The President's Daily Brief - PDB Situation Report | March 15th, 2025: Trump Calls Putin’s Bluff & Syria Erupts in Violence

Episode Date: March 15, 2025

In this episode of The PDB Situation Report: A major development in the war in Ukraine—Kyiv has agreed to a 30-day ceasefire following high-level talks in Saudi Arabia. But will Russia do the same? We break it all down with Fred Fleitz, former National Security Council Chief of Staff and Vice Chair of the America First Policy Institute's Center for American Security. Syria is on the brink once again. A surge of violence and reports of massacres are pushing the country further into chaos as the fragile government struggles to maintain control. We get expert analysis from David Daoud, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. To listen to the show ad-free, become a premium member of The President’s Daily Brief by visiting PDBPremium.com. Please remember to subscribe if you enjoyed this episode of The President's Daily Brief. YouTube: youtube.com/@presidentsdailybrief Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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Only at 711. Valley 36-22326, participating stores only while supplies lastly out for full terms. Welcome to the PDB Situation Report. Oh, is it that time of the week again? I'm Mike Baker. Your eyes and ears on the world stage. All right. Let's get briefed.

We'll start things off with a major development in the war in Ukraine. After high-level talks in Saudi Arabia, Kyiv has agreed to a 30-day ceasefire. But, you ask yourself, isn't there another player in this? And there is. What will Russia do? And will they agree at all to the terms of a 30-day ceasefire? We'll break it all down with Fred Flites. He's a former National Security Council chief of staff and the vice chair of the America

First Policy Institute's Center for American Security. That's hard to fit on one business card. Later in the show, we turned to Syria, where a major outbreak of violence. is threatening to push the country deeper into chaos. Reports of massacres are emerging as the fragile government struggles to maintain control. We'll get analysis from David Dowd, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. But first, today's Situation Report Spotlight. Ukraine has agreed to a 30-day ceasefire with Russia following high-level negotiations in Saudi Arabia.

Now, the announcement came after hours of discussions in Jeddah on Tuesday, where the U.S. also confirmed it would immediately lift its pause on intelligence sharing with Kyiv and resume military aid. Now, the talks mark a significant shift in ceasefire negotiations, which had stalled, of course, after a tense exchange, I think we all saw that, between the Ukrainian and U.S. presidents at the White House. Now, attention turns to Moscow, with American and Ukrainian officials making it clear that the next move is up to Russia. The Kremlin, however, is treading carefully, saying it won't rush to a decision. You have to ask yourself, why would they? They appear to have the upper hand on the battlefield currently. Russian officials are waiting to hear directly from

Washington about a possible call between President Trump and Putin later this week. Okay, joining me now to break it all down is Fred Flights, former National Security Council Chief of Staff, and vice chair of the America First Policy Institute Center for American Security. Fred, thank you very much for taking the time to join us here on the situation of report. Good to be here, but most important, like you, I have a forward CIA officer. That is very, very true. And I do believe our paths crossed a handful of times, at least in the hallways. I never had the good fortune. I don't even know if you'd call it that. Maybe the bad fortune of doing a headquarters tour during my time. But yeah, I know how you felt about your

time in. I loved it. I had a wonderful career with the organization. I really enjoyed it. I don't know whether they would say the same thing about me with them, but I certainly had a good time. I had a good time. There were good times of bad times, mostly good. I was an analyst. You were an operator. I wrote quite a few PDBs, which why I wanted to be on this show. I know a lot about the PDB. I want to see it improved. It's politicized, watered down. It might be a good topic for another show. Yeah, you know what? That would actually be a great thing to talk about. And yeah, it's, I just saw yesterday, not to get off track, I think we are getting off track, but not to get on track, but I just saw that that the Trump administration revoked access

for President Biden to the PDB. So, you know, I'm not sure that President Biden knew he was getting the PDB at this point, but there you go. Anyway, sorry about that. That was, you know what, that was a low blow, and I apologize. All right, let's go straight into the main topic of the day. would be the Ukraine-Russia conflict. I'm going to let you run with this. It's a wide-open playing field. Talk to me about where we are currently with this conflict. Well, we know that for years,

President Trump has been saying that the priority for the United States should be stopped killing. He believes that the previous policy of Joe Biden and the Europeans to just plow weapons into Ukraine for as long as it takes was not a sensible policy, because there was no strategy for either Ukraine to win the war or to push Russia. How? Ukraine was going to run out of troops. This had become a long-term war of attrition. Ukraine was going to lose. It was immoral to keep stringing this out. But Biden didn't want to talk about it in the war. He didn't want to talk about peace talks. He just wanted to attack anyone who suggested trying to end the war as being pro-coot or anti-Ukraine. That's just not true. So we've seen over the last couple of weeks,

Trump and his officials really twisting Zelensky's arm to get behind the approach of ending the war, getting a ceasefire, and we'll negotiate other issues later, like territory, security assistance, NATO membership, etc. And it was hard because I understand that Zelensky doesn't want to concede anything to Russia. Russia was the aggressor. This was a vicious, unprovoked attack. and in a perfect world, we push Russia out and put Putin on trial for war crimes, but we don't live in a perfect world. That isn't possible. We need to do what is possible. That's to get a ceasefire if we can to stop the killing and negotiate the best deal possible so Ukraine can recover, rebuild, and become a robust democracy and strong economy.

