The Peter Attia Drive - #96 - David Epstein: How a range of experience leads to better performance in a highly specialized world
Episode Date: March 9, 2020In this episode, David Epstein, best-selling author of Range and The Sports Gene, discusses the evidence around the most effective ways to improve long-term performance and learning in our specialties..., our sports, our careers, and our lives. David makes a compelling case that a range of experiences and skills are more likely to lead to expert performance compared to early specialization, and offers an in-depth critique of the much-publicized 10,000-Hour Rule. David also provides insights into our role as parents in the process of encouraging exposure to many things, the concepts of when to push them, when to give them space, and when to allow them to quit. Furthermore, David goes into many other fascinating topics such as the role of talent, genetics, and practice in reaching expert status, what differentiates a kind vs. wicked learning environment, the importance of “informal training,” and many case studies that suggest strategies for short-term success may not be best for long-term development. We discuss: A shared interest in Ayrton Senna, and pondering the value in participating in sports [2:30]; Examining the 10,000-Hour Rule, and the importance of questioning existing dogma [15:00]; How the medical profession is affected by bad science, and the importance of understanding individual variation [28:00]; David’s most surprising findings when writing The Sports Gene [35:45]; Kind versus wicked learning environments [40:45]; How and why strategies for short-term success may not be best for long-term development [47:30]; Contrasting the success stories of Tiger Woods and Roger Federer—which path is more common, and an argument for diversified training and experiences [59:15]; Is there an age-range or “critical window” during which exposure is necessary to reach a certain level of proficiency or mastery of a skill or knowledge? [1:14:00]; How diversifying your interests and unraveling your identity from your speciality could lead to more enjoyment and actually improve performance in your speciality [1:22:15]; The undervalued importance of “informal training” [1:29:15]; Advice for increasing match quality in your work—where interests and abilities align—to optimize both job performance and fulfillment [1:41:15]; Would David want his own son to attend college given the current state of higher education? [1:51:15]; The role of a parent—how to encourage sampling, when to push them, when to allow them to quit, and insights from the childhoods of Tiger Woods and Wolfgang Mozart [1:55:45]; The need for varied perspectives and the ability to improvise—insights gained from the Space Shuttle Challenger tragedy [2:08:45]; How a diversified background and identity could be the difference in life or death—the Hotshot firefighters case study [2:22:15]; David’s takeaways from the inspiring story of Frances Hesselbein [2:29:00]; and More. Learn more: https://peterattiamd.com/ Show notes page for this episode: https://peterattiamd.com/davidepstein Subscribe to receive exclusive subscriber-only content: https://peterattiamd.com/subscribe/ Sign up to receive Peter's email newsletter: https://peterattiamd.com/newsletter/ Connect with Peter on Facebook | Twitter | Instagram.
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Hey everyone, welcome to the Drive Podcast.
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Now, without further delay, here's today's episode.
I guess this week is David Epstein. David is the author of the best selling book
of the sports gene and more recently range why generalists triumph in a specialized world,
which ironically makes him a specialist of generalists. He was previously a science
and investigative reporter at
ProPublica and prior to that, a senior writer at Sports Illustrated. I have followed David's work
for some time, have enjoyed his articles, his books, and reached out to him several months ago,
asking to interview him. Even though I had already heard him on a couple of other podcasts that,
frankly, I thought they'd a great job, but I just knew there was more I wanted to explore with him.
So of course, if you've heard David on another podcast, I wouldn't let that discourage you
from listening to him here.
We go into, in my opinion, sort of a broader, deeper discussion that's sort of enabled
by our long format.
We talk about a lot of things, but I think at the root of it, it's basically trying to
get a better understanding of how we can improve our own performance.
And perhaps you can see we get into a lot of stuff around kids but you know as parents how do we manage the exposure of our kids to various things.
I think anyone listening to this who is a parent obviously feels pretty strongly about
giving their kids the best chance at finding something they love and doing well at it.
There are so many things we go into in this podcast that are just fascinating beyond belief
including a really good explanation of why the 10,000-hour rule that most people take for granted is essentially an axiom or dogma,
i.e. that, you know, 10,000 hours of deliberate practice is what is required for mastery and
greatness. And I think David goes into a great explanation of why that's probably completely nonsense,
which is not to say that deliberate practice is not incredibly important, but to break it down
to something as simple as 10,000 hours is almost assuredly incorrect. So without further delay, please enjoy my conversation
with David Epstein.
Thank you so much for coming. It's a pleasure, thanks for having me.
Your work has been something I followed for quite a long time now, and even before your
most recent book came out, just on the basis of the book you wrote, was it in 2013?
That's right.
Yeah, just on the basis of that book, people had always said, you got to interview them
and I was always like, yeah, yeah, I know, I know, I know, I know.
And then the new book comes out and it's like, well now there's no excuse, not to.
And I guess it's tough for you because you have this new book and everybody don't
talk about it, but I kind of want to talk about the old one too, if that's okay.
Whatever you want.
We can talk about something other than my books, if you want.
We owe a lot to talk about actually, because I learned a number of things about you in
getting ready to sit down today, but somehow it escaped me that you were a fan of I Art
and Sennhe.
Yeah, I mean, first of all, one of the all-time great sports documentaries of people have
seen Sennhe, but I used to follow racing and just I loved racing in general. Like, if you put two paper
boats on a pond, you know, I was interested in basically. And then as I learned about him and his
start in carting and the different types of racing, he did the fact that he was a good gymnast as a
young guy that he basically tried to retire from racing at one point. You know, and that he was also very quietly charitable.
And I think, I think kind of a sensitive soul in a lot of ways.
And obviously a very dramatic story.
And I think the greatest deaf one driver ever.
And so just a lot of, I don't really as much as you, some kind of cautious about saying
anything.
But yeah.
I think all those things are really interesting and resonant.
And so last week I went to the beach and was with my kids and the two older kids were in the
water.
So just me and the toddler, who's two, who's actually named after Santa, his name is
Irahton.
And then these other two boys came up and started playing.
And so then I'm sort of overseeing a play group, basically one of mine and two others.
And for like 20 minutes, this is going on.
And then the mother of these two other boys comes up
and she's thanking me or whatever
I'm playing with them.
And I can sense a Brazilian accent.
I said, oh, are you Brazilian?
She says, yeah.
And I said, oh, great, blah, blah, blah, blah.
And we get chatting.
And I can't talk to somebody who's Brazilian
for more than five minutes without, of course,
asking them, do you remember when Santa died in blah, blah?
And I'm still waiting for the exception to this to happen.
It's never happened yet, where that person
doesn't immediately transform into, oh my God,
Senate is the greatest manifestation and representation
of Brazil.
It was the saddest day of my life when he died.
And this woman would have been seven when he died.
And Arnani, also Brazilian, same thing,
was like four when Senate died,
but it's seared
in her mind.
So, I'm talking Uber driver, person at rest, it doesn't matter.
Anytime I meet someone from Brazil, we talk about Senna, and it is without exception,
they speak of him with a reverence that I don't think Americans can relate to.
There is no athlete we talk about.
There's no politician, there's no scientist we can speak about in the
way of Brazilian talks about Senna.
It's amazing. So it sounds like what people hear certain generation might think of where
they were when Kennedy or Martin Luther King were assassinated or something like that.
It's absolutely that way because of course everybody in Brazil was watching F1. So the
world stopped every Sunday to watch the race. So now you take everybody is there stopping to watch your guy doing this thing.
And then you see this person die.
But unlike maybe with say JFK where yes, anybody who was old enough at that moment would
remember it, I don't even think that they can speak about JFK the way with as much love
or reverence as they do Santa.
So it's kind of amazing to me and humbling.
That's interesting because obviously we have Ali, it's the first person who would come to mind,
but in his day a lot of people hated him. It's a lot of athletes like him, I think,
they become beloved once they're sort of older and non-threatening feeling. And so a lot of people
love them don't actually really know what it was like for them at the time, but that's fascinating.
And I think his reputation, I think a lot of the, it turned out after Sena died, that he had been
doing like a lot of charity that people didn't even know about. With no fanfare whatsoever. And so
I think his legacy was, and that's amazing. That's not very, very common. That's right. Very few
people know about how much he did for, for the people in Brazil and how seriously he took his position
of he came from privilege, came from a wealthy family, achieved this unbelievable success.
And people loved this humility that he had that because remember, it's not like he was the
first Brazilian F1 champion.
I mean, Fidda Pauli was a two-time champion, Nelson P.K., a three-time champion who by the
way, Seneca won his first championship the year after P.K. won his last.
So it's like a complete overlap with another,
but they don't even belong in the same sentence
for most Brazilians.
In fact, I asked this question of almost everybody as well,
which is how does he compare to Pele?
And they're like, oh, Pele was great, but.
Oh, really?
Oh, absolutely.
Yeah, yeah, it's really kind of amazing.
Yeah, I guess that's the most telling question
you could ask in Brazil probably.
Yeah, I'll be going for my first time, actually,
to Sao Paulo soon, to watch an F1 race,
and to go, and I want to be able to visit the memorial
where he was buried, and to go to the foundation,
and stuff like that.
And how did you get so interested in him?
I don't do anything in moderation.
I think is what it comes down to.
And I've always loved and been attracted to people
that are incredibly passionate and great at what they do.
And I do think that his perfectionism,
well, I'll take a step back and say,
I was probably attracted to things about him
that I didn't appreciate the pathology in at the time.
So I do think that his desire to win
probably also killed him.
And I think that the sharpness of that edge,
I probably found incredibly appealing
in a way that almost maybe speaks to my own demons.
And I think that's probably true of a lot of people.
I don't think I'm unique in that.
So I just remember, one of the things I remember
loving about him during his career was how
much he cared about the engine and what was going on with the car and the setup and the
time he would spend with the mechanics.
I mean, it was always telling to me that the Honda mechanics loved him.
I mean, just loved him.
You'd have some guys that would show up, they would drive and they would leave, but not
Senate.
Like, he could spend the entire night in the garage, mashing it over every minute detail
of the car.
So it's just this sort of incredible degree of perfectionism.
Also, I do think that there was just a certain...
There were just things that he did that to this day can't be explained.
I think his qualifying session in 1988 at Monaco, there is no explanation for what he did
that day. I'm sure you're familiar with it just for the listener. Monaco, there is no explanation for what he did that day.
I'm sure you're familiar with it just for the listener.
Monaco is a very short circuit.
So in a short circuit, the difference between qualifying times should be tenths of seconds,
hundredths of seconds.
His teammate that year, meaning someone driving the exact same car, which they had the best
car in the field, was Alain Prost, who was himself a three-time world champion at the time,
unbelievable driver, some would argue one of the more underrated drivers ever.
Senna outqualified him by a second and a half.
A second and a half on Monaco in a quality might as well be a day.
It's like winning the 100 meters of the Olympics by a second and a half.
That's exactly right.
It's like even Usain Bolt at his most dominant couldn't win a race by a second.
Even though there's no actual onboard footage of Senna during that quality lap because
he was already on pole, so I don't think the networks were even paying attention to his
very last quality lap, which why would he try to go any faster?
He'd already secured pole.
But when you watch Senna at Monaco over and over again,
which is one of the most demanding circuits
because of how tight it is,
I have my kids watch these videos
because I'm like, I don't think you guys understand.
You think daddy drives a race car
and that's fun because he can go fast.
But I want you to see what the best in the world
is seeing in real time, because we can't do this.
Humans can't do what he's doing.
The other sort of extension to that
story that speaks to this sort of love I have is the tormented nature of this, which is what most
people don't realize is he qualifies first in Monaco or what most people I think have forgotten,
is he qualifies first from Monaco in 1988 by literally a second and a half. As the race is going on
and on and on, he has build up such a lead, He almost has a lap lead over the field with a very short duration to go in the race
I don't remember how many laps I think like maybe six to ten laps to go
He could basically stop
Get out of his car get back in it and still win the race
But he's pushing very hard. He's pushing so hard that he actually crashed
He is disgusted with himself. He
gets out of the car, literally leaves, goes straight to his home in Monaco, doesn't speak
with anybody for days. And to me, this is a guy for whom it's not about winning.
Yeah. Yeah. This actually gets to something. You said I could be digressives. I'm going
to make a multi, multi jump. Let's do it. Something I'm thinking about that I used to think about a lot and then came up recently was
at a certain point when I was at sports illustrated and I was doing reporting on doping
and I would get a lot of reader feedback of why you're reporting on this.
You sort of a killjoy, that kind of stuff.
That took it seriously and started thinking about should I be doing this?
What's the value that comes out of sport?
And somehow I landed on this book called The Grasshopper by a Canadian philosopher named Bernard Suites. And it's called the Grasshopper because
it's sort of an inversion of this Aesop fable where there's a Grasshopper who's playing games all
summer. And while the ant is storing up food in the summer and then come winter, the Grasshopper
doesn't have any food and the ant does and the Grasshopper goes to the ant and asks for some food.
The ant says, no, you were playing while you should have been collecting food and so morals kind of obvious
But in suits there had been this philosophical debate that was supposed to be settled by Bitcoinstein about is there any
Necessary and sufficient core of sports and games and he said no
He said no absolutely. There's not and suits in writing this book thehopper, the Grasshopper is a character who's playing these games.
And his disciples, there's come saying,
you should be storing food, you're gonna die.
And he says, no, this is who I am,
I understand what's coming.
But this is the best thing I can be doing,
this endeavor for the love of what he was doing.
And suits says there is a core to all sports and games,
and it's the voluntary acceptance of unnecessary obstacles,
which I thought was kind of amazing.
And he talks about what he calls the Lucerie Attitude, which is the attitude you adopt when
you get involved in these things, which I think is kind of a love of difficulty, essentially.
And I think he sort of united something.
Aristotle had these two, he put actions into two categories.
One was Kinesis, which is like, build a house.
You're doing it for the end.
And the other was Energea, which is something
like philosophical contemplation.
You're doing it for the doing, not for the end.
And he said these two things have to be separate.
And I think one of the things suits was saying
was in sports and games, these things are united.
There is an end that you're going for,
but the love of difficulty in the middle
is what's really important.
And you're always doing something, you're intentionally doing something inefficient,
right?
Like, you could walk a ball and put it into a goal.
That would be the most efficient way to do it, or you could cut across the track and
get there faster, but you're intentionally engineering an inefficiency in order to facilitate
a certain experience.
I'm sure Senna had that love of difficulty.
And one of the things, not to tie it to my own stuff,
but one of the reasons I think about it is,
to me, I don't know that readers would say this,
but to me, one of the major themes of my new book is
that sometimes the things you can do
to cause the most rapid apparent short-term progress
can undermine long-term development,
and that actually you don't always want to be
as efficient as possible.
And I think that's very much embodied in this love of difficulty in sports and games where
you are intentionally engineering in efficiency in order to facilitate and experience that
you hope has some value in some learning.
So sorry, that was my multi-jump.
No, that is so true.
I think that actually in one sort of story captures the essence of the greatness we see
in sports, which is, as you said,
it has to have a struggle in it. It's not interesting if there's no struggle, but it's in service of
some destination that can be quite arbitrary, by the way. I mean, race car driving happens to be
one of the less arbitrary ones. Going fast seems somewhat understandable in an eight. Mountain
nearing seems somewhat understandable in an eight. Get to the top, but many sports like basketball and
football are kind of arbitrary
and what we're asking people to do.
Think of baseball, it's like bananas.
If you were just watching it with no sense
of the conceptual structure, look ridiculous.
Like why didn't the guy just stay at home late?
They're already there.
Yeah, that's so funny.
Well, before we get to your new book
because there are so many questions I have on that theme
Both personally and then with respect to my profession and then even more broadly
I do want to go back to the gene because I remember when the book came out
I think it came out on the heels of an article you had written in Sports Illustrated correct
Wow, I'm surprised you remember that yeah the Sports Team yeah, yeah, it did yeah
I want to confess something really quick this and nobody really calls me on is
I wrote that article in Sports Illustrated.
It passed fact checking in Sports Illustrated because when the fact checkers called back
the scientists, they said, all this is true, this is true.
But then after a year of, before my books the first year, I tried to just read 10 journal
articles a day every day for the first year, no writing.
And having done that for the year researching the sports gene, I realized that while I had
quoted these scientists appropriately, some of them had told me things that could not be
concluded from their data.
And so I cited my own article as one that was mistaken, but nobody really called me on that.
But I think if you're writing about science, something you're writing about is going to
be wrong, so you have to kind of be ready for that.
Well, it's so funny you bring this up.
So Bob Kaplan, who's my head of research, we are in the process now of going through
the fact-checking for this book that I've been painfully and slowly working on for more
time than I care to admit.
And what we've realized is he can't be the fact-checker, nor can I, because it's not just facts
we're checking, it's interpretation.
And we are already so biased by our view on this.
So we actually have another one of our analysts doing the fact-checking,
but we specifically refer to it as fact plus interpretation, fact plus interpretation,
which turns out to be really a long process and a very challenging process, because you do,
I mean, I've done this a handful of times where you pull up one of the citation classics in
Medicine or Science that people have referenced so many times it's been
Tripley referenced internally to the point where I don't think the people referencing it anymore
Even know what the paper says let alone what it's cited telephone game of citation. It's unbelievable
And the few times I've had our team extract from those papers. I've been mortified at how wrong they are
Which again, they're
not necessarily orthogonally wrong, but they've missed so many things like it's like, oh,
well, of course this so and so does such and such and such and such. Well, let's go back
and look, wait a minute, you realize that was in one really, really, really bad experiment
in mice in which you could never make that inference into another mammal. And now yet it's
taken as sort of a fact.
I have to say, not that that's good, but I have noticed that that sort of thing provides
opportunities for people like me, where I'll go and read the original research of things
that have just been at the core of other best-selling books.
It's kind of a great, if you're willing to do it, it's sort of a competitive advantage.
You know, it gives an opportunity, not that I want people to be citing things wrongly, but I think you're totally right.
I started as a fact checker at Sports Illustrated, and that's where you realize how many ways
there are to go wrong.
Are you looking for any more work right now?
No, no.
No, I was happy to get out of my fact checking days.
I'm in my post book, Never Again Phase, which I was in before, but that's where I am right
now.
