay, now we're going to move into a
read-write mediascape where I can make the videos and do the stuff and make all that. It's going to
be free of those repressive biases. And because we weren't really fluent in McLuhan, we didn't realize that, no,
it's not just that they're free of those biases, it's going to be now subjected to a new set of
biases. What are the biases and affordance of digital technology? And we better understand
those lest we be run over by them. And without doing that analysis, we weren't able to
see how this space would end up favoring the loudest troll, you know, that misbehavior in
cyberspace would be rewarded vastly more than appropriate behavior. It was a different place,
and we didn't compensate for that. We didn't program for that. We programmed for engagement.
Yeah. I feel like it makes a ton
of sense, right? Like when you go back and read Barlow or some of the other writings in that time,
the opposition to government is there, right? Like you can see it very clearly, but then there's so
little mention of the corporation, right? And this other kind of form of power that exists in our
society and how it would be able to swoop in if the government is not there,
if there's no kind of regulatory framework, if we're not thinking about the potential consequences
that come of just unleashing it and creating a whole new market opportunity that a bunch of
companies can then kind of use in order to build a whole new load of businesses.
Right. And not to cheer for authoritarianism on any level, but you look at the difference between the exported version of TikTok and the domestic version of
TikTok in China. Because China has a very, let's use a nice word, strong government and ready
government intervention, the TikTok that their children receive has educational material like pandas and all sorts of stuff. It's basically,
it's an educational channel using the addictiveness or some of the addictiveness of TikTok and the
sensationalism of it to teach kids. And the number one profession that little kids say they want to
go into when they grow up is to be an astronaut, you know, in America where TikTok has no such
controls. And it's the least common denominator. It's even, you know, in America, where TikTok has no such controls. And it's the least
common denominator. It's even, you know, Tristan Harris says, he's got a good one for this. He's
really good. I don't know. I agree with him all the time about his kind of techno-solutionism
for upscaling humanity, but he is good with the phrase. And he says, you know, that domestically,
Chinese TikTok is spinach. Internationally, it's opium, right? And that's true. That's why in America,
you ask kids at the same age what they want to be when they grow up, and they say an influencer.
Like, oh my gosh, a social media influencer. It doesn't matter what they're influencing about,
just influence, influence. Yeah. That also feels linked to,
I feel like I read this somewhere and I can never actually find the study that said it. So maybe
it's something I made up and then just like justified to myself. Good enough. But like
in unequal societies, and I guess maybe like we could even say stagnating to some degree societies,
right? Because one thing I think that we can recognize about whether it's the United States
or, you know, the West more generally is that social mobility is really stagnating, right?
The kind of promise of say an American dream or what have
you, that sure, you work hard and, you know, things are going to get better in your life and
you're going to improve generation on generation, that has kind of evaporated as this inequality
has gotten so much worse. And then you see that reflected in these ideas about careers and what
people want to achieve. Whereas, as you say, somewhere in China, maybe astronaut and these sorts of ideas are what people are going toward what people think would be really
good careers, things that we might have seen in decades past in, say, the United States or Canada.
And now everyone wants to be a sports player or a YouTuber or an influencer or what have you,
because it seems like that is kind of your one shot at getting out of whatever
situation you're in now, right? You can't really pursue the kind of career that is going to give
you the growth or what have you in the past. It's the moonshot or it's nothing.
Right. The main tools that people had for changing class, if you will, for class mobility,
those are the things that are inflated more than anything else. Home prices, where you get into a so-called better neighborhood to send
your kid to a good school so they can then get into college, or college itself, which went up
10 times more than the regular rate of inflation. And now it doesn't even really serve that same
function. Well, college is so much more, and I'm teaching in college, but parents and kids,
they all come in.
It's like, what job can I get when I'm done?
What job?
So the whole, maybe it was elitist, but the beauty of college was it was four years away
from the job market to actually develop your whole instrument, you know, and now it's very
few people look at it that way.
Yeah.
Job training, basically, you know, which is unfortunate.
Right. They're externalizing the cost of worker training to us.
Yeah, exactly. And we have, I think, traditionally been a bit better with,
you know, university tuition and stuff in Canada. But even here in Newfoundland, where I am,
they shot it through the roof recently because the argument was that, oh, it's
too cheap here because the rest of Canada has it more expensive. So we need to match them so that it looks comparable. If it's not expensive, then it looks like it's
a cheap education and not worth as much. And it's like, what? That's so backwards, right?
Like it makes no sense. It's commodity fetishism in education. Yeah, there you go.
Yeah, it's disappointing. And I want to get back to that early period, you know, before we get into what is going on now.
I could stay. I'll stay in the early period. taking off, all these companies are forming. And there's this really kind of mad dash to, you know, be the big internet company to be the next big thing, all of this money is rushing in.
