The President's Daily Brief - PDB Situation Report | April 4th, 2026: Iran War at a Crossroads & Japan Goes Long-Range

Episode Date: April 4, 2026

In this episode of The PDB Situation Report: First up—after a month of fighting, the war with Iran may be entering its most decisive stretch, with the endgame still very much in question. Behnam Ben Taleblu from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies joins us to break it all down. Later in the show—Japan takes a major step away from its postwar defense posture, deploying long-range missiles that can reach the Chinese mainland. Gordon Chang stops by for more on that. To listen to the show ad-free, become a premium member of The President’s Daily Brief by visiting https://PDBPremium.com. Please remember to subscribe if you enjoyed this episode of The President's Daily Brief. YouTube: youtube.com/@presidentsdailybrief Superpower: Stop guessing about your health—get $20 off Superpower at https://superpower.com/pdb with code PDB. Sundays for Dogs: Upgrade your dog’s food without the hassle—try Sundays for Dogs and get 50% off your first order at https://sundaysfordogs.com/PDB50or use code PDB50 at checkout. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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All right. Let's get briefed. First up, after a month of fighting, the war with Iran may be entering its most decisive stretch, with the endgame still very much in question. Ben-Taliblu from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, he'll join us to break it all down. Later in the show, Japan takes a major step away from its post-war defense posture, deploying long-range missiles that can reach the Chinese mainland. Well, that's not going to make Xi Jinping very happy.

Gordon Chang stops by for more on that. But first, today's situation report spotline. We've now crossed the one-month mark in the war with Iran, and despite more than 11,000 strikes, there's still no clear finish line. In his Wednesday address to the nation, President Trump suggested the fight could stretch on for several more weeks, raising a critical question. What does the end actually look like? Is this about dismantling Iran's military capability, forcing a political collapse, or simply degrading the regime enough to claim victory. And with the straight of Humbuz still a lingering concern, well, the hardest phase may still lie ahead.

Let me bring in Ben-Baliblu. He's the Senior Director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracy's Iran program, add a very good friend of the show. Benham, thanks so much for being back here on the Situation Report. Always a pleasure. Good to be back with you. Man, where do we start? I tell you what, give me your assessment of where we are right now. What do you think?

Well, I don't think it's hyperbole to say that we're still in quite the explosive situation. There is a war going on, but it's a very asymmetric war. The U.S. and Israel are trying to atright the military capacity and capability of the Islamic Republic, whereas the Islamic Republic itself is trying to attract the resolve of America, Israel, and the West, in particular by going against the region, the Arab world, critical infrastructure, energy, oil, shipping, we name it. So there is a war. The tools of the war, the weapons of the war, the targets of the war are quite different. And we're now past the one month marker. I still think Uncle Sam needs a bit more time to even win on points, to even win on a technicality, which is this defanging and degrading and destruction mission against the regime's missile and drone forces and against the whole host of military industries that support them. But nonetheless, that's the one where I see the presence most clearly. being able to hang his hat on for a military victory. And I think the Islamic Republic is keen to prevent us from getting a political victory.

From a military standpoint, we've heard a lot from the Pentagon, from the White House, the president, about the degradation of the missile program in particular. We've dismantled it. It's been obliterated. It's decimated. And to some degree, the same talk about the nuclear program. Have you seen any information, any insight, any intelligence statistics that provide more specifics as to how seriously degraded those programs are? Well, the challenge is unless you count local sources, Persian language government sources, Western English language reporting, and of course commercially available satellite imagery.

And even with that cocktail, you get some different answers. unless you count all of that stuff and weigh it heavily against the silence from USG on the numbers, the number of launchers, the number of medium range ballistic missiles versus short range, the various rationales for the drops in a running firepower, the various rationales where despite really losing senior figures in terms of commanding to control,

why the IRGC is still able to shoot and still shoot effectively, I might say. You don't really get to be able to answer that question, honestly or thoroughly or as I would like. You get really a jigsaw puzzle approach to it instead. So I do think that there is success. There's been quite a bit of military success. It's just hard to measure at this point in time because even, for example, the number of how many ballistic missiles does Iran have or did Iran have has been such a political football ever since, you know, former CENCOM chief general McKinsey entered the number 3,000 into the public domain about five,

six years ago. You know, there's debates over how much does an Iranian ballistic missile cost, anywhere from 200,000 to 3 million. There's been debates about how many launchers Iran has versus how much they rebuilt post the 12-day war. The Israelis said for the 400 plus launchers Iran had that they took about a third of them in the 12-day war. Now they're saying about two-thirds of them. The U.S. government is relatively silent on the number of launchers, but the videos they put out had to show them striking a heck of a lot of launchers. There's a lot more questions that answers here when it comes to the numbers. And what we have to do is open source washers is piece together those four things, local Iranian sources, Persian language government sources,

