The President's Daily Brief - PDB Situation Report | June 21st, 2025: Does Israel Really Need U.S. Involvement In Iran? & The Islamic Regime Teeters

Episode Date: June 22, 2025

In this episode of The PDB Situation Report:   Israeli warplanes continue to dominate Iranian airspace as the conflict grinds on. Tehran is vowing to fight until the end, but Israel appears to have the upper hand. Retired IDF Major General Yaakov Amidror joins us with insight into how Israel pulled this off—and what comes next.   Later in the show: With the regime teetering, could this be the moment Iranians finally overthrow the mullahs? Former Senator Robert Torricelli shares his perspective on the future of Iran and the West’s role in shaping what comes next.   To listen to the show ad-free, become a premium member of The President’s Daily Brief by visiting PDBPremium.com. Please remember to subscribe if you enjoyed this episode of The President's Daily Brief. YouTube: youtube.com/@presidentsdailybrief Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Welcome to the PDB Situation Report. I'm Mike Baker. Your eyes and ears on the world stage. All right, let's get briefed. We'll start things off with the latest from the Israel-Iran War. Israeli jets still control the skies over Tehran, and Iran's leaders, well, they're vowing to fight to the end. We'll get perspective from retired IDF Major General Yaakov Amador. Later in the show, regime change in Iran may no longer be a hypothetical. With the mullahs on the rullahs on the ropes, could the people finally bring 45 years of Islamic rule to an end? Former Senator Robert Torcelli weighs it. But first, today's situation report spotlight. It's been just over a week since Israel launched its campaign against Iran, and at this point, Israel controls the skies.

Iran's nuclear facilities, missile launch platforms, and top military leaders have all come under sustained attack. In response, Iran is firing off smaller and less than, less than. effective barrages, many now hitting civilian areas, including a hospital on Wednesday. So how has Israel pulled this off? And how long can the operation continue? Joining me now is retired IDF Major General Yaakov Amadro. He's a distinguished fellow at the Jamunder Center for Defense and Strategy, and he previously served as Israel's national security advisor. Sir, thank you very much for taking the time to join us here on the Situation Report. Thank you for having If we may, I'd like to start with a fairly broad question here at the 30,000 foot level.

And that would be, from your perspective, what is the goal here? Is the goal the destruction of the Iranian nuclear program or is the goal regime change? The goal is to destroy the ability of Iran to produce military nuclear capability. We don't want to have Iran with the bone. And we will do whatever is needed to prevent Iran from having this bomb. The second issue, which was important for us, is about the missiles that the Gulf of Washington. They launched more than 400, what was 450, heavy missiles into Israel. And we see the damage of each minute missile when it hit Tel Aviv or Haifa or Bershev.

The Iranians set a plan to produce 10,000 missiles like that, and even bigger than those. And we are determined to destroy the whole infrastructure that they have and not let them to build more missiles in the future. These are the two goals of the war, nothing more than that. Of course, on side effect of it, we had to destroy the air defense system of Iran, so we will have the ability to control the skies. So we did it. We had to minimize the ability to launch missiles into Israel, so we are killing many launches and were destroying many storages of missiles inside Iran. But this is only because our

homeland is getting the missiles that is limiting our time. So these are not the goals. The goals are very clear. I must admit that the regime afterwards will be weaker, no question. But we cannot impose a regime in Iran. It's too big. The Iranians will have to make the decision whom they might want to be the rulers in the future, the regime will be weaker, but we cannot make the change. The change should be done by the Iranians. If we look at the issue of the nuclear program, the destruction of the nuclear program, in your estimation, can that be done without the involvement of the U.S.? There is one installation that we don't know to do as good as the American. for the installation.

We don't have the mother four bomb. We don't have the ability to carry it. Americans can do it with B-52 and B-2. And if we want that to be destroyed, totally destroyed,

that should be done by the Americans. We can have damage to the place. We can block the entrances, for example. We can destroy the installations around But we cannot destroy completely as the Americans probably can with their capabilities. It is a very specific target. All the other parts of the world can be done without involvement of the Americans.

One remark, the Americans involved very much, and we thank America for that in our defensive efforts. There are two batteries of TAD in Israel. integrated to our air two and three systems, and together they are intercepting the coming missile, the 90% of what was intercepted what was done by American soldiers. But in the think side of the war, we made the whole war with American-made technology. Last time that I checked all the airplanes which forced for reasons to Iran and back, where American made.

So it's American invaliencies by technology, all the munitions that we are buying in America. Spare parts we are getting probably while sharing information, but the war itself is conducted by Israelis, only Israelis. American are helping in the defensive side. When we talk about the defenses, it appears as if the rate, the success rate of intercepts has dropped, has gone down.

