The President's Daily Brief - PDB Situation Report | March 29th, 2025: Signal Gate Fallout & Iran’s Hidden Hand in Yemen

Episode Date: March 29, 2025

In this episode of The PDB Situation Report:   • We begin with the fallout from “Signal Gate,” the serious communications blunder that exposed sensitive U.S. military chatter during early strikes against the Houthis. Retired Army Colonel John Mills, former Director of Cybersecurity Policy at the Pentagon, joins us to break it all down.   • Then: U.S. strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen are escalating—but who’s really calling the shots? Alireza Jafarzadeh, Deputy Director of the Washington Office for the National Council of Resistance of Iran, says the answer lies in Tehran. He joins us to explain how Iran’s regime is orchestrating the fight.   To listen to the show ad-free, become a premium member of The President’s Daily Brief by visiting PDBPremium.com. Please remember to subscribe if you enjoyed this episode of The President's Daily Brief. YouTube: youtube.com/@presidentsdailybrief Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Welcome to the PDB Situation Report. I'm Mike Baker. Your eyes and ears on the world stage. All right. Let's get ourselves briefed. We're starting today's show with the latest on Signalgate. You knew it had to have a catchy name. That's the stunning blunder that exposed sensitive national security jatter during the early strikes against Sohoutis. Retired Army Colonel John Mills, former director of cybersecurity policy at the Pentagon, will join us to break that all down. Later in the show, U.S. strikes on the Fouthis are ramping up. But how much of this fight is actually being run out of Tehran? Now, Ali Reza-Jafrazade, deputy director of the Washington office for the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Can't put that on a bumper sticker. Well, he says the Iran's regime is pulling the strings. He joins us with the evidence. But first, today's situation report in spotlight.

The Trump administration is facing serious questions after a major concern. communications blunder, now known as Signalgate. During the early stages of U.S. strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen, senior national security officials, and there were a lot of them, including the Vice President and Secretary of Defense, we're coordinating in a private signal group chat. Now, if you don't know what Signal is, it's a commercial app. It's considered to be somewhat secure and discreet, certainly more so than an open line. Unfortunately, During the course of this chat, someone mistakenly added the editor-in-chief of the Atlantic, Jeffrey Goldberg.

Okay, enter a journalist. Sets of details about the strikes, including targets and timing, were shared before the mistake was caught. The incident, as you might imagine, has sparked concerns about operational security, what we would call opsec and discipline at the highest levels. Joining us now is retired Army Colonel John Mills, former director of cybersecurity policy at the Department of Defense. Perfect guy to talk to about Signalgate. Now, you can check him out on Substack at Colonel Ret John. You can also grab this excellent book, and that's called War Against the Deep State. If you don't already have it on your shelf, go out and get it,

all right? If there's a bookstore near you, I don't know if we still have bookstores. John, welcome to the show, man. Hey, Mike, always an honor to be on this show with you. Thank you so much. That's very kind of you to say. I would like you, if you wouldn't mind, to write that down and send it as a note to my producers. Tell me what you think about SignalGate. Well, I don't attach the word gate to it. I was one of the key people who had to deal with Hillary Clinton, and it wasn't just Hillary.

It was a pervasive, intentional, criminal RICO effort by the entire Obama team, Obama-Biden team to evade the Government Records Act, and use their personal cell phones. And actually, when they were doing it, even there was early instant messaging inside behind the firewall that, hey, guess what? We weren't capturing that as part of the Government Records Act. So this was intentional and pervasive. They were intentionally trying to get around the Government Records Act.

It was a criminal conspiracy. Okay. And as opposed to this, and I'll go into a lot of detail and enumerations. elements, but as opposed to this situation where we had a successful operation, some very high-level prattle was exposed by Goldberg, the operation was successful, everything was after the fact. I've had to deal with a number of spills or supposed spills. Everything I've seen so far, nothing amounts to a classified spill. So I reject, this is pure street theater. They, in their, attempt to catch up where number 47 and team have run over them and is 100 miles down the

road and they're still trying to figure out what happened. They, they're trying, we got them this time. Well, if they're going to die on this hill, they need to pace themselves. There's going to be a lot more hills to die on. And I mean, this is not it. And, you know, Norm Eisen, was it, was it, Norm Eisen? He is the most craven lunatic out there. He wrote, I was at the NSC in 2009 when he wrote the handling of classified information. And this is the one he rolled out in 2020. I got him. I knew, I knew we were going to get Trump in 2009. So I wrote that executive order on handling of classified information. Norm, you need to read your own executive order.