And then at the end of that period, we have the explosion, right? All this wealth, so to speak,
quote unquote, is destroyed because the boom goes bust. But you also talked about how this period
was, you called it like a Ponzi scheme, basically. You know, all of this money was going in
in search of returns.
And the question was,
will you be able to get out before everything goes bust?
Can you talk to us a bit about that period
and what you take from it?
Yeah, well, it's funny.
I remember all these business plans.
It was like, when I was a kid,
people would write screenplays
and then try to get one.
So you get like $500,000 for a screenplay
and you move out to California and you're rich and get laid and get try to get one. So you get like $500,000 for a screenplay and you move out
to California and you're rich and get laid and get a pool and whatever. And it was like, and people
who had nothing to do with movies would try to write the screenplay. You buy the Sid Feld book.
It was this one on how to write screenplays. And then you just try to bang one out if you have a
good enough idea and you follow the structure. So in the dot-com boom era, like 96, 7, 8, 9, what people would do is come up with a high concept, like a digital bike lock.
And then you write this business plan where you say, okay, there's 500 million bicycles in America times $12, which is the margin that we get on each one of these digital bike locks, equals $2.7 billion.
And that was basically the way it went. Or you'd be generally say, well, if we only sold to 20%
of American bicycles, we would still make $3 billion. So they would write those out and
generate money. It was really a pure pyramid scheme that an angel would come in and support
that. And then they'd go up to a series A for the next level investors and a series B.
And you try to get it all the way up to your IPO where you're selling to the public. And at that
point, the angels and the series A people get out and leave everybody else on the pyramid holding
the bag until the thing dies. And it just kept happening and happening. Even
companies that were delivering some value, their business plans would be like people who stay in
their apartments or their homes by remortgaging and remortgaging at better valuations. That keeps
working as long as the price of your house is going up. So you can get a new mortgage at a
better valuation. But the minute it stops going up, you die. You die suddenly. You have to leave.
And what I was watching was that when was this going to happen to all these companies? Because
everybody, I think, maybe they didn't. I knew and some of my friends knew, but everybody else
thought we were in a new paradigm, that because of digital, it would be all different. And that
was even new paradigm was Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve, said we're in a new
paradigm. We see how that went.
Yeah.
And what the turning point for me was when, and I wrote about it in the book, was when the New York Times asked me to write the op-ed about the AOL-Time Warner merger.
And me, I'm one of us, right?
I'm not a business guy.
I've never written a business piece in my life.
It's like, wait a minute.
I compared the hypertext adventure to a ayahuasca trip versus
an acid trip and here's why like i'm a different you know i mean i was writing about internet
culture and all but not that and they're like no no you're the guy to write this because this is the
new synergy of old media new media you'll be able to explain it you're the new mccluhan you'll tell
us what it is so i go okay if i'm the new mccluhan i'm gonna look at this through the lens of a media
theorist so what is this currency that they're playing with? And it's like, oh, so Steve Case,
the owner of AOL is taking his in-game money, right? It's like video game money. And he's
using it to buy an old media, real company like Time Warner that has a movie studio and cable.
They own Roadrunner Cable. They have amusement parks. They have all
this actual stuff. So right, he's cashing in his chips, his poker chips to get this next level of
money that's tied to the real world. And that must mean his subscriber base has probably peaked.
And that's why he ran to Goldman and Salmon Smith Barney and whoever to do an IPO or
to buy this new company. And it's going to crash
and burn, obviously, because the weight of this funny money into that fake into that real money
is going to dilute everything. I don't know how this is going to even last.
They call me up that afternoon from the op ed page and they say, we can't print this.
We talked to the people in the business section. They say you are insane, that this is insane.
This is paranoid conspiracy theory nuttiness.
He couldn't buy it. He's growing. That's why he's buying, because he's growing. This is the
new synergy of old media, new media, new paradigm, blah, blah. And I'm like, look,
if that's what the business people say, let them write the op-ed. So they wrote the op-ed. I
published mine in The Guardian. And of course, just a few months later, they're taking the
drinking fountains, the water coolers out of the Time Warner building to try to save money.
The whole thing crashes and burns.
You know, Ted Turner says it was the worst thing that happened to America since the Vietnam
War and maybe worse, you know, but he was the guy who ran CNN.
But it was the beginning of the dotcom crash.
That was that moment that people went, oh, I get it.
This isn't real.
This isn't real. This isn't real
money. I thought, yay, we fought off the infection, you know, the bacterial infection of corporatism.
And now we're going to do and I was the one who dubbed it actually 95. I said, this is going to
prove itself a social medium, what the internet is. And I thought this is it. And when I saw even
though they were silly, the beginnings of Friendster and MySpace and Blogger, it's like, oh, here we go.
These are not dot coms.
This is not people buying stuff through the Internet.
It is people sharing ideas and even monetizing them in some cases, but with the medium.
And it's like, this is it.