Western English language reporting and commercial satellite imagery to be able to get a good sense. And I think the best thing that we can point to in terms of targeting by Washington has been two things. One, missile facilities, you know, depending on the commercially available satellite imagery you use and the reporting you use anywhere from 19 to 22 to potentially even 27 missile sites have been targeted. But targeting is not the same as destroyed because some of those that have been targeted have been able to resume fire, I think, within just a matter of days. So that means that these facilities have not been collapsed. It's just the doorways that have been collapsed or the infrastructure has been targeted, but the subterating facility still stands.

That's one. And two is ballistic missile production, you know, sites like Jir, Shahoud, maybe Parcine, the Hakemia complex, those have definitely been struck and struck in a way that Israel had not struck in October 24 or June 2025. So there is evidence to support what these U.S. officials are saying, but there's not sufficient evidence in terms of numbers to take the victory lap right now. Yeah, and they seem to be pointing to the drop in retaliatory strikes by the Iranian regime over the past hand. of weeks, certainly compared to the opening salvos as evidence that they've been, you know, having success and degrading it. And you would have to assume after 11,000 plus strikes just on the U.S. side alone, and the Israelis have said, look, we've worked our way through our initial targeting list. You know, we've covered pretty much everything that we had on there. So you have

to assume, and it does appear as if from a military perspective, they've had some really significant and success, if you measure success by, again, the degradation of Iran's capabilities on the military side. What do you mean when you say that they don't want the U.S. to have a political victory? Well, I think they're going to want, let me just put a footnote of what you said right before, which is if we're looking at the decline in the number of launches, you know, this is not to get all the local sciencey for a second, but I think this is a situation of equitinality, which is many reasons for, one cause. You know, certainly the predominant cause, if we're making a cocktail together here, the main ingredient to that cocktail is the success of the U.S. and Israeli strikes, particularly

against the launchers, because that's one of the main bottlenecks in terms of this Iranian missile infrastructure. You could have, you know, five million missiles, but if you have only two launchers, that really does impact your rate to fire, and that makes you vulnerable to the kind of strikes and the successes that American Israel have had. But on the flip side, the logic that we're seeing, you know, from even just Iranian military commanders in the field, even if you pretend there is zero command and control and everything is totally localized, it's all intonation rather than coordination. If they see less missile teams coming back, if they see less tells coming back from the field, because they have to go out of the mountain, fire the projectile, drive back to the

mountain, load up the missiles and come. And every time they see less and less returning or they get, you know, different insight from the men who do choose to return and come back and it's fear and its hesitation and agitation, if you're a local commander, you're going to send less, not more out. And I think that number for the decline, there's also a local Iranian targeting reason for that. And the third thing is just because there's less volume does not mean there's less fatality. One thing that we're seeing is that is a continuation from the trend of the 12-day war, particularly at the last quarter or the last third of the 12-day war, which is as the missile math kicks in for both sides, interceptors for Israel, medium-range bliss,

missiles for the Islamic Republic. As that kicks in, the reason the Islamic Republic still stands to gain a short-term advantage is because the less a number of interceptors exist for Israel, for example, the more the regime actually has been able to land blows against civilian infrastructure because you have a less number of interceptors available for a wider amount of geography. And you have to prioritize higher value military, strategic political targets to be defended. So that means there's less of the well-layered air and missile defense infrastructure to intercepted incoming projectile towards, as we saw the strikes in Beersheba at the end of the 12-day war, or some of the strikes, again, also in southern Israel during this war,

which means that they can land simply more strikes against civilian centers that are probably less well-defended. So all of these reasons get to a different rationale, and it painted a slightly different picture of declining Iranian missile launches. But to the heart of your question about the political versus the military, the political is I don't think it's possible to have a conversation about Operation Epicure without what happened in Iran in January. And you and I had spoke about that at length, which was the biggest wave of anti-regime protests and the mass, mass, killing 40,000 plus. The president last night mentioned 45,000, I'm not mistaken, of these Iranian protesters. And absent a regime change in that country, if any kind of rump regime,