No, but yeah, I hired independent fact checkers also, and that doesn't mean there aren't
things that are wrong or interpretations that are
wrong, but it certainly cuts it down compared to, I think most books probably have no fact
checking it all.
Yeah, I'm super paranoid about it because I also realize that we can't catch them all.
That's the difference between a blog post and a book is, and I've written more blog
posts than I'll ever be able to count.
And the good news is that we could come out.
Someone smarter than you is going to catch something that you did wrong. And you're like,
oh my God, yeah, totally right. Thank you for that. Boom, I can change it. I can't do that
with a book. And that is crippling me. Yeah. I mean, you can do small stuff for second
printings and things like that, but it's not as easy, right? It doesn't happen right away.
And if it will, especially if it's the interpretation, it's one thing if you get a fact wrong.
When you start to interpret something incorrectly and you come around, it's very
difficult to unwind that. Definitely. And if you're going to change,
yeah, as I learned this time, the both of my books, there are 352 pages, I guess if you
count the front and back, and because they get printed in sets of 16, so everything has
to fit to a multiple of 16,
including the index and the citations and everything.
So if you have to change something major, like an interpretation where it's not one sentence,
if you're going to mess up the page flow, it's not so doable.
You're making some unhappy folks.
You alluded to something there, which is the opportunity to go back and look at something
that people have sort of taken as dogma and questioning it.
And in many ways, that's a big part of what the gene does and what your current book
does.
I'll share with you sort of my bias coming into this discussion, not this discussion with
us per se, but sort of this theme, which is, so Daniel Coil wrote a book in 2009 called
The Talent Code.
And before that, there were a number of other books and pieces of literature on that subject
matter.
And I was obsessed with this.
I was obsessed with this idea of how can one be great, obsessed with it even as a child.
And certainly when I was doing my surgical training, I really remember spending lots of
time reading literature on technically achieving mastery.
Like what does it mean to be a great musician or or a great surgeon, or a great athlete?
Things where there's some sort of dexterity and skill required that goes beyond just thinking
and cognitive prowess.
And so I would say I completely bought this idea that deliberate practice is the only thing
that matters.
And I think a lot of people have taken that to be the case.
What made you question that in the first
place, or did you not question that and instead stumbled organically into questioning that?
I did not question it in the first place. I should say Dan's a friend and I'm a big fan
of his writing also. I did not question it. In fact, if you saw my book proposal for
the sports gene, the talent code in the book proposal, sometimes you do a section
that I don't know if you had to do this or not, but other books that you would be like.
Other books like, yes, yes, yes. I skipped that part for my second proposal, but in the first
one I had to do it, and talent code was one of the ones that I said it was going to be like.
And obviously, I would say for the casual reader, it looks like they're actually diametrically
opposed in many ways, and I don't see them as diametrically opposed, but there are certainly
some differences.
And it was probably when I went back and started looking at some of the original literature.
The 10,000 hours rule was, who was I to question that?
I mean, the one good thing is I was in my past training to be a scientist, and I was like living
in a tent in the Arctic when I decided for sure to become a writer, so I knew I should leverage
that background of, I was in the geological sciences, which are pretty methodologically rigorous
I would say as the sciences go and so I decided to go look at these original papers if I'm going to study them and I come across the first
The so-called 10,000-hour study that the scientists who wrote it wouldn't call that but this was a violinist violinist
Yeah, 30 violinists famous music academy in Berlin
Split into three groups the top ten who were deemed to potentially be international soloists, practiced, and deliberate practices highly focused, error correction,
focused practice, on average 10,000 hours by the age of 20.
The first thing I noticed was that there were no measures of variance reported in the
study, which is not something when I was a grad student that one could have gotten away
with, reporting no measures of variance. So I was explained that some folks might not even know
what that means. So like, they use an example. So if you look at a table and it says this
person practiced this many hours, this many hours, this many hours, what was missing in that
description? First of all, no range. So several of the books and the paper wrote that there was
complete correspondence between the number of hours of practice and what group someone fell into.
And I said, well, I can't tell that from this data.
Like, maybe someone in the lowest group actually practiced more than someone in the highest
group, but you haven't included the range of practice hours or the standard deviations
of practice hours.
What is the individual variation?
Anytime you take an average, it could be that nobody practiced 10,000 hours.
It could be that somebody practiced 100,000 hours and a bunch of people were much less. So sort of like what's my average your average and Bill Gates average wealth? Sure,
right. Sometimes averages can be wildly mislead. That's right. I mean, so for example, in the
chess literature, it takes 11,053 hours on average to reach international master status. So 10,000
hours would be low. That's one level down from Grandmaster, but some people have made it in 3,000
hours. And some people finished a study at 25,000, they still hadn't made it, so we don't really know
where their endpoint is. So you can tell someone, well, it takes 11,053 hours on average to reach
international masters status, but it doesn't tell you anything about the breadth of actual skill
acquisition. So how is that possible, by the way? I mean, I can't imagine looking at a paper that
wouldn't, at a minimum, include a standard deviation for that type of calculation.
Don't know. Okay. So eventually I organized and noticed that the most famous researcher on that paper, who I think has done some very interesting work,
especially in the area of memory, some work that I myself have tried to incorporate into things I do.
So, but I noticed that he was in a lot of his work saying there's no such thing as talent and doesn't matter,
just pick any random thing and you'll be great at it.
You know, if you provided you put the work right right exactly that it doesn't matter
what you match with.
And I noticed he was citing a lot of physiology papers that I knew something about like sports
physiology papers and not like you said, not in the way the interpretation, it was kind
of like these secondary interpretations, telephone game stuff that and so I organized a panel
at the American College of Sports Medicine invited him because, and this was, I thought, a problem.
He was citing a lot of their papers. His work on Erickson was super influential in expertise.
I think that 10,000 hours papers, clearly the most influential paper ever in the development
of expertise, but they weren't talking to each other.
So he organized this panel, and in that, a researcher stood up and Tim Lightfoot and asked what's the variance around that 10,000 hours and he said,
well, that doesn't really matter because the people were actually inconsistent on
multiple retrospective recalls because what they did is they just asked for
retrospective recall and then had the performers keep a diary for a week and
then extrapolated it basically. Which by the way don't even get me started on the
the noise that's introduced by both of those decisions.
Right.
There was just a replication attempt, by the way, last month it published and failed.
But we can talk about that if you want.
But in that there was actually, in the new replication attempt, there was someone at 4,000 hours who
got to the highest group and someone at 11,000 hours who was still in the lowest group.
But anyway, so he asked what's the variance around that 10,000 hours.
And Erickson says, he said, first of all, there was inconsistent recall.
And so Tim says, yeah, a lot of us struggle with imperfect data,
but we still put measures of variance.
And so Andres says, well, that'll be like more valid
when we have video diaries and we can really track it,
because we're not being that precise anyway.
And he says again, we all struggle with imperfect data,
but we include measures of variance. Was it, and then he asks, so what was it? And he says, I don't
know, I'd have to go look back. And so Lightfoot says, definitely more than 500.
And that's where we leave it. And then I think two years ago, some the couple
of years ago, Erickson did publish measures of variance and turns out there
was enormous variance. Not only was there enormous variance in the original
paper, the papers from 1993, and it was three or four years ago that he finally published the variance, made clear that their
conclusions were wrong, that there was not complete correspondence between the number
of practice hours and the group that someone was in.
Well, I think that's sort of where I'm going with this question, which is, you can't even
make an observation of statistical significance without variance.
So I don't really understand what the paper is saying.
This is the first thing where I was reading it and saying
something's not right here.
And so then I started asking these very basic questions.
Because I've been naffy and I've gone from being
like the worst walk on on my college team
to being like a university record holder.
So I'm like, yeah, maybe if I had trained even more,
I would have been even better.
And that probably is true.
But I was, I was like, oh, okay.
So there is no such thing as talent.
I was convinced for a while.
And then when I started seeing this,
I started asking the very basic questions like,
okay, in my third year of training,
I could break the women's world record.
So there has to be at least some basic genetic difference
because I haven't worked harder than the women who are pros
by any stretch of the imagination.
And so I said, okay, let's start with that basic question.
I had context sort of some of the, I shouldn't call them
the 10,000 hours researchers, because they kind of disavowed that,
but the deliberate practice framework.
And I remember contacting one and saying,
wouldn't you agree that a man and a woman who practice the same,
like the man has advantages, which is why we separate sexes and sports?
And she sort of hedged and said, maybe not
if they all trained the same.
I said, really?
And so she sent me a paper saying, in fact,
we think this applies to other organisms.
If you look at this paper about racing dogs,
you'll see that they practice the best ones
and the highest class practice about the equivalent
to their lifespan of 10,000 hours.
And so I'm reading this, and I start reading all the citations.
And one of them notes that like half of these dogs
have what is otherwise an incredibly rare
myostatin mutation.
Let me pause for a moment,
explain to the listener what myostatin mutations are.
So if you knock out the myostatin gene,
you look like a bodybuilder.
Myostatin is a gene that inhibits muscle growth.
And there are lots of myostatin mutants out there
that all have hypofunctional myostatin and therefore are super muscular.
Yeah. And so bracing breeders had been, they didn't know about the gene, but they were
breeding for fast food. They were clearly selecting for this trait.
Yeah. Yeah. And what they wanted was a single myostatin
mean. If you get to then you have a bully whip it and Google that it's pretty cool to
see bully whip it. That they probably can't even move. It's so big. Right. So they want
the single mutation. Yeah. And so I'm like, okay, most of these dogs
just doesn't even mean anything.
So I wasn't going to like use this study or anything,
but I just started saying, these people aren't reading
the primary stuff that they're citing.
Or they're not tracking the references back.
And so I started to have doubts.
Is this a broader problem with non-experimental science?
I think so.
Because we do the same dumb thing in medicine, by the way.
People sort of think of medicine,
which we're going to get to in spades as it's so rigorous.
And yeah, sometimes medicine does get to leverage the scientific method and actually get to do
what Francis Bacon talked about.
But a lot of times you don't.
I mean, when you think of some of the most important public health measures that are out there,
oftentimes they are based on exactly the type of inference you're being appropriately
critical of, which is observational, heavily selected range restricted, which I can't wait
to, you talk about this so eloquently that I cannot wait to have you go off on your tangent,
so bugs, whatever ran on that problem.
But these are huge issues.
Yeah.
Yeah.
I mean, that was the other thing.
I don't know if I should skip to range restriction.
Well, it started with medicine.
So I wrote this one article when I was at ProPublica called When Evidence says No and Doctors
say, yes.
And I should say, I love the medical profession.
I think it's filled with a variety of people like any profession, but a lot of people who
really care and gotten to the profession because they want to do something that is challenging
and useful.
But also, there's like a lot of poor science, and there are a lot of things that continue
to be done even once evidence shows they don't work anymore.
What Mike joiner at the Mayo Clinic always calls bioplausable, something that clearly makes
sense, it definitely should work.
It's just that when somebody does a randomized controlled trial, it doesn't.
You probably saw the Finnish study of partial arthroscopic meniscus repair.
I think there's a lot of devils in the details.
That said, it was interesting they gave some people
sham surgery where they basically made an incision
banged around like they performed surgery
and sent them a physical therapy,
and they did as well as the people who were getting
the surgery, which is a mind-boggling.
Because everyone's doing something that seems
like it has to work.
Because someone's got knee pain, you bring them in,
you give them imaging, they've got a tear, fix it.
How could that not work?
But then I guess it turns out that some huge number of people have
incidental tear that doesn't have anything to do with the knee pain.
The meniscal tear is a huge thorn in the side of the orthopedic specialty
because frankly, I don't know the answer.
I mean, my intuition is that that's a procedure that has probably done far too much,
but it's also probably a procedure that if you knew how to select the right
patients, you could probably make a difference, but because we
don't, we end up applying the tool far too broadly and we dilute the outcome.
I'll give you a much more specific example that is so nerdy, but there's a drug
called a Zedomyib or Zedia, which blocks cholesterol reabsorption. So the body
makes a ton of cholesterol, virtually all the cholesterol in the body is made
by the body, and it gets recirculated throughout the body. Well, part of this recirculation pathway requires that cholesterol
be dumped into, along with bile into the gut, and then in your gut you can reabsorb it, and the
body has a way to regulate how much of that's happening. But it turns out there's a drug that blocks
this thing called the Neiman Pixi, one like one transport of the drags cholesterol back in.
pixie one like one transport of the drags cholesterol back in. Now, when that drug is given in monotherapy, it lowers cholesterol, but not that much, and it doesn't save lives. So, it's not a drug that's
really, in fact, it's absolutely, therefore, not considered a first-line agent, and it's never
considered something that should be used in isolation. Now, when you give it with a statin, turns out,
it lowers cholesterol, and it reduces events. So So the things that you care about, the actual hard outcomes change.
And it's not just the statin.
Correct.
That's right, because you can compare it to statin versus statin alone.
So I have probably kind of a contrarian view on this, which is I actually think this drug
alone would work if you actually only gave it to people who were hyper absorbers.
But that's never been done, because we can measure how much absorption capacity a person
has, but that's a kind of advanced measurement.
You wouldn't normally do that in a clinical setting, but if you select for patients who
have mega amounts of absorption, it's certainly possible that those patients.
So I don't know the answer to this.
And only if a trial was done testing that way, could you get it. But I do think that this problem exists in medicine, which is you dilute by
taking such a heterogeneous population to test an intervention on. And you're therefore not really
powered to detect an effect because in your power calculation, you're using the entire population,
as your denominator, and really it probably needs to be a subset. And so my intuition is that's probably the case with
some of these procedures like meniscal repairs, which still offers no help to you or I right now
if we're having knee pain with an MRI that shows a meniscal tear. I actually don't know the answer
in that setting. That's interesting on so many levels. The first is what you're talking about with
absorption is this sort of lesson that there's huge individual variation in that setting. That's interesting on so many levels. The first is, what you're talking about with absorption is this sort of lesson that there's
huge individual variation in that stuff.
Staggering variation, by the way.
I measure absorption synthesis in every single patient, non-negotiable, no questions asked,
and I am constantly amazed at how much variation exists.
Basically, three variables are determining this, right?
How much do you make, how much do you absorb, and how much do you clear out a circulation
with the LDL receptor?
And the variation is, it's overwhelming,
and yet it's amazing to me that our profession looks at
just one metric, which is how much LDL cholesterol is there,
and that's gonna be the basis for treatment.
It strikes me as flying without instruments
and deciding you only get to look at the horizon.
That's interesting.
That gets it.
Two things I want to remember.
First, this idea of the McNamara fell, so you've heard of named after the Secretary of
Defense during Vietnam, which is he said, are we winning the war?
Are we losing?
Let's use something measurable.
Our bodies versus their bodies.
And since we're always winning, by that metric said, okay, we're winning.
Obviously ignoring a lot of other important things.
What's the collateral damage?
Yeah.
Yeah.
So it's like, we often deem things important because they're easily measuring them
because they're important,
but that individual variation gets to another thing
that got me interested, that sort of caused the
sport gene to be very different from my proposal,
which was underlying the 10,000 hours rule,
which is actually called the deliberate practice framework.
Again, Ericsson would not call it the 10,000 hours rule.
There's something called the monotonic benefits assumption.
And essentially,
if you have two people who have never done something for every equal unit of practice, they should
progress exactly the same amount. So everyone's practice response is the same, is one of the
assumptions underlying it. And I start- How can that be? It's not. To say it's not would be an
interesting conclusion or object, but how could that even be the null hypothesis? It seems so
counterintuitive. I don't know, does it? It might be if people started from zero,
I'm not sure what I would think if they would progress exactly the same or not,
but then people have done those studies, you know, meaning if we took a hundred
people who have never spoken Spanish and we gave them Spanish lessons, give me
the evidence that that if that were the case, wouldn't we see much more homogeneity
in schools? I would think. I mean, Erickson would make the argument that, well, some of those kids are engaged in
some of the mind, or maybe some of them had more practice before.
So I think to really evaluate this, you have to get some skill that nobody else has tried
before, that these people haven't done at all, because who knows what they bring to school,
all sorts of other stuff.
But there are studies like that where people who are sedentary do the exact same exercise.
One of the famous ones called the Heritage Family Study, where every member of two generations of 98 families totally sedentary put on six months
of identical cycling training. And the range of variation was like a thousand percent doing identical
training, identical training. And you can see things like the military does this and people learning
sort of perceptual motor skills for air traffic controller simulations. And it very simple simulations, actually,
it's kind of like that, like they converge
if it's very simple, you just have to see
the one plane's coming, move one off the runway,
and then it becomes about like how fast can you basically
just move the mouse when you do the simulation.
But as it gets more complex,
people start diverging with more practice.
And so that monotonic benefits assumption,
I could find no evidence of it. It's like never shown up in a study of anything unless it's an extremely simple
task that everyone masters very, very quickly. And so again, I was sort of saying that average
is just obscuring individual variation.
So I keep preventing you from talking about this because I can't stop asking you other questions.
But when you look at the title of the sports gene, the assumption would be, oh, this is
a book that explores the notion that a great athlete is genetically gifted.
Michael Jordan is Michael Jordan because he clearly has a set of genes that separate him from the rest of us.
And that's probably a bad example because it's so extreme. But talk me about some of the things that you found in that book that surprised you.
And there were certain elements at that book that didn't get that much attention, by the way, that I, in retrospect thought,
I'm surprised more people didn't fix it on that thing.
Like, I don't know.
Did it surprise you what people drew out of that book
as the most important insights?
Yeah, yeah.
I didn't think the thing that people were gonna find
the most controversial was the 10,000 hour rule
to be quite honest.
I guess I didn't realize how...
How ingrained that is in our psyche.
Yeah, and that people were actually planning certain training plans, soccer teams,
two 10,000 hours on the dot.
And the thing that was the most important to me, I tried to write a book about one of my
closest friends and former training partner, dropped dead at the end of a mile race.
He was like one of the top ranked guys in his age group in the country.
Young Jamaican guy was going to be the first in his family to go to college, all these things.
And that kind of threw me for a loop.
Anyway, I got his family to sign a waiver allowing me to gather his medical records and turn out he had hyper trophic card
I'm out of the textbook case
Miss diagnosed because not easy to diagnose if you'd had a good family history turned out
He probably clearly had a relative who it's like I went started going to meetings for families
That think they have HCM in their family and they'd say say, well, we're not really sure, but Cousin Jimmy died in the pool,
and he was a varsity swimmer, and like Uncle Fred
was in a one car accident, and you're like,
all right, these might be cardiac arrest.