I've seen some reports talking from 90% to somewhere in the 65% range. What accounts for that problem? No, the statistics is different. People are combining and making, try to understand, of the information that we had about Iron Dome. Iron Dome's success was between 90 to 95%. We never said that that would be the success of the of the arrow. We are speaking in about intercepting ballistic missiles. It's totally different challenge. And the launch into Israel till yesterday around 400 and the success of the deception was around 80%.

And that is within our expectations. We didn't have expectation for more than 80% relating to the iron drone to the arrow two and three versus against the ballistic missiles. Don't compare between the missiles coming from 100 kilometers to the missiles coming from 1,500 kilometers. I mean, it's much quite good at the government. No, that makes sense, absolutely. But let me ask this. The success that you've had in destroying the missile stockpiles and the ability to build more on the Iranian side,

that could account for, obviously, it does account for their inability going forward to launch the large-scale barrages that I think was part of their early strategy. But on the Israeli side, is there any issue in terms of shortages of interceptors, particularly for the arrow system? After now, we don't have. We made the calculation in the past, taking into account a long war. We understood that with Iran, it's not going to be a short one, and we have kind of calculation how much should we use in every state of the war. up to me now we didn't go outside the corporation that we did. Okay. And I know this is a tough question.

You may not necessarily want to go into any detail on it. But when looking at the success of the strikes that you've had so far, how good is the intelligence? How good are the damage assessments? And how confident can you be in understanding both, much damage has actually been done to the nuclear program infrastructure and also in terms of just targeting launchers, missile stockpiles, that sort of thing? You know, in such an event, there is a competition between the efforts to get more

intelligence about more targets, new targets, and the BDA. Because at the end, you have limited sources and you have to allocate. And in Israel, according to our DNA, I'm sure that we are allocating more for new targets than for the BDA. Okay, the BDA will wait, learn slowly, whatever.

And if we'll be, if we will have to do something else, to complete something that was not good enough during the bus, but if you ask me, where the intelligence is put in, more efforts now is not about the BDA, it's about new targets. But we have a pretty good intelligence about the BDA because if you destroy something concretes, you see it burning and you know how many missiles were ill that, you can take out all the missiles, and so and so forth.

So we have apparently good BDA, not complete BDA, it will take time, because we prefer to put our resources in what. What are you seeing new targets? General, if you would stay right where you are, I apologize, but we've got to take a quick break. And then we'll be right back. I've got a long list of additional questions to ask you. We'll be right back with General Amador and more on the Situation Report. Stick around.

Welcome back to the Situation Report. Joining me once again is retired IDF Major General Jakob Amadroar. General, thank you very much for sticking around. we were talking in the last segment about the issue of quality of intelligence, the ability to have confidence in damage assessments as you're working through the various operations. And one question I wanted to throw your way is when it comes to U.S. involvement, right? That's always, it's top of mind, obviously, in the U.S. And, you know, this seems to be a cottage industry of trying to guess what President Trump

may do in terms of jumping into this conflict. To what degree to those damage assessments play a role? Because I'm wondering, I guess, and I know this is somewhat speculation, but I'm wondering if perhaps the White House is waiting for those damage assessments to understand whether, in fact, their assistance is actually needed. It's clear that the system is needed for one purpose at least. And the one purpose is very clear. It's the destroying of Fodor installation.

Israel can not do it with our present capabilities within the Air Force. I'm sure that now in Israel somewhere, smart people are sitting and try to think, what can we do without the markets? I'm not sure that they refine the good solution. But this is the only point in which we need active support of the Americans in the offensive side of the war. To destroy the world, theoretically, four B2 can come,

do what they need to do, going back to Diego Garcia, and it's the end of the environment of the American in the world, theoretically. For sure, when you come in, you don't know it will be ended, I know all this or it,

but theoretically, this is all needed. And I don't think that the BDA is the issue here. I think that the Americans have good information about what we succeeded to do and what we want to do in the future. And they have a good impression, it's not good picture, impression of the success of Israel and what was destroyed and what will be destroyed in the future. Let's, if I could, I want to shift just slightly. And this is kind of where we fall into the realm of speculation, and I apologize for going

in that direction. But we talked just briefly about regime change, the idea that, yes, the regime will certainly, certainly be weakened as a result of what's been taking place, but ultimately, as you pointed out, it's up to the Iranian people as to what happens. From a speculative point of view, what could that look like from your perspective? What might come in behind this regime? It very much depends what will happen to the regime. It might be that this regime will remain because the regime is very strong and very