It says, guess what? Who is the ultimate arbitrator of classified? What is and what isn't classified? Hmm. According to his own executive order, it's the president. Yeah. Now, that's a good point, right? Let's break that down just for a second.

Explain to our folks here at the Situation Report. Who does have the ability to determine classification? It can't just be the president. And so who else has that responsibility for that authority to determine what is and isn't classified? Well, I mean, I don't mean to be a policy won't and all those who want to, you know, throw policy on the floor and roll around in it. I mean, but this is, it's the originator. It's the originator. And then you're supposed to have a class.

Anytime you have an operation, a programmed, you're supposed to write a classification guidance manual on what is and what isn't classified. If you want to do the most unfun, boring thing in the world, it's writing a classification guidance manual. Okay, it's stupid. But you got to do it. But it's, in the end, boiling it down and simply the president. And this one was dealing directly with the president. And President Trump always says, yep, we could have done better. We're going to do better next time.

It was a successful operation. whatever got out got out after the fact and and again you know uh goldberg is an absolute craven hack who made up a lie about suckers and losers and he's making this like he has uncovered the greatest conspiracy ever uh you know since he helped also work with the russia hoax so i mean no credibility on this guy everything i've read yeah Right. Doesn't amount to leave classified information. Now, when you say after the fact, I mean, I think we learned it after the fact, right? But to what degree from your perspective, and you've been dealing with this sort of thing for a long time,

could it have been an issue? Look, the Chinese in particular, right? They are extremely well-resourced, extremely capable and extremely motivated to understand what the White House is doing. at any given moment. So what would be the potential for them to target or other state actors or you know, semi-state actors to target signal or other similar commercial apps? Well, of course. And of course they are and there's already been a follow-on story that it's funny. He hasn't really gotten a whole lot of information that somebody has already leaked, you know, kind of the personal, you know, password lists and things like that for several of the officials, of course, that's the highest priority for foreign intelligence. I mean, duh. And,

you know, do we do it also? All I will say is maybe. Oh, how coy are you? Okay, but here's, I guess this is where I'm going with this. Look, what we're seeing right now is, as you've pointed out, is typical Washington gamesmanship, right? So the Democrats see this. They haven't had any oxygen since November, nothing to cheer about. So they get a hold of this. And of course, that's what they're going to do. They're going to rest of the cameras. They're going to say this is the biggest security breach they've ever seen. Chuck Schumer said. And by the way, don't get between a camera and Chuck Schumer. It's a very dangerous place to be. And they'll talk about how, you know, this is, the sky's falling. And on the other side, this is, you know, again, what happens in Washington,

to the other side being the Republicans in this instance, you know, are downplaying it. Nothing to see here, wasn't classified. It's all all right, folks. Taking all that and pushing it to the side, meaning the partisan politics, from an operational perspective, do you think it's a problem? On the scale of,

come on, you know from your time in the company that you got to do a risk assessment here and really how bad was this. On the spectrum of, and again, from what I've seen, but I guess what I'm asking is, is it a problem in terms of, of the highest level officials working in highly classified positions dealing on a regular basis with a highly classified material, apparently okay with the idea of using the commercial

available app rather than their NSA approved and provided devices or other more secure methods to communicate with each other. Yeah, please don't get me going on NSA approved devices. You've got to be kidding me. You know, yeah, if you want yesterday's product delivered tomorrow, yes, we'll go to NSA-approved solutions, okay. But you're not to mid, John. I'm just playing devil's advocate here, right?

And all the time, I'm not talking about, I don't give a crap about the politics of it from one side or the other. I'm simply saying, you know, there are standard, more secure ways to communicate when you're in those positions, and the potential is there for hostile actors, whom we know are really. regularly targeting or attempting to target, you know, key personnel and trying to capture conversation and understand plans and intentions, you know, from that perspective, I mean, what's your impression? Again, push aside the politics of it all. Is this something you would have done? Absolutely. The trend is absolutely use of commercial products, and that's including behind the firewall, including for, now again, there's different levels, unclassified.

We still are behind a firewall when you do unclassified. Then the intelligence community rejects this concept of secret. So they just jump to the top secret and compartmented. But the Department of Defense still calls something secret. So we have unclassified that works, which are still beyond the firewall. You have secret. And then for the super double top secret people pretending that nobody's ever listening to them when everything has been broken into anyway, you've got the top secret.