And I wanted to write a book,
one of the main reasons I got off the science track,
so I wanted to write about sudden cardiac death in athletes.
And that's what I tried to pitch a first book on,
but I didn't have the professional capital at the time
and couldn't sell it,
but there's a section of that that I smuggled into,
one of the chapters in the sports team, which is the most personally important thing to me, that I don't think I professional capital at the time and couldn't sell it, but there's a section of that that I smuggled into, one of the chapters in the sports team, which
is the most personally important thing to me, that I don't think I got asked about one
time ever.
So, I don't know if that's surprising or not.
It just is.
The most surprising findings of the book to me were things like, I still don't know how
to summarize the book, but that things that I assumed were genetic, like the reflexes
it takes to 100 mile per hour fastball turn out not to be.
The fact that majorly baseball players don't have faster reflexes, that was a surprise to me. I
assumed they did. But the same is true, by the way, for Formula One drivers. Is it? Yeah, so it turns out
that even if it's a sense perceptual motor skill, right, they're probably using cues like the
changing size of something in there. Well, one of my favorite exercises that you can see when you
compare. So if you put a novice next to Lewis Hamilton
in a simulator, even adjusting for the speed
at which things are moving, you won't be blown away
at where Lewis's eyes are at every moment
that he is driving.
How far ahead he is able to see what's happening.
So a few weeks ago, I was on the track
and in an effort to really force this type of learning,
we have one camera that is actually looking directly at me, one camera that is looking directly
at the road and capturing all of the telemetry, and then I sit with my coach, and we review
these two side by side, because what I'm working very hard to overcome is the desire to
narrow my field to where I'm driving.
And when you're going fast, that's innate.
You don't want to be looking somewhere way down the road.
You're worried about falling off the road right now, but you can't do that.
So that's the thing that they've been able to train to do.
It's not that they're going faster.
Sorry, that's what they have faster reflexes, which again, when I first was shown these
data, I was like, wow, you're looking
at set up. You'd think you have the fastest reflexes on the planet.
Right. Right. Once you start reading about perceptual motor skills, it makes perfect sense,
because any activity that's happening too fast, I mean, the things they have to do are
too fast for any human, even if they did have were the top 0.001 percent of human reflexes,
it wouldn't be fast enough. So in boxing, there was this study I came across doing this
boardstein where these, someone, I don't even know if they
were doctors or scientists, did some test of Muhammad Ali, I
think that what they were trying to show is that even this
brilliant black man has slower than normal processing speed in
his brain or something. And so they reported his, they would
have him like throwing a punch in response to a light or
something like that. And they were saying like, look, it's
slower than average. And then then someone said that they were saying like, look, it's lower than average.
And then someone said that they were testing it wrong.
And if you subtract the delay for whatever queue they were giving,
he actually, from first perceptible motion
to full extension, it was like 150 milliseconds,
which is extremely fast.
But that means when he's throwing a punch also,
I think other people throw punches that fast.
So I don't think it was a lone outlier for that.
That it's faster than the minimum human reaction time, which is the fifth of a second.
Just to see that something's in front of you and for that message to get to your muscles not to dodge.
And so you literally have to be seeing things before they happen or else you'd get hit by every punch.
Of course, his genius at disguising what he was doing was an attempt to confound people's ability to see the future.
And so anything that's happening at that speed, those aren't skills that anyone comes with.
There might be things that facilitate you downloading that software, but it doesn't come with
the machine.
You talk about kind versus wicked.
I'm jumping between these books.
I think we're just going to end up doing that by the way.
I really want to talk about the gene, but now I can't stop at how moving.
Maybe use that example in boxing as an example,
is boxing a kind sport or is it a wicked sport
and explain what those two distinctions mean?
Yeah, a kind and wicked are,
so those are terms coined by the psychologist Robin Hogarth
and a kind learning environment.
He was trying to reconcile this issue in psychology
and the study of expertise about why some people
who studied experts saw them get better and better and better with very narrow experience and some people saw them not get better sometimes get worse or get more confident and not get better like what was the difference.
And it turns out that the difference often has a lot to do with one the way they're training but also the environment that they are training in and a kind learning environment is one where all your information is clear. The next steps and goals are totally clear.
Work tomorrow will look like work yesterday, patterns recur, and whenever you do something
you get feedback that is immediate and fully accurate.
On the other end of the spectrum.
So golf, golf is a really kind learning environment.
Because the ball is never actually moving towards you.
You're always starting with a static ball and there are
almost a finite number of things that you can see in that position and there's no rush.
And you get automatic and real time feedback every time something happens. So I think some of the people who study golf
characterize it as like almost an industrial task in the sense that part of what you're doing is trying to do a
similar things over and over with as little deviation as possible. Archery, which is my obsession, a very kind learning environment.
Absolutely.
Absolutely.
Absolutely.
And, we can learn environment on the other hand, is you might not know exactly what you're
supposed to do next.
You might not even know the goal.
Human behavior might be involved.
There may be time pressure.
And work next year might not look like work last year.
And importantly, you don't always get automatic feedback.
And sometimes when you get feedback, it's delayed. And sometimes it's inaccurate. One of the,
there's actually a medical example that-
Another story you're going to tell.
Yeah, which is this doctor, this New York doctor who got wealthy and famous because he could
miraculously, by palpating patients' tongues, or feeling around their tongue with his hands.
Before they showed any symptoms, he could predict they would get typhoid.
And he was right over and over and over again.
And one of his colleagues later observed using only his hands.
He was a more productive carrier of typhoid than even typhoid Mary.
So he was giving people typhoid by touching their tongues
and getting the feedback that he was an amazing predictor.
And so he would do it over.
So he was, the feedback was reinforcing the wrong lesson.
So I wouldn't say most of us are in that wicked of a situation either, but what Hoguearth
was doing was setting up this spectrum of learning and...
What do you think is a bigger wickedness within the wicked environment?
Because there are really at least two variables that I think make that type of learning environment
challenging.
The first is the number of scenarios you can face and the unpredictability of them.
So an archery, the goal of archery actually
is to make every single shot identical, non-negotiable.
So everything from the way you stand
to the way your shoulder sits, to the way the release sits,
we pay tremendous attention to the feeling
of the string on the nose and the feeling of the string
on the corner of the mouth.
I mean, you're trying to reproduce the same thing ever and ever.
So part of it is, well, in tennis, for example, there are an infinite number of ways that you could be standing
and your opponent could be standing and the ball could be coming with this spin versus that spin,
or maybe not infinite, but there are so many more variables.
The second piece is this delay between feedback and reality,
which anybody who's ever tried to talk when
they can't hear themselves or when there's a delay realizes how much feedback matters,
which of those two do you think is more important in creating that environment?
I think delayed feedback is usually a killer.
I think that the changing scenarios is easier to accommodate with broader training.
In some ways, so this
classic psychology finding that can be summarized as breadth of training, predicts breadth of transfer.
Transfer is, and by the way, I'd say tennis is definitely more on the wicket end than golf,
but I would still- It's still not.
Yeah, it's still the most.
As Olga said, most of us in the analogy economy are playing Martian tennis. You see some
people playing, nobody's told you the rules, you have to deduce them, and by the way,
they can change without notice.
And so breadth of training predicts breadth of transfer.
Transfer as a term psychologist used to mean your ability
to take skills and knowledge and apply them
to a situation you haven't quite seen before.
It might be similar, but something's a little different.
And what predicts your ability to do that
is how broad your training was.
If your training is broad, it forces you,
instead of expecting the same thing over and over
to build these sort of flexible conceptual frameworks that you can bend when you see a new problem, instead
of just doing the same thing over and over. So I think you can mitigate that with the
right kind of training. The delayed feedback, that really screws people up. In studies where
people have to sort of drive remote control things, if they build in a delay between what
they do in the movement, it'll completely screws them up all the way to, there's some interesting studies of software project managers. There's this famous essay. I had to
cut like 20 or 30,000 words from the book. This was something I had in there called the mythical man
month. And it's an essay by the guy Fred Brooks who was like head of research at Microsoft. And
he went on to found the computer science department at the University of North Carolina. And what he
meant by the mythical man month was he had noticed that when project managers
when their projects got behind in software, if they were complicated, they would start
adding more person power, adding more man or woman power to the team, and that would cause
the project to become more late.
And so Brooks's law is if you add people to an all-related software project,
it will become more late in proportion to like how many people you add. And that's because
there was a delay between those people adding to the team. They needed to be assimilated.
And the managers never learned that lesson because of the delay. And so they keep doing the same
thing over and over and over. And a couple of researchers sort of followed up on that more recently
and called this the experience trap where these project managers, they come up with simpler projects,
where adding people does help it get done faster
because they can right away figure out what to do,
and then they get promoted and promoted
and end up with more complicated projects.
And in those cases, they do the same thing
and bring people on, and they never learn
about the assimilation delay that it takes.
So these researchers were saying,
we need to start telling them,
this is the time between you bringing someone on and then making a positive impact. But they never learned that lesson because of
the feedback delay. So I think that's from the motor skills up to these much more sort of
management kind of softer skills, the feedback delay is really difficult.
That concept ever since I read about it and you're writing, I sort of look at the world a bit
differently now. I actually think of that question specifically.
I'm like, how kind is this?
How wicked is this right now?
Me too, that's what happened.
When I was reading this, I was like, oh, this is going to be the frame
that I'm going to think through I bet for everything in this book.
Well, I think about it a lot with kids.
You have a kid, right?
You've got one.
One, seven months?
Yeah, so I mean, think about the learning that's taking place.
So think about the neuroplasticity of a seven-month-old.
And for example, it's why, like, why, sort of going back to the example before, if a child is deaf,
it's going to delay speaking, not because they can't speak, but because they can't get that
real-time simulation and feedback, and watching it almost makes you think about how much do
you want to intervene when they're doing something wrong, too.
I don't know if you've found that, but it's like, okay, as long as they can't really hurt themselves, I should probably
let them do that thing that is going to hurt, but hopefully not irreversibly hurt.
Yeah, yeah. I mean, that's a huge question again. Like I said, what I think of as this would
make a terrible subtitle, so it's not the subtitle of my book range, is the things that
you can do that seem the best in the moment, maybe you're not the best for long-term development.
And I think that applies to parenting.
Maybe we should talk about that college admission scandal
or something.
The Snowplow parent isn't the new,
but clearly that's not the best for long-term development
in many cases.
There's a story you write about,
I think it's at the Air Force Academy,
that illustrates that point.
Explain that insight.
This was one of my favorite studies in range.
Partly because the experimental setup is so cool.
You could only do this at the US Air Force.
It's a true experiment.
It has randomization, it's prospective, and there's blinding.
Check all the boxes.
Yeah.
So the US Air Force Academy, about a thousand students come in every year, and they have
to take a sequence of three math courses.
Calculus one, two, and third course.
And they are randomized to professors in year one,
re-randomized in year two, and re-randomized in year three.
And the characteristics they come in with
are spread evenly across classes.
And so, a pair of scientists wanted to see,
okay, this is a great experimental setup
for looking at what is the impact of different math teachers.
So they followed about 100 professors
and 10,000 students over a decade.
And one of their main findings was that the better a professor
was, oh, and everyone takes the same test in every class.
Also, when it's created by committee,
so there's no one can make their own students do better.
What they found was the better a professor was
at getting their students to overperform in Calculus 1,
the more those students then underperformed in the next two follow-on courses.
So it was an inverse relationship between how well students with a certain professor did
in the first course and how well they did in the second and third.
So for example, and how they rated their teachers.
So I think the professor who was rated the sixth best by his students in Calculus I and
his students got the seventh best scores overall,
I think, out of 100 professors,
his students did the seventh best,
was dead last and how his students then did
in the next two courses.
And essentially it turned out.
And just to be clear, were they dead last
or were they dead last in improvement?
So there was a value added score,
which said here are the characteristics
these kids come in with. And here's how we'd expect them to do
Are they over under performing?
Yeah, so it's not that they were the worst in Calc 2. It's that they
Underperformed relative to where they came in. That's right. So they grew the least maybe is the right way to think of this
That's right. Yeah, absolutely compared to other people who came other students who came in with the exact same characteristics
They did worse than them in the following courses.
And what these scientists found was that the way to get students to do the best in Calculus
1 was to teach a very narrow curriculum that was tailored to the test, where they learn
a lot of what's called using procedures knowledge, where they just learn how to execute
algorithms and things like that over and over.
Whereas the professors who got rated worse by their students and their students did
worse on the calculus one test,
they learned more called making connections knowledge,
where you have to draw together concepts, essentially,
and you're facing different types of problems
instead of repeating the same type over and over,
which is another thing we should talk about after this.
But then when they go to the next courses,
they have this more conceptual, flexible knowledge.
They're learning how to match a strategy
to a type of problem instead of just how to execute procedures. So they do better later on. And so there's this real
conflict between how they feel they're doing early and how they rate their professors and how
they're really being set up for later success, which is kind of wild. And that spoke to me on many
levels, but one of which being is, I loved mathematics. And I think we spoke before and maybe we'll
tell the story, get into that, get into
these you later about.
I've always wondered about the transition I made when I decided to take school seriously.
But that teacher, who I think sort of turned my life around, would go on to teach me calculus
as well.
And he had a very unique style of teaching, which was, you approach every problem through
the lens of understanding what is being asked physically
and seeing if, in the end, the question says, okay, Johnny throws a ball at this speed in this angle,
where does it land? That might be the question. I mean, that's a very simple calculus question,
but that's an example. But as the problems get more and more challenging,
he would still really insist that you try to understand graphically using sort of functional calculus, like graphically,
what is happening, algebraically what is happening, and numerically what is happening, and how can you
converge the numerical solution with the algebraic solution with the graphical solution? He said,
in calculus, you should almost always be able to come up with an estimate of where the answer is,
based on graphing the functions and looking at how they behave.
Heart.
I mean, a lot of kids didn't do very well in calculus, and yet those lessons took me all
the way through honors math and engineering.
And another sort of example on that path that really spoke to me was in my freshman year
of calculus, I met this guy studying in the stacks.
His name was JP and he came a legend to me because he had simultaneously.
He couldn't decide if he wanted to be a mechanical engineer or an electrical engineer, so he
did both.
And he literally got both degrees in four years.
It's not impossible to get both of those degrees in five or six years, but to do both
in four years is crazy.
And he said the only way he was able to do it was he never wanted to memorize
how a type of problem was solved. He wanted to derive everything from first principles.
At the time, I think we were learning about Coriallus acceleration, which is basically
the acceleration of a body and rotation where the radius is changing. So, named after a
guy who failed to figure this out when miners in a shaft were moving down. So now you actually had a shrinking radius relative to the center of the earth,
and that changes the forces on the elevator shaft.
And he said, you realize you could derive that all from Newton's first law.
And I was like, I never thought of it that way.
And he goes, yeah, let's go through it.
And it's about a one-page derivation, but you can do it.
And that lesson stuck with me for the remainder of my life, which was, oh my god, if you
just think of it in these broader, initially more painful ways, it yields huge dividends.
This gets at so many things, I'm not even sure where to start and range.
But the first thing popped my head was I just saw somebody tweeting research on Twitter
today about how active learning students actually learn more, but they rate themselves as having
learned less, and they also rate their teachers worse.
It turns out early on, we're not actually that good evaluators of how we're doing because
the feeling of fluency and learning makes us think we're doing well, but we're actually
not.
This is what I wrote about called desirable difficulties, but what you were talking about,
I mean, that's serious making connections knowledge.
In Japan, they actually have a term called ban show that means the type of writing on the
blackboard that tracks all these different approaches to the same problem, sort of what
it sounds like your teacher was doing.
But I wanted to the derivation point because there was some research I wrote only a little
bit about in range, but that I read a lot more about.
There was about what college students understand about math, essentially.
And there were some really startling examples where one of the problems was like, I can't
remember what the exact numbers were, but let's say it was 500 plus 200 equals 700.
And the students were asked, how can you check if this was right?
And so they'd say, okay, 700 minus 200 equals 500, that's right.
What's another way you can check if it's right?
And they wouldn't come up with 700 minus 500 equals 200
because they were taught to subtract the number
on the right of the addition sign.
And when their professors were shown this sort of stuff,
so this is wicked feedback.
So you get the feedback that the student understands
because they know one way to do it,
but they actually don't understand it all.
And the professors would say, oh my gosh.
And the students would, in interviews, they'd say like math is a system of rules and executed procedures.
Professors would say like, I went into math because I didn't have to memorize stuff.
Because you could derive it and it makes sense, it's just concepts.
And so they were just in a totally different place than the students were.
And it sounds like you had some opportunity to avoid that.
But I think that's the norm of how math teaching works.
Yeah, and it's hard because my daughter who's in sixth grade, I'm doing this thing and
it's really hard. I mean, I can't imagine I'm the only parent that struggles with this,
but I want her to love math. I don't want her to view it as a subject. I want her to
view it as math is more fun than playing video games. Math is the most beautiful thing in
the world. I want her to look out the window and see math and see that math is
a beautiful tool that we have to explain the world around us through this thing. And yet every time as a parent
I try to ask her a question to ask her to think a certain way. I end up sort of putting her on the spot. And so I'm struggling with this thing of
one, is it just that I'm a bad parent parent and I don't know how to do this correctly
or
Did you have your bad parent? I didn't want to say anything
But you brought it up.
Or is it that a child needs a certain base of facts like they have to know a handful of things and be confident with
The language like the times tables and all these other things before you can even get them to start thinking beyond
tables and all these other things before you can even get them to start thinking beyond the problem.
I think a lot about this actually because I feel like I'm under performing on this actually.
It's a good point, though, and I should say.
Again, in research, these are called using procedures knowledge, which is the knowing stuff
and making connections knowledge, which is derivation, understanding concepts.
They're both important.
It's just that in some of these famous famous studies in the United States almost a hundred percent
a cent, sometimes literally a hundred percent in classrooms would be the using procedures
knowledge and not the making connections.
But I think that is a tricky thing.
There's a study that came out after a range I'd so I couldn't include it, but was on the
topic of desirable difficulties.