That ceasefire only works at both sides stop shooting. And so from your perspective, What is Putin's motivation, given that he's got the upper hand, given that, I mean, Trump has advised that Keith has no cards, what's Putin's motivation for stopping what appears to be forward progress on the battlefield and sitting down to the negotiating table? Russia's making some progress, but it will take quite a while for Russia to conquer Ukraine. If it ever does, it will be a very, very painful and expensive victory. Putin might be lord to agree to end the fighting with an understanding that Ukraine will be neutral.

It will not be a member of NATO. And that's not even our call. That has to be voter out by NATO members with a unanimous vote. That's not going to happen. And that we will work to bring Russia back into the community of nations and good standing, bring Russia into Europe, lower sanctions on Russia with an understanding that some of Russia's revenues have to go to. to rebuild Ukraine. I think Trump is the only leader on the scene right now, maybe ever, who could, may be able to deal with to get a fairly reasonable deal. If that doesn't happen, we don't know who's going to succeed Trump. I think that sanctions on Russia will get even worse.

We will give even more powerful weapons to Ukraine. This is a chance Russia to get out of it. And I don't agree with Putin's security concerns about Ukraine, but I think we can meet him halfway. We're not going to greet a native membership, but we're also still going to arm Ukraine to the teeth. I guess I'm playing devil's advocate here in terms of the, and to be fair to the White House, you know, and the State Department, they've said it's cautious optimism that anything can happen in a positive direction. But Putin's been pretty clear about his hardline demands. And there's no indication that he's inclined to back off of those. And certainly not again, And when I'm just trying to put myself in his position and say, okay, why? Why would I stop at this point?

Is it because my economy is, you know, heading south and, you know, I can't continue to afford this? But I guess where I'm going with this is, again, looking for leverage points that the White House may have to try to get some sort of deal that isn't essentially just giving it all away to Putin. Well, I think that probably there'll be a new border draw along the current battle lines. Ukraine's not going to concede any territory, but it will be decided in long-term negotiations. But this is going to take sophisticated diplomacy by Trump's top national security officials and by Trump to say to Putin, this is a better road for you and the Russia people. Of course, Putin could keep fighting and keep wrecking his economy and isolating his country. or he may see an opportunity with Trump to get out of this war and to set Ukraine up in a situation

where he retains its freedom of Putin can live with it on his borders. That means, you know, we're not going to agree to Ukraine being disarmed, but Ukraine will agree to be neutral. Ukraine won't be put in NATO, at least for the next 10 to 25 years. We won't raise that issue. I mean, how do you twist Putin's arm? He has seen fairly invulnerable to sanctions. He'll subject his people to extreme levels of pain to maintain his policy.

It's going to take personal diplomacy. And look, it's going to be tough. I don't know that we'll win this, but I think it's worth trying. Yeah. No, I don't disagree with you there at all. What's your perspective on the effectiveness of the sanctions to date? They've done significant damage to the Russian economy, but Russia is still able to sell its energy. And the problem with our strategy with Russia is that we've pushed Russia into the

arms of China. And China is by Russian energy and goods and probably providing funds to sustain the Russian economy. This is a huge threat to global security long term. We need to break that growing nexus between Moscow and Beijing, which also includes Iran and with Korea, I might add. And that's another reason why ending this war is so essential. And I don't think we should give anything to Putin other than what I just said. And I don't like the idea that Putin wouldn't be forced to get back all the territory he's taken. But I think we should still keep it on the table that someday we're going to ask Russia to return the territory, maybe after Putin leaves office. Yeah, I guess that was one of my next questions, which is to what degree do you think any agreement now is really good?

just kicking the can down the road. It gives Putin a chance to, you know, in the short-term rebuild is economy, rearm, you know, get stockpiles back up. So are you concerned that any deal that's done now is temporary in a sense? I think it's a concern. That's why Ukraine has to be fully armed to and ready to prevent any Russian invasion. And we have to have peace key was along the border to monitor a ceasefire. And I mean, there's a concern that there might be an agreement that the Trump administration and a future president wouldn't support it or maybe Putin would defer to Trump but would invade after Trump leaves office. Steps will have to be taken to submit this deal. And I think that means bringing Russia into the community of nations and finding ways

to somehow address the issues that Ukraine has of Russia. It's going to be a hard slot. Yeah, and he's already said, I mean, Putin's already said repeatedly that, that, you know, he will not agree to any international force, you know, any EU peacekeeping deployment. So he's been pretty clear about what he won't accept. And so that's why I'm, you know, I think most of the world is somewhat fascinated by the idea of, okay, what will this thing look like if it's not just acquiescing to his current hardline demand. Well, there's several things going on right now. The Trump administration has called for sending European and nine European peacekeepers to Ukraine. Europe is talking about sending something different. They want to send AT Terrence force that would use military force to enforce a ceasefire and other peace agreement. Putin is never going to agree to NATO ground troops in Ukraine that could attack Russia. That's not going to happen.