Okay. So it's utterly ridiculous and a charade, but the trend is commercial product. And there's in, well, I believe the DNI and both John Ratcliffe both said this was an approved product. Now, it really is an NSA, NSA, the DNI, which supposedly works for the DNI. Yes, they're, they're essentially the, I think it's NSPD 38. They're essentially in charge of the top secret networks. and they farm out J.Wix to the bottom feeders at DIA to manage. But yeah, this was an approved product, and we used many approved products behind the firewall.

And a lot of these commercial solutions are good. The basic concept with cybersecurity, though, is also you have to presume breach, even at the highest levels of supposedly, again, I'm just, I'm not releasing anything classified here. I'm just saying you have to presume breach at all times. So, but let me give you the vignette of the high value targeting process with General Stan McChrystal. Because before you do that, hold on to that thought because I want to kick off our second segment with what you're about to do. But before you do that, I need to do that, I need to. you to stay put, please. You know what, let me be more polite about that. Don't go anywhere. Stay put.

It's like I'm talking to Hendricks, my golden retriever. If you stay right where you are, we've got to take a quick break, and then we're going to be back with more of the situation report. This is Euphoria Calvin Klein, the new elixir collection featuring three perfume intense scents, inspired by a unique orchid accord paired with vanilla, each with its own distinct attitude, each with its own universe, bold elixir, sensual, woody, addictive. Magnetic Elixir. Sweet and romantic, like a lingering touch. Solar Elixir, a radiant expression of joy. Ultra concentrated for amplified impact and lasting power. Find your euphoria. Discover the Euphoria Elixir collection by Calvin Klein. Choice hotels get you more of what you value. Here's a little tune to help you remember.

Same drive, different day. Don't you wish you were getting away? Pack your bags and come on through. Texas, Ohio, Alaska, we're up there too. In, it's calling your name. Save on the stay. Oh, and free waffles are yours to claim. Well, I hope you like my little song, book direct at sourcevilletales.com. Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report. Joining me once again is the excellent friend of the show, retired army colonel John Mills.

John, thanks for sticking around. And you were about, in our previous segment, you were about to go into a vignette, please, Carry on. Well, I think this is, this really explains a lot of this since you, you know, you've, you want to, you know, yes, it's a political haymaking exercise on people like Schiff and Swalwell who've been absolute liars. That's Swalwell who was sleeping with a foreign agent and still has access to top secret information for some reason. But the, so the high value targeting process was a very successful process used. by Stan Crystal and an interagency J-Soc-led team to really, well, actually take that back.

Sometimes it was under a DSS and D-Triple-S to CIA as the lead, but it's truly successful process. Okay? And he's talked about it in open forums on a number of occasions, and he's been asked a number of times. I've asked him on a number of also is, so what happens if any of this information gets out on what you did? And you know what his response was? Essentially, words the exact effect. Couldn't care less. Why?

Because I'm already 10 miles down the road on my fifth subsequent operation. Who cares him, it gets out. Because if some bad person is reading this, it may be the last thing they're doing before they're filled with lead or go to pieces. I mean, this is, listen, it's all about, there's two key concepts. The velocity of operations. In the modern era, it's always, you've got to. outpace, you've got to be so far ahead, just like number 47 is so far ahead of the opposition,

you've got to always be way down the road. So what if this gets out there? By the time they make sense out of it, I mean, you've already run over them 20 times. Who cares? Unless, unless, of course, the system is compromised for the long term, right? I mean, there is the potential for systems. I could like a signal now to be compromised for the long term. Yeah. Again, commercial products are the trend. There's many commercial products approved, okay? And behind the fire for use behind the firewall, many. So, I mean, we got to get past that. Now, this was, I think you brought up an important point. Everything, all roads lead to China. This is a Chinese integrated operation. The Houthis are part of the Chinese-led operation of Topple America. China has the Ministry of State Security

and their integrated cyber operations. They copy, they copy us. They do everything we do. They copy it and they play it right back at us. So their big data, their big data analytics are pretty ferocious with none of the legal guardrails that we supposedly have. We don't have them if you have an R behind your name. But the, so yeah.

But again, velocity, velocity, velocity. So the Chinese have a ferocious data analytics, a ferocious big data, which they've essentially a big collection system. And look at the, well, don't look at them. I'm not allowed to look at him, but look at all the files that Snowden, a guy who passed his polygraph. Let me remind everybody, a guy who passed it multiple times, his full stroke poly. Interesting. That's another issue. So look at the documents.

