The President's Daily Brief - PDB Situation Report | June 28th, 2025: How Israeli Intelligence Crushed Iran & Trump’s Global Power Test

Episode Date: June 28, 2025

In this episode of The PDB Situation Report:   The war between Israel and Iran is over—but behind the scenes, it was Israel’s intelligence services that helped deliver the decisive edge. Former Mossad official Oded Ailam joins us to explain how Israeli espionage shaped the outcome.   While the weapons of war grabbed headlines, the end of the conflict came through diplomacy, pressure, and negotiation. Stephen Yates from The Heritage Foundation breaks down how the Trump administration ended the war—and what that reveals about America’s global power today.   To listen to the show ad-free, become a premium member of The President’s Daily Brief by visiting PDBPremium.com. Please remember to subscribe if you enjoyed this episode of The President's Daily Brief. YouTube: youtube.com/@presidentsdailybrief Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Welcome to the BDB Situation Report. I'm Mike Baker. Your eyes and ears on the world stage. Let's get briefed. Now, first up, the war between Israel and Iran officially came to an end earlier this week. Perhaps you heard about it. But the outcome wasn't shaped by firepower alone. It was Israel's intelligence apparatus that helped tip the scales. Oded Alam. These Mossad's former deputy head of global operations, they'll join us for more on that. Later in the show, the war may have been fought with missiles, drones, and jets, but it was ended with a mix of hard and soft power from the White House. The Heritage Foundation's Stephen Yates, good friend of the show, stops by to look at how the Trump administration brought the conflict to a close and what that strategy tells us about U.S. power in the world today. But first,

today's situation reports spotlight. Now, the war may have played out in the skies over Tehran, but its outcome was shaped long before the first missile was fire. Years of intelligence groundwork laid by Mossad gave Israel a decisive edge. Reports say Mossad embedded dozens of local collaborators inside Iran, mapping air defenses, identifying nuclear scientists, and tracking senior IRGC commanders. Covert drone bases were built deep inside Iranian territory and drone components were smuggled in piece by piece, sometimes in suitcases. So when the first strikes came, they were surgical, as you saw. Air defense systems were crippled in minutes. Key targets were taken out before they could react. Now, for more on this, I'm joined by Oded Alam. He's the former deputy head of global operations from Assad.

Odette spent over 22 years in Israeli intelligence, leading high-level counterterrorism operations and global intelligence missions. Odette, thank you very much for take. the time to join us here on the Situation Report. Thank you for having me. Where I'd like to start is an area that I know is it's imperfect right now in terms of the intelligence because things are still developing. But I'd love to get your perspective on the success of the strikes to date. If the objective was, let's call it twofold, the destruction of the Iranian regime's nuclear program and their ballistic missile capability. Could you talk to me about what you're seeing from the initial damage assessments?

Regarding the initial damage assessments, it's a bit of tricky. And why is it tricky? Because in Purdue, for instance, the damage was inflicted by the bombs that were penetrating into the mountain and the explosion had almost caused some sort of a seismic, small, miniature earthquake within the complex of the FDU nuclear facility. But it is very difficult to assess it from aerial photos from a bomb because the penetration was deep inside under the mountain. It's not just normal, regular BDA that you can assess by aerial photos, satellite photo, and so on.

You need to have some sort of intelligence and access inside the compound. And this is more difficult to do. The Iranians themselves do not have a full picture right now of the amount of damage. and Habok that was inflicted on them, they are still, by the way, bewildered. And they have some problems in penetrating this compound just for the sake of nuclear radiation. Okay?

