The President's Daily Brief - PDB Situation Report | August 24, 2024: Inside Russia: Kursk's Frontlines & Life Under Economic Siege

Episode Date: August 24, 2024

In this episode of The PDB Situation Report: Ukraine's push into Russia's Kursk region enters its third week. Kyiv's forces are solidifying and expanding their foothold, but the situation on Ukrainian soil tells a different story. We’ll break down the latest developments and what they mean for the ongoing conflict with insights from George Barros of the Institute for the Study of War. The Russia-Ukraine conflict is taking a toll not just on the battlefield but on the Russian people. Beyond the losses in combat, Russia is grappling with sanctions that are upending daily life. For a closer look at how these pressures are reshaping Russian society, we'll be joined by Konstantin Samoilov, a Russian expat and host of the popular YouTube channel Inside Russia. To listen to the show ad-free, become a premium member of The President’s Daily Brief by visiting PDBPremium.com. Please remember to subscribe if you enjoyed this episode of The President's Daily Brief. Konstantin Samoilov's YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/@INSIDERUSSIA ☕ Blackout Coffee: https://www.blackoutcoffee.com/PDB 🏅 Patriot Gold: Patriot Gold: Call 1-888-870-5457 for a free investor guide. 💵 Tax Network: Tax Network USA: Tax Network USA: To schedule a complimentary consultation, call 1(800)245-6000 or visit https://TNUSA.com/MIKE  🕶️ MySudo: Go to https://MySudo.com/MIKEBAKER & use code 'MIKEBAKER' to get 30 days free on a SudoPro yearly subscription. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Welcome to the PDB Situation Report. I'm Mike Baker, your eyes and ears on the world stage. All right, let's get briefed. Ukraine's push into Russia's Kursk region has entered its third week, with Keeves' forces solidifying and expanding their foothold. But while progress is being made across the border, the situation on Ukrainian soil, well, it tells a different story. We'll break down the latest developments

and what they mean for the conflict with George Barrows from the Institute for the Study of War. Later in the show, we'll shift our focus to the toll that the Russian-Ukraine conflict is taking on the Russian people. And here, obviously, I don't mean Putin and his cronies, his minions. I could care less about any toll on them. In fact, I hope it's a fairly sizable toll on them. I'm talking about the Russian population

that suffering in many ways from Putin's military adventurism, the soldiers and conscripts regularly tossed into the meat grinder and the people at home dealing with a worsening economy and the impact of sanctions. Beyond the battlefield losses, Russia is grappling with sanctions that have, frankly, upended daily life. And for a closer look at how these pressures are reshaping society, we'll be joined by Konstantin Samoilov, and he's a Russian expat, and host of the popular YouTube channel inside Russia. He's got some really interesting insight.

But first, the Situation Report Spotlight. Kiev's surprise incursion into Kursk on August 6th has dramatically altered the landscape of the conflict. Now, as of this week, Ukrainian forces have reportedly seized control of approximately 500 square miles of Russian territory, give or take 10 or 20 miles, including approximately 92 settlements. Now, this unexpected advance has placed significant pressure on the Kremlin, with Russian President Putin working overtime to deflect blame for the situation. It's certainly not the fault of the fellow who led the invasion. No, it wouldn't be that. In a video conference with Russian politicians, including the governors of Kursk, Belgarod,

and Brensk regions, Putin stated that the, quote, security issues in Kursk were, quote, problems that are the responsibility of the security forces. Now, while Russia faces setbacks in Kursk, it's not without gains on other fronts. And this is important to understand and to remember. On the battlefield in Ukraine, Russian forces have reported capturing the small town of New York in eastern Ukraine, marking a step forward in their push towards major population centers in the Densk region. Okay, for more on the incursion into Kursk, let me bring in George Barrows. Now, he's the Russia team lead at the Institute for the Study of War.

George, thank you very much for joining us here on the Situation Report. Really appreciate it. Thanks so much for having me again, Mike. It's good to see you. Yeah, thank you. Likewise, good to see you. Let's, I guess, start from the beginning. I don't know that when it comes to Ukrainian military flipping the tables on Putin and making their march on Russian territory, I don't know that anybody really had that on their 2024 bingo cards. So let's start from that point.

To what degree was that incursion into Russian territory expected? And more importantly, from your perspective, what does it mean? What's the overall objective? Yeah, absolutely. It was a partial surprise. In terms of the geography to go into Russia itself, that was unexpected. However, in terms of the timing, we actually were forecasting that the Ukrainian lines would have solidified a little bit better by late 2024, 2025. And we published a report back in mid-20204, that the Ukrainians would likely be in a better position and they might even conduct some limited operations, offensive operations, in late 24, early 25. So the timing tracks,

But the geography is unique and different. And that's interesting, I think. I don't want to speculate on the Ukrainian's objective because no one really knows unless you're in the Ukrainian high command. I mean, they didn't tell Washington about this operation ahead of time either. But the campaign is causing a series of dilemmas for the Kremlin. And I think we can have a very interesting debate or series of questions to ask, what is the primary objective, what's the secondary or tertiary one.

but there's a series of effects that are being created by this offensive. And I'll briefly lay out what those are. Number one, this offensive is drastically challenging Putin's strategic planning assumptions about what it takes to wage a protracted war against Ukraine. If you look at the map, the international border between the north-eastern part of Ukraine and Russia, there's about a thousand kilometers of territory there. And we know that over the last two and a half years, Putin has made a decision to not defend that international border. He has availed himself to Western policies that assumed that the Western states would not allow Ukraine to go into the offensive and use Western provided kit in or against Russia.