And it was about interleaving, which is, well, I'll explain the study.
Seventh grade math classrooms were randomly assigned to different types of math teaching.
Some of them got what's called blocked practice where you get problem type A, A, A, A, B,
B, B, B, B, and so on.
And the students get better really quickly and they rate their teachers well and they rate
their own learning well.
Other classrooms got interleaved practice where it's like, as if you threw all the problem
types in the hat and you pick out randomly.
And in that condition, the students are frustrated at first.
They rate their own learning low, they rate their teachers poorly.
But again, they're learning how to match a strategy to a type of problem instead of just
do the same thing over and over and come test time.
They all took the same test.
The interleaving students who had interleaved practice blew the block practice students away.
It was, I think, like the largest effect size I've ever seen in an education study
that was randomized, 0.83 steender deviations.
It was like taking a kid from the 50th percentile,
moving them to the 80th percentile.
But they didn't like it early on.
They don't feel like they're learning.
And so I'm not sure what the balance is as a parent
where you know some of this desirable difficulty
is in the long term desirable,
but you also don't wanna turn someone off from the subject.
So what's that delicate balance?
I think that's sort of kind of the art of coaching and everything we do, whether that's
someone in sport trying to develop someone for the long term or a parent, is like, how do
you balance maintaining enthusiasm with optimal development and helping someone have that
vision of their future self, like your professor did for you without having them be burned out
I don't know. I really think that's why there's
What like great coaches kind of do is they figure out how to balance these things when to make things difficult and when to
Allow things to be easy and sort of more easily inspirational
But I think that's an art as well as a science. So what was sort of the
takeaway of the idea that
And I don't like using the extreme examples, because they're not a silly, and that's the problem with them, but if you look at a high school
track team, and you pick a big division one school, and you look at their sprinters, are they genetically
predisposed to be sprinters, but without a certain degree of training could
never appreciate it, or could a certain amount of training overcome a lack of genetic predisposition?
I mean, how do you feel about that today versus when you wrote the book versus when you wrote
the article?
Because again, you're getting smarter as we go.
Yeah, when I wrote the article, I was more convinced than I had been before the article
that genes were unimportant, completely unimportant.
And by the time I wrote the book, I came to feel that there were sort of two extreme camps.
One that felt genes have no influence on performance.
And another that I'd say the other extreme wasn't that practice has no influence. I don't think anybody thought that's uncontroversial
So I think one extreme was only practice matters and the other extreme was practice and jeans matter
I think that is not as extreme saying they both matter which and my bias is the latter my bias is just that
I mean, that's what the evidence shows. Yeah, and it's like
People don't randomly pick to train from marathon to the hundred meters
if they're trying to get to the top level.
Because there's some zero, some physiology going on there.
And so I think to be a sprinter, you're not turning a car to horse into a race horse
as the saying goes.
Like, you have to have some predisposition to being fast and being explosive.
And there's a reason why those people are particularly bad.
You say in bolt would be a worse marathon runner than a random person picked off the street
because it's different physiology.
But I also think it's important to note that at the beginning of the season and six months
later someone like him are very different in how fast they are.
Even over the course of one season they change out fast they are.
So I think the practice is incredibly important, but you also need talent.
Now, which is maybe a reasonable segue into a story
that I know you just get asked about all the time.
But I also feel like for the sake of the listener,
if they haven't heard you on another podcast,
it's worth them hearing you explain the difference
between Roger Federer and Tiger Woods.
But of course, once you're done with this,
I wanna kind of go down more extreme examples and stuff.
So is it safe to say that the contrast between Tiger
and Roger are elite examples of opposing views?
Yeah, yeah, definitely. And it's sort of interesting because, well, I'll give the quick versions
of the story first before I criticize myself. The Tiger Woods story, I think, even if you
don't know the details, they probably kind of absorb the gist. Seven months old, father
gives him a putter. Not trying to turn him into a golfer, by the way. Oh, this reminds,
we should talk about how the Tiger and Mozart stories, I think, are told wrong after this.
So I'm just putting that on our court board here.
Ten months, he starts imitating his father's swing.
Two years old, you can go on YouTube
and see him on national television,
demonstrating his swing on the mic, Douglas show it.
At three or four, he starts saying,
I'm gonna be the next Jack Nicholas,
fast forward age 21, he's greatest golfer in the world.
And that's sort of the quintessential, I think that story has seeped into culture so much
that people who don't even follow golf ever kind of know it.
Veteran on the other hand, every bit as famous as an adult, but obscure.
Every bit is dominant.
I mean, it is just more so, over a longer time.
For sure.
And when he was a kid, he played some basketball, badminton, tennis.
His mother was a tennis coach, refused to coach him
because he wouldn't return balls normally.
He continued on to skateboarding, swimming, wrestling,
soccer.
When his coaches wanted to move him up a level,
he declined because he just wanted to talk
about pro wrestling with his friends after practice.
He went on to play.
Handball, maybe I said volleyball, ready?
I'm not sure.
Some rugby.
Do we know how good he was at these other sports, by the way?
He was good at soccer, for sure. Most of the other sports, I'm not sure some rugby. Do we know how good he was at these other sports, by the way? He was good at soccer, for sure.
Most of the other sports, I'm not really sure.
But he kept playing badminton basketball soccer
longer than some of the others.
And then soccer was the one that he finally decided he had to,
he had to choose between soccer and tennis.
And what age is that when he's having to make that decision?
I think he was starting to think about that
as he was like entering his teens, basically.
And he wasn't focused tagger saying I'm a mid-jack, Nicholas when I'm four, Roger was actually,
when he first got good enough to get interviewed by a local paper, the reporter asked him if
he ever became a pro, what would he buy with his first hypothetical paycheck?
And he says Mercedes.
His mother doesn't want him putting all his eggs in this basket, it's like a Pald.
And ask the reporter if she can hear the interview recording, and the reporter obliged,
as it turns out, Roger said mayor CDs and Swiss Germany just wanted more CDs, not a Mercedes,
and so his mom's like, all right, fine.
But it's just very different in every way from the Tiger story.
And the way I sort of used these as a device to start range, first to set up just the concept
going forward.
The book proposal was titled Roger versus Tiger, and it was going to be like, when
should you be a Roger and when should you be a Tiger?
But they felt everyone would think it was a biography of those two guys, my publisher.
And I thought I was telling that we only know only here one of those stories. And my question was
which of these is the norm. Obviously, they both worked for these individuals. And I think there's
many paths to the top as there are people, but what was the norm? And it turns out that the norm
when scientists track athletes on route to becoming elite is is that early on they tend to have what they call a sampling period, where they try a wide variety of activities.
That often includes things like martial arts and dance and doesn't just have to be other sports, gymnastics.
And they learn these broad general, these physical skills.
And they learn about their interests and their abilities, importantly, and delay specializing until later soups, plateau at lower level. And that turns out to be the norm.
And so I sort of felt we should let people know what the norm is instead of always focusing
on these very few exceptions that happen to be in the most kind learning environment
sports, and that aren't that good to extrapolate to everything else.
Now, to that, do you think is the psychology of it and the neuromuscular physiology of it?
So looking at Roger, for example, who I know very little about Roger Federer, that's not
the obvious stuff that most people who are not, I'm not a tennis player or anything like
that, but part of his longevity is it possible to be explained by the fact that he never burnt
out versus just sort of slowly acquired a love for this thing versus had it shoved down his throat.
I'm sure like there's lots of stories of trying to create these tennis prodigies
where it probably backfires because by the time the kid is 16,
they're great, but they've lost the desire. So it's more of a
above the neck phenomenon than a below the like environment. How much of it do you think is that?
Versus in playing all those other sports,
Roger actually developed synaptic connections that served him better in tennis. He basically created a bigger foundation across his neuromuscular system that ultimately came
to serve him when he specialized.
And so there are a couple of points.
So this will be a sort of a longer point for us because you bring up a couple of good
things.
Initially, I thought that most of the effect was going to be accounted for by the fact
that if you allow people to delay selection, it's more likely you get them in the sport
that they're the best at.
Whereas we know the earlier you forced selection, the more likely you put the wrong person
in the wrong sport.
And when selection occurs really early, you end up seeing this huge relative age effect, where coaches just pick for kids who are born early in the selection year, because
they're seven or eight or nine or ten months older than their cohort.
And so they're at young ages, that's a huge difference.
And so, coaches mistake biological maturation for talent.
So I thought most of it was just going to be the fact that if you delay selection more, you'll get the right people in the right support more.
But then I started coming across these studies of German national soccer players or people
in the national development pipeline where they were matched for ability at a certain age,
tracked for several years, and they see who improves more.
And at certain ages, you have to focus eventually, but at certain ages, like in the early and
mid-teen years, it was those who did a wider variety of activities.
And so then I started to think maybe there really is something to the skill benefit,
which didn't surprise me intuitively, but I didn't to see it empirically was interesting.
And then I spent some time with, I should say by the way, my colleague John Wertham asked Roger
Fetter about this, one of the questions you asked on the tennis channel recently, and Roger Fetter
said it contributed to his not burning out. You never know how much to trust someone's own
story, but it's worth noting that that's what he said.
There's been some time with this physiologist
for Cirque du Soleil, and he noted that they started
implementing this program where some of the performers
are former Olympians and things like that too,
where they would have performers learn the basics
of three other performers' disciplines,
not because they were ever gonna perform them,
but to see if it would vary up what they were doing, maybe reduce stress-related injuries
and stuff like that.
And they track their injuries next to Canadian gymnastics, I guess it's a Canadian company.
And he said it reduced their injuries by like a third, so they implemented it.
They must feel really strongly about it if they're taking away from practice time for
those performers their main discipline.
There seems to be something, they showed up in another longitudinal study of young athletes
where the best predictor of suffering what they called an adult style over use injury
was how specialized the athlete was. And it wasn't necessarily their total time spent
in physical activity. It was if it was just the same thing over and over. So there was
like some protective effect from diversifying. We can guess at what that is. I'm sure your guesses would be better than mine.
But ultimately, my feeling is the Roger pattern is more prevalent.
One, because you have that breadth of training,
that predicts breadth of transfer.
You're exposed to much more neuromuscular stuff,
much more perceptual stuff.
And when the challenge gets harder as you go up,
you need to draw on those.
There's a funny book called Extraordinary Tennis for the
ordinary player. I think by this guy, Sai Ramos, who's better known as the father of intercontinental
ballistic missiles, but also wrote some books about tennis and a couple other things. And in it,
one of the interesting things in it was that he shows, he does some like serious analysis of
gameplay at different levels and shows that even for good amateur players
something like 80 or 90% of the points are scored by just keeping the ball in play and someone making an error.
And then when you get to the elite level it's totally exactly the opposite.
It's like 80 90% of points have to be earned and that completely changes the kind of game that you're seeing.
So I think the challenge that a lot of these athletes are facing really changes a lot as they go up in levels.
And so they really want to have that kind of breadth of training in this experience responding
to different types of things.
You think this overlaps with the Air Force Academy example where having the harder, more
orthogonal education and calculus prepares you for more real world problem solving, which
is what's happening as you go from kelk 1 to 2 to 3?
I think so.
I think so.
And again, that's why I think the theme of the book is the things that will cause you
to be the best today, might not be the best for five or ten years from now, or the best
way to develop a ten-year-old might not be the best way to develop a twenty-year-old,
or certainly isn't.
And it's also why I think the specialization model may well, there's a surprising
dearth of research in golf for how popular sport it is. But I think the
specialization model may well work for
golf because you're not facing some of
that same stuff. It is a very kind learning
environment. And I mean, I guess the best
guy in the world right now Brooks kept
good in coming to the later. It's unclear
if he even likes golf. But I could see it
makes sense to me that the specialization
model would work or at least not be
deleterious and golf, whereas in the other sports, I'm...
What about the sports where physiology is undeniably huge, so that big three being swimming,
cycling, and running?
Cycling started to talk about because people tend to conflate the use of drugs with somehow
discounting the remarkable physiology of these guys.
But if you take a chrysthrum, for example, four time, two to four ounce
champion, grows up in Kenya, we can speak to what the importance of early exposure to
hypoxia could have been.
What is our belief about the training effect and the duration of the training effect necessary
to produce world-class athletes at that level?
Because to me, that's as foreign, like if you said to me, Peter, I'm gonna put you
into time capsule, you're gonna be 16,
you're 14 years old again, knowing everything you know today,
if you have to become a professional athlete,
which sport would it be in?
The answer is none.
I positively know there's nothing I could ever be good enough in.
And that includes, if I was willing to do everything
that was necessary
to become the best cyclist, runner, swimmer, they just couldn't do it.
You have to do what some countries host the Olympics, what they focus on is just recruiting
more people in the much less competitive sports.
If there's a basket weaving, I have a friend who joked about this because my interests
are so diverse. He goes, Peter, do you realize that if someone comes up with an Olympic sport
that requires solving a differential
equation, driving a car fast, shooting a bow and arrow, and doing a deadlift, you could
be one of the best.
That's basically modern pentathlon.
You're pretty much there.
And he listed off 10 other really stupid esoteric things I do, and I'm like, yep, that's
great.
That's my claim to fame.
Modern pentathlon is like fencing, horse riding, swimming, running.
It's like, we should have that.
I think there was a time when chess and fiction writing were in the Olympics.
So there's hope for you.
I suck at both of those things.
The Brits, I think, in the winter sports when Skeleton got introduced, which is where
you slide.
Yeah, yeah.
I'm hilarious.
And there's a great innovation story about that.
If you want to get to that.
But one of the guys who I talked to in their program said, we've got this down like 80% to a science.
We make like an open call for women.
We like do some measurements.
We know what size they need to be.
We know what kind of explosion they need to have.
We pick the gold medalist and they've done that.
So that stuff's kind of amazing.
But do you think that for these super physiologic things
where presumably mitochondrial density,
mitochondrial efficiency,
fiber distribution matter the most.
Is that more of a gulf?
Is that more tiger?
Is that more Roger not withstanding this like a logical component, which is obviously enormous?
So I think in sports in general, more people, a hundred years ago, you could have come to
the Olympics and been the only person to do anything about training or the only person
who was really talented and win.
Now I think in every sport, many more people are ruled out by either their nature or their
nurture, no matter what the sport is, but I think in those...
Meaning, they're not willing to train hard enough, no matter how much their ability.
So that rules the...
Or they don't have the opportunities.
I mean, a huge portion of people in the world don't have an opportunity to be exposed to
most sports, so they don't have the opportunity.
I mean, I think one thing, the impact of Title IX in the U. the US is showing in how dominant we are in some women's sports, where I think
I just saw a stat, I think we're all stuck or he's at science of sport and prominent
sports scientist. He tweeted that the United States has something like 40% of all the women's
registered soccer players in the world. So like, of course, we're awesome because we're
giving more opportunities. So I think a lot of people, either they're not willing to train,
they don't have access to training, one of those, or they don't have the nature for it, and the more competitive the sport is,
the more important that it is, right? Because obviously, if we had everyone do identical training,
only genes would separate them, and if we had everyone be identical twins, only training would
separate them. But I think people are more quickly filtered out by their nature and things like
sprinting. So how old are you? I'm 38.
38.
So I'm 10 years older than you, but directionally,
like we're both clearly past our prime, right?
In the sense of sports wise.
Sports wise, yeah.
I think I'm past my prime and everything,
but clearly athletically.
Is there a reason that I, let's assume I'm a decent athlete,
which I'm actually not, but let's assume I was,
could I, if I decided tomorrow, like I want to play
tennis? I don't think anybody would ever assume I could become a good tennis player, but is it
because the deliberate practice argument would be there aren't enough hours left for you to
devote to this. Another argument would be no, you missed a critical window, just as we say,
by the way, this might be totally BS, I'd like to hear your view on it. This view that we learn
language is best at a certain window,
and once that window closes, it's sort of like a growth plate
closing over a bone, it becomes really hard
to learn languages thereafter.
Is there something about this critical window of exposure?
I guess it's really the thing I'm trying to get out
with this question when it comes to physical talent?
That's a tough question, and there's this book by a neurologist
called Why Michael Couldn't Hit, and it's about why I love this book was one of my favorite books.
So he was saying Michael Jordan kind of missed the critical window for developing the perceptual
anticipation skill that you need to see things that are coming because your reflexes are
too slow.
Right.
Why the greatest athlete we'd ever seen of a generation was a 188 hitter in triple A ball.
Yeah.
I'm a little bit of a dad fly about that though because I think that was a great book.
I loved the book.
I love the Wayne Gretzky story by the way, but we'll come back. Great. generation was a 188 hitter in triple A ball. Yeah, I'm a little bit of a gad fly about that though,
because I think that was a great book.
I loved the book.
I love the Wayne Gretzky story, by the way,
but we'll come back.
Great, and one season, I think Michael hit like 220
or something like that in the minors,
which I think if we went down and picked a random
person off the street, they would hit zero in double A.
These are people who are stars of college
and high school teams or foreign teams.
So did you do well or poorly?
I don't know.
If he had hit 10, you
know, I wouldn't have been surprised because he hadn't been playing in a long time. So I'm
kind of impressed with what he did. But I also think there's something to...
I mean, I think the point though was the expectation. It's not that hitting 288 or whatever
intripley ball is horrible. No, it's just why isn't the guy that seemingly has the best
hand-eye coordination in the world immediately able to absorb it?
Right. And in that sense, I do think there was probably something to the critical period.
And there are always people, there are always exceptions to everything.
One of the most dynamic players in baseball now is the Renzo Cain.
And he did not play a game of baseball until age 16.
That surprises me.
He did not know how to play.
I think most people would need to have some exposure.
Not necessarily specialized, but have some exposure at that age.
So there's always exceptions. But I do think you want some of that early exposure,
partly just because you run out of time, because you want your perceptual expertise to coincide with your physical time.
Right. So you're just under a serious time limit. And in relating that to language, I actually do think,
and you know there was a guy who tried, dropped everything when you read about the 10,000 hour rule, and decided to try to become a pro golfer,
by doing 10,000 hours exactly. And to try to become a pro golfer.
By doing 10,000 hours exactly.
And he got Erickson to consult with him and everything, to name Dan McLaughlin.
How far did he get?
He got to something like 7,000 hours or something like that.