national security, deep state lives along in that country post-conflict, we're going to be getting ready for a Middle Eastern version of North Korea. And that's what I mean by avoiding the political win or robbing us of a political win, because there is no Delsey Rodriguez and Devon. The stakes are so high that it's high risk, high reward, it's go big or go home. And the model we're trying to carve out as a potentially limited war model where we defang and neuter the adversary. But the question is, what is the political strategy that we bring to bear? And I'm not claiming that I'm some kind of profit here, but I do believe I was one of the first ones in the middle of the 12-day war last year to raise the alarm bell about we could be

moving towards an Iraq situation, but not Iraq 2003, Iraq post-91. And fortunately, I hear a lot of people saying that now after this war, because the limited war experience, of this kind of adversary. You know, anti-American, anti-Israeli, oil-rich, authoritarian, doesn't control its own airspace, firing ballistic missiles, subject to UN sanctions, weak enough that I can't win a war abroad, strong enough to kill its own people. That does sound a lot like Saddam in the 90s. And if we're going to get this right whenever the conflict is going to be turned off,

the thing that is more important to me is what kind of political strategy are we going to bring to bear? Where is maximum pressure going to come back in? Where is maximum support going to come back in? How are we going to fracture this national security deep state? How can we extend the shelf life for the military win? And by the Islamic Republic, making all of those things harder for us, they're robbing us of the ability to have a political win or they're raising the cost of it significantly given the limited options that we have.

Now, I take your point. I think it's a very, very sound assessment. at the end of the day, if they decide, okay, well, let's call victory here, and you've still got this existing regime, right? It's not a new, I mean, I don't know. Maybe we can talk about that in the next segment, but, you know, there's this Venice narrative that seems to come out of the White House, and it happens with every administration.

Let's test this talking point. And the talking point became, you know, we're dealing with a new regime. And, you know, they were even saying they seem, you know, very reasonable. I would argue that you've simply reshuffled the deck chair. you've got new faces staffing these positions, but you've still got the same Islamic Republic regime. Benham, if you could stay right where you are, being mindful of the time, we've got to take a quick break, and then we'll be back with more from Benin Talblu from the Foundation for Defensive Democracies right here on the situation report, and you know what I'm going to say next. Stick around.

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inspired by a unique orchid accord, paired with vanilla, each with its own distinct attitude, each with its own universe, bold elixir, sensual, woody, addictive, magnetic elixir, sweet and romantic like a lingering touch, solar elixir, a radiant expression of joy, ultra-concentrated for amplified impact and lasting power. Find your euphoria. Discover the Euphoria Elixir Collection by Calvin Klein. Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report. Let me bring back our guest, Senior Director of Foundation for the Defense of Democracy's Iran program, Ben and Ben Taliblu. Ben, thank you very much for sticking around. In the previous segment, you were talking about the various reasons why we've seen a drop in retaliatory strikes from the Iranian regime.

And you mentioned lethality as an element of all of this or effectiveness of targeting. there's been talk, and quite a bit of it, about the influence and support from the Russians, possibly the Chinese, in terms of targeting data and assistance in basically strategy, use of drones. And obviously, as a result of Putin's invasion for the past four years, the Russians have significant experience in the deployment of drones. So have you seen anything that lends credibility to that talk, that in fact the Russians have been supporting the Iranian regime with better targeting data, the movement of U.S. assets, that sort of thing? It's a great question. It's hard to confirm it outside of the scorp of the original reporting that did have that exclusive. All I can tell you is looking at some of the Thad Raiders that I've been at looking at the fact that the regime was able to really hit on a tarmac where early Air War, radar system for the AWAC's plane had been hit, this does raise a lot of alarm bells for me. And based on that report, there was, you know, the Russians basically taking snapshots, downloading

higher resolution satellite imagery, giving these kind of targets to the Islamic Republic. I am quite worried about that. This would be, again, more linkage in my view, in my mind, of the Ukrainian theater and of the Iranian theater of uranium. Asia and the Middle East. I know there's a lot of different views with Washington. You know, the left tends to be more hawkish on Russia these days. The right tends to be more hawkish on Iran. The problem is they're both American adversaries and they don't give a damn if there's a D

or an R or any other letter or acronym besides any of our names here. So when we kind of disconnect the dots, we do both of these adversaries a major service. You know, Russia has, in my view, due to this alone, let alone some other Shadamon, including another report that said that they're giving the Iranian their updated version of the Shahhead 136, which is they get on too to use in this conflict. All of this stuff, again, just based on reports, no independent way for me to verify at the moment, should be connecting the dots in our mind why we have to win in one theater to be able to even win in another. So suffice to say, I am very worried about it.