And Putin, therefore, did not adequately protect the border regions. Now with this protracted Ukrainian incursion, this is going to force a decision point on the Kremlin. Will Putin, moving forward, actually invest substantial resources, including deploying several divisions, tens of thousands of Russian soldiers that will now have to cover an additional thousand kilometers of border in the theater, or will Putin not? If he chooses to actually invest in defending the border, then that drastically increases the resourcing requirements indefinitely to actually be able to protract the war, and that will decrease the unit resources available to actually fight the war inside of occupied Ukraine.

Even if the Russians swing around eventually push the Ukrainians out, if they do indeed cover that additional border, that would be a wind in my book for the Ukrainians. Other effects that this is generating for the Ukrainians, which are good. This is gumming up the entire Russian high operational and strategic level planning for the whole campaign. We know that the Russians over the last eight, nine months, they've been the beneficiaries of having the initiative across the entire theater. That is, they get to choose when, where, the tempo of operations, and essentially how to serve up in different parts of the theater, a bunch of dilemmas for the Ukrainians for how to respond. Now with the Ukrainians flipping the script, the Russians are on the back foot in at least the north, and now the Russians are stripping parts of the line, not everywhere, but parts of the line, and redeploying units to go respond to Kirstk.

I think it's a little too early to see exactly how that's going to affect the tempo of operations. As you noted, the introduction, the Russians are actually doubling down on their offensive efforts in the east. But this is substantial and it's changing the way that the Russians wanted to fight this war. Finally, it's a political dilemma for Putin. You know, Putin spent the last two decades trying to rebuild the prestige of Russia, present Russia as a country of stability, of recovery, of resurging geopolitical, political preeminence. And I think Putin's chosen response to this incursion was very interesting. He chatted a little bit of his inner Stalin. He did not respond for three or four days after

the incursion began. He very interestingly did not use this as an opportunity to declare war against Ukraine or to declare martial law. And he didn't even create a military headquarters to deal with this invasion. He instead said this is going to be a counterterrorist operation that the Russian domestic police, the Russian Federal Security Service, the FSB, are going to handle. And now with this FSB joint headquarters that he's standing up, it has to deal with a variety of different security agencies and the military units and try to cobble together what, you know, looks to be a very unorthodox and very sketchy joint, you know, headquarters, which I'm personally skeptical of its ability to effectively deal with the first time that mechanized combined arms

forces operated on Russian soil since the 1940s. Yeah. Why do you think he's reacted the way he did, right? Because I mean, oftentimes Putin loves nothing more than to have a bogeyman, right, to point, you know, and to whip up the nationalist frenzy and say we're being attacked from the outside. And, you know, it's all whoever, the U.S.'s fault, the EU's fault. Why is he having this limited, I don't know if that's the right word for it, response and not beating the drum more in terms of saying, you know, we're at war, look at this, you know, they're invading us. Yeah, I mean, I was expecting Putin to use this as the opportunity to say, my fellow Russians,

this is the time that I've been warning you about for decades. This is the NATO-backed effort to, like Napoleon did, and like the Germans did, and World War II to dismantle the Russian Federation. And now we must defend the motherland, but he didn't. I think it's actually because the popular myth about Putin being the tactical mastermind and the shrewd gambler, I think those are not true. we have a lot of counterfactual evidence over the last two and a half years of war that demonstrates that at the strategic level, Putin is very, very calculating, but he's extremely cautious, and he's unwilling to actually undertake risky decisions that are going to risk his political stability, domestic stability at home. Russian leaders, they typically change either due to Powell's coups or due to large-scale revolution from the ground up.

And Putin is very comfortable, I think, about his palo's situation. He shored that up with, you know, removing Yipani Progogian actually on this day last year. However, he doesn't want to call general war. He doesn't want to conduct general mobilization. In his response to this incursion, he didn't dignify the Ukrainian brigades rolling around in Russia as regular, legitimate military combatants. He said that they were terrorists. We are going to conduct a counterterrorist operation. And so it seems like in his effort to try to downplay the severity and the embarrassment and his mistakes and not adequately protecting the border,

he's trying to essentially do damage control, message to the Russians of population not to worry. This isn't as embarrassing as it is. It's not a big deal. It's just a minor border incursion. The local police are going to take care of it. And interestingly, he did not signal that he wants to conduct a new way of immobilization. He, in fact, said that the number of... of volunteer recruits who have come forward to participate in this counter operation and answer the

call of duty is very high. And that's his tacit way of communicating to the Russian people. I'm not interested in. Don't worry. I'm not going to violate another aspect of our social contract. I'm not going to call a mobilization. I think he's getting a lot of pushback. If I'm not mistaken, I think he's getting a lot of pushback from a variety of elements, including probably a variety of oligarchs, businessmen who see what the war has done to the economy inside Russia, and even just something as straightforward as labor shortages, to members of the Kremlin, I think, who think a mobilization is a terrible idea. So he may actually be taking their advice at this point.