And then he stopped, he was having injuries.
And what happened was, I think he didn't make it.
And he didn't nearly make it.
But he got really good.
So he got better than like 90% of amateurs or something, but wasn't nearly going to get
into Q-school qualifying for a professional tour.
And so what I think, and I didn't know if he was going to make it or not, because my
point has been like people were saying, oh, you were right, he didn't make it.
I wrote a little bit about him.
I'm like, that's not what I said.
So there's huge individual variation.
If he's going to make it, it's not going to be at exactly 10,000 hours.
And so he didn't make it.
By the way, do you think there's enough variation that it almost is uncoupled?
Like what would be your 90% confidence interval on that?
Or does it even...
I mean, I think there has to be a 90% confidence interval right, if you think about it, is it
a thousand to 40,000 if you had to say 90% of people that achieve mastery do so in a certain
amount of deliberate practice
I think it really depends on the sport. I listed in the sports team
I listed some hours and varied a lot by sport and so I think it sort of depends what it is
Most of them were in sports were lower than 10,000 hours significantly four to six thousand hours kinds of things
And again, these are averages in
Chessu was higher than that so I think it depends
I think it's sport dependent and again something like skeleton
There's a great paper called ice novice to winter Olympian in 14 months
Whereas basically they just pick somebody and then they can go to the Olympics
So I think it a lot depends on what you're doing and also when I sat in a Harvard Business School class for
Some reporting I was doing for range. You just reminded me of something where the professor asks the students
He asked them all these things like how many subway sandwich apps do you think there are in America?
Give your 90% confidence interval.
And basically, we can't do it because if you're asked that question, if you're asked
20 of those questions, you should be able to get 18 correctly in a reference range.
I've played this game myself and with people, I've never seen anybody come close to it.
People don't go big enough, give your 90% confidence interval and you'd be better off going like, well, I know there's 10,
you know, to like a million and instead they go much narrower and they end up missing almost all
of them. So what would my 90% confidence interval be? And it sort of, it depends what counts too
because there's some accounts of athletes who have done a bunch of different sports. So there are studies that show that invasion sports are the ones that require anticipatory
people can't see me doing air quotes, I guess we're on a podcast, but that's the term
that they use in the invasion sports where you have to anticipate things that are happening
faster than you can react to, boxing, soccer, whatever baseball, things are flying, trying
to get past you.
There's some studies that show that people who have done a variety of invasion sports will then
pick up any subsequent invasion sport more rapidly. And so I think there was a case of one woman who
had played a variety of sports and then it only took her like 500 hours to become one of the
best basketball players in the world, but she'd world. But she'd played a whole bunch of other sports, volleyball and all this stuff.
So it sort of depends what you count as delivered, like Ericsson wouldn't count that as deliver
practice because it's not the same sport.
But clearly it is like lowering the thread.
Well, and that's really the fatter point, isn't it?
It's that all those other sports he's doing soccer, badminton, etc.
I mean, there's still training in a more diffuse way, a set of skills that
obviously have gone on to serve him greatly in tennis.
Yeah, and I think this relates to language, if I want to segue to language a little bit, which is
I wanted to write about language in the book. As I was going through all the research,
I found so much of it contradictory and confusing that I decided to kind of stay away from it
largely because I just couldn't figure out. I was hoping there'd be, in my proposal, I wrote about this. I'd seen this
really cool study and I had video for it where infants who were being raised bilingual,
they were given like this loose-site box sort of thing and plexiglass or whatever it was.
And there was some object and they had to find the opening in this clear box and get an
object out of it and then put some other object in it.
And the ones who were bilingual would try more different strategies and the researchers
were saying, well, they think differently and they have more executive function.
And I thought that was tantalizing and I loved the video, but I just, the research was
all over and my conclusion was kind of, there's a lot of tantalizing stuff and nobody's quite
sure, really, for a lot of it.
But one that I did think was pretty strong was the idea that people who grew up bilingual
had an advantage for then learning a third language without being taught it formally.
So there were studies where they'll be given like a fake made up language and fake grammar
and just have to learn it by immersion and they seem to do that better.
And I think that's sort of akin to what we see in sports.
And with regard to the sensitive period, I do think there is a real sensitive period in language where I think
about after like age 12, you're not going to make something your native language anymore.
And I think there are cases where kids, feral children cases, these rare cases where a kid
like grows up in the woods or isolated from people. And if they haven't learned some,
if they haven't had exposure to language by age 12, they never learn it, basically.
And that also happens to be about the age you have to start, if you don't start studying
chess patterns by age 12, your chances of reaching international master status drop, international
master status, again, one down from grandmaster, they drop from like one in four to one in 55.
So I think there are some critical periods, but I don't think, for most things, maybe
for these feral children, but for most things, I don't think it's nearly the expiration date that people think it is. I think most
people can get better at most things than they think they can, and they can get better
most things than they think they can at older ages than they think they can, too.
Yeah, it's funny you say that. That's kind of where I wanted to pivot for a second,
which was all of this discussion is interesting through the lens of being the absolute best tennis player or the absolute best golfer on the planet.
But isn't that really besides the point for most of us?
Because if there's 7 billion of us on this planet, 6.999999999 billion of us are never
going to be good enough at anything to make a living at it outside of our day jobs anyway. I was asked on a podcast recently why I love archery and driving a race car so
much. Part of it is there is still every six months I'm still able to look back and appreciate the
progress I've made. In other words, I'm coming from a place of being so not expert at these things, that the joy is actually in the monotonic
increase in skill.
That is actually the joy to me.
It's the, I don't want to say mastery because that implies you are mastering it, but it's
the path towards mastery that is more joyous.
And I don't know, it's almost like on some on some levels it must maybe it's not that much fun to be the best in the world at something because by definition
You only have one way to go at some point and that's probably a lot less enjoyable than working your way up the curve and I guess
Generalists have the ability to I don't know this gets more into the psychology
But again, but you don't have to tether your identity to just this one thing. I always feel bad actually for athletes who...
It's a brutal, brutal way to make a living in the sense that you have a far narrower window in which you can be the best at something,
versus like, say, any sort of normal career.
Yeah, and if you interact with a lot of athletes, you hear a lot of them say,
now it's just a job and it's something that they love to a certain point.
I think we were talking about Ayrton Senna earlier.
I seem to recall him saying something like,
the times that supported he loved the most
were not when he was necessarily on the top of the world.
It was early.
It was actually during his last two seasons in Carding.
It was racing this British guy named Fullerton.
For everything he did that Carding was his favorite time,
right?
Absolutely.
It was pure bliss, no politics, as he said, just pure racing.
I just actually interviewed a friend of mine the other day, this podcast, it'll come out
at some point in relation to this one, I'm not sure when, but same question I asked her,
she knows she's an Olympian, and it was like, okay, you were the second best in the world
on this day, you got a silver medal.
When was the sport the most fun?
And it's like, oh, yeah, two years before I went to my first Olympics was when it was its most fun.
Yeah, yeah, it's amazing. I mean, this makes me think of so many things. One, I think people
that our performers need other stuff to do. There was a study I mentioned in Rangewear,
Nobel laureates, or 22 times more like than a typical scientist, have like a serious aesthetic hobby,
even though they're certainly not as good at it as they are at their day job.
For me, I noticed while I was writing this book somewhere along the line, I sort of started
to forget what I loved about writing, I think.
And I keep this thing, I call it my little book of small experiments where at least every
other month, I think of some skill I'd like to learn a little bit about or some interest
I'd like to explore a little bit.
And I put a hypothesis of, well, what could I try to, almost like my grad student, like
notebook, what could I try to get some insight into this?
And I forces me to try something new every other month.
It doesn't have to be a big deal.
Maybe it's some job that I don't know about.
I just have to find somebody to talk to about it.
But when I was sort of losing my enthusiasm for the kind of writing I was doing and starting
to feel more pressure because my first book was a surprise success and then all the sudden
You had a lot more pressure after that. I took an online beginner's fiction writing course
I've been reading this book about the Zen concept of beginner's mind where you just always keep your mindset as a beginner never as I've arrived
and this class it's like
Nobody cares. So you are nobody cares what you've done
Get back in that feeling of being uncomfortable.
And I loved it.
I mean, it reminded me what I loved about doing this.
It made me totally uncomfortable
because it's still writing, but it's very, very different.
I think that these huge benefits, like one of the exercises
was you had to write a story using no dialogue,
whatsoever.
And after I did that, I went back to my book manuscript
that I had and was like, I've been leaning on quotes
in a lazy way when I don't understand stuff.
I don't understand it, the reader's not going to understand it.
So I need to learn it better and clarify with narrative writing instead of people's voices.
And so in every way, it refreshed me.
And so now it's like something I really, I really want to do.
And one of the kind of shared this a lot of tech on another story here, but this is one
of the greatest things I've ever seen in sports live has to do a little bit with this,
having something else going on your identity
Which was at the Vancouver Winter Olympics in
2010 yeah 2010 I was up at the women's
1.6k cross-country sprint they say sprint but you go like way up a big hill and come back down and and there's like
Four rounds. They're all in a day from the prelims to the metal round and this woman named Petra mightich
They're all in a day from the prelims to the metal round and this woman named Petra Middich
Slovenian skier had been one of the top ranked people in the world for years and never meddled at world championships at Olympics totally snakebitten something Would always go wrong. They didn't bring the right skis. Oh the technician didn't have the right wax a ski breaks like just freak stuff and
Here she's favored to get silver I think in Vancouver in Vancouver. And in the warm-up, right before the first round,
she slides off a curve, falls into a frozen creek bed,
and bruises up all of her side.
And they take her to a quick examination
because she has to go to the first round.
It's okay, nothing's broken, it's just pain.
Like, if you're okay, you can go.
And she goes to the first round, qualifies on time
when she was the favorite in that round,
barely makes it through.
Second round, similar thing, the examiner,
it's just pain. You know, if you can do it, you can go. Second round, similar thing, the examiner, it's just pain.
You know, if you can do it, you can go.
Third round, she falls down after the finish line, screaming.
They have to carry her away and examine her again and say,
if anything was really wrong, we'd tell you,
you couldn't go, but if you can go, you can.
Final round, you hear her screaming every time she's like
pulling the ground, gets the bronze medal, just nips in there.
Then they have time to examine her and find,
she broke a whole bunch of ribs on her side. One of them broke off and punctured her lung.
And so she came to the medal ceremony with a tube sticking out of her chest in a wheelchair.
And I remember she was, I talked to her sports psychologist and they were saying,
if we had known that she had broken all these ribs or had a freaking pneumothorax.
Yeah. They weren't going to let her go to the medal ceremony and she was like,
I will die in the middle.
We got to go in.
You know?
And so they brought the wheeler.
And they all said, well, first of all, it's kind of a testament to the mentality that if
they told her it was an injury, she wouldn't have done it, right?
But it's just pain.
And I was talking to our sports psychologist about what got her here.
Like what's the journey been like, especially after she's always having this stuff going
wrong.
This must have been like, oh, again.
And he said one of the most important things was like diversifying her identity.
She was getting so fixated on and so much pressure.
He was like, you need to do something else.
So he forced her to start building a house, basically.
And that became like a task for her to do
and a whole new thing and a new skill.
And he felt like, I thought maybe he was gonna talk about
some new type of cross training.
He was like, no, the building the house took the pressure off.
It gave her some other part of her identity. So it wasn't just as the person who's like always
having something go wrong. And I just thought that was so interesting that what he felt was his
main contribution was giving her a hobby, essentially, and that he thought that really
allowed her not to feel like the pressure that would break her in some way.
You sort of alluded to it earlier with the story of the Nobel laureates as well.
I can't remember if it was, I think it was Francis Crick who said this, I could be wrong, that, and it might've
been Watson, but I think it was Crick who said, the key to doing great science is always being
a little bit unemployed. And I'm also probably paraphrasing that and bastardizing it, it must have
been said much more eloquently, but you get the point that just if it is great insight in science
you get the point, the gist of it is great insight in science comes from having time to wander in your mind.
You said something a while ago about, which made me very jealous by the way and kind of pissed
me off, you would read 10 papers a day in the exploration phase of writing and it's like,
I'd give anything to read 10 papers a day today.
Instead, I feel fortunate at least to have a team that can read 10 papers a day today. Instead, I feel fortunate at least to have a team
that can read 10 papers a day for me.
I remember that bliss of, you just get to read the paper
all day, every day, highlight it, take notes,
call the author, go to journal club,
like boo, like that was unbelievable.
And we don't, I mean, it's very difficult
to be a scientist today because nobody's paying
you to be just thinking.
Nobody's really rewarding you.
Nobody is promoting you based on that.
So we've created this very perverse set of incentives.
And in some ways, honestly, I consider it a miracle that there are still really good
science being done.
Most science being done, by the way, just sucks.
I mean, if we're going to be brutally honest, if you pull up pub med and you look at
every one of those hundred thousand papers every month that makes the way on the pub med, I think 90 to 95% of them are
absolutely useless. Serve absolutely no purpose to our civilization, do not advance natural knowledge, do nothing beneficial for us.
They increase the publication count to the person doing them,
which is why they're doing them.
That's right.
It's an economic tool of the journals,
and it's a promotional tool.
So you don't have any absolutely nefarious actors
in the situation.
You just have a system with such perverse incentives
that nothing...
Some of the predatory journals, but those are...
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Yeah, and I think a lot of the science is bad.
I confess and range that I think my own master's thesis
was not good science and wouldn't replicate,
but I didn't know, like I was rushed into studying
the specifics of arctic plant physiology really quickly
without learning what was actually happening
when I hit a button on the statistics program
and how science has to be set up to make conclusions.
And I think that's kind of the norm for a lot of scientists.
And I think there's 2005 paper by John Ionitis.
It was titled, Why Most Publish Research is False?
The people kind of wrote off.
Now it looks like he's a genius, right?
Oh, and now I hope I'm not saying something John wouldn't want me to repeat.
But I think John's been pretty vocal about this probably like seven or eight years ago.
He's having dinner with John and I said, John, I want to know bullshit answer on this.
What percentage of people who do science for a living?
So they apply for grants, they get the money, they do the thing. What percentage of those people shouldn't be doing that?
Which doesn't mean they can't work in a lab, but they can't be principal investigators.
I mean, he said something to the tune of 95. He's like 19 out of 20 people who basically for a living are in the business
of generating hypotheses, testing them experimentally, and evaluating the results of those experiments.
That's the scientific method. 19 out of 20 people who do that can't do it, and probably
should not be doing it.
That's scary, but also I would guess that we don't want to try to narrow it down to just
the people that should be doing it because you'd have this purifying form of selection where you have to like allow some
failure.
So this is kind of where I want to go with this thinking, right?
So why aren't we going down this tangent?
So you've obviously written a lot about the importance of even generalist within science.
You've given a couple of examples which we should go into about the hard problem that gets solved by somebody
whose native scientific tongue is not the one that is being addressed.
So I want to talk about that, but I want to contrast it with this other thing, which is,
I have this thesis that I harp on all the time, which is mostly my way of communicating
with myself to not get so upset at the lack of scientific
insight in the world. And the idea is genetics and evolution have never prepared us for science.
So the scientific method is less than 400 years old. Even the earliest signs of formal logic
as a construct to describe the way we think represents less than 0.1% of our genetic existence.
So, Atia, why would you ever get upset at somebody who can't think logically?
Why would you ever get upset when you pull up a story on Goop that is written like
the most insulting thing you've ever seen in your life with respect to signs?
Why would you let that upset you, Peter? It's like you're expecting something
that is simply too much.
And you might be assuming that the people writing
for Goop are trying to get things right.
So that might be the assumption.
There that's part of the assumption.
I would love to hear you hold forth about Goop to be honest.
So I contrast this with,
there has to be some degree of rigidity and formality
in the training.
I like to think of myself as a pretty good
critic of science. I have the ability to read papers and immediately most of the time figure out
why these are total crap and what all the biases are and all these other things.
But to take any credit for that would be ridiculous. I can't take any credit for that. That's simply
because I was mentored by people and I went through a formal type of training or informal type of training.
Really, it wasn't formal and codified,
but it was informal.
It's going to journal club.
It's doing the experiments yourself,
putting something together, thinking you're slick
and having people tell you,
hey, Numb Nuts, did you realize how many ways
you screwed this up and how you've drawn the wrong conclusion?
So how do you balance that you have to go through
that type of training with, but that you have to go through that type of training
with, but sometimes you have to be an outsider?
Yeah. And by the way, what you mentioned in formal training, I think we underestimate
the importance of informal training. And you have to kind of set up cultures for it and
things like that. So I have a master's degree in geological sciences. And I got a much
better education in genetics writing a book than I did in a grad program.
I wouldn't know how to run like the equipment in the lab, but I basically kept like a statistician
on retainer and just to talk to me about a paper any time.
And that's an amazing way to learn.
You're not just being talked at.
You have a specific question of why is this right?
He's like, no, you can't use this.
And so it's an amazing way to have like informal learning.
And you're right.
And I think the way to balance that, I think it's difficult,
because you're right, you do need some formal training in it.
Like in other words, the takeaway from your book
is not that the person who's going to crack the code
on pancreatic cancer is currently working
at an investment bank as a finance analyst
who's never taken a science course.
That's not going to happen, not even close.
And I don't think you're trying to suggest that,
but I've heard people try to take your work
and paraphrase it as,
oh, well, all these scientists working on cancer,
you screw it, man, they're not gonna figure anything out.
We need to, we need to go get the history majors
to solve the cancer problem.
And I'm like, not a freaking chance
without some modicum of scientific training.
Yeah, and I mean, I think the scientific community, I would say the tech community in particular
would do well to interact with historians.
I think there are a lot of things they could learn.
Sometimes I feel like the Silicon Valley set maybe doesn't respect history quite enough,
or it'd be useful for them, but that's a side point.
My guess is that when people are saying that, they just like go pick some person at random
to do science, maybe they're taking that from the chapter where I wrote partly about Inocentive,
which was the VP of Research and Development
at Eli Lilly in the past,
on Skynamed Alf Bingham, who was at these,
I remember when I first talked to him,
he said, look, I'm an organic chemist,
doesn't have a carbonate,
I'm not even supposed to play with it, okay, I'm specialized.