It's becoming social again.
And, of course, the business came back and said, OK, we're going to invest again. But now, instead of just doing
your crazy.com thing, once we give you money, we're going to ask you to pivot towards something
that actually makes some money. And they even did it to companies that were like Google that was
making money. They said, but how are you going to make 100 billion instead of 10 billion?
And that was, of course, surveillance. Always more, always more, because they're chasing
exponential growth, which is not
real. Exponential growth does not exist in nature except in cancer, and it kills its host.
Yeah. And there's been such a mistake, I feel like, especially in recent years, as
increasingly they've tried to apply that exponential thinking to the real world,
to things like cars and things like Ubers and houses and anything else.
But there are a few things I want to pick up on what you just said, because I think there's so
much fascinating in it in looking back at that period and even thinking about it in terms of,
you know, what has gone on in the past decade or so. Like, you know, when you're talking about
the dot-com boom and these angel investors, these VCs buying in and then going to the various rounds to
get more money and then cashing out at the IPO. Like the thing that I immediately think of is a
company like Uber, right? It's never made any money. The investors bought in early on. They
got more investors to come in on it and then they cashed out at the IPO and put the company onto
the retail investors of the other people who buy in at that period. But they've made their money even though Uber has never been profitable. How do you compare what was going on
in that kind of dot-com boom period to what we've seen in kind of the post-2008 cheap money,
like all of that, what was going on in that period? The main difference is more of the early investors now understand to get out.
You know, in the dot-com boom bust period, a lot of wealthy people lost a lot of money.
You know, they lost 80, 90% of their portfolio in that crash because, and then they blame people like me for saying the internet was great.
You know, it's like, no, I said the internet was great.
Not that these dot-com companies are great.
There's a really big difference.
Oh no, Rushkoff, you've soured on the dot-com.
It's like, no, I was screaming about the dot-com in 95
saying don't do this thing.
You know, I didn't, I honestly,
I didn't think Amazon was going to make money.
I was like, what?
Why would I do that instead of going to the bookstore
and supporting my local shop?
It's like, I remember writing a piece saying
we just lived through a Barnes and Noble's
decimation of the
local book industry. Do you think we're really going to go a step further? And it's like,
maybe it's because of what Barnes and Noble's and Borders and all did to the local bookshops
that made it easier. They kind of destroyed the look. So then it's like, what's worse about this
company than that one? Well, it's like Walmart too, right? To some degree, there was even like,
Walmart sucks. Walmart is terrible. Walmart's destroying our communities. But now Amazon is coming and eating
Walmart's lunch. Do we really want to lose Walmart too, if that's all that we have left?
Right, right. And now Uber is a particular case. I think Airbnb actually makes money,
right? Uber loses money. And even though their impact on society and local economies is pretty similar.
I guess because Uber thought, like a lot of these companies, like Facebook does, they think that their big payday is in the next thing that they do. It's going to be running the national network of autonomous vehicles or something.
That they'll partner with Tesla or something and create a new drones of automobiles. I saw they did an architectural competition for spaceports or heliports, right?
For flying Uber cars.
Where the rich are in this layer above the city and the poor down on the ground, you know, fighting each other like some John Carpenter movie.
But in the PR, it's actually for everyone, right? Everyone gets to take the helicopters.
I don't think we do. I really don't. It's each level of new thing. I'm less invited to participate.
My wealth has stayed the same. I used to be able to afford an Uber. No, I mean,
I could afford an Uber, luckily. It is a little different. And it's also because I think that the amount of financialization
around these things is greater so that it's easier for, say, like Jason Calacanis bought in
Uber early and got really rich, like $100 million rich off that. And yes, and the company didn't make money.
I think it would have been harder to do that before people learned how to game the system.
It's like, oh, wait a minute. When we buy this, they're going to put a two-year lock on us being
able to sell our stock. Well, let's change that to 90 days. And how do we obfuscate this and do
that in 83B? And they've got all of these little hacks that they've developed so they
could do the same Ponzi, but kind of delay the crash long enough to get out. It's so fascinating,
right? Because it does feel like what you were describing with a lot of the dot-com stuff was
also a lot of what we saw in kind of the post-2008 period, where you have all this cheap money,
where cash is everywhere, where again, there's these companies that are building the Uber for X, and they have
an app for everything. And like, you know, in many cases, that's not really socially useful. It's
just what can we dream up that someone else hasn't done before, and then can try to raise a bunch of
money from a bunch of venture capitalists, even if it crashes and burns in six months or whatever,
at least we got that kind of
payday for now. And then we can move on to the next thing and the next thing.