So it's hard to say and hard to assess right now. I know in percentage, how much, 60, 70, 80, but I can say one thing for sure. Israel has a very, very precise and excellent sources of information, not just from aerial photos, but from ground operations. And I cannot, of course, elaborate on what the nature of the intelligence. But we have seen the outcome of the Israeli intelligence and the precision and the accuracy. So if the Israeli intelligence services right now predict that there was a substantial damage caused to those installation, and I'm not just talking about Purdue, I'm talking about Natanz, I'm talking about his Pahan, and I'm even talking about Iraq. I trust their judgment fully, and I'm absolutely certain that there was a considerable damage.

to the compounds. You have to remember one thing which is important. Centipuge are very, very vulnerable, and I would say cannot stand any sort of external pressure. And it's very hard to replace damage centrifuge. It takes a long time to do it. And so this tremendous internal blow would definitely cause a considerable damage to the project. Now, there's a big question. Have they managed to evacuate those 400 presumed kilo of enriched uranium to 60% grade beforehand, or is it buried under the rubbles, or is it maybe in Espahan, as some say, I don't know. I don't know. I can just guess that the Israeli intelligence has more knowledge than anyone else regarding that. And from the way that the Iranians are right now acting, it seems to me, you know, from my years of experience in this field,

that they are quite, I would say, devastated by the amount of damage that they hadn't predicted that was caused by Israel and the coup de grace of the United States. I don't think they are able right now to recover quickly. It will take time. It will take a lot of efforts, a lot of energy. I'll tell you another thing. In order to recover and to create some sort of a nuclear facility, even one or two warheads, you have to conduct series of tests in order to be certain that this thing can work.

Now, those tests naturally can be very easily detected by the Israeli intelligence. So I would presume it would be quite difficult for the Iranian to mislead or hide any sort of big leak into the nuclear being on a threshold of a nuclear nation. So right now it is important to monitor as much as possible in all different ways and all different sources. what is going to be the next step of the Iranian? And of course, we should drag them by the ear to the negotiation table. No, I think that's, that kind of takes us into the next question, I suppose, because in the immediate aftermath of the, certainly of the U.S. airstrikes, and the Israeli military, obviously, the Air Force had been having,

the Israeli Air Force had been having remarkable success in controlling the skies even over Tehran and taking out a variety of important and valuable targets. But after the U.S. strikes, obviously the big question in the immediacy of the big question was, what will Iran do in terms of retaliatory strikes? With that off the table in theory because of this initial ceasefire, then the question has become, okay, were the strikes successful in meeting those obligations? And I think you laid out very logically, you know, what that looks like right now. And also I think the problem is we're speculating because of the lack of human, of human

intelligence and specifics about that damage. But given all your time running global operations from Assad, when you look at what sort of damage we're talking about, you're looking at their ability to reconstruct their program. What's your gut telling you, based on all your experience? Because, you know, I know that's asking you to speculate. But from what you've seen and from your experience in the past, do you think, as an example, the Iranian regime was successful in moving the enriched uranium off-site? Because there was a fair amount of talk about the potential for these strikes leading up to the actual strikes.

I don't know. I really don't know what is the answer. I think the coming days and weeks will be more, will enable us to be more accurate in our assessment. But I know one thing for sure. The Iranian's capability to reach a nuclear warhead, which is not just enriched uranium, it's all the facilities of conducting the warhead, which is extremely, extremely complicated issues. It's not just, you know, you plug in two things, and then there it goes, you know. I think the diminishing of the scientists

and diminishing of their archive and diminishing some sites that were supposed to be sites of nuclear, construction is taking the Iranians back quite a time. Let's say we don't stop the clock but we definitely

we move it backwards to somewhere around 2019 where they started the big leap forward. So what is important right now is to have the ability and I think we have the ability is to

monitor and supervise every single step of the Iranians and react to that. I mean, we have to be proactive in the reaction, which means not allowing them under no circumstances to rebuild their infrastructure or starting to play around with this enriched uranium. What is also important is the nature of the agreements that will come with the United States regarding that. And I really hope that the Trump administration will not back off from the initial demands that they had demanded at the beginning, which applies not only to the nuclear program, but also to the use of proxies, to these ballistic missile manufacturing,

and all of it, we should expect to have some sort of an agreement that will encompass all the layers that we are talking right now and not just the certain nuclear elements. Also, I would tell you frankly, for my position, I don't care if the Iranians will enrich uranium to the grade of 2.6% in Iran as long as it's supervised by Americans. And when I'm talking about Americans, I'm talking all on the ground, not just, you know, coming back and forth, but sitting on the ground in the facility and supervising them. I don't see that as a threat. And it might be some sort of, I would say, concession to the pride of their regime, but it has to be monitored extremely careful. And as I said before, it has to engulf an overall strategy of eliminating this regime being a threat