They read the documents. Well, I mean, if you don't have a sense of right or wrong, you can pass the polygraph. Isn't that interesting? I'm going, I'm a good friend of mine who saved Christian is dealing with multiple no-goes on its polygraph. Isn't that interesting? They catch saved evangelical Christians, but they don't save, you know, what is it, reality winner, NSA, Georgia. Didn't catch her. Yeah, didn't catch snow.

didn't get a bunch of people. Oh, yo, you know, who's the, who's the... Well, you don't catch people, you know, the moles, for instance, right, our counterintelligence cases, you know, whether it's Hansen or Edley Howard or Alder James or any of them, you know, you can argue that a psychopath who doesn't really care about right and wrong, you know, that's what you're, that's what you're playing off of, right? The polygraph is definitely, it's not a complete science. Polygraph consumes an enormous amount of our counterintelligence resource. Oh, enormous.

Absolutely. Absolutely. I think we need to invert that whole model. That should be used on an exception basis in very targeted situations. But it consumes if people would see the budget books, which they're not supposed to see because they're classified, it consumes an enormous amount of resources that just look, look how many. This one CIA officer recently who the Biden team was just chewing off a leg of Israel, give us your war plans against Iran. And they got them in 30 seconds. later, Iran had him because a CIA officer who was fully, you know, gave him, you know, there you go. Yeah. Yeah. But anyway. That's the problem. That's why counterintelligence is so difficult not to disappear down that rabbit hole in this conversation, but that's why it's so difficult, right? It's a human endeavor. And, you know, you're always going to have the potential for a breach in that regard. And that's, that's a human breach as opposed to what we've been talking about, which is the potential to compromise technical solutions, whether it's signal or anything else. Well, but, John,

Let me ask you this. I know, I know what you've said about this and I don't disagree in terms of, look, obviously, you know, there are apps that are available. Clearly, this wasn't the first time this group or individuals in this group of you signal to communicate with each other. I think it would be completely odd if this was the very first time they've ever done it. What would be your advice if you were, you know, in there? And, yeah, would you go and say, okay, let's wrap this up, you know, here's a different app you can use or are you, or are you, you? not concerned with a continuing use of an app like Signal. And again, I know I take your point.

I know what you're saying that some of these are approved. I think the Defense Department had issued some concern about Signal in the past, but I don't know where that ended up. Bottom line, if there has, and I know I said and spoke ill of our NSA brothers, please forgive me and stop surveilling me. But if there is a modicum of a check, it's approved. Again, you have to presume breach, even on the higher level networks. Now, I'm not going to say yes or no, whatever we've been breached on there, etc.

You have to presume breach. It's velocity, velocity, velocity in the modern era of the operations. And, okay, you know, now, I also, I wrote a substack piece on this that contained many enumerated points. You know, one of them is, because at first, when I, I first wrote this, I wasn't clear on whether signal was, was this their personal signal, or was this signal approved and behind the firewall, which on the end class can still reach out to the general public beyond the dot mill, the dot gov, etc. Okay. So it appears it was behind the firewall

and they had, you know, Nordberg's, no, Goldberg's, you know, telephone number, okay? Oops. But that also, I wrote a piece on that because, you know, contact lists are complex databases. And they can even without malicious behavior, they can become confused. The databases can become confused, especially when you're using them across multiple platforms. Guess what? Even without malicious behavior, they can start transferring data and messing up contact lists and the I don't mean honestly I think a lot of people out there in the general population that have had that experience right I mean you hear that on a somewhat regular basis how that that happens

so from your perspective is it more of a concern of speed of communication is it ease of communication because I've read a number of things now there's a lot of people out there that are that are trying to make their way through what happened and I think there's a number of folks that are saying, well, yes, it's understandable because the, you know, the sort of the high side, the secure comms for those most secure conversations are cumbersome or, you know, it's not easy, right? And so the tendency is let's go with something easy. And we see that, again, when you're talking about security protocols at large corporations, right? If you layer on too much security, people are going to eventually bypass it because they need to get their work done.

Yeah, I was brought into the cyber world in 2006 by my NSA boss. I didn't work for NSA, but he needed a planner. He didn't need a career IT person who had knuckledregor, had spent all their life connecting and disconnecting cables. I mean, he needed a planner to be the Senior Department of Defense representative to the Inter-Agency Program called the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative. and so we learned a lot of things in that but we learned about offense we learned about defense but again velocity is important and you've got you that you what you brought up several times