cruel and ready to take measures against any kind of opposition which might emerge in the district of stay around. And on the other side, there is no opposition as such. I mean, there is no any organization that you can call this the opposition. There's no group of people. You can say these are the leaders of the opposition. So when the regime is ready to take very hard measures. And on the other side, there is no organized opposition unless the mass of the people

are running to the palace and kill the king. Other than that, the regime can continue. So this is an option which is a very realistic one. But for our point of way, regime without nuclear capability and without missiles that can reach Israel is not a regime that we are going to fight with. I mean, we don't have any claim to the Iranians. We don't want to be destroyed by Iran, and this is why we went to the war. But if this regime remains, but without nuclear capability and resigns,

it's the business of the Iranian people to deal with the regime not ours. Yeah, that kind of falls under the category of, I suppose, in a way, not to put this, and I don't mean to be glib, but be careful what you wish for, I suppose. because we have recent cases. I agree with you. Don't try to do too much because you find the certain is too late. Looking at the operations so far, how important has it been and why to be targeting military and IRGC leadership? On our point of view, it is part of the military plan to make the decision makers, to the decision

making process is much more problematic for the rulers of Iran. We went to a war in which we wanted to be sure that we can reach the targets, that we can reach the goal of this destruction of the nuclear capability in the research. And we wanted it will be not impossible, but much more complicated for the decision makers to make the decisions. What to lunch, when to launch, were to move the anti-air besides, where to move the facilities which are very sensitive and so and so far. From our point of view, decapitating of the military leadership was very important part of the military plan, not connected at all to regime change. They are not the regime.

The regime is Hamaniyan down to Raj around him. And he herself is not so important. It's not a total organization. Tops is by law. That you kill Masarra. and this is the people don't know what to do. This is a strong establishment with many people with deep state behind it. It is not going to change if you take the leader.

But if you take quality, medium decision makers, the chief of staff, the staff, the head of the intelligence, so and so forth, you made the whole process of understanding what is the situation, how to react, very problematic for them. Which is more important to the regime? Is it Khomeini and the Mullahs or is it the IRGC? If the IRGC disappearing, it's the end of this Iran. Iran will remain as fate.

But this Iran, Iran of the Mullahs, will not show why. Is one of the Mullahs. The IRGC is the basis of all the Mollars. So it is very important, not important. This is the, if you ask for the regime, what is the center of gravity, the algae. Yeah, my understanding is, and correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems as if they have their, meaning that the Revolutionary Guard Corps,

they've got their tentacles in every aspect of Iran, the economy, the government, the media. Is you all right. They are, as I say, they are the basics. They are everywhere. and they have the responsibility to keep the regime going on and to make sure that no one will revolt. And we cannot eliminate the ILCC, it's a huge body. But if you ask theoretically, what is the basis for the stability

of the regime and the ability of the regime to survive? How would you describe the... This is going to sound odd, but how would you describe the management style or structure of the IRGC? And what I mean by that is, is it effectively a top-down where the generals are unquestioned, the leaders, and then below that, nobody really has decision-making authority. They're not given flexibility or responsibility, or is it more diffused than that? And they push down decision-making to lower levels. No, they don't push the decision-making to the lower levels, but they push the implementation

to the lower level. After having the policy, the lower level can act and probably if they achieve if they go ahead within the frame, no one intussed. Again, shifting gears a little bit. Going back inside Israel, from your perspective, what's the mood of the people like right now in Israel, as it relates to? to this conflict. I think that from the beginning of this part of the world, remember, we are in a war since the 7th of October, to be almost year enough ago, more than if we went. But I think that the decision to go to Iran was accepted as a very legitimate act.

You will very few voices against it. The feeling of most of the Israelis is that the, the feeling of the Israelis is that the, you feel very few. whole war cannot be ended without taking care for the head of the snake. Everyone understand that we fought Hamas. Hamas is the result of the efforts of the Iranians. We fought his body. Everyone understands that this is an algorithm which has been established by the Iranians, financed by the Iranians.