Europe has to stop talking about that. But I think we can get Putin to agree to peacekeepers. Now, I think, now, look, in classic peacekeeping, each of the parties get to decide what nations contribute to peacekeeping. I don't think Putin's going to agree to British troops on his border, but he may agree to Irish troops. He may agree to Egyptian troops, troops from Nepal. There are many nations with experience in peacekeeping, who I think would be acceptable to Ukraine

in Russia and, look, this has to be negotiated. And what do you make of the, the muds talked about and now apparently agreed upon minerals deal? I think the minerals deal is significant because it's something Trump wanted and he thinks it'll be in court for the U.S. economy, represents the U.S. being paid back for our military assistance. And it was a sign of good faith by Zelensky to give this to him. I know people have said that this is some kind of a security assistance or it will shield Ukraine from invading.

I'm not really putting it that way because I think this will take a long time to implement. And in the short term, it's not going to make any difference. What it does be is that Zelensky is saying to Trump, I've prepared to play ball with you. You want this here it is. And correct me if I'm wrong, but if you just look at it as an economic deal, I think it's very interesting. And again, setting aside this idea that it serves as a deterrent in some fashion. But just looking at the economics of it and the resources that were part of this deal, am I wrong in saying that a significant amount of those resources, the minerals, the oil, gas, natural resources are

currently sitting in the 20% of territory held by the Russians? Some of them are in Russian territory, but they're spread throughout Ukraine. and if they're actually there, there's more than enough rare earth minerals and energy to extract from the territory that Ukraine currently holds. Okay. All right, that's excellent.

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Joining me once again is Fred Flights, former National Security Council Chief of Staff, and Vice Chair of the America First Policy Institute's Center for American Security. Fred, thanks very much for sticking around here on the Situation Report. We've been talking about Russia and Ukraine, of course, but let's switch gears a little bit. And let's talk about what's happening in the Middle East. Give me your assessment of the current state of play in Gaza. Well, you know, we've seen some encouraging news in Gaza, but we've seen some encouraging news in Gaza, but we're far from settling this war between Hamas and Israel.

I think because of Trump's election and leadership, this is why a number of hostages were released by Hamas. And I might add that Hamas made critical concessions just after Trump on the election concessions. It would not make to the Biden administration. And I think that's because of Trump's leadership and, frankly, respect they have for Trump. I forget how many hostages have gotten out. We're now looking at the second phase, which would mean the rest of the hostage would be released. But that also would require Israel pulling out on Gaza, which it's not prepared to do.

Israel is trying to extend second phase of the peace agreement. Hamas is resisting. Trump said there's going to be severe consequences if Hamas doesn't agree. U.S. negotiators have spoken directly to Hamas, which is really unprecedented, try to find an agreement to get the hostages out to stop the conflict. It's important to Trump to win this conflict, but not on terms that it dangers Israel's security. Yeah, I was very impressed, actually, with the communications discipline, with their ability to hold those talks between, I think it was Adam Bowler, the hostage affairs envoy for the Trump administration, and Hamas. I mean, you can argue back and forth over, should we be negotiating, should we be talking directly with a terrorist organization.

But, you know, this, I think we've all become accustomed to, you know, an administration. being unable to keep a secret. So I thought it was pretty impressive that they were able to have these discussions outside of the camera's eye. I was surprised how Moss would meet with U.S. officials because of the risk that the U.S. Bay uses an opportunity to find out who these people are and where they live and maybe capture them and take them to Guantanamo, which many of our colleagues would like to do because they're terrorists living in luxury in Qatar. And I know people are saying we should negotiate with terrorists. Human lives are at stake here. I have no problem with this. We have to get these hosses out while they're alive because they won't be alive for much longer.

Yeah, I think as long as we're doing it for operationally sound purposes, and look, I take your point, but I would suspect we already know where these individuals live, and we've got target packages drawn up, you know, should, you know, things head south. But it is an interesting development. And I think it's surprised an awful lot of people. But let's look sort of the 30,000 foot level at Gaza in terms of where this could go. And I know that's a lot of speculation and a bit of a fool's game, given the history there. But talk to me about potential future governance of the enclave. Well, as you know, President Trump put out an audacious plan where the U.S. would take ownership of Gaza

and rebuild it and move the population out to other areas. And he thinks that this would make Gaza into one of the leading tourist destinations into the Mediterranean. Well, predictably, just about every Arab nation threw a fit over this, so they're not going to cooperate. The Palestinian Gaza said they won't leave. There's been charges of ethnic cleansing and all kinds of other nonsense, and no nation wants to take them.

But this proposal did succeed in forcing, other nations to consider putting forward their own proposals. The Egyptians have a pretty strong proposal that they're putting forward right now that has the support of most Arab nations who would fund it. It would rebuild Gaza without ruling the population. I think Trump proposal is ambitious, but unless we can find nations to take the people of Gaza, I'm not sure it will work. But that doesn't matter. You know, the Washington Journal editorial report, it hates Trump with a passion, and it wrote an editor, ridicule his Gaza plan. But it also said that as much as it dislikes the plan, Trump forced states in the region