to Israel and to the war. O'Ded, I would say that up until this point, all these years, there's never been transparency with the Iranian program. And so I guess the question is, do you believe that there's some fundamental change that's resulted from this recent, let's call it the 12-day war, and that's what President Trump referred to it as, and combination of Israeli and U.S. military action, is there some fundamental see change in the way that Iran will approach negotiations, because I'm not sure why we would think going in and creating another agreement, we would get any different result other than the

Iranian regime continuing to obfuscate and cheat and not provide 100% transparency on their program. You're absolutely right. And it comes to the next point which I wanted to refer to. If you remember, after the agreement in 2015, the JPCOA, immediately the Iranian started breaching this agreement. They were supposed to remove three and a half pounds of low-enriching uranium out of Iran. They didn't do it. They had to supply all the documentary regarding their military nuclear program to the IAA. enjoyed and the Mossade had stolen their eye card, which reflected how much they were actually lying and cheating.

And of course, we are talking about all other hanky-panky games that have played with the inspectors of the IEA. I can tell you from here to eternity stories and how they are trying to deceive and lie. And so I don't believe and I don't trust them at all. The negotiation is one part, But I think the only way, the only way to stop the Iranian from trying to recover and reach uranium or their ballistic missiles is a change of the regime. There is no other alternative but a change of the regime. This is an ideological jihadist regime that is dedicated to the eradication. of the Zionist entity and the West as well. You should simply listen to what they're saying,

and they are saying that out loud. So the only way, if we want to make sure that this will not happen again, is a change of the regime. Now, this is tricky, because to change the regime, we've seen a lot of time Israel and America, in Afghanistan, and Iraq and Israel and Lebanon, When you try to change the regime externally, it's problematic. The change should come from within.

But we could encourage, we can use a lot of, let's say, Musa tactics in order to facilitate internal inclusion in Italian debate. I want to pick up on this topic. I need to take a quick break. And so if you'll stay right where you are, We'll be back with Oded Elam, former deputy head of global operations from Assad, right after this break and the Situation Report, stick around. Welcome back to the BDB Situation Report.

Joining me once again is Odad Alam. He's the former deputy head of global operations from Assad, a perfect person to have on this show given current situation. Odette, thank you for sticking around. We were talking in the last section at the very end. You mentioned what is often a very touchy, difficult subject, and that's regime change. Now, based on what you're seeing, and again, based on all the experience that you've had over the years, do you think that that is a possibility, or is that just something that is a hoped for a byproduct

that is not going to materialize. I would say one thing for sure. We are not going to see the Syrian amazing collapse of the regime in three days, simply because there is no real opposition in Iran. We don't have those malicious that we have seen in Idlib, in the north, where Erdogan just put a glue on them and tied them together and they went, they start driving their to Yura SUV towards Damascus, and in three days we saw the collapse of the regime. That one happened. We have some militias in Iran. We have some in Kurdistan. We have some the Mujahideen

Chalk, which are secular militias, and we have the Baluchis, they're very weak. and they don't have the power to overcome this regime. The turnover can be in two ways. First of all, internal coup, either by the military or the army, which in a way, it's adversary to the Republican Guard, or within the Republican Guards, or within the higher echelon of the... Iran, assuming that Khomeini is no longer possesses the power that he had before. This is one alternative, and it's very feasible.

And I can just imagine that there are some sort of contacts between foreign intelligence services and some prominent people within the regime. Okay? And I don't want to elaborate on that. Now, the other option is, of course, something that comes from the internal, from the boiling reluctancy of the Iranian people toward the regime. And you can, we have to know the fact. The Persian are only 40% of the Iranian population.

We're talking about around 92 million people. There are only 40% there are Balochis, to Keminist, Azeris, all. whatever, you know, it's not a real nation in a way that you look at America and you look at in Europe or something like that. It's some sort of a rough combination that will gather somehow and it's volatile. It can collapse also and be disintegrated into different nations. Now, I'll give you just an example of what could have happened and what should have happened. About three weeks ago, there was a strike in Iran of truck drivers.