All the wood consistent came from Iran and Syria was kind of a state controlled by the Iranians. So I think that the feeling here in Israel that it would be impossible or not logic to make the law without ending it, taking care for the head of the snake. Is there any likelihood? I know what their public comments have been, but is there any likelihood that a ceasefire could exist and a peace proposal of some. sort could exist in which the Iranians are still allowed to enrich uranium? From our point of view, the answer is very strong, clear note. And I hope that the Americans will not do the same mistake again. The bad agreement, which was achieved by the Obama administration, was from our point of view a very bad one. And I hope that this administration

you not make the same mistake. What, again, I know this is a tough one to answer, I suspect, but when you look at the last agreement, the 2015 agreement, and, you know, part of that was the idea that, okay, well, we've got trust but verify, you know, we'll have inspectors on the ground. From your perspective, you know, if we put a percentage on it, to what degree, you know, was there transparency in that deal? The problem is that DIM was not the monitoring system, in spite the fact that the weapon system was not under monitoring at all. It was not part of the agreement.

And missiles hadn't been part of the agreement. It was just the enrichment. And the enriching pardon, the Iranians were smart enough. They didn't cheat it about the enrichment. They prepared the next generation of the ability to enrich. which is more problematic. New modern Sardi Fujits has been

produced and they learn how to do better than to accelerate the timetable in Richmond because the agreement gave them the ability to make research about new generation of and at the end of the day

they ended with new Sotting produce that can make the job much much easier for them. So And remember that the agreement was very limited in time. This year, 26, supposed to be the last thing of the agreement. So from all of the agreements, it was very bad agreement

because it gave the Iranians the ability to enhance their capabilities without reaching. And in 26, to end the agreement at all and to have all the legitimacy to produce. So I saw that it is very bad agreement. And by the way, when the grain was exposed to the media and the people, Susan Rice, my counterpart gave a speech in the APAC convention. She didn't say it's a good agreement. She said it the best that could be achieved. And I told them, your best is not enough. But I think that even that was not the rich story. The Americans had very good cards.

The negotiators missed the opportunity. They could achieve a better agreement. So I believe, I hope, I pray that this research will not make the same mistakes again. One last question, General. if I could. The question of the timing of the conflict when you started this operation against Iran, why that timing? Did you, again, I know this is tough to answer, but was there specific intelligence

that was acquired that said, now we have to move? Was it a matter of you've weak? the proxy network to such a degree that there was just an opportunity? It was a unique opportunity. What accounted for the timing of this? I think it's a combination. It's the perfect storm from the positive side. We understood immediately after the 7th of October that we have an opportunity here to get rid of the proxies. If we do it one by one. I don't think. fight all of them to battle. We are going on Hamas, then we are going on Hezbada, then we are the collapse of the regime in Syria gave us a huge opportunity. And that was the end of the

ability of the Iranians to rebuild the Hezbada, and the lost ability to influence the mid-list, what King Abdullah Jordan called the Shiite chrysan disappeared. And that was the the opportunity. Then there was the timetable of the Iranians. The Iranians decided, and we had very good intelligence about it, to escalate to

the whole process within the weaponization system, the group that they had. It was done very secretly because they understood that this is the only element that if they finish, it's the end of the story. We cannot stop the process anymore.

And we understood that we might miss it because if they continue with the same way that they decided to do, we are very little time to stop it. And the decision to accelerate the preparations for producing thousands of thousands of missiles. They have in mind that all 10,000 missiles within that 2 and a half scale. We understood that both are very close to a situation in which tomorrow it will be too late. And the combination between the new opportunity based on our achievements in the world and the understanding that tomorrow might be too late brought us to this period.

The day itself was the day 61 from the declaration of the president of the United States of America, that the Iranians have 60 days to reach the agreement. We waited the whole 60 days, risking our agents in Iraq that could be exposed. And the result was the date that we decided that it is after the timetable that the Americans and the Iranians had, according to America, to achieve an agreement. It's not the way which said 60 days. The president said 60 days. And nothing is moving on.

The Iranians are playing to have more time to continue with their nuclear and missile project. The Americans understood that the Iranians are playing with that. So that was the result. The day was picked because it was the 61 days after the declaration of the president, the decision, the principal decision was because it was almost too late, and the opportunity was there. And don't forget that having more open administration in Washington is also a factor in our decisions. Yes.

Listen, general, unfortunately, we've run out of time because I've got a number of questions left for you. I can only hope that when we call you again that you'll agree to come on back, because we very much appreciate all your experience, your insight, your comments. Thank you. General Yakov, Amadr, former national security advisor for Israel. Again, thank you very much for stopping by and sharing your experience. All right. Coming up after the break, as Israel strikes batteredekron and the regime reels, well, many are asking. Will Iran's people take back their country? We just had a little bit of that conversation.

We'll get perspective from former New Jersey Senator Robert Torreselli. Stick around. How many discounts does USAA auto insurance offer? Too many to say here. Multi-vehicle discount. Safe driver discount. New vehicle discount. Storage discount. How many discounts will you stack up?