Yeah, it's funny. I had a bunch of different companies or groups and whatever,
wanted me to join them on conferences and panels and things about Web3. I always say when they
email, I say, I don't know if Web3 is really a thing. It just seems to be this basket of ill-defined or undefined innovations,
VR and AR and crypto and blockchain and NFTs and fantasy role-playing and media and into the next
whatever, this sort of meta, literally meta, but a meta innovation, right? It's some kind of meta
innovation for the meta crisis and the meta economy. And when I challenge it, what more than one person has said, yeah, but there's so much
money invested in it that it has to happen, that it can't not happen. And I'm like, why can't it
not? I feel like it cannot happen, even with all that money, right?
I mean, yeah, no, I agree with you. Look at how much it has imploded since the peak in, when was it, November 2021, I guess,
about a year or so ago.
Web 3 for a little while was going to happen.
It was the next big thing.
And now we see the NFT market has crashed.
We see these completely empty NFT conferences where a year ago they would have been like
filled with people.
And now we see Mark Zuckerberg burning, you know, his company to the ground in pursuit
of this metaverse that no one really seems to want.
I know.
It's like I was really into what we called meta theater when I was in college, you know,
the play within the play.
Because that moment when you see the play within the play and then the audience thinks, am I in a play and someone's seeing me? There's that moment of looking over your shoulder, that paranoid, beautiful play within a play within a play within a play, and you go know what they call it, that if your philosophy is based on
an infinite recursion or something, it's like there's a name for it in philosophy, then you know,
okay, you're kind of going down the wrong path. If your proof of God is that God could go meta on us,
well, then what goes meta on God and what goes meta on that and meta on that? It's like, okay,
you're stuck in a kind of a metaphysical loop. And I think that we recognize that
intuitively. So everyone understood Web 2. It's like, okay, you can have a.com or you could have
the site that aggregates the.coms. Who do you want to be? Do you want to be American Airlines
buying planes and buying fuel and having people and crashing and all this stuff? Or do you want
to be the website that aggregates American Airlines
and United Airlines, gets 10 or 15% of every ticket, and you got no planes, no gas, nothing.
You went meta, right? Or go meta on that maybe, and then have a site that aggregates the prices
from all the meta sites and does that. So you could do that one or two times. But then I think
when we went from web two to web three, I think a lot of people went, wait
a minute, does this just keep happening?
So if I could go Web 3 on Web 2, then is someone else going to just go Web 4 on Web 3?
And if they can, I'm going to be the sucker again.
So fuck that.
Maybe the place to go is not up to Web 3, but down to Web 1 or reality 1.0, where the actual scarce resources exist.
The actual rare earth metals, the actual human beings, the actual water.
It's like, what do you want to be in, Web 3 or water?
Yeah, take the water, you know?
Yeah. And it's also like, do I want another level of commercialization when the degree to which the
web is commercialized already is already so shitty and terrible? Okay, so I do want to get to the
topic of the book. I have one more thing I want to pick up on what you said. I'm fascinated,
you know, obviously, as you wrote about in the book, and as you were just describing,
you wrote this op ed about the Time Warner AOL merger, you know, before it all imploded. And we're also in this moment where there's a lot of kind of interaction between the kind of more traditional entertainment companies, you know, the Warners, the Discoveries, all these, and the tech companies, right, as they've moved into this increasingly with streaming and things like that. And it seemed like they were, you know, revolutionizing the video film television sectors with this streaming
business model that Netflix really pioneered. And a lot of them kind of jumped onto and a lot of the
big entertainment companies felt that they had to replicate, you know, force them to consolidate
more because they had to compete with these highly capitalized tech firms. And it does feel like after the hype of that for the past decade,
it does feel like the wheels are kind of coming off of that kind of vision for entertainment
right now, right? With the trouble that Netflix has had with the whole mess with Warner and
Discovery now. Obviously, we were talking about what happened before when the tech companies
started to move into the entertainment space by AOL buying Time Warner and how that was a disaster.
Like, what do you make of what is going on now and the effect that they have had in transforming
the film and television industries and, you know, what that has kind of turned into?
Well, I mean, you're right. These companies had massive power, the new companies. And that's because their capital structures were one or even two orders of magnitude greater
than the companies that they were competing with.
So you get like an MGM or a Time Warner and like these little quaint property owning reality
based companies that have been around a long time and have
peonies that are related to the last 50 years of earnings that we know about.
Sweet little Fox movies or whatever.
Then you've got these digital companies that are just Saudi sovereign wealth fund,
massive extra billions from oil and molybdenum mining.
It's like cash looking.
You're looking for what? You know what I mean? So the amount of content that they could make,
it's like Warner has its schedule of, oh, we'll do like six movies this year and two TV shows.
And, you know, oh, we're really going, you know, maybe we'll have a Hunger Games and really
do well. And then it's like, OK, so we will never we're going to do 51 shows a year so that we can release one new major series a week on every week except, you know, Yom Kippur.
Right. Or whatever. And each one of them having so much or Disney having so much.