And I guess he realized at a certain point
that chemists at Lilly were getting so specialized
that there were certain things they were great at,
but it also narrowed their view.
So he talked a lot about this terminology
and some of the business literature exploration
versus exploitation.
Exploration meaning essentially going
and looking for new ideas and solutions, exploitation.
Once you find them, how do you make the most out of them?
Both of those incredibly important.
And he said basically the exploration phase
is increasingly found outside because people are so specialized
so it's not covering as much ground.
We had this idea to just post online some of Lily's problems in drug development, and
at first everyone was like, no way proprietary information.
He said, well, pick stuff, nobody will know what we're doing.
They said, who else is going to be able to solve this?
We post some online, and a third of them get solved.
Remember one of his favorite memories was a, an attorney who solved some important
chemical synthesis project because he had worked on some tear gas, copyright case or something
and it reminded him of that. And so a third of those problems get solved, which is amazing.
Yeah, that story amazed me actually. And then those problems, it does tend to be, because
they've selected for problems that have stumped the specialists, right? So it does tend to
be the more likely the problem is to get solved, the diversity.
And I think my question on that to really double click on it is, did the generalist actually
solve the problem or did the generalist just come up with a clue that completely changed
how the specialist went about approaching it?
Like in the case of that example, the attorney doesn't actually know how to completely synthesize
the molecule.
What they're basically saying is, you guys are looking at it this way, stop.
Rotate 90 degrees over there and turn around.
I think the answer is over here, to which case,
either a new set of specialists could do it,
is it sort of a bit of that hybrid?
Yeah, and actually, in a sense of a valve to where they give different,
now they help other operations post their questions in a way that'll attract what they call solvers, and their different monetary rewards depending on what kind
of contribution it is the person makes. And sometimes he did get people sent in
powders and stuff. They synthesize stuff. On their own, other times it was much
more like you're taking the wrong approach, and here's another thing to think about.
But they were still chemists that had to do this, right?
Not all of them. Not all of them. But there was a lot of that. Sometimes they'd be chemists from some other area, but sometimes it was totally random people.
But again, you're farming it out to the whole world. People have not the whole world. I mean,
not most people don't know about it, no incentive, but a huge number of people. I think he was
surprised. Sometimes things would come from people who worked with machinery, but weren't really
formally trained in it, but had a lot of experience. And so I think sometimes there were true outsiders. But most of the
problems don't get to the incentive stage anyway. They're being handled by
the specialists. And I wouldn't extrapolate in a incentive to mean that
specialists aren't incredibly important. I mean my broad view of this is the same
as physicist Freeman Dyson, he gave this great speech, he said, we need birds
and frogs. The frogs are down in the mud looking at the granular details.
The birds are up above, they don't see the detail, but they're integrating the knowledge of the frogs.
And he said, the world is wide and deep, it'd be stupid to say one's better than the other.
You need both for a healthy ecosystem. His concern was we're telling everybody to be frogs.
And so we're not having birds. And that's kind of how I can see of it.
And I think the biggest impact would come from what Arturo Kassadavall, who's kind of how I conceive of it. And I think the biggest impact would come from
what Arturo Kassadavall, who's this kind of one of the prime characters of the last chapter is trying to do
where adding range to people who are within science already,
like these people are being formally trained,
he's just backing up the formal training
instead of jumping right into kind of the reductionist
studying the body as a machine sort of thing.
It's like the initial classes in the program he's pioneering,
and he's like one of the, I think his H index,
which is a measure of his productivity,
the researchers surpassed Einstein's recently,
which isn't fair because people publish a lot more now
as you alluded to for their careers,
but it still puts them in very rare company.
And so he's starting people with,
how do we know what is true?
And the anatomy of scientific errors,
and also how errors have sometimes led to breakthroughs.
And so he's just like backing up the training into these broader concepts and saying,
you can learn the more specific didactic stuff later.
But if you don't learn the broader conceptual stuff, you never get it.
Because you're only going to get more and more and more specialized from here.
So I think one way we can approach this is just by backing up the training basically.
Because I don't think we have to worry about people will learn the specialized stuff in their field just by doing it and being there,
but the other stuff, but that's what we kind of teach them and start them with, but the other
stuff like scientific thinking, how does it work, what constitutes evidence, they'll never get that
stuff if they don't get it early in training. Yeah, I sort of cite the examples you've given when
I get asked a question a lot, which is someone going to college who wants to go to medical school saying
What is the best thing to study in college to which I don't know the answer?
But my advice is anything but pre-med
So you couldn't really do anything work and I'm sorry because I know there's somebody listening to this
I'm sure who's doing pre-med who's gonna go into medical school and my only take for you is
Okay, I'm sorry that you're in pre-med right now, but make sure you spend a lot of time doing non pre-med stuff in college.
You still have the bandwidth to take other classes. You should be doing so liberally,
but you are better off being a history major who goes to medical school than a biochem major who goes to medical school.
In my opinion, I could be wrong, but having seen enough people go through it,
you're going to learn as much biochemistries you're going to need to learn when you get there.
Both interpersonally and frankly in the breadth of thinking, you'll be better off if you
studied something else.
I mean, a lot of our Charles argument, too, is I saw him make this argument talking about
he went from Einstein to Johns Hopkins School of Public Health because they're allowing him
to start this new grad program.
And I saw him on a panel about the replication crisis in science.
He was a problem with a lot of work, basically not being true. And the head editor of the New England Journal of Medicine said, you can't
do that. Training is already too long. And Arturo said, it's clearly not working. He said,
I'm saying drop the didactic stuff because it's not been working. I think you actually point
it out that the New England Journal of Medicine had the highest retraction rate in some study
also. But so I thought that was interesting where he said, a lot of that stuff is in one ear
and out the other anyway. If it's really didacticactic people don't even know if they're gonna need it or when they're gonna need it
And so I thought that was an interesting take that he said you can just drop some of that other stuff
But to your point about telling people not to do pre-med when I was at sports illustrated
Not so much anymore, but when I was there I would get asked by a young aspiring journalist
What should I do if I want to work as a sports writer which I made your English an English or journalism. And my first instinct was to say journalism. If you know what you want to do,
get ahead start. Second instinct English. And then I, if I thought about it, I'd be like, well, I made
you an geology and astronomy, so I have no idea what to tell you, but stats course, biology course,
never heard anyone, you should do one of those, because you'll learn the job by doing the job,
and that's the only way you'll learn the job. That is the challenge of giving advice, isn't it?
Because I don't feel this way at all anymore.
I'm totally comfortable with my non-linear path to doing what I do, but I spent a great
deal of time frustrated that I couldn't figure out sooner in life what I wanted to be when
I grew up and I thought of all the time squandered.
But again, that was through the paradigm of you only had one to two 10,000 hour windows.
You didn't take them.
You spent them doing something you will never do again.
I had my 10,000 hour shot and I put it in the wrong thing,
and now I never do it again.
But I think that speaks to probably the insights
of your book, which is you're discounting
a bunch of things you learned in doing that.
And also, sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt you, were you gonna?
No, no, no.
And also I think your insight into yourself, your skills and interests in the world are
constrained by your roster of previous experiences.
As Hermione Ibarra, who studies how people find what's called match quality, the degree of
fit between their interests and abilities and the work that they do, which turns out
to be really important for how likely they are to burn out, for their performance, for
all these sorts of things. and we really underestimate it. She studies basically how people
seek this out and transition careers. And she said, we learn who we are in practice, not in theory,
which means there's this kind of cultural idea and lots of career gurus and personality quizzes
that kind of seek to convince you that you can just introspect and know what you should do, putting in that time.
But in fact, the way we learn about what we want to do is we have to do stuff, act and
then think.
You have to do stuff and then reflect on it.
And that's the only way you figured out.
And match quality seems to be so important that spending some time in that experimentation
is worth it.
So one of the, that I think is sort of representative of that, this economist who found a natural experiment in the higher ed systems of England and Scotland where in the period he studied
students in England had to pick a specialty in their mid-teen years to apply for a certain
program in college, a scout of students could keep sampling throughout university and he said,
who wins the trade-off? Otherwise, the systems were very similar. Who wins the earlier late specializers?
And what he found was the early specializers do in fact jump out to an income lead because they have more domain specific skills. But the late specializers sample more
things and when they do pick they have better match quality and so they have higher growth rates. So by
year six out they fly by the early specializers. Meanwhile the early specializers. That's based on
the economics. Yeah. What about when you look at things that probably matter even more, which is
happiness and satisfaction. He was only looking at finance and career
switching. So because he was looking at huge numbers of people. But we can talk about fulfillment
in a sec. So the early specializers then start leaving their career tracks in much higher numbers,
even though they have much more distance center from doing so. They're made to pick so early
that they more often make a wrong choice. So the return to match quality was higher than the return
to getting a head start in domain specific skills. The Dark Horse project, which I wanted to get around to anyway, has to do with fulfillment,
because I think you should tell more of your story, because it sounded really interesting,
and I want to hear more of it, but that project, the dependent variable, was fulfillment,
and it was about how people go on.
Yeah, well, before we started the podcast, I said,
there's this thing I've always tried to explain when I've told my story to high school kids or something
like that.
It doesn't really make sense, which is growing up, all of my energy went into boxing and martial
arts, and I didn't do anything in school.
I was super mediocre, and then I had this awesome teacher who, when I was in grade 12, in
Canada, you say grade 12, not 12th grade, sounds stupid.
So weird, I can't believe we can even get a lot of that.
It's hard to think that we can even have a discussion.
And he called me in one morning and he said,
hey, I heard you're not applying to university and stuff.
And I said, that's right.
And he certainly didn't bust my chops.
He, in fact, I wrote about him after he died
and how amazing it was that he just knew what to say.
He knew the right thing to say at the right time,
which was, hey, I totally get it.
When I was your age, all I wanted to do
was play in the NHL and it was the only thing that mattered to me.
And you really ought to, don't let anybody tell you
that you're a dream of being middleweight champion
in the world as a dumb idea.
It's not.
But he said, but, there's almost like a Steve Jobs moment.
Like one more thing, I think you have a gift for mathematics.
And you should at least entertain the idea
that maybe that's your calling is more in terms of math
than it is in fighting.
And I remember that day as clear as,
I mean, that got so long ago,
it's more than half my life ago, was that moment.
But it did change the course of my life completely.
And then I did come back to high school to finish
and did better than anybody expected I could ever do.
And I've always assumed the reason I was able to do that
is I simply took the work ethic of exercising six hours a day,
which was sort of what I did in high school. I would run five to 13 miles every morning, 400 push-ups before bed every night,
and everything in between was training around that. And I just applied that to calculus, algebra, physics, geometry, et cetera.
So that sort of gets into the duck worth grit stuff. The question I guess I have in that is had I taken the grit of
age 13 to 18 and basically with no other cognitive capacity turned it into
then doing well in school. I definitely wouldn't say no other cognitive capacity because
well, I think those things take a different certain cognitive capacity that kind of discipline, but
clearly the teacher recognized something in you that you did not recognize in yourself.
It didn't just pick you out randomly and I assumed it.
Well, especially because I wasn't even the top student in mathematics at the time.
I wasn't even near the top.
So yeah.
So obviously you saw something that you didn't yourself see.
And so it seems to me like you had this training, whether that was something that was part
of who you are naturally or something that motivated you, that you could take that and transfer that to then something that had better match quality for you. So, it was a combination
of you using certain skills and approaches that you would learn, and somebody helping you find
better match quality, basically. I think that's like an explosive combination in a good way.
But it is interesting. I wonder what he saw, because he was right. But did you have any inkling
that that was the case? At the time, was that total news to you that he thought you might have?
No, in fact, I found math incredibly frustrating because it wasn't something you could be
us your way through.
At least in English class, I remember this well because I'm actually still very close
to my English teacher from high school.
I always managed to find a way to weasel through by writing every essay I wrote was on Muhammad Ali
or Mike Tyson or Marvin Hagler or Jimmy Hendrix.
I basically screwed my way through English by always figuring out a way to read a book
that I was interested in and figuring out a way to write.
But you couldn't do that in math, you sort of had to do it.
So what I remember is that math frustrated me more than anything.
But I wish what he was still alive for many reasons, but one of them being I wish I could
ask him why he said that.
Yeah, no, it's cute. I mean, and I think a lot of people find math more frustrating than English class.
It's like English class and more subjective and you can kind of get through it.
If you know a lot of people, even if you don't know what you're doing, but that is interesting.
I wonder what he saw. And I think that's the reason I said I think it resonates with the Dark Horse Project,
which was this project by these two Harvard researchers to sort of figure out how people who find fulfillment in
their work go about it in a wide range of careers, essentially, there was a huge variety.
But most of the people did not stick on their first sort of dream, basically.
There were some, but it was a small minority.
Most of them had this, they actually called it the Dark Horse Project because people would
come in and say, well, don't tell anybody to do what I did because I started this other thing and then I something else came up or something random happened
or I realized there wasn't what I wanted to do so I just start my own thing. So they also felt
sort of sheepish about their non-linear paths together. And they saw themselves as having gotten
lucky and come out of nowhere which you do have to get lucky is important but they all saw themselves
as having come out of nowhere which is why they called it the Dark Horse Project. What they kind of had in common was this, they would sort of respond, instead of sticking to like an ironclad long term plan,
they would respond to their lived experience by ziggin and zagging and kind of finding what they were good at, whether that was someone helping them figure that out,
which I think is often the case for a younger person or them being older and maturing and sort of realizing that.
And it sounds like that kind of happened you in some way. You view yourself as coming out of nowhere because you had a talent and
also some transferable skills that could come together in a way that you hadn't conceived before
and worked really well. So I think you'd be kind of the type for the tariff course project.
I mean to take something you said a moment ago and couple it to this. So let's say we fast
forward whatever 18 years in your son says, dad, I don't want to go
to college.
I'm going to learn a bunch of stuff that, A, I don't need to learn because I could teach
it on my own.
I'm going to get a degree in something that doesn't necessarily imply what I'm going to
do with myself thereafter.
The letters don't really matter after my name.
And by the way, notwithstanding the fact that maybe by the time our kids are going to college, the debt that they'd incur to do so is itself more debilitating
than anything else. So can you make a case that one does not need formal education at that level
to go far? I mean, notwithstanding the fact that sometimes you need it from a professional standpoint,
like you can't become a lawyer without going to school. I don't see that changing and things like that.
At least in California, you just have to pass the bar.
That's a great point.
You can't become a doctor, I guess, without going to school.
And so, does this change the way you think about higher education?
Yeah, and, gosh, I don't even know where to start with this question.
I hope the college looks different 18 years from now than it does now,
because if we keep ramping up people's debt,
then we will make sure that they fall prey to the sunk cost fallacy, where the more you invest in something, one of my favorite
writers Maria Connokova wrote a book about Con Men, and one of their strategies is they start with
asking for small things. Oh, I thought you meant Con Men. Oh, no, no, not Con Men. No, no, Con Men,
playing confidence games. Yeah, the books call the confidence game. And she's a psychology PhD and a great writer.
And she notes that they'll start with these small, lots of small asks because the more you
invest, the more likely you are to fall prey to the sun cost fallacy of then saying,
like, well, I've already put some in, so I should keep going.
Even when to an outsider, it's like clear that it's disaster.
And I think the more debt we saddle people with, like that study we were just talking about
with the higher ed systems in England, Scotland, the English students who specialized earlier
have more disincentive from quitting, even though they should, when they do quit, their
growth rates are then higher because they're quitting and response to information about
themselves that they've learned.
And I think the more time and debt we saddle people with, the more we make sure they will
not respond to match quality information and instead we'll say, you blunt their receptivity to the signal.
That's right.
I think we want to, Steve Levitt, the Freakonomics economist at this interesting study,
where he had people flip a coin to determine major life decisions.
The most commonly asked question was, should I quit my job?
What he found was the people who flipped, I think it was heads and changed their job were
better off when you checked in with them later.
I think you want as little friction as possible to people job changing.
In fact, when I was watching one of the Democratic primary debates recently and people were
talking about universal health care, I would think one of the advantages might be that
it would lower friction to job changing because you're not as worried about so that maybe
people can shuffle around more and have better match quality.
So I think something has to be done about the dead situation.
I think there's plenty of evidence that for a lot of students,
so the economist Brian Kaplan wrote a book called the case against education.
I certainly don't agree with an entire education specifically.
I certainly don't agree with everything in the book, but I think it's provocative and a rigorous take.
And his argument, so we know that some part of college education is signaling to the job world.
That is not about anything that you've learned.
It's just about, I am smart enough and like I'm serious enough. And yeah, like the minor leagues for the job world that is not about anything that you've learned. It's just about, I am smart enough and like, I'm serious enough.
I'm serious enough.
It's like the minor leagues for the job world, so we're doing them a favor because they don't
have to be good scouts.
And basically, what he was saying is nobody says that either signaling or learning is all
of the effect of college, but his argument was that he thinks signaling is like 80% of it,
whereas other people would say, oh, maybe it's 20%.
So he thinks most of it is just, you need this credential to signal
to the work world that I'm okay. And I don't know if he's right about how much it is,
but I think it's probably more than people into it because research seems to suggest that
it doesn't change people as much as we might think in some ways. What I do think is important
about it though, is that it does give that kind of sampling ability. Like I didn't know
about it. So the Scottish students in that study that kind of sampling ability. I didn't know about it.
So the Scottish students in that study also much more often, the late specializers, end
up studying something that wasn't offered in their high school, because they didn't know
about it.
I didn't know about the stuff I studied until I got to college.
And so without it, I would want to be some other mechanism for sampling, but I think that
kind of communication technology that we have now, in the internet may, if we use it
smartly, it can expose you to a lot more stuff. And I think
there's huge potential of online courses. I love some of these
online courses. So I do think while I would want him to be able
to have a sampling period, my kid, I think I don't know that the
same kind of college model that we have now will be the answer.
And I think there are other things that could expose them to more or other things.
And but if society forces the signaling to continue, then what can you do?
Then it's just like you have to pay your dues because you have to pay your dues.
The way I see my role as a parent, you mentioned Angela Duckworth, by the way.
I should mention the week that my book came out, I've subscribed to her newsletter.
Her newsletter was titled Summars for Sampling.
And she said, kids shouldn't be too gritty until they figure out what to be gritty in.