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you need. There's a reason millions of companies like Mattel, Heinz, and all birds continue to trust and use them. With Shopify on your side, turn your big business idea into... Sign up for your $1 per month trial at Shopify.com slash special offer. Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report. As Israel's campaign grinds on, one question is gaining urgency. What happens if the Islamic regime in Iran collapses? While the Mullahs still cling to power, their grip is weakening. Decades of repression,

economic ruin, and international isolation have left many Iranians disillusioned. But if the regime falls, who fills the vacuum? And how should the U.S. and its allies respond? That's another good question you've asked. joining me now is former U.S. Senator Bob Torres-Sel. He's a long-time advocate for reform in Iran and remains closely engaged with opposition voices and exiled leaders watching events unfold. Sir, thank you very much for taking the time out on the situation. Thank you for having me. I've actually look forward to it. Excellent. Well, hopefully you feel that same way after we finish talking. Let's start from sort of the top line view. Give me your perspective. on what's happening right now with the Israel-Iran conflict.

Mike, let me also to make clear from the beginning, although I've spent most of my adult life in the United States government, since leaving the government, although I'm a private citizen, I've stayed involved in this issue by a consultant to the opposition in Iran, those who would like to replace the Ayatollah. So I want your audience to be clear that while my views are always the interests of the United States, I've interpreted that interest also involved. regime change in Iran. I want to be completely forthcoming with you. I think the Israelis may have started with a limited objective that was to compromise the purification of uranium, plutonium, by the Iranians. It quickly expanded to also destroying their ability to make ballistic missiles. But now we're

on the verge of something broader, and that is, building. upon the enormous economic pressure and the political stability and the isolation of the Iranian government, we're entering into that phase of regime change. That is where we could solve these problems permanently by eliminating the Ayatollah and or the government. That obviously is a prescription to solve a much bigger problem, but also much, much more complicated. It's interesting because Nanyahu, as in others, on the Israeli side, have been, I think, relatively clear that, you know, their objectives are to go after and to decimate the nuclear program to, you know, ensure they can no longer fire ballistic missiles into Israel. But they've also been clear that, you know,

regime change as an objective is not on their plate, but that, you know, should conditions allow for it, then that's up to the Iranian people. We've become very close to that policy morphing into something different, and that is that as Iran gets more destabilized, and you're not starting from scratch. There's enormous resistance to the Iranian government within Iran. You've seen this in street demonstrations that have come up three times in the last 15 years that have come very close to, I think, threatening the regime. The question now is you never know with a society, and it's very hard to judge from the outside when you destroy its military capability when you do economic damage when a foreign power attacks.

This can swing two ways. It can consolidate the population behind the regime, as I think would happen in the United States if someone attacked us, or it can further destabilize it, where people realizing they're paying an enormous price for the actions of an illegitimate government and seek its overthrow. We've gotten this wrong as much as we've gotten it right in the United States and trying to figure that out. Generally, you don't get it right from abroad. My own view, knowing the expatriate community and watching Iran, I think it's a powder cake. I think with a push, with a push of the Iranian people could take this into their own hands. Let me ask you this.

I've talked to a number of Iranians who have said, look, the people, not the regime, but the people, they don't have a problem with Israel, right? That's not an issue. There's almost more of a problem between the Persians and the Arabs in a way. But at the same time, you know, you don't tend to rise up and protest and overthrow a regime when you're being bombed, right? And so there's, I think, I get the sense in talking to some of Iranians that they're very conflicted here. You know, no matter how awful your leader is, you tend to rally around them when you're getting attacked from the park. Nevertheless, looking at, as I tend to, American interests exclusively, the interest of the United States, despite what our government has said in recent years

is for this government to be overthrown. I know, I know we've made the that mistake before. We've tried regime change in places where we couldn't, we shouldn't, we did, and it backfired. I accept all that. We've made a lot of mistakes in this arena. In this case, I want your audience to remember. These are the people who took the hostages in 1980. These are the people who planted IEDs all over Iraq that took the arms, lives, and legs of hundreds and thousands of American soldiers. These are the people who have funded Hezbollah. Bala and Hamas. This is not a regime that had a bad policy for a while. I don't say this lightly. They are the face of evil on earth. And the Israeli bombing campaign may rid them of the ability

to purify fuel and to build an atomic weapon. That may succeed. But ultimately, the only way to get stability in the region and the nuclear threat is to eliminate this regime. If the Israelis can do it, more power to them, I think it's going to take more than the capabilities of Israel, that the seeds of that revolution are on the street to the cities of Iran. I'd point you to the last three major disruptions that you've seen in Iran. People clearly are ready given a push. The problem in the American government, in my opinion is, we've come to the view that there's no alternative. And this is probably influenced by what happened in Iraq, that if you take out Saddam Hussein is chaos. There's no one else. Iran is not Iraq. It is a large country. It has