The strike was because of fuel shortage and it's unbelievable. Iran is the second world's biggest natural gas supplier. And so on, it engulfed around 450,000 truck drivers in 155 cities. Now, they were on strike and it was a huge huge challenge to the regime because they had hardly ways to handle it. But they ran out of money and they ran out of money and they went back to work. Now just imagine if there was some fund, even external fund, that could have fund this and elevate this strike in order to get more people into it and maybe,

like we've seen in 2009 during the Obama period and in 2022, the Aminiy and the hijab. So they need external support, but the external support cannot replace the Iranian people, which means we cannot dictate from outside to the Iranian of their faith. They have to take the faith into their own hand, but we can assist it, we can elevate it, We can help that, not just, you know, by words of comfort and, you know, clapping hands to the bravery of the people, but more into a much more involvement. And we should, I think, work towards this goal and it's feasible because you have to remember the regime now is in worst position since August 2, In 1988, the end of Iraq war, it's weak, it's vulnerable, it penetrated instead of panic. And so we should just hit with the nail on this war in order to crack it.

It will take time. It will not be a month, two months or so, and it would take time, but it's possible. It's interesting because I'm old enough to remember the fall of the Shah. And I know from my couple of decades with the agency that kind of hoping for anticipating the rise of the Iranian people, right, against the regime, against the Mullahs and the IRGC, has always been a little bit like the Holy Grail. We've always anticipated it could happen. We've hoped that it could happen. There's been moments, as you pointed out correctly. There's been moments in time, but it's always obviously fallen short.

So I guess I'm one of those people who's become very cynical over the idea that that may happen. And so I guess my question for you is, at the end of all of this, if we look down the road a month or two from now, and we have more accurate damage assessments. And right now there's a defense intelligence agency report that was leaked. I'm sure you've seen it. It was leaked to the press only a matter of a couple of days after the strikes. And it went out to the press. And admittedly, it's imperfect information.

It's early intelligence. But none of that mattered because the narrative that got out in the public was, well, these strikes, you know, were not as effective as the White House said they were that they may be as little as a couple of months away from rebuilding their program. So there's that narrative that's floating out there. And I guess the question is, to you, is do you believe that at this point, if we get a month or two down the road and the assessments are that there was damage, but that they will be able to rebuild in, let's say, a year or so, and the regime hasn't changed. Do you look at that and consider it a, I hate to say this, do you look at it and consider it

a failure? Absolutely not. I think we had caused tremendous damage we inflicted on their missile capabilities, on their status in the environment, in the ecosystem that we are in. they can look. They have no proxy. They have no proxies. They have the Kizvala, banished. The Houthis fired two missiles. Even the Iraqi militias didn't join in.

And of course, Syria is gone. And on top of it, look at the stand of the Chinese and the Russians. They didn't come for help. And the Iranian begged for Russian help. and the Russian simply they aside. Iran is completely isolated with no actual defense system that can defend Iran. They are vulnerable to external attack and internal attack. We have changed the course of things dramatically.

It doesn't really matter right now if we eliminated the 400 kilos or we did not. It doesn't matter. You have to look at the overall picture where Iran is right now. They never been in such a situation since the, as I said, since the August, 24 of August 98, the end of the Iraq-Iran war. And they are very, very vulnerable, and they lost their, I would say, their initiative in the region. Remember, they took upon themselves to spread the Shia into the Middle East and to the Western world. And remember, the Shia are only 15% of the Muslims, okay? And they become

like the big godfather of Islam. And they are not anymore. And this is a major and tremendous change in the region. And I will see the outcome also. with the moderate Sunni countries around them. No, I agree with you 100% of that. I just, I'm worried about the narrative, what gets driven out there in the media. I guess you can only worry about that so much because it's, at the end of the day, I suppose it really doesn't matter all that much. But you can already see that there's a narrative that's building about this.