Talking about internally within Russia, depending on who you believe, maybe upwards of 200,000 residents in that area, had been evacuated. Now, obviously they're aware of what's going on, but to what degree do we know about what the rest of the country is thinking or is even aware of in terms of what's happening in Curse? Yeah. I think the Russian state media has done a very masterful job

of patrolling the accident information and the framing of information within the Russian Federation. And it's actually interesting. There's different segments of the society that are reacting to it in very different ways. I think your average Russian, they're pretty, they probably know about it, but they're indifferent. We've seen that the Russian state media has tried to focus on the fact of, hey, we've got internally displaced people now, and we have to mobilize volunteers to get food and clothing

and shelter for these people, that sort of thing. The response has been focused on that, not on the, there's active combat operations happening, and there's reconnaissance groups thrown around with strikers and that sort of thing. within Russia itself, there's a very interesting debate happening right now about how to use conscripts. By Russian law, conscripts cannot be sent to deploy to foreign countries for expeditionary wars. They can, however, be sent to combat after four months of service. And what's been very interesting to see is that when the Ukrainians rolled over into the international border, they ran across the conscripts.

There were conscript units there. There were also conscripts that were stationed with the Border Guard service, and the Ukrainians killed and captured a bunch of them. This is very substantially significant for the Kremlin because, you know, casualties amongst conscripts is one of the substantial contributing factors that led to the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s due to the mothers movements and certain mothers

about the conscripts that were dying in Afghanistan and then the early 90s with the ones that were dying in Chechnya. So Putin's got a problem here and part of Russian society, including the Chechen, warlords, they've been arguing that the conscripts must actually be deployed to Kursk, because you can't eat Russian bread and collect the, you know, paychecks and then not fight to defend the Motherland when you're a conscript. But then the mothers and the conscripts have been argued that they would rather not be deployed to the front here. Right now,

the Russian government is indeed setting up deployment plans to start sending to conscripts from different parts of Russia to the front here, and it'll be very difficult to see, you know, or interesting to see how Putin's going to juggle this political hot potato with conscripts. Yeah, agreed, 100%. Listen, George, if you could stay right there, as you know, the Situation Report, we've got some terrific sponsors. We're going to have to take a quick break. We'll be back with more with George Barrows from the Institute for the Study of War

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Sign up for your $1 per month trial at Shopify.com special offer. Welcome back to the BDB Situation Report. Let me bring back my guest, George Barros, he's the Russia team leader at the Institute for the Study of War. George, thanks very much for sticking with us. Let's talk briefly about something that you mentioned at the very beginning of our conversation, and that is that this was not expected, meaning the incursion, the invasion of Russia by the Ukrainian military. Now, it raises all sorts of questions, but one of the things that I'm interested in is to what degree and how good is our intelligence about the Ukrainian military's use of U.S. munitions and weapons during the course of this incursion into the Kursk region?

Yeah, that's a fascinating question. So what I'll start with doing is laying out the facts, what we know about what's happened in terms of the tactics and the combat, and then I'll sort of try to answer my current assessment what the U.S. policy is. The facts are that the Ukrainians are using heavy American military equipment on Russian soil. The 82nd Ukrainian airborne brigade, they are operating, fighter, combat vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles on Russian territory. That's visually confirmed. We've had M777, 155 millimeter field artillery been deployed to Kirst as well to provide fire support. We've got Humvees and a whole bunch of other equipment from other NATO countries as well. And we've gotten some confirmed Himmars, GMLRS missiles with a range of 75

kilometers that have been fired across the international border to interdict Russian targets as well. So we've got a couple of reflections here in terms of what we've seen before. We've never seen heavy equipment operating on Russian soil. In the past, we had seen Humvees that were being operated by pro-Ukrainian Russian volunteers, not as part of a large scale operation, but as tactical raids across the border from last summer, we have seen limited Ukrainian counter-battery fire from Haimars across the international border to hit Russian forces that we're preparing to attack across the border into Ukraine. But we've never seen the strikers before, and we've never seen the Ukrainians pull 777s into Russia. In terms of what the current policy

is. Oh, sure. Go ahead. I'm sorry. I just let me just interrupt. just for a second there, George, I have not seen any, but have we seen any reporting or any insight on the White House's reaction on this particular issue, or even from the Pentagon? Has there been any effort to clamp down? Look, they set the table a little bit, right? Initially, they were saying, no, you can't use weapons. That went on for almost a couple of years. And then over the past few months, they sort of, you know, give them a little bit of free rein, but only in the border area. So I'm wondering whether anybody in the U.S. military is pushing back saying, you know, wait a second, because the whole fear was escalation, right? And the whole fear was,

was, you know, this thing just blowing up because of the use of our munitions into Russia. Has that fear just gone away? I think it's evaporating over time, right? Because where we were back in April this year, the policy was strictly the Ukrainians cannot use any American provided weapons, including just fuel artillery across the international border full stop. The one exception was maybe they could interdict aircraft if they were getting close and a Patriot missile could take them out. That would be okay. But it was very, very strict.