institutions. It has a middle class. It has a professional class. It has educational institutions. I think there's much more reason to believe that if the Ayatollahs were gone, you could get an internal revolution. And I say that, as you just said, you talked to Iranians in America, there's a strong diaspora community, a wealthy diaspora community, an educated of a community, very dedicated to rebuilding the country, hopefully with a democratic government. And in my case, where I'm close to the M.E.K, probably the leading group of the diaspora, they're almost a shadow government. They have people as part of a coalition or by themselves could govern Iran tomorrow if they could get past their revolution.

guards in the Ayatollah. So let's talk just a minute. I know that a lot of this is speculation, right? I mean, and that's and that's true. And also, before I forget, I appreciate you. I'm glad that you mentioned all the blood that's on the current Iranian regime's hands from their activities in Iraq. I don't think a lot of people understand just how many lives were lost or damaged, injured. When you see an injured American veteran without an arm or a leg, you think Iran. That's where those IEDs came from. Yeah, it's, again, I don't think it's really understood by the general population. They think of Iran as something outside of, you know, any concern that the U.S. may have had in the past.

But here, let me ask you this, if I could. The IRGC, like, they've got their hands in everything. They're in all aspects of Iran. And what's the, and again, I know this is speculation, sir, but what's the likelihood that whenever comes in behind this regime, should there be change? What's the likelihood that the IRGC is going to be somehow not involved? I mean, I have a hard time imagining them giving up their grasp of power. I don't think they give it up. I think the best analogy to see the IRC is the Nazi Gestapo. It is an army within an army.

It is an army within the regime designed not to protect from foreign enemies, but to protect the regime from the people. And kind of like a Gestapo, they own means of production, they own real estate, they are a part of the economy. They're a nation within the nation. They will not give up power gently. This is their families. It's their standard of life.

It's their legacy. It's their life. They will cling to the last possible moment. But it's a nation of 94 million people. If you get a revolution on the streets, as powerful as the IRGC may be, look what happened to Savak. Savok was the Shah's internal army. Same model, same methods, same brutality, same economics. They vanished overnight.

When the Shah fell, they ended up in California, they ended up in Iraq, they ended up in France, they headed for the winds. So will these people. Well, I had a great deal of the senior leadership has already been taken out during this current. The senior list has been taken out, and I will guarantee you just by instinct watching these characters through my life that if you're a senior mid-level person in the IRGC, you've got an airline ticket and some cash in your back pocket just in case. Where in this equation does Reza Balabia and the monarchists fit? I know this is controversial in Iranian community in the United States, but you know, you ask an honest question, you get an honest answer. There's a lot of emotional attachment by a lot of American Iranians who were in the Shah's regime, came and saw a refuge in the United States, and we accepted them and they built good lives here. I know they have memories of the Shah's time. There's a nostalgia to it.

But very frankly, the specter of the Shah's son returning to Tehran is a gift for the Iranian regime. Their argument, like unfortunately some in the American government is, well, the Ayatollah may be a problem, but there's no alternative. If there's no Ayatollah, it's the Shah. And if that's the twin reality, the Ayatollahs or the Shah, we're not going to get a public uprising to overthrow the government. People are not going to make that choice. And that's a false choice. There are democratic sectors within Iran. There is the IRGC, there's the MEK that is on the outside, based in Paris, that is an umbrella for thousands of Iranians within Iran and in the diaspora. As I said, there's almost a shadow government. There is an alternative. But as long as

the regime can hold up the specter that if we fall, you've got the Shah back. It's a gift to them. Senator, if you could stay right where you are, I apologize, but we have to take a break, and then we'll be back with Senator Torricelli and more here on the situation report. Stick around. Some follow the noise. Bloomberg follows the money, because behind every headline is a bottom line. Whether it's the funds fueling AI or crypto's trillion dollar swings, there's a money side to every story. And when you see the money side, you understand what others miss. Get the money side of the story. Subscribe now at Bloomberg.com. Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report.