But I couldn't agree with you more. The damage over the past year and a half, and still to this day, of the proxy network that they built and trained and funded and resourced. I'm very glad you pointed out also the reaction of the Russians and the Chinese. The fact that Iran is probably amazed at their lack of support. I suspect the regional actors in the area, the Saudis and others. I've all been privately thinking this is terrific, just finished the job. So I couldn't agree with it more that it's a unique moment in history. I guess what hangs out there is what will the Iranian people do with it.

I've got a long list of additional questions to throw your way, O'Ded, but we are, unfortunately, out of time for today. I do hope that we can get you back on the situation report in the near future because your insight, your experience, very much appreciated here. I will be more than glad to join you again. I really enjoyed the conversation and hope to be here soon. Well, that was Odette Allum, Mossad's former deputy head of global operations right here on the Situation Report. Fascinating conversation. I hope you found it. Fascinating.

Listen, coming up next, President Trump didn't start the war, but, well, he certainly helped to end it. We'll look at how a mix of pressure, deterrence, and diplomacy. brought what President Chopper first to as the 12-day war to a halt. Stay with us. Starting a business can seem like a daunting task, unless you have a partner like Shopify. They have the tools you need to start and grow your business. From designing a website to marketing to selling and beyond,

Shopify can help with everything you need. There's a reason millions of companies like Mattel, Heinz, and all birds continue to trust and use them. With Shopify on your side, turn your big business idea into sign up for your $1 per month trial at Shopify.com slash special offer. Welcome back to the PDB situation report. After nearly two weeks of war, the fighting between Israel and Iran has come to an end.

The ceasefire, brokered by President Trump and his team, officially took hold earlier this week. And while there were a few initial violations, both sides have now stepped back from the brick. The White House applied a mix of military deterrence and diplomatic pressure to bring about the truce, making it clear to both Tehran and Jerusalem that escalation was no longer on the table. The Trump administration is already framing the outcome as a win for peace through strength with new talks potentially on the horizon. Joining me now is Stephen Yates. He's a senior research fellow for China and national security policy at the Heritage Foundation. He previously served in the White House as Deputy National Security Advisor to the vice president with a focus on

global threats and strategic diplomacy. Stephen, thanks very much for joining us, although we apparently have no global threats and no need for strategic diplomacy, so I won't know what we're going to talk about. I know. It's a very boring world these days. It is. It really is. I think it was Winston Churchill who said, may we live in interesting times, and we are. Listen, I'm going to start with an unusual question. It's focused on Iran, and obviously the U.S. Air, strikes. But in the immediate aftermath, we've heard very little China. What do you make of the Chinese reaction and mindset towards what's happened regarding Iran? Well, my first assumption is that they, like most of the world, including a lot of Americans, did not realize this was actually going to happen.

And I think that they were probably thrown a bit when they saw the B-2s going to Guam. That is getting close to the area they like to operate in. And then all of a sudden, before they really get any other news, some things go boom, boom, and Iran from another area. So a little bit of a head fake probably made them spin a bit. But they also were a little high on their own supply in giving Pakistan some weapons. and they thought that the recent skirmish between India and Pakistan saw Pakistan maybe besting some technology the Indians had. And all of a sudden, the world sees that American stealth technology actually works,

that we can actually have an operation without leaks. And I think that probably put a pin in one of the balloons of China is on the rise, inevitably, the next boss on the block. America's on the decline. and you better make a deal with the new boss. So I bet they had a big, big, deep breath to contemplate what just happened. Do you think, tell me what you think about this. I know it's speculation, but you know me. I love to ask speculative questions.