to confront their hypocrisies about Gaza. They say they care about the people of Gaza, but they don't want to lift a finger to help them. And Trump really has made them realize that and to take action before he does. When he came out with this plan, we're going to just going to move out 2.3 million or so, you know, Palestinians out of Gaza. and Bill de Riviera, well, yeah, I mean, it wasn't just the Arab states. A lot of people around the world were like, what is he talking about now? But the key point is exactly what you said, which it forced action. It created a bit of chaos, a bit of uncertainty. And, you know, for the first time in quite some time, the Arab states had to actually, as you say, confront reality or had to have a conversation and say, we've got to have an alternative. And our past, you know, in our past. And our past. And alternatives have been unworkable. So the fact that it generated that movement, I think, was the point behind it. I don't know about you, but I think there's no chance in our lifetime that Egypt

and Jordan except 2.3 million Palestinians on their turf. But I am impressed with how it generated that follow-on conversation. I agree with you, and Egypt and Jordan do not want Trump to be putting maximum pressure on them because they won't take these refugees. So guess what happened? Egypt came up with a plan to take the refugees. I'm sorry, not to take the, to take care of them, to keep them there to rebuild. And I don't know who or what is going to govern Gaza. I've heard discussions of Palestinian technocrats. Whoever runs Gaza, it can't be Hamas, it can't be the Palestinian Authority. Israel won't permit that. I don't think the Trump administration will either. But there's a discussion right now, what will we do with Gaza if and when the war is over? And there really wasn't

a serious discussion about that until Trump put forward his proposal. Yeah, I think, yeah, that's a good point you raised. I think on the governance issue, I believe the Arab plan, the Egyptian plan includes an interim technocrat board that would manage things until apparently they retrain the Palestinian authority to come. and take over the governance, that's fraught with problems. So I think parts of their plan seem to some degree logical, possibly workable, but that issue, I think it's going to be where this all just starts to fall apart, is the idea of, well, but who's in charge later? A big obstacle here is the two-state solution, which was agreed to decades ago. That's off the

table for Israel. It should be for the U.S. too. I think it's off the table for the Trump administration. And I've talked to Israeli officials about. this after the October 7th massacre by Hamas. In the view of Israeli officials, the Palestinians cannot be trusted with their own state until they are de-radicalized. That means mosques, schools, media. When you have a society that trains their population from the time they are toddlers to murder Jews and destroy the state of Israel, that society cannot be trusted with their own state. Israel knows what will happen if there is a separate state in Gaza. Hamas will run it.

It will use it as a base of operations to launch an even more deadly attack against Israel. Israel will never let this out. Fred, can there ever be mid to long-term peace and stability in that part of the world as long as the current Iranian regime and the IRC are in control? I think that's a good question. I would say no, but it's also worth noting that one reason why the Middle East is so unstable now is because of Joe Biden's incredible weakness and his decision to try to appease Iran. Iran is about $100 billion richer today that it would have been of Trump had won the 2020 election because Biden didn't enforce sanctions on Iran, especially

oil sanctions. And I might add, it sold most of that oil to China. This gave Iran money to spend on its nuclear program, its missile program, its Poland, and Hamas. This Hamas attack was funded by Iran, and I think it was directed by Iran. So I'm glad Trump has re-implemented, aggressive sanctions against Iran that I think will be much more painful

than what he put on Iran in the first administration. Yeah, and you, that's, I'm glad you mentioned China because, like, I, talking to people sometimes, I worry that people don't understand how interconnected things are and how nothing happens in a bubble. And so in our first segment, Fred, we were able to talk about Ukraine and Russia, the sanctions against Russia. In large part, they've been able to get past some of those sanctions with the help of China. And, you know, the Iranians, to the same degree,

have relied on China in a way to maintain some semblance of economic stability. There's a lot more here we could discuss, but I want to be mindful of your time. And I really appreciate you're joining us here today. Fred Flights, thank you again. America First Policy Institute's Center for American Security and former CIA senior official. Thanks so much for joining us today. All right. When we come back, escalating violence and reports of massacres are testing the Syrian government's fragile grip on power, and it is fragile right now. David Dowd, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defensive Democracies, joins us to break down the situation. Welcome back to the P.D. B situation report. Syria experienced its worst violence since the fall of Assad this week with

reports of massacres targeting the Alawite minority. According to reports, entire families, including women and children, were killed during operations carried out by government security forces. The UN has documented at least 111 civilian deaths, though the actual toll is expected to be higher. Survivors describe summary executions carried out on a sictarian bases, leading to a mass exodus of al-Oyid civilians seeking refuge in neighboring Lebanon. Sirius interim government led by President Ahmed al-Shara has vowed to investigate these atrocities, stating that no one is above the law. All right.

Joining me now to provide further insight is David Dowd. He's a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. David, thanks very much for joining us here on the Situation Report. Pleasure is all night. Thank you for having me on. Well, you'll think differently after we start our conversation. You'll say, my God, what an idea? But let's start at the top level with Syria. Give me your insight into where they are currently, just how stable, unstable, chaotic. What's your assessment?

Well, I described the situation in Syria is fragile, particularly new administration's control over the country. Now, there have been deals yesterday to help stabilize the situation between the administration under the Muhammad Julani, also known as Ahadd Ashah, the new interim self-appointed president of Syria, and the SDF, the, you know, colloquially known as the Kurds, but really a specific faction of the Kurds in northeast Syria. There was also talk of a similar deal in the works between the administration in Damascus and the Druze and Swayda in southern Syria. So what Shara is trying to do is, through peaceful means, consolidate power over the U.S. the country. He's only been in power since December 8th, really. But he still has the issue with the Alawites on the coast, where he could face the most challenges to consolidating power,

and that could threaten to unravel the rest of his control over Syria. With the Alawite situation, how entrenched are they? How well armed is this the Assad supporters? And what do you make of the reports coming out of there of the violence against the Alawites. Well, let's start with the violence. Look, every side in this conflict has the incentive to lie, to exaggerate its opponent's crimes and to minimize its own crimes. So it's hard to tell, it's been in this case with Syria since the outset of the Civil War. It's hard to tell what happened to whom.