I can't independently confirm it. But the logic, unfortunately, especially from their view, does make sense. I mean, the Russians do see America supporting Ukraine. This is, you know, another return at bait and bleed, potentially even for someone like Putin, who still carries the scars and the, and the ills of America's successes against the Soviet Union. Here I'm thinking particularly Afghanistan in the 1980s. I'm sure he sees this as a low-cost, average of an investment way,

one, to empower an increasing Iranian adversary that is willing to take on the West and buy time for other members of the axis of aggressors. And two, to be able to debate and bleed America on the cheap. Yeah, there's not much new, I guess, under the sun when it comes to sort of geopolitical thought and reasoning. I mean, we look at Ukraine and think, well, look, you know, a lot of people have pointed out, you know, it's in a sense, a low-cost way for someone else to point out the weaknesses of the Russian military and to degrade their capabilities. So it's not a surprise that Putin would look at this opportunity.

And we already know there was a great deal of technology and information sharing and support going on between Iran and Russia. I find it interesting when someone would be completely dismissive of the idea that Russia would be helping the Iranian regime improve the let'sality of their strikes. So let me switch by good, Benham, to something else you mentioned in the previous segment. the protests of January, all the people coming out in the streets, the regime murdering so many of their own citizens. I think it seems as if perhaps there was some real optimism that shortly after starting this conflict, we might see that people come back out in the streets. And that hasn't happened. The regime seemed to be pretty clear about it publicly stating that if you're coming out in the streets,

were going to kill you. So that's kind of incentive to stay home. But do you have, do you harbor any optimism that we may see in the relatively near future some similar level of protests from the people of some willingness, despite how horrific the regime was previously, to come out and try to make a difference on the streets? I am, I want to use the words here even very carefully, cautiously optimistic about that, I would say yes, I still believe the matter of the next round of protest just structurally in the Islamic Republic is more a matter of when than if, which is that, you know, that when question is really a matter of time. You know, the number one emotion I've heard on the soul, I have to say, because of the internet issue, both in the month of March and in the month of January

at times where the internet was cut in that country, the number one emotion is anger more than fear. Yes, they are afraid of being killed, but anger. As in, you know, they harbor a hostility against their own government, and they have drawn such a sharp line against their own government. And many Iranians have lost so much due to Iranian government policy. Many still believe that they have nothing left to lose. And that might be changing the dynamics and the risk tolerance and even the way protests will look and will function in Iran in the future. And it's important for the West to know that because there's a lot of variables that could militate against that. obviously no one will go into the street in the middle of the war. That's basically a suicide mission.

The biggest city, Tehran, which has anywhere from 11 million to 15 million, depending on the time of day, has not largely been vacated, but there has been several million who migrated to the north, to the other provinces and villages and more rural areas to avoid the conflicts. That's an internal migration thing during war. We saw part of that last time as well during the 12-day war. But suffice to say, they will come back and they will come back. And it's about the father. of war dissipating. The fog of war will dissipate for the, you know, hardened national security deep state and they will really see what happens when you go up against a tier one regional military and really a global superpower. The supporters of the regime are going to have to try to spin that

narrative and see how, you know, the emperor not having any clothes is still, you know, how can they take a victory lap there? But then for those dissidents, those large swath of dissatisfied Iranians, they too will see the damage done and perhaps they're resolved and their spine will be stiffened. The challenge is, of course, that they will be going out into the street unarmed again against a regime that, again, I fear, is too weak to win a war abroad but strong enough to kill at home. And their behavior during this entire month tells you everything because this regime, while it's been fighting again, these two conventional superpowers has still been taking time to intimidate its population and especially to send thubs, paramilitaries, vigilantes into streets,

major urban centers at night wielding clubs and chains and enchanting religious hymns and a bit to intimidate the population to prevent them from coming out. Because the regime fear is one thing. And I call that the horseshoe effect or the containment effect. They are, I said the contagion effect. They don't want foreign military pressure to beget domestic street pressure. And they don't want domestic street pressure to beget foreign military. pressure, the more distance they put between these two things, the more fear they create between

these two audiences, Western militaries and Iranian domestic dissidents, the more successful they are in buying time to stay in power. Right after the 12-day war, they arrested 21,000 Iranians. During the protests in June, they arrested over 50,000 Iranians after killing over 40,000 in just a matter of days, just early 2026. And the thinking here is the same. They're trying to disconnect the dots. They fear the contagion effect. I think it should be up to us, Israel, the exiled opposition, internal Iranian dissidents to connect the dots for them because I fear we are in no way out but through a situation. When you talk to individuals there on the phone, this may seem like a odd question coming out of left field, but the protests in January, in a significant part, were driven by the state of the economy and problems that just generally, yeah, the quality of life. And it wasn't that long ago that we were reporting here on the PDB about the water crisis in Iran.