What were the chances that China was tracking those B-2s? Well, I think it's 100% that they were trying to, especially once, you know, I was scratching my own head when I was reading that the stealth bombers were spotted in Guamma. I said, well, what's the word stealth mean? And so in retrospect, it seems obvious someone wanted them to be seen. So at the very latest when that move was happening, they had to be trying to watch everything. There's no evidence to me that they did because if they were able to track, I think there's also a hundred percent chance they would have talked to Tehran. And if there was anything that could be done in that amount of time. I think we would have seen more activity and very,

very clearly Iran was caught off guard by this. Talk to me if you could about the extent, the nature of the relationship between Iran and China and then also in context with China's response in the aftermath of the attacks. Are you surprised at their reaction, which, I mean, to me or to anybody who's not an expert on China, we look at it and go, that's pretty hands-off from their perspective. Yeah. Well, yeah, because they have been giving a political narrative out to the world that, that together with Moscow and Tehran and maybe Pyongyang and a few others, they were trying

to create this alternative universe that was going to be multipolar and balance against the bad Americans and it was going to, they were going to have their own currency be a reserve of currency, all this pie in the sky stuff about what they were going to do in the world. And so if you believe that narrative, and there's some truth to their trying to at least stoke those ideas, then this does look like conspicuous pulling back from someone who's supposed to be an ally getting walloped and you're like, whoa, you're on your own. I don't really know who you are. But the Iran's response by threatening to shut off the Straits and Poor Moose, that was definite

no-go zone for China because they are still very dependent on a lot of energy from the Gulf, not just buying a lot of Iranian oil, which they have done, but from other sources too. And so my guess is that they were conveying that privately to Tehran. And I think that they did have a national interest and they're not being a wider conflict because it would have a material impact on their economic forecast. They can't be the manufacturing supply platform for the world without that dose of natural gas and oil from the Gulf. That's really interesting because, I mean, you know, typically it's always seemed that the Chinese regime has been giddy anytime the U.S. gets mired in some sort of overseas conflict. It distracts the U.S. it uses up resources.

but your point is very interesting in that on this occasion, you know, again, if you go with the theory that the regime, the Chinese regime always acts in its own best interests, they looked at it and said, well, it's not in our best interests if this thing escalates. Yeah. Well, and I think they'll still play some politics, but basically they are a chaser, not a maker in this. What do you mean by that? So they're not driving events, they're chasing events. And so when this breaks out, number one, Israel proves capable to do nearly miraculous things to the Iranians. That has to freak the Chinese out because Israel is not a major power.

Israel is not one of these poles in this balancing act that they thought they were going to try to come out on top with this multipolar world. And, of course, if Israel has advanced technology, they have been fighting, they know how to fight. They also know how to do real intelligence, I think stunningly effective intelligence in the way these things played out. And all of that, I think, has to freak China out because if you look at what the Ukrainians were able to do with drones deep into Russia and then you look what the Israelis were able to do deep into Iran, not just with drones, but human intelligence placing people in vital positions. They had basically Tehran's complete playbook. and they were striking with unbelievable precision where there's just a burnt black hole in one flat, in one building, killing one top military advisor. That's the kind of stuff that creeps the Chinese out that someone could do to them at some

point. Yeah. I'm sorry. If you're interrupting, Steve, you would have to imagine that it's exactly what the Chinese regime has been doing in regards to Taiwan, right? Placing assets. Oh, yeah. that's, you know, identifying collaborators, gathering intelligence.

So, I mean, it would almost have to be a vindication of what you would assume to be their actions on the island of Taiwan over the past many years. Well, I agree, unless we were on the receiving end of what do they really know, where are they really placed in Taiwan? and if they look at what Israel was able to do and then they look at where their placements are, do they really have the full playbook? Are they really reading everything that America or others have been doing with Taiwan? Do they, and it could be, we don't really get to know. This is the world of spin or analysis or whatever, whatever it is that we do, Mike. But they probably are realizing that they don't have this.

this good of a dial in on what Taiwan can and would do. And maybe Taiwan has some things tucked away that are not as easy for them to get to, as, you know, like the Israelis hitting the flat of somebody that really would call the shots. Maybe they've got redundancy in their system that Tehran did not have. Yeah, no, I take your point there. I want to pick up on that, though, in just a minute. Steve, if you'll stay right where you are, as you know, we do have terrific sponsors. We do need to take a break now and then for them.