What changed the policy was what happened on May 10. On May 10, the Russians began the renewed cross-border invasion into Harkeith, and it became so obvious how the Russians were exploiting the sanctuary that our policy had de facto created because they were setting up their command posts and their assembly areas. And only after they rolled across the part of the field that's demarked as the international border, that's when we could actually, the Ukrainians could interdict them, which was stupid. The policies have since shifted because it became intellectually indefensible. And then now where we're currently at in terms of policy debate is we've basically, you know,

we've witnessed all the counterfactual evidence that you can indeed conduct conventional combat operations with American provided equipment with the Ukrainians on Russian soil. You can kill them, you can blow them up, you can do a variety of tactical tasks. And it is not the vertical escalation that we're all concerned about into nuclear war of weapons and mass destruction. It is horizontal escalation, a continuation of more intense conventional warfare. And that's what we've been arguing this whole time. Currently, the debate is about can the Ukrainians use long-range precision fires with the

Tachem's missiles to interject high-value targets and logistics nodes in the deep rear. And currently, the administration policy has not loosened on that at all. I would argue that, you know, in order to create a serious strategy for how the Ukrainians are to actually be successful in defending themselves, we have to remove all of the safety nets and all of the little stops that prevent the Ukraine from building momentum against the Russians. And frankly, there's a lot of really good targets that the Ukrainians could strike if they had the rules of engagement permissions to hit those targets with the attack on those missiles. But what's the downside to that?

Well, the downside is that it comes with more risk, right, because you're hitting, you know, more sensitive targets in the rear. By that I mean command posts, depots that are difficult to protect. You are going to be, you know, you're getting closer to the risky things that the Russians don't want to happen. But I would argue that the risks are actually quite minimal, right? Like, what's going to happen is the Russians are going to get mad. They're going to say you cross the red lines, but there's very little, I think,

concretely that Putin can actually do to further escalate this war that he has not already done. I mean, they're fully invested in this, and this is where they're at. And I would argue that deterrence theory, the same logic that kept us all safe during the Cold War, it's still fundamentally valid. We have nukes too. Firing those missiles deeper into Russia will actually do a lot of good for the Ukrainians as well. If you look at the map, and we published maps of this, if you look and see the area that the Ukrainians are able to strike with attack them's missiles, and you map all of the, just from open source intelligence, the 250 known military targets and installations, many of which cannot be moved that fall in that range, it requires the Russians that have to protect like a 300,000 more kilometers worth of stuff.

And as we know with this cross-border invasion, they've been, they've had a luxury of. of not having to protect anything in their deep rear, aside from, you know, weak little Ukrainian drones with relatively limited payloads. If we indeed open up this vast, large, deep rear area, it will compel a decision point on the Russian military. Is it going to be, do we redeploy our relatively few high-end electronic warfare assets and our high-end air defense assets, which are currently bunched up in the front in Ukraine in order to protect those forward, of most operating areas. Or if this stuff in the rear comes under risk, do we actually start redeploying that stuff, pulling it out of the front, sending it to the back to then protect the

vulnerable back? I would argue that, you know, if they don't make a decision and they say, we're going to keep it in the front, congrats. You get free hits in the back and you can take their tail. If they do argue that we're going to protect the back at the expense of the front, congrats. You have a softer front and the likes of which of doing a penetration battle that the the Ukraine as Dale then last year have become easier to do. If they make the really bad for the sake, oh, sorry, go ahead. I'm sorry, I'm sorry, George. You mentioned deterrence.

So in the back of people's minds typically, you know, the concern is always, you know, does something force or push Putin into making what obviously is an irrational decision, but it could happen to use a tactical nuclear weapon in response because he, then would argue that he feels as if, you know, the very, you know, uh, existence of, of the motherland is at risk. I mean, that's kind of how he would posture it. Yeah. I think the risk is very low, uh, because look, there's tremendous amount of counterfactual evidence that shows that the Ukrainians are there.

The Russians decided not to dignify it as a, as a military operation. It's a counterterrorist operation that the FSB are going to do. Um, when the Ukrainians broke the seal on firing high Mars, Gimler's missiles into Russia back in May, that was a big red line that had been crossed. And the Kremlin watchers, look at the tea leaves, were looking very closely at the Kremlin response. And Putin gave a speech in June in which he said that the military operations that the Ukrainians are doing now with the American provided weapons, that those do not reach

substantial threshold that would require the use of nuclear weapons. So Putin gave the green light. Then he continues to give the green light now. And I really hope that it's a good thing. the policymakers, look at all the counterfactual evidence that indicates that you can conduct a suite of military activities with American provided weapons against the Russian military in Ukraine and in Russia. And it doesn't result with that escalation that we all want to avoid.