There have been videos that are credible of crimes against Alawites. I'm going to shut out of the current president, has threatened retribution for this to punish the perpetrators, there have been claims of arrests of several individuals who are involved in these crimes. Again, is this for show? Is this not? It remains to be seen. What can be said is that certain elements of the forces, now it's not just the HTS forces, but the broader coalition under Shudda did commit crimes against minorities, particularly al-a-whites, but to a much lesser degree of Syrian Christians that are on the coast. The numbers have varied. I've heard somewhere between close to 1,000 up to 7,000, the 7,000 doesn't necessarily seem credible to me.

I would say closer to 1,000 seems more credible. Now, in terms of how armed are they, well, they don't really need to be very armed. They don't need to be well armed. Right now, all they need to do is act as spoiler. Like I said, the Shara's rule in Syria is fragile. It has only been in power since December 8th. It doesn't have a real army to speak of. I think estimates are somewhere between 40, 50,000.

Now, there's recruitment going on, but the training takes time from what I'm hearing. There's like 10 days of training before these guys get sent into the field. So these aren't credible fighters just yet. In terms of his army, what we've seen with the Israelis destroyed a lot of the former regime's arsenal. These guys seem to be fighting with some remnants of that arsenal, but mostly light weapons, outdated weapons. So it's not a heavy list for the Alawites who just need to act. Well, let me narrow that. not the Al-Oites. The Al-Oites who are still loyalists of the former Assad regime, who are probably allied with the Iranians, with Hezbollah, or getting assistance from the Iranians, according to certain reports, to just act as spoiler. They just need to prevent Shara from consolidating his control over the area to get him into clashes and get his forces into clashes with minority communities to give off this image that he has not repented of his past as an al-Qaeda terrorist, that he still has it out for minorities.

That will not only prevent the alleviation of sanctions, which he is demanding, which is necessary for him to grow his strength and consolidate power, it may lead to more sanctions, which will further weaken him. So this lack of consolidation on the coast could then, in time, gradually grow and fracture Syria. How credible do you think are the reports of Iranian support for the Assad loyalists? Look, I would assess that to have a high credibility. Iran, Hezbollah, their allies have a high interest in preventing Assad. the consolidation of control under Ahmad al-Hadha of Syria. This was a main conduit for Iran to supply Hezbollah with weapons. Hezbollah is severely damaged after the recent war with Israel.

The Lebanese have under Israeli pressure and American pressure tightened the screws on Beirutin International Airport to some degree for the entry of weapons, sorry, funds to Hezbollah. So this is a necessary lifeline for Hezbollah. Now, what does it take? What is the nature of that involved? It could mean anything from logistics to acting in an advisory capacity to helping to spread the narrative media warfare, narrative warfare. It doesn't take much. Like I said, it's not a heavy lift for the Aloitites, the Alawite loyalists of the former Assad regime to prevent the consolidation of Syria.

It won't take a lot from either Iran or Hezbollah to secure their interest of preventing this consolidation by a potentially hostile actor over Syria. Again, they just need to give this image off to the world that this man remains. the bloodthirsty terrorist that he was, which is, you know, look, there's a high likelihood. That's true. And if that happens, again, sanctions remain, which means over time he weakens and could tighten, which, again, would weaken him further. So there's, it takes little from them to secure this major interest.

Well, if I'm not mistaken, this would be the first time that the Iranian regime and the IRGC would be accused of meddling. I, for one, am shocked. But so let's look at the reports of violence, because, look, even if it's on the low end, as you said, 1,000. And frankly, estimates of 1,000 to a 7,000 just shows you how shaky the intel is and the credibility of reporting coming out of the area. But who would be primarily responsible for committing those killings, those actions against the Assad supporters? Well, look, it's not just the militants that were killed, the asset supporters that were militants.

It seems to be that civilians were also killed. Al-O-Ite civilians were also killed. Who's responsible? it could be elements from within HTS, it could be elements from within the SNA. There are also foreign jihadists that have attached themselves to having to shut off forces, namely Chechens and others from Central Asia, Uyghur fighters who are there for ideological purposes who are proper jihadists. Now, the question is, did the orders come from on high, or were these rogue actors who were simply venting their frustrations at, if they were of Syrian origin, at the oppression, that the al-a-white sect is associated with, because of its association with the Assad regime, that's not a justification, but this could be the mindset. Or are they proper jihadists who are acting on ideology because, look, the al-whites are not properly Muslim in their eyes.