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Slotidotidstractions apply. Welcome back to the Situation Report. Joining me once again is good Friday of the show. Joe Steve Yates of the Heritage Foundation. Steve, we're talking about China's reaction, their relationship with Iran, their reaction to the aftermath of the U.S. air strikes in Iran. And I want to take a little bit of a left turn here. Coming up at the beginning of July will be an important Bricks Nation's summit. And two of the attendees at that summit will be China and Iran. Obviously, Russia will be there as well and others. How interesting is that summit going to be? And what do you expect to see

as results from that series of meetings? Well, from some of the speculation that's out there in the press, it may be the case that China does not attend at the leader level. And that it would be very interesting. It sort of falls into what you're looking at generally about China's reaction after this conflict. And there's some stuff going on with Beijing where Xi Jinping has not been going out in public as much as leading to a lot of people to wonder about his health. Of course, he was able to take a phone call or make a phone call with President Trump to talk trade or other things not that long ago. And we get a proof of life with a visiting dignitary here or there. But getting indications, he might not go to that.

gathering. And so it does kind of, again, put a pin in that balloon of what is this alternative gathering? Does it have momentum? Is it on the rise? Or was it really for show and politics? And with Iran's situation really complicating things, maybe China doesn't want to be in a room where one of these things is not like the others, at least in their estimation, they're a big deal. And the rest of these guys, what are they? I mean, after all, Iran seems to have been crippled for now very quickly. And so what does that mean for the rest of this group? And Russia, yeah, best friends are here for the party for kicking the crap out of Ukraine

for whoever, however long. But really, Russia, with an overwhelming military advantage on paper, should have made fast work of this. And this is dragging on. It's tragic for Ukrainians. It's probably tragic for some of Russia. But it's taking longer. So all of a sudden, this collection.

doesn't look like it's the winning team. And China, I don't know that it wants to be associated with that brand as much. But at least for now, I really doubt that Xi Jinping's going to be there. And I think it's going to be a little bit less of a blip in the media cycle and other things about what this group is really about. Yeah, it's like the celebrities don't show up at your party and you get like the C and the D-listers. Now, I'm glad you brought up Russia. You know, we were talking about, you know, the Chinese reaction to this. And I think, you know, sort of in a more direct manner, the Russian reaction to what's happened with Iran has been absolutely fascinating.

The foreign minister of Basarachi from Iran, you know, went basically hat in hand with a letter from the Supreme Leader, Harmony, to Moscow. And you would have to imagine what they were saying is, hey, you know, what's up? I thought we were best friends. I was fascinated, maybe even a little surprise too, that Putin's quick quip was, well, there's a lot of Jewish people in Russia and there's a lot of Russian Jews in Israel. And that has to weigh on what we do. I'm like, man, what's the demographics of Ukraine? I don't know.

Maybe there you've hit around too, but that's a whole other topic. But it was an indirect way of saying what China and others were doing, which was, okay, you got yourself into this, and I don't think I want to be a part of it. And when it comes to sanctions, energy, they'll probably try to help replenish some of the supply chain, depending on what is left of these programs and capabilities. they might play around with helping reconstitute some of the capabilities that were lost in these attacks. So I don't think they're going to leave them forever, but it was very conspicuous. It's almost like the kid on the playground, you're there with all your pals. You get punched in the face and all of a sudden there's this conspicuous distance and they're looking the other way.

Yeah. Yeah. It was interesting when Putin was asked about the level of support that they had been offering to the Iranians. you know, his initial reaction, aside from mentioning the number of Russian Jews in Israel, was also to say, well, look, we've been, you know, vocal. We've made comments of support for Iran. And they go, good. So that is a fascinating part. How, let me, let me shift again a different direction here. Steve, how important has it been to China to, in a sense, sit with a bag of popcorn over the past while and watch not just the Russian war in Ukraine in terms of an education,

but also to see what's been happening with Iran here lately and in particular the U.S. air strikes. How important is it for them if you have in the back of your mind what they're thinking about regarding Taiwan? Well, it all comes down to whether and how much rationality really resides in Xi Jinping's head. And whether he alone or with whatever collection is around him is truly in charge and there's little anyone else can do about it. But if there are rational people in Beijing and at the top of their military, they would be looking at some of these events and saying, you know what?