Where does that stand? Because they were talk about, you know, they could literally be out of water within weeks. And this was some time ago. And then that story was faded in the distance, in part because of the protests and then obviously the current conflict. I'm so glad you called it a story. And I'm so glad you mentioned it because we at FD just put out a math. about the water crisis, not in the past 47 years, but measuring all the reported instances from the end of the 12-day war in June 2025 to the start of the protests in late December, 2025.

We found over 60 instances, and the solution to even one of these 60 instances did not come in January, February, and March. The regime has not addressed any of those things. So they are all operating in the background. And we actually chose to publish this in the month of January as the protests were going on just so that the world saw how many different variables were going into the grievances of your average Iranian. And as again, whenever the fighting stops, whatever that looks like on whatever timeline that comes, and whatever the fog of war dissipates, all of those things, social, political, religious, economic, and again, as you mentioned, environmental, will again raise their heads. And let me tell you something that I heard in 2025

from someone in Iran, not during the protests, but between the end of the 12-day war when the Internet was restored after that to the beginning of the protests in December. So think like late summer, early fall, 2025. And I actually cited a pro-regime reformist individual, former Taferland University professor, in the conversation with this, you can say, disgruntled youth in Iran. And I said, you know, this individual, this Tehran professor, Sadev Zibokialam, has always said that if American Israel really go to war against you guys, even a lamppost won't be left standing. And then, you know, and I was just testing to see, like, what is their tolerance for conflict after having pasted conflict, which was so alien to Iranian territory for so long? And without missing a beat, the person just cut me off and said, was the lamppost even working, though?

did we even have electricity? So, I mean, that's how far the fed up to here mentality is. So, you know, it usually feels like, oh, you and the diaspora are just sitting there giving orders that people are on the street and they're the ones who are suffering and therefore we have to kind of coddle them. But it seemed like actually it was me coddling them and them pushing back art and saying, no, these are the crass realities of life. And when you have such a nationalistic population being so pro-conflict, that tells you about how many of these other factors have driven them to this point. So I think, you know, you hit the nail right on the head with the environmental one because absolutely nothing. Absolutely nothing has been done to address those long-standing

qualms and concerns from the 12-day war to the protest and now into this conflict. And now that the conflict will be done, when again, you zoom out and the fog of war dissipates, the situation has only gotten worse, not better. Ben, last question. This is really, obviously, this is so speculative. I almost hate to, no, I don't hate to ask it at all. I'm going to throw it at you. With all your experience and insight, how do you believe this will end?

This is also something folks in Iran then to ask us here in D.C., they say, Oh, how does she mischief? What will happen in the end? You know, I'm not a profit, I'm not a sage, I even have an art kind of reading history and how to project that forward. But I do worry that in the short term, it's going to be bumpy. In fact, it's going to be very bumpy. In fact, it'll be costly and risky and dare I even say bloody.

But it's not like all the other paths have not been tried. So how will this end? In the short to medium term, it'll be a regime that courses. I liken this to the analogy, you take a wet hand. on a beach and you pick up sand and you squeeze and that sand which is loose and slips through it becomes cohesive it becomes kind of like a muddy you know thing and it becomes one and that's what we're seeing with the national security deep state it's not you know capable but now it's it's united whatever is left of it it sink together or swim together but if you

keep squeezing if you keep the pressure up that sand that mud will slip through each piece of the finger and you will have actually choked it off. We are in that process of choking. It's a bad analogy, but it just goes to show you that those systems that don't bend inevitably do break. And we are right now in the hardening position. Some will say, oh, but now some of these political institutions like the Supreme National Security Council are run by IRGC veterans, to which I say, yes, that's unfortunate, that's a reality. But it's not like pre-war. And for the decade, the past three secretaries of that institution have also not been IRGC veterans. The war has expedited the phenomenon that we have been seeing in slow motion for Iran for three decades,

which is the military ascendancy into so many of these institutions. You know, the Islamic Republic, as was said by somebody who was supposed to be a future Supreme Leader and then he died under house arrest, he said, Islamic Republic is neither Islamic nor Republic. And you see that today in terms of the extendance of an institution that is neither Islamic nor a republic, and that's the hardline security forces. Benham, as always, great insight, great analysis, and I can guarantee you one thing. I don't have any clue how that conflict is going to wrap up, but I do know 100% that we will be calling you back very soon, and I hope you'll come on back when we do. Thank you so much, ma'am.