If anything, they are infidels who have the choice of conversion or death. And if these people are that ideological, is this their ability, taking them taking the chance to hit at the so-called infidels? The question remains whether, again, Ahmad Dishara gave the order. If these orders came from top down, he's denying it. He's claiming there's going to be punishment. Again, it's hard to tell if this is some kind of post facto covering of one's rear end by Ahmad Dishara, or if he genuinely, you know, if this is something.

something that just got out of hand and he's trying to put a lid on it. Right. Now, it, leading up to the fall and the ouster of Assad, right, the, it wasn't just this, as you pointed out, it wasn't just this one rebel faction led by Shirah. It was a band of militias, a band of groups with different agendas, different objectives. To what degree, I know you've already said that, you know, his rule, the interim president is, is fragile, but to what degree does he have any sort of control over these various factions, these various groups, including sort of the, you know, the jihadists that are out there? I mean, look, HTS themselves are not jihadists, right?

So they're all kind of a collection of jihadists. It really depends on how much he can get them to accept this new reality in Syria. And again, this is a big if, if we take him at face value that he has changed, that he wants to be the leader and president of all Syrians to usher in a new civil state in Syria, you know, the statements he's made since taking power, how, you know, these people signed up to fight for different reasons. How much can he get them on board with this new project called post-revolutionary Syria remains a question. Like you noted, they're all there for different reasons. I think if he can offer them different incentives, or maybe if he's trying to offer them

different incentives to bring them in line, kind of a carrot and a stick, there was talk, for example, of the foreign fighters, the Uyghurs, the Chechens, of offering them Syrian citizenship for having fought on behalf of Syria that they would lay down their arms and integrate into Syrian society? Is that something that they would accept? I don't know, right? Would they accept the very notion of having thought what in their mind could be, it could have been a religious war, now transitioning to a post-revolutionary state building exercise? Again, those are question marks.

know what, you could offer someone who is that much of an ideal. I'll have to say, we're laying down the weapons, you know, the Holy War is over. Now we get down to the nitty, you know, mundane, banal business of state building. And that state will include people that, you know, have religious beliefs that you don't like and who may be outside of the ambit of of, of, of, of, of, of, of, of, of, of, of, of, of, of, of, of, according to Islamic law. And that just has to be the case. So it depends on whether he can mobilize his carrots and he sticks properly against these groups to get them in line. And how important is this agreement that really is just materialized with the SDF in northeastern

Syria to come into the early stages of the government in Damascus? So, look, on paper, it's going well. Look, if it succeeds, it's critical because you have foreign interests, look, you have the Turks who have a problem with the SDF. This kind of gives Turkey less reason to intervene in Syria, at least on that angle. The SDF, while it has been allied with the United States for some time, has kind of gone back in force between alliances with the Assad regime, kind of, you know, playing footsy, if you will, with the Iranians.

So this could kind of take an excuse away from the Iranians or a foothold for the Iranians if the Kurds or the SDF properly consolidates under Damascus's control for a foothold for the Iranians taken away. The Israelis have also talked about protecting the Kurds to a lesser degree. The main focus from the Israeli side is the Druze. Again, this prevents a lot of foreign intervention and helps critical part of this consolidation process. It moves forward, a critical part of this consolidation process. Again, with the caveat, if it holds, you know, you can put a lot of things on paper. It doesn't mean in five years or two years or even less that this won't fall apart. Right. And I think you've raised a very important point,

which is the influence of outside actors, including the Iranian regime. And I suspect when it comes to some of the other jihadist groups that are there, they've also got outside influence and support because, again, look, it's only natural. Everybody's acting in their own best interests here. We've got a lot more ground to cover. You mentioned Lebanon. I want to kind of shift our focus over to Lebanon and Israel. But, David, we've got to take a quick break.

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Comfort in, it's calling your name. Save on the stay. Oh, and free waffles are yours to claim. Well, I hope you like my little song, book direct at storeshills.com. Welcome back to the Situation Report. Joining me once again is Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defensive Democracy's David Dowd. David, thanks for sticking around. I appreciate that very much. Of course, we locked you in. We weren't going to let you out until the end of the interview. We talked briefly, or you mentioned very briefly as we were discussing Syria. You mentioned Lebanon. And I'd like to kind of shift our focus at this point because there have been some recent developments between Lebanon and Israel. And if you could talk to us about that. As of yesterday, there are negotiation committees, I think three in total that are meant to settle outstanding issues between Lebanon and Israel,

namely 13 border points along the land border. Now, there's no official internationally recognized border between Lebanon and Israel. There's what's called the blue line that was delineated after the Israelis withdrew from from Lebanon in May of 2000. And the Lebanese refused to certify that, saying that Israel continued to retain what they alleged was occupied Lebanese land in Shuba Hills and the Shaba farms and so on and so forth. After 2006, additional points were added to that, the northern part of the village of Bajjar, which the Lebanese claim is their own.

So a total of 13 points, they're not big points. I mean, they're probably the size. Some of these places are the size of my table. So this is part of the outstanding issues. There are also the five positions that the Israelis have retained in South Lebanon after the February 18th extended withdrawal date for the Israeli forces after the recent war between Israel and Hezbollah. So these are the issues that are about about how many people are leading.