We had some questions about maybe Donald Trump personally, about the United States generally, what risks would they be willing to take? would they be willing to strike in a time of crisis? Would they stand by an ally or a partner? I mean, Taiwan is technically legally, not an ally, but the Taiwan Relations Act puts it in a category unto itself that seems like an ally. And so if you kind of take the Iran situation and move it over to East Asia, we'll say China tries to do something to Taiwan. It then crosses the line with Japanese territorial waters or airspace. We have a U.S. treaty ally involved.

The treaty ally is demanding action. If we look at Israel, the United States did stand up with Israel. So in two ways, Donald Trump made clear one of his national security philosophies. One was he wants peace and he will speak loudly and consistently sit down and negotiate and stop the killing. And the other hand, when one party and his estimation needs to get hit and it's going to get hit by our ally, he's going to let that ally do it if he's been frustrated that you're not negotiating peace. And we had concerns about what Iran's air defense capabilities might be. We had concerns about where exactly was their nuclear program. We didn't know exactly what they might do in response and what our exposure might be.

We have bases that are not very far from Iran. And he was still willing to strike with stealth at distance effectively. And so if you're a top of the PLA, you'd say, well, shoot. That means it doesn't really matter whether the United States is close. It doesn't really matter what's going on in this part of the world if we're not negotiating, as the president is saying. And he's getting frustrated. and our treaty allies are saying they're going to have to take things into their own hands. This is a very different narrative and calculus than they've been playing with of a weary,

depleted America, Taiwan and others are far away, we're close and right here. And I think with drones and other kinds of technologies kind of leading a new revolutionary and military affairs, I just don't think that the brand new aircraft carriers that they've been trying to trot out and the other kinds of vessels. I mean, these are things that would be pretty quick work in a real conflict because they're not hiding from anything. And so that's where I come down on if, it's sort of like the Sting song, if the Russians love their children too. If there's rationality in Beijing, what they just saw should make this 2027 talk really fizzle a little bit and say, yeah, maybe we should make that trade deal. Maybe we should buy a little bit more time. Maybe this

Xi guy isn't the right answer for the 2027 party caucus. But what's your instinct tell you about Xi Jinping? I mean, is he completely in charge? I think he is largely in charge. Complete is probably too much for any Communist Party system in China. Russia sure does seem like it's Putin's game and Putin's game alone. Others would probably know better, but it sure looks like that and smells like that. And there's a lot of similarities with China, but there's a little bit more of a collective

leadership in China. And in past crises, there would be sort of a group of people that would decide. Are we sticking with this leader, are we going to shift gears? And anyone is expendable. So it all comes down to does it play that way? And when I look at, he's picked a lot of fights that he didn't need to pick. And there's been forks in the road between escalation and accommodation to buy time or make a deal. And each one in recent years, he's picked the escalation, whether it's Hong Kong, some of the wolf warrior weirdness of aggression, even sending military capabilities out to the Pacific side of Australia to freak people out.

There's just so many things where he's chosen the fight, and that makes me worry that he's not completely irrational. And that's why I think people of Taiwan and our allies closest to this have to live every day preparing, mitigating. and deterring. And that's the healthy part of the conversation that the new administration has kicked in, whether people like it or not, when someone says you need to be paying more, doing more, that pressure might not be welcome. The number might not make a lot of sense to them, but the direction is correct. Well, no, that's a very good point. I think that's worn out with the NATO summit that's taking place this week and their decision to up the spend for each NATO member, and they did say China and Russia, right? They did highlight both of those as the reasons

that the military buildup in China was highlighted as a reason for increasing spending up to 5% for each member. Steve, listen, thank you as always. Really, really appreciate that. There's a lot more we could cover, but obviously we've, well, we've run. And maybe it's not obvious, but we have run out of time. Thank you for watch, Mike. Take good care. Excellent, man. Thanks very much. Steve Yates from the Heritage Foundation. Well, that's all the time we have for this week's BDB situation report. Look, if you have any questions or comments or humorous anecdotes or maybe you got a limerick, do you want to share with us? Just reach out to me at PDB at thefirsttv.com. I don't think anybody does limericks anymore. Maybe so. Every month,

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