It was a bit like Bannon, just like flood the zone. Right. So they flooded the zone with all of this media. It was great for people who wanted to make media. It was really hard for people to watch. I mean,
when I was a kid, there were three main channels, maybe four if you included Fox,
as they arose with The Simpsons. But most kids I knew knew pretty much every TV show,
what channel it was on and what day of the week. There was Thursday nights, had MASH and this and that certain comedies.
There was must see TV.
There was this.
But you knew the whole thing.
Even if you didn't watch Everybody Loves Raymond, you knew what it was and where it was.
Where now there are like six season, multi hundred million dollar mammoth series about like barbarians and Medici and
Romans it's like I've never even heard of and it's like someone says oh go see the Medici thing and
I go look and it's like there's like nine different major multi-million dollar series on that family
or the Borgia so whatever they were called they've got like six series it's like oh there's the
Jeremy Irons one and this one so there's massive amount of content and they were called, they've got like six series. It's like, oh, there's the Jeremy Irons one and this one. So there's massive amount of content. And they were all doing it until they could be the last man standing. So I would argue it was successful, just like the automobile industry had 100 companies until it was the three last ones stand. People are not, I'm not able to afford every
single streaming network I'd like between, you know, Hulu and Paramount and Peacock and this
and that and the other. So I'm just missing, I missed the last three Star Trek series.
And I'm someone who never would have missed, even if it was bad, you know, I made it through
everything, you know, through Deep Space Nine, Voyager, all of them. I made it through them. I don't even have time
to watch them if I wanted to. Yeah. So the consolidation is necessary. There's not enough
eyeball hours to do it. So it was going to happen. But I would argue they succeeded. I mean, TV has
been transformed into this remote control operated menus of stuff. It's a whole different thing.
Streaming worked. It just can't work for
so many companies at the same time. Yeah, no, I completely agree with you.
They absolutely transformed it. I think it was just, you know, so many companies trying to
compete for so much and then having to spend to make so much content and to consolidate in order
to compete and how that consolidation is going to be pushed even further. But also the
discussions of, you know, what that means for the people who work on the shows. You know,
it was good for some actors and screenwriters and things like that who are in high demand.
But then it also had some issues for some of the people who work on the sets and how the rates were
different, what it means for residuals. It's a real disruption. And, you know, obviously there
are discussions now as to whether the finances of streaming make as much sense as the way it
worked before, because, you know, you make the content, it drops in the library and then it
stays there and never goes anywhere else. Right. No. And it will flip again. I mean,
that's where Cory Doctorow's new book on chokepoint capitalism is interesting for people
to read, like, look at how these big, massive interactive media companies
or internet era media companies went in wisely, creating choke points so that no one else can get
value from the thing except, you know, the studio or the streamer or whoever it is that's in charge.
All of those things that they do open up the possibility of a people's bottom up different sort of media. Look at the alternatives
to YouTube that have different profit models. Look at even a service like Vimeo. You know,
if you had proper publicity, you could put a movie on Vimeo in 4K. They have admissions.
They'll run the money for you. So the keys to an independent media space are in our hands now. It's just a matter of whether
we can kind of organize ourselves to create a different method of discoverability.
And that's the real challenge, right? Because then you need to face up against the power
of these major companies that exist there, the people who head them, and all this sort of stuff.
And I want to use that to transition into the hook of the book, right? Because you start by talking about going to an exclusive
conference where you meet these people who are really concerned about the quote-unquote event,
right? And how they are going to survive it. So I was hoping you could tell us a bit about what
this event is, what is motivating these people. And in the book, you talk about the mindset,
right? How these people are thinking. And I think that is really key. So can you outline that for us?
I still don't really know what the event I went to was exactly. I was under the impression that it
was the highest net worth investors of a particular hedge fund family, you know, so that they were
there and that they brought in a bunch of speakers to talk about the future of various things. I thought I was going to be brought out to speak.
And instead, they brought these five guys into my green room and they just sat down at the table.
I thought it was like a pre-talk thing that they were doing. I was pretty much going to say,
look, right before I give a talk, I'd like to have a few minutes alone. And then it was like,
oh no, this is it. This is your event. It's happening right now. So, I mean, what I did learn was there were lots of different kinds
of professionals at this thing, not just speakers, but like a golf coach and a chef
and an astronaut. So it's possible that each of us was a form of entertainment.
And I also consider the possibility
that the reason they didn't bring me out to do my talk in whatever the auditorium speaker space was,
was that maybe only five people showed up for my event, right? So these are, I don't know if any
of this is true or not. This is just like afterthought, like in the years I've had to
think about this, that what if there seems to be some possibility that, oh, they were going to bring me, I wasn't deluded, right? This was
a green room. They were going to bring me out and then maybe brought these guys in instead,
except there was already a table in there with chairs around it. So why would that be in the
green room if that, so I don't know, but then they're talking to me, you know, and they didn't
let me do my talk.