Joining me once again is former Senator Bob Torricelli. We've been talking about in a broad sense what could happen, what may really. result if there is a regime change. The senator, anytime you say regime change, particularly here in the U.S., people get a little bit squirrelly. I understand that. And yeah, and so I'm wondering from your perspective, again, I don't disagree with you. Look, anything other than that is just limited, you're putting lipstick on a pig or a band-aid on a sucking chest road. How do you want to describe it? You're kicking the can down the road to deal with the problem. At some, point in the future. And so I don't disagree at all that that would be the best outcome. Let me ask you

this. I know how people in the U.S. government and elsewhere feel about it, but let's look at the regional actors, the Saudis, the Jordanians, and others. What's your perspective on how they feel about the current conflict, but also about this idea of a change in Iranian government? So in the neighborhood, all nations are not equal in power or influence. There's an outside sphere of Iran, and you can understand it. It is the largest country is potentially the most powerful. It is the most unstable and is by far the most aggressive. So this willingness to arm, to seek alliances, to seek protection,

at the same time to engage with the Iranian to try to keep an edge off the problems. I don't want to say this in a disparaging way, but in the region there's always been a sense that you can kind of trade your way out of trouble, just keep enough commerce going there, one type or another, to keep peace with them. But if you ask me, would there be a relief in Bahrain or in Riyadh, if the regime fell, I think there would be fireworks. They just won't say it out loud. They will not say that out loud.

There's an enormous intimidation. You know, I have affection for some of these nations in the region, so I hate being overly critical of them. But the reality is most of these regimes in the region live in sphere of fundamentalism and poor parts of their societies that are not as in touch with the monarchies or the regimes. they live in the top lives in fear of the bottom. And there's always this belief that the fundamentalist Islam of Iran can stoke that problem. So it's not simply a fear that Iran can attack militarily with sophisticated weapons. It's more they can create unrest on the streets from below. Monarchies often live with that fear.

In this case, I think even more so. So the world's a strange place. It creates odd alliances, but I will guarantee you the Saudis for whatever they say and the UAE for whatever they say and the Kuwaitis are hoping with bated breath there could be a regime change here without them having to show their cards. Kind of go back to the idea of, you know, be careful of what you wish for and what could come in behind this, right? We've got recent case studies, certainly Libya, a good example, Iraq. I mean, we know that what comes next, you know, can be worse. That's all true. Let me tell you, I'm old enough to have a lot of old stories.

When I was a kid, out of law school, I worked in the Carter White House. And I remember Hamilton, Jordan having a staff meeting saying, you know, if we can just avoid the problems of Vietnam or Watergate, we'll have a successful administration. I remember thinking, that's your scale of history? We're learning from the last 10 years? Actually, it wasn't even 10 years. We're learning from the last six years? Isn't history a little deeper than that?

What you say is true. Regime change in Libya backfired. Regime change, even in Iraq, backfired. I accept all that. Regime change in Germany and Italy and Japan worked out pretty well. regime change in Poland and Czechoslovakia and East Germany worked out pretty well. So I'm not telling you it always works. I'm not telling you it doesn't have dangers. It does. But in many ways, our attempt to change some of these governments, whether it was a product of war or economic

pressure or otherwise, in many cases it also made the world better. All I'm suggesting to you is is that kind of like my days out of law school in the Carter White House, we need to think more broadly than our unfortunate experience of the last 10 to 15 years. As you were talking, sir, I was just, I was trying to, in my mind, catalog any successful regime change examples in the Middle East. That's a, it's a, it's a, it is a challenge. And I don't know that I can. I, you know, I had hoped that the regime change in Egypt was going to be more successful, but if I could go back and take Mubarak, Barack Obama almost single-handedly took out Mubarak, and we ended up with

a more fundamentalist, more brutal, less American a line. The United States has a way of making our own problems. So I'm giving you the best example against my argument. And a lot of it, admittedly, is speculation. So I know I'm putting in sort of that uncomfortable position of having to answer questions with speculation. But is the opposition, let's look at the M.E.K. As the best example, is the opposition strong enough to, and again, I'm not sure how to phrase this, to take control to step into a vacuum should the current regime collapse? I think you're phrase, step into a vacuum is the key here. No opposition group is strong enough right now to invade Iran, defeat their military forces, and march into Tehran. If that's the model you have in mind,

then the State Department is right. There's no one with that capability. But that is unlikely to be the scenario. I mean, I would have argued that Lenin wasn't strong enough to march across the German border and take over Russia either. He returned to, I think he returned to St. Petersburg with 24 men with Napoleon left Corsico with, what, 80 men to take down the monarchy? It's walking into what you said is the vacuum. The aayatolls are only falling for the same reason the Shah fell. It's not that their guns don't work anymore. It's that people just stop cooperating. At some point, soldiers just say, well, I'm not pointing these guns at my neighbors anymore. People just won't support the regime anymore. They stop working. Revenue stops coming in.