By the way, Putin dropping a nuke doesn't solve any of his problems. It doesn't fix his command and control problems. It doesn't fix his labor shortage in GDP and inflation. it doesn't fix his military's inability to restore operational maneuver to actually be able to, you know, move on the ground. It doesn't fix his force generation problem. So it doesn't do a lot for him. I really think it's not likely.

Yeah. It's interesting because that would posit that, you know, he makes decisions because he's on the logic train and you could push back, I suppose, and say, well, look, there was no real logic in his decision to engage in this. adventurism going back to February 2022. But, you know, that's a study in psychology. We probably won't get into that just yet. But if we could look just for a moment at the logistics of all of this, do you view their incursion into Kursk in a sense as a one-off? Do you view it as a legitimate

effort to seize and hold Russian territory? For whatever reason, to inflict pain on Putin, to disrupt the Russian psyche and create unrest, maybe to use as a leverage for negotiations. I mean, you know, let's talk about that just for a minute because there's this whole issue of, look, you're spreading limited resources now, right? And you've got to keep supplying, so you've got to keep your supply lines open. And so the idea that you're going to keep pushing out beyond whatever it may be, 500 square miles of territory that they currently hold, you know, what do you view this as, in terms of is it short term, is it medium term, is it negotiating tool?

Run with it wherever you want to. Yeah, absolutely. So I think it can advance multiple lines of effort, and I think the Ukrainians are keeping it vague deliberately. What it does do is I think it's not a means and to an end by itself. What it is doing is it's forcing the Russians to think about their resource allocation throughout the theater. And I think it's designed in part to help create some opportunities for where the Ukrainians might be able to conduct offensive operations. in the near future or other tactical counterattacks of convenience in the near future. Right now, by the Russian zone reporting, they are reporting, and I have no way to verify this

because we don't collect on friendly forces, but that the Ukrainians are assembling forces in the south, where the Russians are currently pulling forces away to go respond to Kirst. We also yesterday had a Ukrainian brigade officially announced that their beginning offensive of operations in neighboring Kharkiv Oblast slightly to the east of Kursk. So what we see now is, you know, the Russians moving stuff, the Ukrainians seeming to set themselves up for other things. And Ukrainians, they achieved operational surprise with this campaign. I think that they're setting themselves up to be able to achieve some operational surprise

of future supporting operations in the future. The Soviets and their doctrine, they call this the operational art. It's the idea that you use small supporting campaigns, you link them to, together in space time so that one undertaking sets the ground for the next one, which sets the ground for the next one, which sets the ground for the next one, so that if you're skillful with your operational in campaign design, you get to such a place where your adversary is perpetually on the back foot. They never really recover from losing the initiative. That's actually one of the key cornerstones of Soviet operational art that Ukrainians are students of. So I think

that's what we're talking about. So where does this go? I mean, I'm sorry, George, I want to be mindful of our time. And you can count on the fact we're going to be calling you again. We're going to put your number on Speeddahl because there's a lot more to discuss here. But is there any sense that part of this, though, is we want turf and, you know, P.O.Ws, look, they've captured a significant number of Russian soldiers to force Putin's hand to get them to the negotiating table? Yeah, I think the Ukrainians are trying to stave off negotiations right now, because they know that any kind of negotiations are not going to be worth the paper they're written on, that the current front lines are not a stable equilibrium, and that the Russians will be able

to resume this operation at a place and time of their choosing, just as Putin began the 2022 war on the basis of a 2015 ceasefire deal that was inked out by the powers of be then. So I think the Ukraine are trying to stave off negotiations, but I think the territory that they currently hold and seize can indeed be used as a bartering ship to improve their negotiating position. But I actually, I don't think that's the means to the end. That's one of the pluses of it. With regards to holding indefinitely, I don't think the Ukrainians want to hold it indefinitely. They say they don't. And I personally, I buy that, but it's a good chip to have in the back pocket. Yeah, yeah. Well, George, I can tell you something. This has been fascinating. I've got a ton more

questions. So like I said, we will be pestering you again to rejoin us here. George Barros from the Institute for the Study of War. Thank you again for joining us. It's always appreciated. And we look forward to the next time. Thanks for having me, Mike. Really appreciate it. All right. Well, up next, we're shifting our focus to the war's impact beyond the battlefield. We're still in Russia. We're still dealing with the conflict. But we're looking at it beyond the battlefield, including the economic and social turmoil inside Russia. Joining us to discuss this is Konstantin Samoyov, a Russian expat and commentator,