And they were doing what wealthy guys usually do with me, which is a really dumb thing to do with
me, which is ask me binary questions about where they should place their bets. Because while I am
almost always correct about where things are going, I am almost always incorrect about where
to place your bet, right? I would have said CompuServe, not AOL. I would have
said Betamax, not VHS, right? I would have said, you know, Ethereum, not Bitcoin, although maybe
that one will prove to be true. But they were peppering me with those questions. It was the
old, you know, should I bet on Ethereum or Bitcoin or virtual reality or augmented reality or this
or that? And then finally, it was Alaska or New Zealand. So we spent this hour
talking about these things, just about their bunkers after that question came out. And again,
I have to wonder, did they invite me there to water test their bunker strategies? Or did they
wander into a conversation that it turns out all five of these guys were actually concerned about.
And one of them popped the cork on that conversation. So now it was, oh yeah,
I've been worrying about my Navy SEALs and I'm worrying about this and I'm worrying about that.
And what I realized was their concern. One of them said that their actuaries had decided there
was a 20% likelihood of a cataclysmic event by the end of their lifetimes.
So that's why they were investing 20% of their money in plan Bs, right? In these bunker scenarios.
And they weren't all bunkers. I mean, one of them is like a seasteader. They had different sorts of
things they were thinking about, or at least saying that they were thinking about in front
of each other. Because there was also the feeling like this is some kind of a weird little kind of poker game that they're playing with each other, like bluffing
on who has what. So what was really going on? There was some point I had brought up, something
about their water supply, some real basic point about their water supply being able... Oh no,
there's swimming pools. One of them was talking about that he was getting this bunker thing with
an indoor swimming pool and natural light somehow. And I was like, you know, dude, my neighbor's got a swimming pool and there's always a truck in front of that house. Like it's always someone's bringing a new filter and a new water thing, a new heater. It's like, where are you going to get your pool supplies when you're down there? It's like, what are you going to 3D print them? And the guy opens one of those little moleskin books and I see him write down, you know, indoor swimming pool supplies,
question mark. It's if like, okay, so you're really not thinking about this at all. You're
just like losers. But what I realized was what we were looking at was a bigger guilt paranoia,
where they have always been trying to build a car that could go fast enough to escape from its own exhaust,
that they've been living with trying to escape externalities.
And back in the days when it was, you know, people of color in faraway places
and their resources that you were taking and their children that you were enslaving,
it wasn't quite as bad as when it was right in your own country. When your own Northern California,
indigenous made log cabin wigwam is now being singed with forest fires from your own deforestation
practices. What do you think is going to happen? You know, now they're starting to worry. You know,
when they see the storming of the Capitol got a lot of them scared. It's like, oh, what power have we unleashed? You know, it's one thing to not let my own kid use any of the stuff. And they don't. Their kids are going to Rudolf Steiner schools and Waldorf academies and living on organic goat milk and whatever up in the up in Nevada somewhere while they're given us just like the Chinese. They're giving us all the same bad stuff the Chinese would give us. But who are they living amongst then? So that's really their real fear is, wait a minute,
I've externalized so much that now I'm neck deep in my own externalized harm. I've got to get away
from this somehow. So they fantasize. Blue Origin, getting off the planet. Oh, the 8 billion people
alive today, according to long-termism, they're just the larval
stage in humanity's inevitable ascent to the heavens when the 40 trillion of us spread out
through the solar system will matter a lot more than the 8 billion larvae squirming around today.
It's so distressing, right?
Well, it's laughable. When you realize who they are and how silly they are, like the guy, there's a great story in there about a guy who's really afraid of AI. One of the guys
who started one of the main social networks. It was at a food camp, the friends of O'Reilly. So
we're not allowed to say the names of people who say stuff, but the guy's asking me, aren't you
scared? You've been posting such negative things about AI on medium and on Twitter. Aren't you
scared that when the AIs are in charge, they're going to rub you out? And I was like, well, why should I be? And he goes, well, I don't
write anything at all about AI. I've been since 1997, I've meticulously scrubbed anything.
There's not one comment. And I said, well, if you think these AIs are going to be so smart with all
their machine learning, aren't they going to be able to infer from your posting pattern
how you actually feel about them? And the guy goes, oh, shit. He's never even thought of that.
And these are the smart guys. These are the guys smarter than us, right? The geniuses who
program this shit. Yeah, it's so true, right? And it's frustrating to see how influential they are,
how much harm they're causing in society, and how the response that
they have is how can I try to protect myself from the consequences of my actions, rather than
saying, hey, these actions are like, destroying society, maybe I should be doing something a
little bit different. Maybe I should be trying to change that. And not in the way that you know,
you might hear from some of these effective altruists, Sam Bankman Freed, people like that. Okay, I'm doing the terrible thing,
but I'll take some of that money and I'll put it into good causes. So that's ethical. It makes,
you know, building crypto Ponzi schemes and working for oil companies and stuff like that
ethical, right? Because I'm doing that. I'm doing more good. It's in the math. It's in the math.