Foundation for Defensive Democracies, there's a lot there. We've got pages and pages of additional questions, but we had no time left. Coming up next, Tokyo breaks with decades of restraint. Have you heard about this? Moving to deploy missiles that can hit the Chinese mainland. Oh, Xi Jinping is going to be ecstatic with that news. Gordon Chang, good friend of the show, stops by with his analysis. Stay with us.

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The sound may have changed a bit, but the vibes remain unmatched. Let your student remix their own college soundtrack at Rutgers New Brunswick. Welcome back to the Situation Report. Japan is making a significant shift in its defense posture, moving to deploy long-range missiles capable of striking targets on the Chinese mainland. It's a clear break from decades of post-war restraint as Tokyo responds to growing pressure from Beijing in an increasingly unstable regional security environment. Now, these systems are designed to, enhance Japan's counter-strike capability, deterrence by holding adversary assets at risk. But the move is already drawing sharp criticism, as you might suspect, from China, which

sees it as an escalation. The bigger question, now does this striking the deterrence or accelerate an arms race in the Indo-Pacific? Joining us is Gordon G. Chang. He's a good friend of the show and author of Plan Red, China's project to destroy America. You can follow him on X at Gordon G.J. Gordon, thank you very much for coming back here on a situation report. Oh, well, thank you so much, Mike. So let's start with this whole situation with Japan and sort of their restructuring of their defense posture.

How happy do you think that makes Xi Jinping? I think Xi Jinping is upset. You know, he has pushed the Japanese really, really hard and the Japanese are now pushing back. You got to remember that both my... Osdung and Deng Xiaoping, the first two leaders of the People's Republic, had very cordial and warm relations with Japan. It was only when you started with Zhang Zemin, who was a weak leader, and following two leaders, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, that you have these real problems with Tokyo,

because they're trying to create an enemy to rally the Chinese people. And right now, the Japanese have had enough of it. So they're said, look, we're not saying sorry anymore. We're just going full board and we're going to protect our country. So that's a really important change in the mentality. And you can see it throughout Tokyo's establishment, whether left or right. It's interesting because the Japanese do seem to be still trying to define this change, the deployment of the missile systems and some of their other activity, as still a defensive mindset.

And yet it's clear that at least the initial comments coming out of China, they don't view it that way at all. They view it as giving up on their pacifist nature and moving into this offensive position. If you go back to November 7th when Prime Minister Takeichi answered that question on the floor of the diet, and that enraged China. And she did not back down. And she took an ailing liberal Democratic Party, which was having troubles across the board, and she won an historic victory in February, because she stood up to the Chinese, and now you're seeing Japan do things, which would be inconceivable a year or two ago. So that's a really important sea change, and the Chinese, I think, have just gone too far. They were able to get their way with Japan for decades,

and now that's over, because I think that essentially the Japanese political establishment believes that they've got to defend their country, and they've got a willing ally in the United States and friends across the region. So all of this Chinese propaganda since November 7 has really fallen flat, not only in Japan, but across East Asia. Do you think it will create a change in their strategy? I mean, the Chinese regime strategy in terms of dealing with Japan, dealing with their neighbors, or will this sort of harden their position in their dealings with Japan? You know, that's a great question.

And normally you would think that the Chinese were supple and flexible, which they have been in the past, that they would change their posture. But they haven't. And so we have seen unyielding hostility on the part of Beijing, even though it's playing very poorly across the region. And the Chinese know it. They have to know that their message is falling flat. And Japan is elevated in its status now in East Asia. So I would have thought the Chinese would have pivoted by now, but they certainly haven't. And I think that's an indication that Xi Jinping is just never going to change his view.

This is kind of veering a little bit away from the situation with Japan. But I'm curious to get your assessment of how Xi Jinping may be processing what's been happening recently. And by that, I mean, the developments in Venezuela, the pressure on Cuba. and obviously the situation in Iran. What's your assessment? How is viewing all of this? And in particular, how is he viewing it in terms of his vision for Taiwan? This is the way I think he's viewing it.