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Multi-vehicle discount, safe driver discount, new vehicle discount, storage discount. How many discounts will you stack up? Tap the banner or visit usaa.com slash auto discounts. Restrictions apply. Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report. Now, I want to keep our focus on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, but this time from a different perspective. While much of our attention is rightly focused on the battlefield, it's important to recognize

the massive impact that the war is having on those inside Russia and Ukraine who aren't on the front lines. But beyond the battlefield, the sanctions that have been imposed have had a significant, serious, some would say crippling effect on key sectors of the Russian economy, leading to widespread financial hardship for everyday citizens. Additionally, the increasing censorship and repression within Russia have created a climate of fear and uncertainty. I don't think I'm going out on a limb saying that, and that's affecting millions who are grappling with the consequences of a war that, at least for now, shows no sign of ending anytime soon. Now, for more on that, I'm joined by a very special guest,

Konstantin Semelov, a Russian expat who left his country in the fall of 2022. Shortly, after the government's military mobilization. He now runs the popular YouTube channel inside Russia. I highly recommend you check that out, where he offers insightful commentary on the current situation within Russia. Constantine, thank you very much for joining us here on the Situation Report.

I really appreciate it. Mike, thank you for having me. It's a pleasure and honor being here. Well, after you talk to me for a little while, you'll think differently about that. But let's get right into our conversation. Look, let's let's say, start from the top in terms of a 30,000-foot view. And this is going to be a very general,

very simple question, but I want you to go with it wherever you want. What is the current mood of the Russian population when it comes to this conflict with Ukraine? We're talking about right now in August, late August of 24, after Ukrainians rolled into Russian territory, I can't really call it invasion. I call it the special military operation. that Ukraine is conducting on Russian soil. So once that started happening, Russians have started waking up and getting angry. And this is the sense that, you know,

this is the feeling that I'm getting in Russia. Is there, I guess, when it comes to dissemination of information, look, I'd argue that here in the U.S., we all have way too much access to immediate information and opinion, and everyone's become a journalist. Obviously, if we look at the incursion into Kursk as an example, depending on who you talk to, maybe a couple hundred thousand people have been evacuated from the area, so clearly they know about it.

But the people in Moscow, for instance, in other parts of Russia, are they aware of the extent of this incursion into Russian territory by the Ukrainian military? Well, first of all, there are two Russia's, not one. one Russia is Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the second Russia is the rest of Russia. And if we're talking about Moscow in St. Petersburg, life is well there. People still have jobs. People, their lives are peaceful. They are doing well compared to the rest of Russia. And there's not much of a difference after the Ukrainians ruled in. Perhaps there is, but not as visible as in the rest of Russia, because in the rest of Russia,

especially in the western part of Russia, the central Russia, you know, people all of a sudden realize that something that is very majorly wrong is happening. And government isn't doing much about it. They're just keeping quiet, but, you know, like you said, a couple hundred thousand people have been displaced. More than that. official information is 121,000, but I never trust Russian officials. At least double that, perhaps triple that.

People are running, running, and they're screaming, they're very loud, and you can't really silence them. You can't sugarcoat them. And they're becoming, you know, this information has become more widespread, and it's definitely given a lot of food for thought of Russians. I would say that this is the new stage in the history of Russia. The Russian people have started waking up, or at least started thinking and asking questions. What the heck is going on, you know?

Is there a sense of fatigue among the general population over this conflict? Or is there a sense of resignation and, look, this is going to happen? We can't influence it, so we just need to worry about our own selves. know, putting food on the table and taking care of the kids, that sort of thing. Or I guess the big question that I'm trying to get to here is, is there a concern by Putin that he could be losing the population in terms of popular opinion? There is fatigue, definitely, and it's growing. Okay, and it started, it just increased its speed.

As of for Putin, I don't really think he cares about Russian population. He has absolutely different goals, and he has different means of reaching goals. And population is definitely not his concern. I think he's much more concerned of macroeconomics problems, microeconomic problems that Russia is facing right now, with Turkey, China and the US sanctions, increasing US sanctions, And he's very, I think, that's my opinion, he's very afraid of political fight inside the elites, that someone will be trying to take on him, you know, on his power to topple him. How effective, in your opinion, are the sanctions at this point on the economy?

What sort of impact are they actually having on people's everyday lives inside Russia? They have, you know, they've, how do I say that? They've had a very slow start. Of course, lots of sanctions, you know, Russia is the, became the most sanctioned country in the history of humankind in 2022. And tons of questions were, you know, tons of sanctions were placed. All kinds of sanctions. Economic, you know, athletics,

cultural, scientific, you know. I think that a lot of them were not effective, but two years later, the United States started taking it seriously. Okay. And in the last six months, let's say a little more, eight months, we're seeing the effects. The secondary sanctions are right now the silent killer of Russia in its economy.

everyone in Russia starts filling them. I'm just going to give you two examples. Well, three examples, really. It's like showcases. First of all, Russian oil trade is declining, and that is breadmaking of Russia. Okay, I'm not talking about natural gas. It's almost shut down, okay?

But oil, that's what has been keeping Russian economy alive for all this two and a half years. Number two, the international trade, the trade with Turkey has shut down completely. You know, after the U.S. Secretary of State blinking visited Turkish banks, Turkish business elites, and warned them that if they keep on doing business with Russians, then they might fall victims as well. And that's it. They just shot off Russia, off their, you know, you can't transfer money to Turkey. you cannot buy anything from Turkey.