You're doing. Yeah. Yeah. As long as I can calculate it out and make it look right on the sheet, right?
The balance sheet.
It's so frustrating.
That'll always work.
That always works.
Yeah.
There's the other kind, though, who don't just want to escape it or do some correction,
but feel like they have the exclusive vision of how to fix the whole thing. The guys
that have such hubris and such, we are as gods and may as well get good at it self-confidence,
that they drop some acid or go to Burning Man and do some ayahuasca and come back thinking that
they've got the total solution for all of humanity. And you look, say, at Atil,
who believes he has that in, you know, techno monarchy, or some of the guys with their great
reset and game B who think they have it in their stack of software. But I feel like that's reaching
an endpoint to like, right now, we are watching Elon Musk have a nervous breakdown in real time on Twitter and bring an entire community into that.
And it's like people are asking what I can compare what Musk is going through, too.
And it's like the closest thing is Charlie Sheen, if you remember when he did that tiger thing.
And he kind of there's this like standing wave of culture.
And then someone decides to jump into it. So like Charlie Sheen was the first. And he got like thrashed around and huge and then kind of there's this like standing wave of culture and then someone decides to jump into it so like charlie sheen was the first and he got like thrashed around and huge and then kind of
spit out then like the next one to do it was kind of donald trump jumped in there right in this big
way it's not him it's the culture people keep blaming him it's not he's the fucking golem he's
the golem being inhabited by this cultural spirit and And now I think that the greatest threat to Donald Trump is Elon Musk, because if Elon
Musk takes on the sort of anti-Christ like quality that he is the one being martyred
by civilization, then Trump loses that.
You know, whoever is the troll in chief wins.
I would much rather Elon play that role non-politically
than Trump in the civic sector. Yeah, it makes total sense. I guess the risk there, I guess,
is he's someone who very much holds this third view, as you're talking about. Very much his
visions are what is going to save us, whether it is from climate change or from extinction or
what have you. There's a whole other load of things that he thinks he's saving us from,
defender of free speech now. But along with that, he not only brings along a particular politics of
grievance, it seems like a particular politics that nobody should stand in his way. He should
not have to pay taxes. He should not have to pay attention to regulations.
He should be allowed to, not only allowed to, but enabled to undertake and roll out his vision of
what this society should be and how it's going to solve our problems and fix everything and what
have you. And that seems particularly concerning because, and you know, this is something that you
write about in the book, it doesn't really contain the real solutions to the problems that we face. And in many ways,
probably even exacerbates them, right? Because it puts our focus on these moonshots, on these
things that he is excited about. Whereas, you know, the real solutions to these problems,
often solutions that don't involve, you know, holding out hope for some new technology that's
going to save us from whatever
it is we're doing to ourselves is really trending us in the wrong direction.
Yeah. No, it's nightmarish. So then the question becomes, what do we do about that? And I think
all we can do about that is attempt to achieve coherence ourselves. I'm less and less involved in the Twitter wars. It's unwinnable.
That space is unwinnable. It's just like in the book, I have this argument with Richard Dawkins
where he wants me to provide evidence of a non-evidence-based reality. It's like, wait a
minute, that's not going to work. So it's like, how can I troll us toward an anti-troll society? You can't. It's the wrong tool for the job.
I wonder, as we start to wrap up a conversation that I've really enjoyed, and obviously I thank
you for coming on the show, I wonder what you feel your big takeaway is with this book, right?
What are you trying to get people to recognize or understand about the tech industry and the way that this industry and the particular people who are powerful in this industry are shaping the world in a particular way? What should we take away from this? And what does it kind of force us to do or to think about as we consider how we really try to address these problems and think about a better future.
I mean, I guess the emotional takeaway for me is that these people, these men who once
showered the world with madly optimistic business plans for how technology might benefit human
society have reduced technological progress to a video game that one of them wins
by finding the escape hatch. And I want the effect of that to be humor, to be a black comedy,
that these dudes that we think are so great are children, basically plucked from college as
freshmen who didn't even have the myelin sheaths
formed around their frontal lobes and transfer parental authority onto a Peter Thiel and never
took ethics or philosophy or economics. And now you've a kid like Mark Zuckerberg still wants to
be Augustus Caesar. That's who he models himself and his haircut and everything after. And it's
like, on the one hand, we should be thankful it's Augustus and not Caligula. But he's still one of the richest men in
the world modeling himself after a Roman dictator. So that's the number one. And I guess the second
thing is for us to look at in terms of technology and ask, what are we solving for? Are we solving
for the blockchain? Are we solving for the exponential growth of the economy? Or are we solving for? Are we solving for the blockchain? Are we solving for the exponential
growth of the economy? Or are we solving for human society? So when you look at the homeless people
in Palo Alto, say, the tent villages in one of the wealthiest cities in the world, you think,
what kind of problem is this? Is this a city problem or is this a human problem?