And the reason I say think is that although it's very clear about what he should be thinking, he's pretty isolated right now and he's very dogmatic. but he should be apoplectic right now, and the reason is that he has seen the United States take his pawns off the board. Venezuela, Cuba is in trouble. Iran, if you look at the Middle East two years ago, China was becoming the dominant foreign power in the Middle East. But then you had President Trump come back, that triumphant tour through the three Gulf states last May, and China has been basically removed from all sorts of. sorts of places. And, you know, if the war in Iran goes as President Trump thinks, and I think

there's a pretty good chance of that, then China's going to lose Iran, which is its second most important proxy after Russia. So, Xi Jinping should right now be extremely concerned, but he has a very different mindset. So I can't say definitely what's going through that iron skull of his. Is that a technical term? The iron skull of Beijing. There are ways which, you know, he has taken China really to the edge of the cliff in so many different ways. And so that's why I think that I really worry because I think C's perception of the world is very different than everybody else's. And I'm sure there are a lot of people in the upper reaches of the Communist Party.

who know that what Xi Jinping is doing is not good for China, but they won't stand up to him. So, you know, in that system, they have seen what happens if you oppose Xi Jinping. And sometimes, you know, there are rumors that people have lost their lives recently for opposing C. So right now, I think you're seeing a political system that is completely unable to deal with the world as it is. Well, speaking of the world, when we come back, I want to take a left turn and have us talk about Iran, in part in context with China and their relationship. But if you could stay right where you are, Gordon, we do have to take a quick break. We'll be back with more from Gordon Chang right here on the Situation Report. Stay with us.

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And joining us again is Gordon Chang, right? A great friend of the show. And if you haven't read his book, I've talked to you about this before, you got to start listening to me. Pick it up. It's called Plan Red China's Project to Destroy America, and you can follow him again on X at Gordon G. Chang. Gordon, thank you for sticking around.

Thanks, Mike. Hey, let's talk Iran. I'm not sure if you've been following it. There's something going on over there. And the president gave an address to the nation, just in the past handful of days. what did you make of that? And then I want to spend some time talking about your perceptions on the relationship between Iran and China.

The most important thing was for President Trump to make the case to the American people and the people of the world that Iran posed a clear and present danger or was an imminent or near imminent threat because that would justify the use of force. And President Trump has a lot of important facts that he could have actually given. but he was very conclusory last night, and I don't think he made the case. And I'll just give you one example. You know, President Trump in one sentence said that Iran had missiles that could almost get to the United States. He said they would soon be able to do that. Well, on CNN afterwards, Caitlin Collins correctly said that that assessment is not consistent with the one from the U.S. intelligence community. The U.S. intelligence community thinks that Iran does not have a bliss in an ICBM program.

But the intelligence community is wrong. There is an analyst, Bruce Bechtel, Evangelos State University, who has made a very clear case that Iran has the components for a Wassong 15, which is a North Korean missile with a range of 8100 miles, which have fired from Iran can hit any part of the United States. and he runs through this going back to U.S. Treasury sanctions on a North Korea for transferring, basically the first stage, the booster, the most important thing in order for Iran to have an ICBM. You know, we know from everything, Mike, that they have all the components for a Wasang 15. The only thing we don't know, and we can't see this because we can't see into their tunnels, is what they've actually put all the pieces together.

But President Trump was right about that. The intelligence community was wrong. And if President Trump had made that case, then Caitlin Collins could not have said that last night. Because what her words were probably swayed a lot of people saying, oh, that's just Trump exaggerating. No, Trump was not exaggerating. He was maybe even underplaying the case. But the American people don't believe that because Trump did not go through the facts. You go through the facts, Trump is right at the U.S. intelligence community.

guess what is wrong again? Well, yeah, the Intel on Iran, I've talked about this before, has always been an extremely heavy lift for the U.S. Intel community to get any specificity on whether it's their nuclear program or their ballistic missile program. And we've always relied very heavily on liaison partners for insight and assistance on that. The speech that Trump gave was briefed. certainly by by Trump standards.