Now, there's talk of normalization, or that this will be a platform for normalization, at least unnamed sources close to the Prime Minister's Bureau in Israel, according to Channel 12 News. Israeli Channel 12 News has said that this will be a platform for normalization. There's been no confirmation or official denial from the Lebanese side, and Mayadine, which is a pro-Hesbel outlet and which has an interest in denying such things. again, based on unnamed sources, said that this is absolutely false, that these committees would be dealing with technical issues alone, rather than with more substantive issues like normalization. To me, again, even though I'm skeptical of anything that comes out of a Mayadin, again, they don't have an interest in Israeli-Lebanese normalization moving forward for obvious reasons. It would really put Hezbollah in more of a corner than it is now.

But all this talk reminds me of the lead-up to the October 2022 maritime border negotiations between Israel and Lebanon, where because of an off-the-cuff remark by former president, Mishan Hollin, no relation to the current president, there was all this talk that this would be the stepping stone including Lebanon and the Abraham Accords. Then the Lebanese denied it, and as we saw, this was really just a resolution of technical matters. looking at this, why would these discussions be any different than past discussions? I mean, what has significantly changed that would give anybody, if they have optimism, optimism that this could result in something other than what we've seen over the past decades?

So the significant factor is the drubbing that Hezbollah took at the hands of Israel in the recent conflict. Now, Hezbollah is not the only impediment to Lebanese-Israeli peace or Lebanese-Israeli normalization, but it is a significant impediment. Now, Israel, as far as we know, according to the Israelis, destroyed something like 80% of Hezbo's strategic arsenal, held something like 30% of Hezbo's fighting force, assassinated its top military leadership, a lot of its top political leadership, Asan Nasrullah, Hashim Safia D. The organization is significantly degraded to deny that, would be to deny fact. At the same time, and here's the but.

Hesbola is not down for the count, and anyone who's telling you that would be falsifying information as well. What Hesbola has been trying to do since the November 27, 2024, CIFI, realizing its vulnerable state, realizing that its vulnerability could offer an opportunity for enemies domestic and foreign to finish the job. And Hesbola does have significant number of enemies in Lebanon. It's been to, one, consolidate its base, right? Because this is the source of its strength in Lebanon. As much as we don't like Hezbollah, as well,

is part of the Lebanese political and social fabric because it has large Shiite support. Lebanon is built on this kind of a sectarian power sharing model. And if you are the most powerful representative of a specific sect, then you get a seat at the table, at the political table. Hezbollah represents what is possibly Lebanon's largest and fastest growing sect. The Shiites a significant proportion of them, According to recent polling, it was late as September of 2024, something like 85% of Lebanese Shiites, support Hezbollah to some degree.

And for various reasons, they're not all, you know, hardcore ideologues. But they support the organization. Only 5% in that poll that was issued by error barometer were shown to oppose Hezbollah. Now, I'm sorry to interrupt, David, but I always wonder about these surveys and these polls that come out of the region. I mean, we had a number of them coming out of Gaza, right? Where they said, yeah, do you support Hamas? And I'm being, okay, well, why put any faith in anything coming out of there? Because if someone knocks on your door, or they call you and say, do you support Hamas,

you're probably going to say, yeah, it's probably, you know, there's no upside here if I say, no, I don't support Hamas. And you can argue the same with Hezbollah, if they're doing a survey of Shi'at. So it's not Hezbollah doing the survey. It's an independent organization called Erebarometer. They tend to be very credible. But also, look, and this is where Hezbollah tried to address these claims in its own way, after the war with Nostrales February 23rd funeral, which drew according to information international. This is an independent consultancy organization in Beirut that mapped out the square footage of the area where people had congregated for the funeral. that somewhere between 650,000 at a minimum to 900,000 people came out out of a sect in Lebanon, the Shiites that is estimated to be 1.2 million people. And that's assuming that the people that stayed home all stayed at home for reasons of opposition to Hezbollah.

People can stay home for all types of different reasons. Logistics. Their kid got a cold. They got a cold. They were lazy, whatever. So as far as we can tell, right, and this is what Hezbollah intended this to be, not just an outpouring of grievance for their fallen leader, but also, as they said repeatedly, this was a demonstration of their continued viability in Lebanon.

So because of that, whatever you want to do moving forward in Lebanon, because they've demonstrated, at least they've tried to demonstrate the retention of this base, you have to take them into consideration the same way you did prior to the war. Now, two examples of this, Noelle-Slam, the current Prime Minister of Lebanon, who was not initially endorsed by Hezbollah, but now Hezbo is part of the government, at least indirectly in some ways. In an interview with Lebanon's state broadcaster, Taylor Le Bonn, about a month ago, I want to say, he said that he had to take into account while forming his government, the political realities in the country, and the sense of the Shia community's feelings of being

wounded by the recent war. Now, if Hezbo has been decimated, you wouldn't take these two things into consideration. You put out a policy statement, right, as his government was gaining the vote of confidence in parliament. And this is kind of the division of how the government wants to operate that said, critically, Lebanon will set a national defense policy. Now, this sounds benign probably to regular ears, but this has been a Hezboa demand. Because to set a national defense policy means you have to get all the Lebanese factions at the table, which includes Hezbollah.

And you have to ask them, what do we do with Hezbollah's arms? And the outcome that I think Hezbo is seeking is something like maybe, state authorization of their arms or something akin to the PMF law in 2016 in Iraq, where the Hezbo is folded into the apparatus of the state but remains its own cohesive separate entity. And then it gets funding from the state. I think that's the path that Hezbo is going to take. Now, again, if they've been decimated, if they've lost critical mass of support, you don't need to take that into consideration.