If it's a city problem, you get them to move along and then it's done.
They're gone.
They're somewhere else.
They're over in Redwood City.
If it's a people problem, then you look toward solving something in a very, and solving is
even a tricky word to use, but you look toward addressing this in a very different way.
And I think that's sort of what I'm asking people to do, that if they can see these guys and their dreams not as the big things shaping society, but as bad trips spawned at Burning Man, and they're small enough to laugh at, then we can start to see our own capacity to disengage from their rule sets,
from their video games as entirely within our control. That yes, we can buy less stuff. You can
buy one lawnmower. Rather than getting a minimum viable product drill, as Cory Doctorow says,
in order to make one hole in your wall, go and borrow one from your neighbor, a nice metal drill, a real drill that the whole block shares.
And the reason not to do that is people will go, well, what about the drill company?
What about the guy who's going to lose his job at the drill company because you're not
buying enough drills?
Since when are human beings here to serve the economy?
The economy is supposed to be here to serve us.
If it turns out that we don't need to do as much work,
that should be a good thing, not a bad thing. So we should feel free to engineer and to reverse
engineer our economy around human needs rather than other ones. And all sorts of different
possibilities emerge. But the prerequisite to that is not seeing these guys who call themselves gods, not seeing them as gods and not letting them
recode our reality to suit their aims because their aims don't involve us. Their aims involve
escaping us and leaving us behind in a polluted morass of horror.
Yeah, I obviously completely agree. It feels like, you know, there's been this idea of technology, of the tech industry, of the way that tech can, not to repeat the name of the podcast, but can save us really, certainly since the 90s. particular ideology that has shaped this period. And it really does feel that after all of this
time of it really shaping how we respond to these things, really informing a lot of how we approach
these problems, that there does feel like there's a more critical turn toward it, a questioning of it
that maybe wasn't there before, or at least didn't have this kind of energy that it has in this
moment to really say, you know what, we've tried this before. We've been trying this for decades.
It's not solving the problems. In many cases, it's making things worse. And it's really time to
rethink that at a more fundamental level and consider how we improve this society and how
we change the way that we think about how we improve society so that we can actually do that
in the years to come. Yeah. And the, I mean, it's interesting though, the two loudest voices in this reconsideration
of technology moment are on the one hand, you've got, you know, Bannon and the fascists who are
saying, you know, and I get it, you know, return to blood and soil, you know, and these technocrats
are trying to take over and program our brains and put silicon chips in our, you know, COVID vaccines and nanobots and, you know, and the energy under it is right.
But where it's going is really the excuse for hate and violence is doesn't really work there.
And it's interesting how he's able basically to leverage the Gamergate kids against technology is genius, right? He's a wizard.
It's a little scary. And then the other main allies we have are whatever they call themselves,
you know, humane technologists who are willing to question everything about this stuff except
the underlying operating system of capitalism. So they stay invested in these companies and they're looking for solutions
that both solve for capitalism and solve for humans. And I'm sorry, but capitalism is intrinsically
anti-human. You can't energize it. You might be able to work with it as a tool, but you can't
see it as the underlying operating system for society because technology amplifies it. It
revs it up too much beyond our ability to control it. That's where all the meta comes from. The
original meta really is derivatives. Derivatives on derivatives on derivatives. It's a way to invest
to leverage the money so that money is worth a thousand or a million or a trillion times
what was actually earned. When you leverage
things that much, it's what allows bits to overcome atoms, because there's a zillion more
bits than there are atoms. And no, it's not that they're going to expand out through the universe
in a trillion simulations that matter as much as our world. They're not real. They're symbol
systems. They're MP3s to music, right? They're not real.
Yeah. I think it's a really important point that we need to recognize, right?
That this way of thinking about the world is not how we're going to solve these fundamental
problems. And we need to really question that at a fundamental level if we ever hope to
respond to serious issues like climate change or inequality or anything else that exists out there.
Douglas, it's been fantastic to speak with you.
The book is great, and I highly recommend everyone go pick it up.
Thanks so much for taking the time.
Oh, thank you for taking the time.
And I do intend to get on a little, maybe electric bicycle or something and make it
up to see you.
I want to breathe the air while it's still there.
Next time I'm in New York, we'll have to hang out.
Okie doke, that too. at Paris Marks, and you can follow the show at at Tech Won't Save Us. Tech Won't Save Us is produced by Eric Wickham and is part of the Harbinger Media Network. If you want to support
the work that goes into making the show every week, you can go to patreon.com slash tech won't
save us and become a supporter. Thanks for listening. Thank you.