And the Chinese started doing the same, only a few weeks later, mid-February, okay? And these three things are really putting tremendous, I can't even say stress, tremendous damage to the economy. So they're working. They were late, but they started working pretty darn well. Your comment about China is interesting

because I think the general perception, at least in the West, is that, you know, if anything, the relationship between China and Russia has strengthened, and that to some degree the reason why Putin can continue his adventurism in Ukraine is because the Chinese regime has helped the Russian economy. Is that, from your perspective, is that not the case? Mike, you know, using this chance being sinned by many people in the USA in the West, I have a bone to pick with the Western media.

I know that a lot of people have been saying, hey, the relationship between China and Russia is strengthening because of this situation, this war with Ukraine and sanctions. But have they done any research? Have they looked at the situation a little deeper? I don't think so, because this is just on the very surface. It's wishful thinking for Russia. That's the image Russia has been portraying and projecting everywhere.

Oh, we're friends with China, more. We're allies. We have a military pact, you know, military document, military union. We conduct military exercises together, joint exercises. Oh, the Chinese are buying our natural gas, and we're going to build another pipeline. We're going to double what we sell them, export our guests. and they're going to bail us out.

They're going to give us all the technology. That's the Russian, not point of view, propaganda projection. In reality, China hasn't done much at all. It's, well, the only thing it's been doing producing consumer goods and exporting to Russia, but that's to the benefit of China, not to Russia. That's a really good. Actually, that's a, I'm sorry, Constantine, for interrupting,

but that's a really good point, because, look, frankly, the Chinese regime always acts in its own best interest, right? I mean, to be fair, that's what most nations do. Always, always. They don't have friends. You say, Putin is trying to say, well, China is our friends. Chinese do not have friends. They have interests. Okay, and that's what Russians fail to understand,

because this myth is alive, and Russia as well. Russian people also think that since the West has turned away from Russia, Russia has turned away from the West, you know, the China is right there waiting with arms wide open. But no, there are rumors that they supplied some military products, drones or technology. But I highly doubt that. Because you know what happens? The minute someone finds a Chinese drone in Ukraine shot down and gives it as a proof, oh, China's going to have it in forms of sanction.

Why would they risk everything, you know, supply? and Iran has been supplying, yes, but not China. Yeah. And, you know, the last whole... I think they have been... I'm sorry for interrupting constantly. I'm just mindful of the time. And I want to pick that conversation up again,

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then full price plan options available. Taxes and fees extra. See full terms at mintmobile.com. Welcome back to the PDB situation report. I want to bring back our guest, Constantine Samilov. He is the host of the terrific YouTube channel. inside Russia. Now, Constantine, when we took a break, we were talking about something very interesting, which is this relationship between China and Russia. And there is a disconnect between how it's being

reported in the West and what you've been describing, right, in Western media and certainly in the White House and in other, I think, governments. They are looking at this as if the conflict with Ukraine has, over the past couple of years brought Russia and China together. And that China, in a sense, has been supporting the Russian war machine, mostly through economic reasons, purchasing of energy, that sort of thing. From your perspective, that's not the case. Do you get the sense that there is, look, China acts in its own best interest, right? It does what is in China's best interest.

And right now, I suspect, they view it in their best interest to have at least some association, some relationship with Russia, that continues Putin's efforts. Tell me if I'm wrong, but I mean, I think they have been providing a fair amount of economic support. I disagree. They have been providing lots of things that Russia doesn't manufacture, but they haven't been providing. They have been exporting, selling to Russia.

Russians have been trying to get a large loan from China. They have failed. Russians have been trying to sell lots of oil and natural gas to China. They have succeeded at selling, but they have failed at negotiating good prices. You know, they were selling natural gas and oil to Europe, its best customer in the past, you know. But that's not the case with China. The Chinese have a stronger negotiation position. Russia has nowhere to go except for China.

So they're not paying much for Russian oil and gas. And the last mail into Russia's coffin, so to speak, is recently happened a couple of days ago. You know, Vladimir Putin was trying, was betting everything on this, constructing this new, expanding this gas pipeline, SILA Siberia II, the power of Siberia, to re-rule. that natural gas from Europe into China, but he's failed. The Chinese announced a couple days ago that this is it. They're not going to do it. And I think that's a huge blow to Putin personally. And it's a huge blow to his power, his foundation of his power. And it's a huge blow for Russia because Russia has lost. You see, Putin is going down, but he's taking Russia with him. He's going to. He's going to. He's going to. He's going to. He's going to. He's going to. He's going to. He's going to be gone sooner or later, you know, but Russia will stay. And it's going to be going down and it's going to stay down. And that is the tragedy. Let's turn back to the Russian population inside the country. And let's look at the issue of manpower for the conflict, right? Just, you know, in terms of conscripts, in terms of the potential for another mobilization,

Talk to me about that a little bit. Talk about the mood of the people inside of Russia and their willingness to sign up, to join the military. I mean, is it, is morale high, or is it more that people are just looking to try to avoid this situation altogether? Mike, this is something that I can only guess and get the secondary signs, because I have not been to the front lines.