And she says it took me a decade of trying stuff to figure out.
So it really speaks to a broader point here, which is a lot of these insights that we sort
of latch onto are slightly out of context.
Yeah, definitely, definitely.
And I mean, so now, if her point is you should be gritty when you should be gritty, I'm
totally on board with that.
I view my roles.
I write a little bit in that section about grit, about something I should have written
more about, about the way the army adjusted when they realized in an industrial economy and
they had this strict upper out structure, it was great because you did want to be specialized
because work next year did look like work last year.
And there were huge barriers to lateral mobility, but knowledge economy comes along
and now there's tons of ladder mobility
for people who can engage in knowledge creation
and creative problem solving.
So their highest potential officers started quitting
if they didn't have any agency over their career matching.
And so first they tried to throw money at people
to retain them and people were gonna stay,
took it, people were gonna leave left anyway,
half billion dollars of taxpayer money down the drain.
Then they started programs like one they call talent-based branching.
Where instead of saying, here's your career track, go up or out, they say, we're going to
pair you with a coach and try this one career track and reflect on how it fits you and
then try these other two and these other two and we'll triangulate a better fit for you.
And that improved retention more than throwing money at people.
They've basically built in a match quality sampling system. And so maybe we could do stuff.
That's how, frankly, I view right now my parenting role as being the coach in the Matt Town-Pace
Branching System for my kid, facilitate, help him know that a lot of things are available
and get the maximum amount of signal about himself from each one.
And I think there are ways that that can be done possibly more effectively and a lot more
cheaply than the formal education structure.
How do you know how long to push? So give you two examples with my daughter. And I feel so bad
sometimes telling these stories about her because one day she'll listen to this and she'll be like,
Dad, I can't believe you embarrassed me. But when she was five, she said, I want to play the drums.
And we've had lots of parents who have interacted with us. You said, are you crazy? How did you listen
to her? But we were like, oh, we just did.
So we got her, like I said, a cheapo little toy drums,
just to see what she actually do anything.
And she did.
She wouldn't stop wailing on them.
No, she was four when she said that.
Then when she was five, she said, no, I really
want to keep playing.
So I was like, okay, fine.
So we got a drum teacher, got her a real set of drums,
and a way she went.
And here she is now.
She's 11.
She still drums.
She loves it.
She's, I mean,
she's really good. I can say that without too much bias, just objectively based on what her teacher
tells me, which is like she drums better than most anyone, and she's only 11. And we never pushed
her, right? So it was just, she just wanted to do this. There was one time when she kind of wanted
to quit, when she was about seven. And we talked to her teacher and said,
hey, let's spend way more time just letting her play
Taylor Swift songs than doing scales for a while
and see what happens, and then that was great.
Like it all came back into the mix.
Year ago she starts taking tennis lessons.
I think her tennis teacher is the most awesome guy.
He's like this young Russian kid.
He's so fun.
He's so smart.
I'm gonna watch them.
I mean, he just has a beautiful way
of explaining things to her.
She never feels bad.
Like he never hammers her, but he's strict.
If she's screwing around, he tells her.
She's like, I don't wanna play tennis anymore.
And I'm like, Olivia, are you freaking crazy?
Do you know what I'd give to have played tennis when I was a kid? And I don't get into the sob story'm like, Olivia, are you freaking crazy? Do you know what I'd give to have played tennis
when I was a kid?
And I don't get into the sob story of like
we didn't have the opportunity for private tennis
lessons or whatever, but it's more the
tennis is such a beautiful sport.
You will be able to play this forever.
How can you not want this?
And I'm really torn.
Do I push her to continue taking lessons?
And I'm not saying like you have to go and even compete. It's just sit here and play tennis for two hours a week.
You and mom play, it's fun.
Why wouldn't you want to do this?
Or do I just say, well, she only wants to play basketball,
which is the only sport she wants to play right now.
I just, I don't know if this is a great example,
but I think you get the point, right?
It's like, it's a part of me that thinks it's really good
for her to keep playing tennis.
Yeah, yeah.
And she's crazy to stop.
Obviously, you're saying she'll regret it. It sounds like it's really good for her to keep playing tennis. Yeah, yeah. And she's crazy to stop.
Obviously, you're saying she'll regret it.
It sounds like it's...
That's my potentially stupid fear, which is you're going to be 51 day and you're not going
to be playing basketball.
Because nobody's playing.
No 50-year-old woman is running around playing pickup basketball, but you will still play
tennis.
So why wouldn't you continue to learn this now?
Well, you have this critical window in which you could get good at this sport.
Yeah, and she could play tennis at start up at 50,
she just wouldn't be as good at it.
Exactly, yeah.
And you're going to do our achievement.
So she might be a great drummer
and a crap tennis player, she starts at 50,
she might still like tennis, though.
Yes, and I'm trying to balance the,
yes, I think that's the part of it.
I can't let go of this idea that I'm not great at anything.
It would be really cool if my kids had a potential
to be great at something.
World class.
Wouldn't it be cool if she could be a world class drummer one day?
I have no delusion she won't just the interest or even the talent to be a world class tennis
player, but I still think you have this wind.
I think I'm still stuck to this idea that there's a window in which you can assimilate
skill, be it language, music, sports, that to go a little further.
If she said, I don't know, anyway, that's sort of...
And when she's younger also, you have more time to put into it and you're a lot less concerned
about making mistakes, so you'll throw yourself in and practice in a way that you probably
won't win your older and most things.
I mean, that's a great question.
It sounds like in drums, you found a way to sort of when she was saying, I don't really
want to do it anymore,
to keep her foot in by sort of changing what she was doing.
Right, and it was just this one little audible call
down the line of scrimmage, everything was fine.
But also, it would have never even occurred to me
to put a kid in drums.
Like, this was 100% her insisting on it.
And there was no resistance from us.
I was like, great.
But if she'd said piano, violin, fill in the blank,
we would have been equally interested in letting her pursue that.
So maybe it just comes back to this broader issue
of is there an age at which parents should force
some of the sampling?
Is there an age at which parents say,
enough is enough?
You've sampled enough if you don't wanna play tennis
anymore, don't play tennis.
I should make clear, I don't wanna prescribe
diversification any more than I wanna prescribe specialization, Right. And this gets to something I mentioned before,
which is I think we tell the tiger and the Mozart stories a little wrong. Yeah, let's do that story,
actually. Okay. So tiger said in 2000, his father never asked him to play golf. So his father did
put a putter in his hand when he was seven months old, but he wasn't attempting to make him a golf
race, just giving it to him as a toy. And he responded, so he said in 2000,
my father never once asked me to play golf.
It was always me asking him, it's the child's desire
to play, not the parents' desire to have the child play.
That matters.
That resonates with the work of this woman, Ellen Winner,
who's maybe the world's authority on prodigies
of that nature, that they're usually
driving their parents crazy, not the reverse.
And that there's not really...
Yeah, I mean, Wayne Gratsky's a great example of that.
He listened to these interviews with his parents,
like they couldn't get this kid to come in for dinner.
And what Ellen Winner, I think,
she alluded to some research,
I don't think this research was exactly hers,
but it's really a problem when someone's parents,
if they're low socioeconomic status,
and they have a prodigy,
and the person has this incredible drive,
a master, whatever it is they're doing, the parent can't accommodate that because it really is
hard for the parents. Obviously, Tiger's father responded to his very unusual display of interest
in prowess. Mozart probably the second most famous example. Tell people just what's the mythology
around Mozart that... Oh, that his father basically was like Tiger Woods father except for music
that he started very young.
Shut the violin into the crib and.
Yeah, exactly.
And so I was going through these letters and one that I remember really well about Mozart's
early life was a musician who would come over to play with Mozart's father who was a musician.
And he recalls young Mozart coming in with the group of adults and saying, I want to play
the second violin part.
And Mozart's father says, go away.
You have any lessons.
You obviously can't play violin.
And then the letter writer,
his name is Andreas, something I can't remember the last name,
says little Wolfgang started crying.
And so I said, okay, I'll go play with him in the other room.
And his father says, but play quietly.
Don't disturb us.
Next thing you know, they hear the second violin part
coming from the other room.
And so they walk in and look, and young Wolfgang Mozart
is playing the second violin part
with made up fingering, because nobody's taught him the fingering.
And then the letter this part, I remember verbatim.
He says, young Wolfgang was emboldened by our applause
to insist that he could also play the first violin part.
And so then he goes and does that.
And that's when his father says, holy crap, yeah.
And it responds to it.
So neither of those cases where they like manufactured the way we tell that story.
So I don't think we should be scared about missing a tiger or Mozart because the best
way to find one of those people is probably still to expose them to a bunch of things and
see if something lights their fire that way.
I mean, I think a Mozart...
That's a great point.
That's a great point.
Yeah.
I'm sure there's a lot of those people who never got exposed to the thing that would have
ignited what Ellen Winner calls that rage to master.
Most people, you're not going to have a lot of tigers and motes, or it's no matter what,
obviously those are exceptions.
I think that's important to keep in mind.
To go back to when do you allow your kid to quit?
This is something I've seen Angela Duckworth has tried to respond to a number of times.
It's very difficult.
She'll say things like, don't quit on a bad day, which I think is sensible, but also,
should you quit on a good day? It's kind of hard to know what is the calculus for when you should quit.
Like, if you're having tons of bad days, maybe you should quit on a bad day.
And Levitt and Dubner have written about this, right? I think it's in one of their, maybe their
third book. Well, Levitt is always saying, my best thing is I know when to quit, like everything,
like fields of study, projects, whatever. Yeah. By the way, is it funny aside, you know, Steve has tried very hard to get me to take up golf.
No, really?
Yeah.
So he's a very good golfer.
I don't know.
A lot of people don't know how good a golfer Steve is.
Incredible.
And he's convinced that taking sort of a freakonomics approach to golf, you could take
a novice and make them really good in a short period of time.
We've had very serious discussions about if I would give him one year he could turn me into a
really good golfer as someone who's never even touched a golf club. I don't
know if that's true, but I'm curious enough that I'd love to try it if I had the
time because when he's explained to me the logic behind it, like how many steps
you can shortcut if you're purely optimizing around this thing
and how he's figured out a bunch of these hacks.
I'm like, it's kind of fun.
It's not gonna happen with me, I don't think, but.
Yeah, probably don't have time to do that,
but if you did take him up on that,
like that guy we talked about earlier, Dan McLaughlin,
who dropped his job to try to become a pro.
Right, who got 7,000 hours into it.
I think he got better early,
so he was getting way better at first,
like anything, the learning curve is, but I think how quickly he got better and he had never golfed before ever was
surprising to most people how quickly he got better early on. And so I think doing that
plus, I mean, he was practicing that was like his full-time job for the time. But if you
did that for a year plus whatever Hax he's talking about, I bet you'd pass most of the
amateur golfers out there because most of them are just going and like swatting
And it's like stress relief. They're not even really trying to get better a lot of times, but I bet you'd surprise yourself with how good you'd get
But I'm not a huge golf fan. I'm putting all of that energy into the things that I'm currently doing but but this idea of quitting
It is really an underappreciated thing isn't it because sometimes it's the it's time
It really comes down to time and exposure and that's the most valuable resource we have. So, but the when to do it is still the million dollar
question. Totally. I mean, I think that's why this, I like this model of talent-based branching,
the Army used so much because they pair someone with a coach to help them make that decision,
and it's still not a science. And I also like they call talent-based branching because basically
it's coached quitting, but they use a different term so it doesn't sound bad.
But I don't know what's perfect. I mean, I think someone a mother asked me recently,
said her son is really good at violin and now he just wants to quit.
And I think he just wants to play tennis.
And she was saying, but he's so good and I know he'll love it when he's older.
And the best thing I could think of was try to help him keep a foot in,
whether that's playingating, tailor, swift
songs, or whatever. Maybe he just needs to back off and try something else for a while. Can
you keep a foot in that pool so that he doesn't totally detach from it, and when he feels
regenerated or whatever, can go back to it. If you know that progress comes from alternating
stress and rest and things like that, so maybe they just need a break, or maybe they need
to try some other type of training, I think that's undervalued. If someone wants to quit and say,
oh, either you have to stick with it or quit,
but the approach you took was,
let's try varying what you're doing.
I think that's incredibly undervalued.
We act as if it's a binary choice instead of,
why don't we see what else this area has to offer?
Maybe you just need to get on a different track.
And again, I think that's the brilliance of good coaches,
is they help personalize that environment
so that the person continues to be interested and continues to progress.
And so the first thing I would try is varying up what they're actually doing. And if they really want to quit, I'd say maybe keep a foot in if you can for a little while.
But then ultimately if they really want to quit, then it defeats the purpose. If some aspiration of life is to find happiness then, yeah.
Yeah, and make it and if they want to come back maybe they just need a break keep it available
if possible but if they quit and they don't regret it then what are you going to do?
The proofs in the pudding. There are a couple other stories in range that I wanted to
ask you about. One of them is the story about the Space Shuttle Challenger. I'll let you tell
this story and then I'll bring my question to it.
Okay so I don't even know how to tell this story quickly.
I'll set the stage. Everybody knows what happened.
Let's assume everybody knows the following.
January 1986, Space Shuttle Challenger is scheduled to launch.
Happens to be the first time there's a civilian on board.
It also happens to be the first time it's ever launched on a day that's that cold.
Everybody knows what happened, which is whatever, 73 seconds after lifto off, the O-ring failed to contain one
of the liquid fuels.
I can't remember if it was liquid oxygen, but basically there was a spark in explosion
and the rest is history.
You write about one, the decision to launch that day, two, the challenges of figuring out
what was the cause of that.
Talk about both of those, especially the former, actually, and then I'll tell you where
I'm curious.
What I focused on was this emergency conference call the night before the launch when the
weather report came in that it was going to be an unusually cold day in Florida.
And so engineers at Morton Thia call, which was the rocket booster contractor,
and NASA, they get on this big conference call in three different locations, a group of engineers,
and they say, what should we do? Is this a problem? Should we worry about it? The shuttle was supposed
to be cleared for cool temperatures, but nobody really knew because they had never launched below
53 degrees, and they were concerned. As an aside, by the way, that O-ring was from the Apollo program.
That's a great example of engineering sort of shortcut,
which is they never actually redesigned the O-rings
for this shuttle.
They literally just took the O-rings from the Apollo project,
which had a different spec and brought them over.
Maybe I should describe what O-rings are a little bit.
It's like, is a strip of rubber that runs,
if you can picture the rocket booster,
you know, it looks like a missile attached to the shuttle,
and the O-rings, it's put together
in different vertical segments,
and the O-rings run along the perimeter
of the missile like rocket booster
and seal the joints between pieces,
and they have to stay sealed
so that they block the rocket fuel coming down the booster
from shooting outside, essentially.
And there was concern that the rubber of the O-ring
that launched the resources that moved the O-ring, the move the metal pieces that were being
sealed apart, and the o-ring rubber had to expand immediately to maintain
contact so that fuel didn't come shooting past. And the concern was that the
rubber would harden a little when it was cold, and so it wouldn't expand
quite as quickly, and so some rocket fuel would basically shoot through the wall
of the booster.
And that is exactly what happened. And the question was that they were trying to answer is,
should we be worried? Because twice before, they had had cases where they saw
sutt on the wrong side of the o-ring which meant rocket fuel had gotten past it, but it wasn't
catastrophic. One of those was when they launched at 53 degrees,
which was the coolest temperature, they'd launched at,
one was at like 75 degrees,
which was one of the warmest temperatures they had launched at.
And so,
and on this day, it was like 30 something, right?
It was like 38 or something like that.
They were looking at it,
that it was gonna be like 40,
but it ended up being colder than they expected even.
And I think in retrospect,
some of the temperatures of actual components were even colder.
There was like ice on the, so it ended up being colder than anybody expected
anyway. But their question was, in these temperatures will the O-ring work or not basically.
And the fact was that they didn't really, there were only two cases of this so-called blow-by
when the rocket fuel goes past. Again, one at the coolest temperature, one at one of the
warmest temperatures. And the whole shuttle was thought by the project manager to be cleared
for lower temperatures anyway.
And so all of a sudden they're having this last minute meeting, we're just saying like,
how do O-rings work and when do they work? And the only real,
they didn't have enough day to answer the question. And one of the engineers was saying we shouldn't do this
because I inspected the joints and in the 53-degree day, there was lots of blacks at behind the O-ring.
So that means a lot of gas capi and we're lucky it came back.
And the 75 degree day, something else
must have happened because only a little bit got passed.
I don't know what happened, but only a little got passed.
And so we go colder, so he said, they asked him
to quantify this.
So what's the relationship between temperature
and gas blow by?
And he said, I don't know, I can't quantify it.
All I know is colder is away from goodness.
That's how he put it.
And they kept saying quantify it, quantify it, quantify it.
He said, I can't, I've got photographs.
That's it.
And I think they're telling a story.
And the fact that he couldn't quantify it meant that essentially it was deemed an
admissible evidence, basically, because they couldn't quantify what the problem was.
And so he made the decision to launch the rest of history.
So the story is tragic on so many levels
because it would almost be easier to accept a disaster
like that if nobody had seen what could have been done,
that's what makes it so painful.
But on a second reading,
what makes it even more painful
is the way the questions are being asked,
which is, were they asking for him to assign a probability?
Like, I don't even understand what the question was.
Quantify it, what does that mean?
Yeah, I mean, I think they wanted him to say
what temperature would it fail?
Because the...
Well, it clearly had already failed.
So really, this is a probabilistic question.
Exactly, yeah.
But again, that's not a linear question, right?
That's an asymmetry question.
That's the question of, so and so has an actuarial
risk of having a heart attack of 5.4% in the next decade. Should you take preventative measures?
I don't know. I mean, depends on your view of the world. What's the upside? What's the downside?
What's the risk of doing something about it versus the risk of not doing something about it?
Those are very asymmetric risks.
Yeah.
I mean, actually, if you read the Rogers Commission, which investigated the challenger disaster, Richard
Feynman, you know, my middle son is named after him, by the way.
Oh, okay.
So, Senna and Feynman are two heroes of mine.
And your daughter named after?
Actually, she's named after her grandmother.
Okay.
Who was also, I'm sure, an exceptional person.