I think it ran for 19 or 20 minutes. And I agree. I think there were a lot of people tuning in who still in their minds wanted to know about this imminent threat and what the problem was. And I think adding up those facts and providing more insight, transparency to the people,

I think that would have been a good thing. But look, I think lots of things can be true, contradictory things can be true all at the same time. And I think it's very true that administrations before the Trump administration, this turk, have kicked this can down the road, hoping that somebody else would deal with it. And I think the world, you know, the goal factors and a variety of others are all believed that the world would be better off without this regime. Now, whether this regime shows enough resilience to stick around is a different question. And so far they've shown some remarkable resilience, despite having lost so many leaders

and having their military capabilities degraded as much as they have. But part of that I suspect is down to support following their few friends that they have. And that's kind of this long-winded way I'm getting around asking you about the relationship between China and Iran. How do you assess that? Well, Harad is essentially China's proxy. China gives across-the-board support. The only thing they don't support the supply are combat troops.

But you look at, for instance, diplomatic support, propaganda support, military intelligence from even before the beginning of the war, weapons. Iran has a nuclear weapons program because of China. And we can go through all of this. But Iran would not be in a position to be a threat to its neighbors if it were not for the Chinese support. We talk about oil, the elevated commodity purchases. They just put a lot of money into Iran's hands, which they can then use to destabilize their neighbors. So this is something that President Trump, I think, needs to talk more about. You know, on your earlier point, by kicking the can down the road, that's absolutely right.

And if anybody ever does an update to profiles and courage, which is John F. Kennedy's book, they should add a chapter on President Trump's dealing with Iran because this was bound to be politically unpopular and Trump took it on anyway because of the threat that Iran posed to the United States and to our allies and partners. And he did it. And that took a lot of courage. Absolutely. No, again, it's you hit the nail of the head with, you know, it's politically unpopular. And you could see that also from the European allies' perspective from the Gulf states' reaction, although, again, there's credible reporting that a number of the Gulf state, you know, leaders are basically saying, please keep the fight going, right? Let's do this once and for all.

Obviously, no friends of Iran. They have been very slow in, you know, considering getting in on the offensive side of this, but the UAE may join the fray here at some point. With China, though, have you seen anything credible, any information that? indicates that China is also providing Iran with targeting assistance in terms of their retaliatory strikes against U.S. and Israeli facilities. Okay. Before the bombing began on February 28th, there was a private Chinese company, I think it's Shanghai-based Meiser Vision, which was providing to the world images of U.S. military assets

in the region along with precise coordinates. And then, of course, there's that large Chinese intelligence ship just off. off of Iran's coast. So, you know, you put those two things together, and clearly they're supplying, targeting data. We know that China has its own constellation of satellites. Of course, we don't know what is being down from them, but I imagine it is what the Russians have been accused of doing, and that is providing the Iranians with targeting information.

Remember, they took out our AWACS plane in Saudi Arabia. They hit it exactly where it would do the most damage in the back. And that takes a lot of information that the Iranians themselves don't have. Yeah, we've seen improved lethality in some of their strikes. The Iranian strikes, I mean, targeting Prince Sultan Air Base and Saudi, where they hit that EC3 on the tarmac. So it would be naive, I think, to imagine that the Russians and Chatties are not providing that type. of assistance. Gordon, I, you know, I've got a page of questions left for you, but I have no more time for this. And I've apologized for that because, you know, it is, there's a lot to unpack here.

And I can't think of anyone better to talk to about these types of issues. I hope you'll join us again when we call you and pick up the phone and say, absolutely, because we always appreciate your insight, your expertise. Gordon G. Chang, like I've said before, you can find him on X at Gordon G. Chang. Make sure you pick up his book, Plan Red. A great friend of the show. Excellent insight on China. And again, nothing happens at a bubble, which is why we spend our time talking about those relationships between China and Russia and Iran. Well, that is all the time we have for this week's PDB situation report. I know. Sad trombone. If you have any questions or comments, maybe you've got a humorous anecdote, please reach out to me.

PDB at thefirsttb.com. You know what we do every month? That's right. We collect your best questions. We mash them into an episode that we call, ask me anything, and we've got one heading to the launch bat. And by way, launch pad, did you catch the launch of Artemis II? My God, if that doesn't fill you with pride and amazement, I don't know what would. Godspeed to that crew. And a hearty congratulations to the thousands of brilliant people and hard workers who made Artemis II possible. What a fantastic. event. All right, here we go. It's the end of the show. And don't forget, if you want to listen to this show ad-free, you can do that. It's very simple. Just become a premium member of the President's daily brief by visiting bdb premium.com. I'm Mike Baker. And until next time, you know the drill. Stay informed.

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