People take to the streets and they take over the means of production. Several thousand oil workers right now, if they revolted, could shut down the Iranian economy. Before I get, sir, sorry for interrupting. I'm at that age where if I don't, ask what pops into my head, I may forget. So you mentioned, as an example, should the oil workers go on strike. There was a recent situation, truck drivers on strike in Iran. Exactly. And then it went off the headlines. It kind of flared up briefly. It looked like it might, catch on, and then we hear nothing else about it. What can you tell us about that situation? First, you've got to be very careful with news out of Iran. In the United States, if the news

New York Times doesn't have a reporter there or the network doesn't send a reporter, and neither of which exists in Tehran, from an American perspective, it didn't happen. And you've got to be very careful of that. For months, there were revolts going on in the streets of Iranian cities, and the average American would have known it was even going on because there's no mainstream reporter there. So you've got to be careful of that. But the scenario you're talking about is exactly what I have in mind, that this doesn't come from armed invasion. regime change because the truck drivers won't deliver food, the oil workers won't keep the pumps running or the docks going. In the case of the Shah, it was the small shopkeepers. They just shut down. They wouldn't take customers anymore. And it created an economic collapse. This happened from lower middle class store owners, really were the heart of the collapse of the Shah. Where this comes from in Iran, no one knows.

I guarantee you whatever the CIA thinks they're wrong. They don't know. You remember the famous memo that the CIA wrote to President Carter, predicting that the Shah had another 20 years as they couldn't have an island of stability, and he was gone in two weeks. And that's not a fault of the institution. It's a fault of sitting thousands of miles away. It's a problem.

You just don't know. But it's wild, but I have the overwhelming instinct. it's coming from, just so you look at the circumstances, it's coming. And to your question, could the M.E.K. fill the vacuum? Yes, either alone or more likely in a coalition of other opposition groups. They have the resources, the will, the expertise to come in in a vacuum, in a vacuum, not in a war, in a vacuum, and make the trains run on time, get the oil pumped, get the mail, delivered, pick up the garbage, and transition into a free economy of some definition. I mean, I know what you are hoping for, which I think, you know, obviously I agree, right, it would be the

best thing for regional stability, for national security interests of the U.S. and our allies for regime change. So I know that that's the hope for result, but what do you think will happen? I have no idea. I can tell you the end game, but this could play out over the next five days or play out over the next 10 years. I mean, at the end of the day, a regime with this narrow abase with these economic problems that has oppressed its own people, I mean, every time they leave the world by far in executions. I mean, to be a member of the NECA, for example, is a death sentence. You do that over enough years and you kill enough people, you suppress enough people, another generation losing any quality of life, any economic opportunity.

It compounds, it builds to an inevitable result. The regime cannot survive it. But different cultures have a different measure of the ability to absorb pain. Look at it as a spectrum. Of all the nations of the world I know, the country that can take pain the least is the United States. You know, you disrupt our quality of life. I'm not saying this. I love America, but this is not our strong suit.

Disrupt our quality of life and to our credit our freedoms, have us lose faith in the future. The incumbent government is going to have a problem. But it has surprised me in my life the ability of some cultures to absorb pain. Enormous pain. We look how long the Russians put up with Soviet communism. generations were lost, but they put up with it. And that is true with many regimes in the Middle East. Look how long the Chinese put up with Maoist communism.

I mean, the great leap forward to the 1950s, 50 million people starved to death, but the regime continued. Now, so how long people will put up with this is different by cultures. But that doesn't change the end result. in the end it accumulates, the pressure accumulates, and people rebel. It will happen in Iran. You ask me when? Honestly, I have no idea. Neither do you anybody else.

Only that it's coming. I hope that when we pick up the phone and give you a call, you'll come back because I'd love to. You'd miss it this. I would enjoy it, and I'm honored to be on today, and thank you for having me. Senator Bob Torres-Seli, here on the Situation Report, I suspect we We'll be talking with the Senator again in the not too distant future, given I don't think this conflict is going to be solved anytime soon, frankly. That's all the time we have for this week's PDB situation report. And if you have any questions or comments, please reach out to me at PDB at thefirsttv.com.

You know what we do with your questions, your comments. We take the best ones every month and we smash them together into an episode that we call, Ask Me Anything. You got another one in the tube ready to launch, so keep the cards and letters coming. Finally, to listen to the podcast of this show ad-free, you can do that. You can do that very simply. Just become a premium member of the president's daily brief by visiting pdbpremium.com. See, I told you it was simple. I'm Mike Baker.

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