There was a point where Feynman was asking this questions like this
So like what were you trying to get him to say they say well, he couldn't quantify his case
You can have data and Feynman says when you don't have data you have to use reason and he was giving you reasons and
There is a point at which they're trying to say well at this temperature based on this data
The chances of failure should have been like one in a I don't know a affiliate some enormous number and Feynman's like
That's nonsense.
You had two cases that had like a small failure here, and you're
telling me it's basically impossible.
On a small finite number of launches.
Yeah. Yeah.
And so obviously there was a lot of cover your ass stuff going
and they even knew that at the time.
So there was this unusual on that conference call.
Once Morton Diacol said, well, our engineers saying don't
launch, we're going to support that. And then there was all this discussion. And they went for an offline caucus where they said,
where they kept being asked for data, quantify your case, quantify your case, quantify your case,
and they said, we can't. Okay, I guess we agreed to launch. And then they were required to
do a sign off that they didn't have to do in the past. So obviously people were sort of in the
CYI mode at some level or they felt protected by the process. But yeah, I don't think they weren't the best questions
that they were asking.
I mean, I think they wanted to know
what, again, at what temperature
will we suffer catastrophic failure?
And the answer was that they didn't know,
but that things didn't look good,
and there was reason to be worried.
Think about that question,
even through the lens of the financial crisis,
at what loan to value ratio,
do you see a default?
Or if you go through all the metrics,
it's like it's a probability distribution.
The only way you can really answer these questions
is you can't answer them this way,
but the only way you can even get estimates at that
is to run simulations across distributions,
assuming you even know how to predict
the probability of failure, which in that case,
I would argue they didn't even have that.
And spatial, most complicated machine ever made, maybe not as complicated as the credit
system, but most complicated machine ever made, not whatever, 24 launches, they all come
back safely.
And you're right, they didn't know.
And in fact, when Morton Diet call gave its first recommendation, their initial recommendation
was don't launch below 53 degrees because that's a wanted a temperature
And I think the project manager thought that the whole shuttle was cleared from 33 to 99
So they were putting definite boundaries on it
So they said don't go below 53 and they said well, what's your reasoning for that?
They said well, we've done 53 before and it came back and that actually totally backfired
So basically they set the lower bound at what they'd already done and said, don't go below it.
And so it backfired in the sense that NASA had
this very strong engineering culture, of course,
that had worked great up till then.
And so he said, that's not science, that's tradition.
That's not an answer.
You've departed from engineering.
Give us an engineering story.
I don't say just do what we've done before.
And I get that, like as Mary Schaefer,
a NASA engineer later said, perfect safety is for people who don't have the balls to live in the real world. So you
can't, it is a probability distribution. You can't have perfect safety. But I think there
are attempt to be prudent backfired because it was viewed as an emotional rather than a
scientific case essentially. But as Feynman said, the data wasn't there. So you have to
start thinking about reason. And that doesn't mean maybe they would have gone with the same solution, but they had
to start thinking about this problem in a different way than they were used to, because
usually they did have the data.
They needed to make a decision.
And in this case, they didn't.
The other challenge of these case studies, because it's easy to just stop there, but we
also don't realize in the 24 launches prior and the God knows how many launches that followed it,
including one or more disaster, by the way, on reentry,
what's the denominator?
How many times did somebody,
how many disasters were barely avoided,
maybe at least another one on the day that it was 53,
and could you ever have had a full consensus on any given day?
This is a great case study because it has so much
the richness of the data that follow are there, but we don't know if every time one of these
things goes up, there was also somebody in the room that said, and by the way, with perfectly
good reason, no way, no way, no way, and here's the reason. And if that's, so is this the price we
have to pay to live in an uncertain world or in retrospect was
fine and right?
And this one should have been averted using reasonable engineering insight.
Yeah, I think I think and it's so easy to say in retrospect, of course, these people are
under incredible pressure, they've had all successes in the past, the astronauts know
they're taking risks, everyone knows they're taking risks.
But I do think there's a case we made that this one should have been averted, like voices
were being raised.
And in fact, I think one of the reforms that came, you mentioned narrowly averting crisis
before, that's the 53 degree launch.
I think one of the, I spent a lot of time talking to the head of the Rocket Booster program,
while I was reporting the book.
I think it was saying one of the changes that occurred was sharing information like that
with the astronauts themselves because the feeling was had they known what happened with that
O-ring, then they would have said, no, no, no, no, we're not ready to go. You guys need to figure this out.
And so I don't know whether that would have or it wouldn't have.
That's an interesting idea.
But I think maybe I think it's worth getting a different view when you're assessing that risk.
Was it Atlantis that which was the one that burned upon re-entry Columbia?
Columbia.
So totally different issue had to do with it.
Same culture.
That's what I was going to ask you.
Was there a cultural similarity in the screw up?
Totally.
Or was it a different totally different type of miscultural carbon copy?
In fact, the investigation commission for the Columbia accident wrote in their conclusions,
this is so similar to the Challenger disaster culturally,
that we deem NASA not a learning organization
because they didn't learn from that experience.
And what I write about is they had this incredibly strong process culture,
essentially, that was it was signed on the mission
on one of the rooms that said, in God, we trust all others bring data,
which is great, like they were super rigorous.
But when they would get into these situations
where you didn't have the data you wanted, then continuing to sort of ask for it and follow
these very strict procedures meant they really kind of constrained their thinking. Like with
Columbia, there were engineers who said, we'd like photographs of a part of the shuttle we
think is damaged. And so they went and asked the Department of Defense for those photos. And their superiors not only blocked them, but apologized to the Department of Defense for going outside
of the normal process for trying to acquire things like that. And so in both cases, they
kept sticking to this very rigid process. We need an engineer case. We need a quantitative
case. Or these concerns, like they're not being quantified and you're not going through
the proper channels. And so it doesn't count.
Evidence and hunches kept being deemed inadmissible because they weren't part of the normal
formal process and it happened in an exact same way.
Both times people suspected what was going to happen but because their concerns didn't
fit into the normal procedural boxes they were discounted.
No, we don't know the denominator.
We don't know how many times people had concerns that were completely unwarranted and would
have thwarted so therein lies the challenge.
And that's what Alan McDonald, who was the head of the Rocket Booster program, told me.
He's like, look, if we called off that launch for Challenger, people would be called as
he said, chicken littles, because you have to be willing to take risk in the space program
and you don't really get credit for not launching.
As I was going about to say, let's assume they had not launched that day, and they'd
waited until the next day, and it was warmer, and they launched.
We wouldn't be having a discussion about it.
You're never a hero in that situation.
That's right.
And I think there's one sort of thing that I didn't write about, but that I think has been
attributed a little wrongly where some people have said there was pressure on Morton
Diacol, for sure.
More pressure because there was a civilian, and this was more high profile, or what was
the... No, for Diacol, there was more pressure because NASA said they high profile or what was the no for thai call there was more pressure because nassad said they were going to like open up the
rocket booster contract got it but so people have said oh that pressure maybe that pressure was
a problem but thai call gave the initial recommendation not to launch so they were okay not to launch
and then they were pressed for the quantitative case so i don't think that pressure was definitive
because they initially came with the recommendation. I'm not to launch.
So speaking of stories in the book, this is different, but it's equally perplexing to me,
which is the firefighters and these guys who are doing these crazy jump rescue things.
It's not that I don't believe the stories I do, but I can't.
I'm trying to be empathetic to that situation and say, where am I making a similar mistake in my life?
So spend a moment explaining what that is.
Yeah, this comes from the work of a psychologist named Carl Whike, who writes a lot about what he
calls sense-making, like how do people collectively make sense of a dynamic situation?
And one of the things he noticed when he was studying wilderness firefighting teams, hot
shot firefighters who hike in, had a dig trenches around wilderness fires or smoke jumpers who
parachute into them,
is that they do a great job, they're very reliable,
but sometimes something unusual happens
like a fire jumps from one slope across a gulch
to another slope and starts chasing them uphill.
And when unexpected things happen,
sometimes they have trouble and sometimes they die.
And when they die, what he noticed was they tend,
the ones who die tend to die with their tools, chainsaws, trip torches, axes, whatever, hundreds of pounds of equipment.
And the ones who survive or much fewer have dropped their equipment and run. And in many
cases, the hot shots or firefighters will refuse orders to drop their tools. And so I was
going through like reports of some of these tragedies and you'd see,
victim is 100 feet from safety, still carrying chainsaw and drip torch and backpack and things like
that. And even accounts of survivors would say they'd be running, they'd be looking for a place to
put there, they couldn't believe they were dropping their equipment because it was so central to
their identity. I as a firefighter, Norman McLean, who most famously wrote, a river runs through it,
also wrote a book called The Young Men in Fire.
And he wrote that being asked to drop your tools
is like being asked to forget that you are a firefighter.
Because that's your whole group identity
and all your training is built on never getting rid of your tools.
But an unfamiliar situation holding onto them kills you.
And so, Wike used that as kind of an allegory
for what he saw in other usually highly reliable organizations,
like commercial airlines, where when things go as expected,
these very formal strict procedures work incredibly well.
But sometimes, having done them so many times
makes the organization rigid such that when things change
and when it's obvious to an outsider
that they should drop their tools and run,
they don't do it because they're so used to doing one thing.
And so what he was arguing for is how can we make training so that we have those reliable
procedures, but also so that people know they have to improvise and we can't train them
exactly what to do for improvising necessarily.
Although now they do get trained to drop their tools, but who knows what the other
answer.
How many people had to die to figure that out?
And again, the more powerful part of that allegory is
the what's my tool, right?
What are the tools that I am lugging around
that are probably helping me 99% of the time,
but one percent of the time,
not only are they not helping me,
but they could be catastrophically wounding me.
Yeah.
I mean, have you thought about this in your own life?
Oh, for sure.
In fact, when I told that, and this is not nearly as,
it sounds like it has so little gravity
compared to this, but when I was talking before about taking a fiction writing class, I
was trying to think about the joy of it and think about new structure, learn new structure
for writing.
But what really came out of it was this thing where it said to me, I'm using quotes in
a stupid way because I've been writing investigative magazine articles for the last couple of years
where you and the lawyers really want other people to explain stuff in their voice if they can, but that's not good for this kind
of book.
And I didn't even think about that it was not the right way to go about it until I was
like knocked out of it by doing something different.
Again, that's not that's not anything on the level of tragedy, but some of the other things
white wrote about work to commercial airlines.
They have these incredible, it's incredibly safe to pretty remarkable actually.
But when there are problems, it was usually the large majority of problems would be caused
when a situation would change and the flight crew would do the thing they were used to anyway,
even though to like an outsider would become obvious that they had to shift what they
were doing.
So I think it's this sometimes paradox of expertise where if you haven't learned to do some improvisation,
then you kind of get stuck doing similar things over and over.
You know, you get like the typical when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail problem.
And I think there's plenty of that in medicine.
You could argue medicine is probably has more of that than anything else, given the degree of specialization.
But also, I think the tacit kind of, what's the word I'm looking for,
sort of the air of invincibility,
not invincibility either, is the sort of the,
I think part of it stems from the privilege of medicine,
which is like you can sit down with,
you could meet a person for the very first time
in the emergency room and they'll take their clothes off
and you're gonna examine them and they'll tell you
a detail about their life they've never told
another human being.
There's just something about that that says,
well, there's still something about this profession we place so much faith in. And then by extension,
those in the profession start to project that faith on their own decisions. So I think that
coupled with the stakes, coupled with the specialization, I think probably creates a fertile
environment for exactly that type of thinking. Now, I Now, I guess the last point I want to ask about on this particular issue is, had those
firefighters going back to this particular example been trained as lifelong firefighters
versus they had been sampled across a much broader group of people coming in, is the
point of the story that if you'd come in to that role
having been an accountant working at Subway just pick a totally random
distribution of people would it be more intuitive to that group to have dropped
their tools. That's a suggestion. Yeah, that it would be. And in fact what what
Wiken McLean argued is that in the first of the famous disasters called the mangulch fire,
a few people survived, and the leader of the group, he ordered people to drop their
tools.
They refused the orders, essentially, except for the two that did survive.
And one of the things they pointed out was that he had a much broader training base.
He was used to doing lots of other things with tools, not only firefighting. And so
they thought that he was, we don't know for sure, but the argument that they made was that
he had had a much broader experience with tools. So he didn't think of them as like only
these things that he used in a certain way for firefighting. And so in fact, what he did
to save himself was, he's ordering his guys to drop his tools. Most of them aren't. He
realized he wasn't going to, he was far down the gulch,
he realized he wasn't gonna be able to run away from the fire.
So he actually lit a fire in front of himself,
burned the grass and dove into the ash
and the fire burned around him.
So he improvised, and now people are trained to do that.
The idea that you would stop a fire
by lighting a fire in the grass in front of yourself
and that worked.
But so they made the argument
that he was much better set up to improvise because he was
used to improvising with tools.
David, I could continue having this discussion for another couple of hours, but I want to
be sensitive to your time.
So before we wrap, is there anything that I feel like we've only scratched the surface
frankly of these two books?
I actually thought we'd get through more, but I guess that speaks to how long wind that I am when I ask questions.
No, you told me before we started that I could go on and be digressive. And I told you
that I'm naturally digressive. So I took you up on it.
It was perfect. It was match quality. And it's finest. Anything we didn't talk about in the
last few minutes that you, you want a chance to sort of discuss.
Someone who became that I don't get asked about much in the book who became sort of a role model for me.
It works not so far from here.
Woman named Francis Hesselbein,
who took her first real job at the age of 54.
And I'll keep her story short here,
but basically, she essentially became,
she became a CEO of the Girl Scouts.
And when she had one semester of junior college
under her belt in her entire life,
but now has 23 honorary degrees,
as she likes to note. And when she actually interviewed for the CEO position, the people
before her had had incredible leadership credentials. Captain Dorothy Stratton was one. She started
the women's Coast Guard Reserve and was a university dean and other was Cessli Canon-Celby,
prominent scientist and leader in industry and education. Francis Hesselbein, one semester junior college,
leader of one of 355 local councils of Girl Scouts.
And again, first professional job at age 54.
And so she says, no, no, I'm not taking that CEO job.
I'm never moving out of Pennsylvania.
She grew up in John's town.
And her husband says, no, I'll drive you to New York,
you can turn it down in person.
And so they ask her, if you took over Girl Scouts,
this is late 60s.
Girl Scouts is in total crisis, free fall of membership and volunteers.
And what would you do if you took it over? And she doesn't want the job. She feels fine
to say whatever she to speak her mind freely. And she says, the rollout are sacrosanct
handbook. I'd replace it with ones that appeal to girls of different ages. I'd start working
on diversity if an indigenous girl near an ice flow in Alaska
opens a book, I want her to see herself
in a Girl Scouts uniform.
She just goes through all this.
I sell some of the underused campsites,
even though it would be painful.
Get rid of some of this home-making stuff,
focus on educate girls about sex and drugs
and math and science and all this.
And she's like, well, I was fun,
but I'm never gonna hear from that again.
Of course she comes back.
I mean, it's actually the early 70s
when she was interviewing.
But so she gets the CEO job and totally transforms
the organization, turns the cookie business into like
a third of a billion dollar business.
Triple's diversity representation adds 130,000 volunteers,
people she's paying in a sense of mission, not in money.
And basically saves the Girl Scouts.
And she works every week, I'm sure she's at our office right now
because she works every week day in Manhattan. She's only 103 and a half. So she has a lot of,
I'm sure she has a lot of place to go. But I think she meant a lot of things to me. One,
people can make an impact when they're older than they think they can. She's now running the
Francis Hezzle-Bine Leadership Institute and teaching at West Point. Also, she never expected
to do any of the things she did. Every time she got offered an opportunity, she'd say, like,
no, I'm not doing it.
And then they'd tell her, well, then this Girl Scout
troops gonna have to be folded,
sorry, and she'd be like, fine, I'll do it for a month,
and would get to try it and then be like, wait,
I actually love this.
And that's everything she did.
So she sort of short-term planned her way through life,
and she had two sayings that really stuck with me.
One was leadership is a matter of how to be,
not a matter of what to do. I think that's a powerful thing to think about. So much about leadership is a matter of how to be, not a matter of what to do.
I think that's a powerful thing to think about.
So much about leadership is being a good example,
not having to know everything.
Sometimes I think we have this George Washington
standing up in the boat crossing the Delaware,
which I don't think that's an accurate depiction.
I think there's a real painting of him somewhere
and obviously he's sitting down in the boat,
but it's like this idea that they know everything ahead
or they're clear of wine.
It's like no, they need to be a good example
and part of that is admitting that you don't know stuff. And the other was
her saying was, you have to carry a big basket to bring something home. And she told me
when she was at one of her first training events, some woman complained that she wasn't
learning anything, she already knew all this stuff. And then this other woman told that
saying to Francis and then it sort of became one of her mantras. And I loved that saying because I realized, again, it was part of this, I don't want to
keep coming back to this online beginner's fiction writing class I took, but it was sort
of the emphasis of hearing her say that.
I said, sure, I can take a beginner's class.
And I realized there's like no amount of beginner's classes I could take that I wouldn't learn
something from.
Because if you go in open-minded, you'll learn something from it.
There was one day in my neighborhood I live in DC now where I noticed a bunch of increase
in the population of wizards in my neighborhood.
So I walked over to nearby hotel and noticed they were having a Japanese animation.
And they had a beginning Japanese comics writing class.
I'm like, I'll sit in on that.
Probably not going to write a Japanese comic, but it's structure and it's story and narrative
and dialogue and all this stuff.
You can't not learn from it. So it's just, just made me realize that if you go into it
with that mindset, you're just constantly learning something.
And so that's an approach I try to adopt.
Two of those phrases really stuck with me.
And I am glad you told that story.
That is a beautiful story.
And I think it dovetails perfectly
into this idea of being a lifelong student,
which I think, well, frankly, that's sort of one of the things that's fun about a podcast.
So basically there's an excuse to learn a whole bunch of stuff.
That's why I figured, I mean, you don't have to be doing this for any professional reason.
Yeah. Well, David, thank you so much. I really appreciate it. Thanks for coming up to New York today.
I pleasure. I enjoyed it.
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professionals for any such conditions.
Finally, I take conflicts of interest very seriously. For all of my disclosures and the companies I
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