You don't need to include that in your policy statement as the prime minister of Lebanon. So in your opinion, in your perspective, from all the work you do studying the area, to what degree does the Iranian regime have control over Hezbollah? To what degree do they have input in their planning, their strategic thinking? Look, significant input. Ultimately, Hezbollah is loyal to the Supreme Leader in Iran. This is an ideological link, meaning if Iranian funding and weapons were to stop, Hezbollah's loyalty would not stop. It is a matter of belief. Now, does that mean, while there is a hierarchy in the relationship between Iran and all of its extensions, I don't call them proxies when we talk about Hezbollah because my arm is not my proxy, it is my extension. Now, there is a hierarchy. Iran sits at the top, but it is not dictate Hezbollah's actions. It takes into consideration Hasbola's local circumstances and how it must navigate. This is why. I mean, this is part of the, if you will, the genius of the Iranian model that having local organizations made up of locals who understand.

understand the local environment, the local playing field, obviates the need for, say, intelligence, like a massive intelligence operation in Lebanon for top-down control. Basically, you're assured of Hezbollah's loyalty to you by this ideological link, so you can allow them leeway to operate as they see fit within Lebanon to suit their circumstances, to suit Lebanon's circumstances, because the ultimate objective here is growth. It is not just destroying Israel that is important to the Iran. It's not just fighting the United States, which they consider their primary enemy ideologically. It's not the Israelis.

They all say it, it has to Iran say we are their primary enemy. But more importantly than that, if you want to destroy Israel, if you want to fight and combat the United States, you need to survive and you need to grow. You can't be this minor, tiny organization. So they will allow their proxies sufficient leeway to sustain their growth and will not dictate to them. necessarily in areas that could harm their growth unless there's an existential matter at hand, unless there's something that a force of New York comes into play. But Iran will not push Hezbollah to suicide because it's its most important regional asset. Right. Well, there's a leverage from the ideological link. There's also obviously the leverage, as you pointed out, from the resourcing,

from the money, from the munitions, the hardware, the weaponry. It does beg the question. And this will basically be the last, I guess, question I want to be mindful of your time and we're almost out of it, is that any longer term agreement between Lebanon and Israel, by definition, leaves Hezbollah in place to grow. And you have to assume that Israel understands that Hasbullah's objective, which is Iran's objective, won't change over time. And so you would argue that any agreement is just kicking the can down the road to another conflict. In many ways, yes, look, I mean, the idea behind the resolution of the disputed border points is to take away one of Hasbola's excuses for maintaining its arms and its fight against Israel. But, look, this kind of doesn't address the poor enmity that Hasbola has for Israel. It's not about 13 disputed border points. It was never about even the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon, right?

The Israelis withdrew from South Lebanon. Suddenly, these disputes, you know, the Shabah farms, which had never been mentioned before, were on the table. And these farms were taken by Israel from the Syrians from 1967. So between 1967 and the Israeli entry into Lebanon, 1982, nothing. And then all of a sudden this becomes an issue. With the maritime border dispute, Nasrullah in his post-agreement speech, even said that there was something like two square kilometer that remained outstanding.

that weren't resolved and that Hezbo would continue to fight for them. The point is, Hezbollah's problem with Israel is not a border point here or there. It's Israel's very existence. So long as Israel exists, Hezbo will find a way to continue fighting it. And so long as Lebanon does not have the will to constrain Hezbollah, to restrain Hezbollah, to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbo will find a way to do so. Hezbo will find some excuse and will continue its war against Israel with the knowledge that Lebanon will simply not act against it. Now, do the Lebanese suddenly have the will to put an end to Hezbollah's private arsenal once and for all?

I don't see positive indications. There's talk of that, but it seems to me that Hezbollah is undertaking now a tactical withdrawal. They're further trying to integrate into Lebanon. This is something they've done at every juncture where they've been threatened or where they felt threatened or where they felt the odd man out, right? After the end of the Lebanese Civil War in the 1990s, they suddenly joined the parliament, where before that was anathema to them. After the Syrians were forced to withdraw from 2005, the protector in Lebanon, they suddenly joined the government. And now it seems like they're trying to integrate, they're trying to push for the integration of their forces into the apparatus of the Lebanese state.

Again, integration and further integration to give them this protective cover where they can continue to grow. And Lebanon, it does not seem whether they're willing to take the action necessary to put an, end to that. So yes, you're absolutely right. Whatever happens will not take away Hezbollah's ideological enmity for Israel and would lead Hezbollah intact to continue to grow and perhaps fight another day. I would argue, David, that, you know, it's not just the will. It's, I mean, this is the Lebanese government have the ability to deal with Hezbollah. And I, you know, I've had the chance to, you know, observe and be out there and understand to some degree, you know, not an expert, You have to know your limitations.

But I would argue it's a problem of both the will and their ability. Look, this has been fascinating. And I got a whole list of additional questions, which we're out of time right now. But what that means is you have to come back. David Dowd, the Foundation for Defense of Democracy. Thank you so much for joining us here on the Situation Report. And that is all the time we have for this week's PDB Situation Report. Look, if you have any questions or comments, or you got a Limerick or a Humorous Anerner,

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