You know, I have not seen what's going on there. I've been hearing things. I've been hearing lots of things from different sources. In the front lines, the morale is extremely low. Russia is its worst. Corruption. They don't care about the soldiers, you know, all these things. They don't provide soldiers with anything.

There are so many things, there are so many sources I've heard to ignore. that must be true or some kind of truth in there. What about the population? Basically, they have been buying soldiers for the past two years. And it's a very sad thing. I'm very ashamed as Russian because a lot of my fellow citizens signed up voluntarily and went to the front lines for money. And you could see the supply diminishing very easily.

very easily by judging how much they have been offering. They've been increasing the sign-up bonuses. It all started with, I believe, 200,000 federal, like the federal government would pay you $2,000 and around $1,000 from a local government. Now the federal government is paying double, what it used to, $4,000, and the law. local governments you know different amounts but it's as much as 20,000 dollars.

Okay, they keep on raising the sign-up bonuses. It means they want they they have fewer and fewer people this pure economics and it just tells you about the situation. This is it. Everyone who wanted to go that they're done they're they're they're all gone and then don't forget about those who are killed at the front lines and those who have left just like myself. Over 3 million people have left since the beginning of the war, refusing to take arms, go kill Ukrainians, and refusing just to go along with Putin's regime, you know, paying taxes and so forth. So people, we go back to the question about fatigue. People are very tired of this. They want, they want peace, they want normal life. Well, unfortunately, it's.

a little too late. Even when peace is reached, there's no way of going back to normal life for Russia and Russians. The numbers, the statistics for casualties, fatalities have been all over the map on both sides, right? And you just hear there's such a discrepancy between, you know, one set of numbers. We've lost this many people and on the other side as well. from your contacts, from your insight, on the Russian side, what do you think is the best closest estimate to the number of fatalities that the Russian military suffered? Mike, I have, you put me on the spot. I don't know. I think the count is in hundreds of thousands, but I don't know. I don't know. know a lot. A lot of people

were killed. I know personally six people who have been killed. Not personally, but like neighbors, neighbor, neighbor's friend and, you know, things like that. So I think it's really safe to

say that it's hundreds of thousands. I mean, you're in good company. I was going to say, Constantine again, sorry to interrupt. You're in good company because There's not a lot of people actually have the actual facts. Again, you know, even talking about Intel community and the EU, our liaison partners, people are confused over what the actual numbers look like.

And that's just been the history of this ever since the beginning. You know, an interesting thing here to notice is that Russian officials, Russian propaganda government, they've been quiet about it. They haven't said, well, they've said three times, week number one, week number one, week number, 4 and September 21, 2021, when they announced

mobilization. And the numbers were like 5,000, something like that. So which is, of course, it was not true. It was a lie. But they keep ignoring as if nothing is happening.

And people are not asking this hugely important question. I don't understand why. Why they are, this is their sons, husbands. You know, they're fathers and they're just keeping quiet. Yeah. Last question, Constantine, and then I hope you'll come back again because I've got a lot more questions.

But just with our time that we have allowed for today, where does this go? How does this end? In your opinion? There are a few paths. And, you know, it depends, of course, it depends on Russia. because Russia is going to be the driving force in the end. I think that the victory will be Ukraine, and the victory will not come from the front lines,

but it will come from inside Russia. I think that the regime that is in the power right now will fall, because it's simply, it's not sustainable. It cannot go on for a long time. at this situation. The leadership will be changed. How, I don't know, there are different paths. Peaceful path, Russia would have to repent.

Russians would have to repent, because it's really about Russian people. It's not about, you know, a strong man. So they would have to realize what they have done by silently supporting, by not saying anything, by paying taxes, okay, by voting or not voting. So they have to realize, it's their responsibility.

It's their fault. That's their guilt. And they have to repent. They have to somehow find peaceful terms with Ukraine and start rebuilding their country. Or Russia might fall into different pieces. That's also a possibility. And that scares a lot of people.

It scares me too. But this is, you know, the more of this is going on, the more clear that scenario is, you know, kind of appearing. So there are other scenarios. Well, yeah. Well, Constantine, listen, this has been fascinating, and I very much appreciate your time, Constantine Semmelov.

I want to say thanks very much for joining us. I encourage the viewers. Please go check out Constantine's YouTube channel. It's called Inside Russia. There'll be a link to the channel in the show description to those watching on YouTube or listening on podcast. Constantine, thanks very much. I hope to see you again here.

the near future. Mike, thank you for having me. It's been a pleasure. I hope to come back and I'll answer more questions. We will definitely be calling you. Take care, man. All right. Now, listen, if we had a house band, well, now would be the time that they'd quietly just off to the side be kicking off our theme song. You didn't know we had a theme song, did you? Well, but basically what I'm saying is that's all the time we have for the PDB situation report. If you have any questions or comments, please reach out at PDB at thefirsttv.com. We love to hear from you. The highlight of the week for our interns, frankly,

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