is so important if you are doing so good in security that everything is just so clamped down that, you know, oh boy, no, well, you know, and let's not even talk about people using endarounds just to try to accomplish the mission. But you got it so clamped down that it's so complex to do anything. Well, guess what? The enemy's accomplishing their objectives anyway, because they've shut you down. So, and that's a, this is a hard thing for the career, CIO or C.I.O. or chief information officer or chief information security officer to get their heads around because they're going to, we're coming up. the perfect solution. Remember, remember CIOs and CISOs, you are not the main thing, you are an enabler to the main thing. So you do have to consider ease of use because what you do is if

you make it so difficult, either people are not getting anything done or people are going around and creating late opportunities. Then the other side is one again, because right, you're looking for people who are breaching established security protocols if you're a hostile element, you know, whether it's state or non-state actors. John, this is, I would love to continue this conversation because you're always fascinating and, you know, you've lived in this world for so long that it's refreshing because it's important for people to, again, to step back and actually hear what I would, you know, and have referred to as sort of the operational aspects of this, rather than the political side of it.

Because again, we're so used to Washington, D.C., regardless of who's in charge, regardless of which administration it is, you're always going to get this, right? And I've listened to Schiff and I've listened to Chuck Schumer and the others rushing to the cameras and saying, you know, everybody's got to go. This is horrible. And then, you know, on the other side, again, there's some downplaying, but I'm really appreciative of view coming on here and kind of walking us through the operational aspects of this so people can get, you know, a what I think is more of a nonpartisan view on this to make their own

determination as to where this all, you know, goes. But thank you again, John. And I hope you'll come back next time we call you on the phone. Coming up next, as the U.S. strikes against the Houthis intensify, is Iran really calling the shots? Hmm, it's an important question. And we've got a great person here to talk about it. That would be Al-Iraza-Jafrzade. He says yes, and he's got the evidence. to prove it. They'll join us when we come back. Starting a business can seem like a daunting task, unless you have a partner like Shopify. They have the tools you need to start and grow your business.

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There's a money side to every story. Get the money side of the story. Subscribe now at Bloomberg.com. Welcome back to the BDB Situation Report. The U.S. military campaign against Ahutis is entering its second week, with strikes continuing to target missile launch sites, radar systems, and the group's leadership across Yemen. Now, the Trump administration

says the goal is to degrade the Houthis ability to threaten international shipping in the Red Sea. But there's a bigger question at play. How much of this Houthi aggression is actually being directed by the Iranian regime? It's Tehran using the Houthis as a proxy to escalate tensions without getting its hands dirty. Joining us now is Ali Reza Jafersadehadeh, Deputy Director of the Washington office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Ali Reza, thank you very much for coming on with the situation report. I really appreciate you. Thank you so much.

Always a pleasure, Mike. Let's start from sort of the top line. Talk to me about what you perceive here. To what degree does the Iranian regime drive the actions, the strategic thinking, planning, and activities of the Khutis? It's 100% to be honest with you. because the Houthis, also known as al-Assad Allah, were actually a creation of Tehran. There were no Houthis some 25 years ago.

And the father, Badradi, along with two sons, Hussein and Abduan Malik, they went to Iran to Omb, where the religious schools are there near Tehran. and they spent at least one year in KOM getting all kinds of trainings from then, and then came back to Yemen, first started as sort of like a benign-looking movement. They even participated in some parliamentary elections. And since 2004, the order came that now is the time, and they got engaged into major confrontations. with the central government there.

And since then, what is now known as the Houthis has become a creation of Tehran, both in terms of army, sponsoring, funding, providing guidance, intelligence, all kinds of training provided to them. And that's why, I mean, similar to Hezbollah in Lebanon, I would say this is like the Herald version, of Hezbollah, and the names are pretty similar, and Saralah and Hezbollah. And their area of operation, obviously, is in Yemen, but they get a lot of their trainings, not necessarily in Yemen, or not even not necessarily in Tehran or Iranian cities. Rather, some of that is provided to them in Lebanon or was provided to them in Lebanon by Hezbollah. Also, some of the trainings took place in Najaf by the Iran regime's proxies, the hashtag Shabiyah and others. You mentioned something interesting in 2004.

You said that the group shifted from sort of a benign or semi-benyne political entity or taking part in elections, etc., to the group that we now know. What was the motivation? What was happening in 2004 that caused that shift? Well, I think what the regime was doing was basically nurturing them in the beginning because they had no real foundation. They had no real support there. So they wanted to give them some kind of a footing there. And then gradually, this process turned them into an anti-American entity.

That's how, that's the model that used in Lebanon, in, you know, in other places around the world. but also at the same time, Tehran felt that, you know, the outside war is really not responding to the regime's terrorism. They have a pretty much free way to go. You know, in Iraq, they had their, you know, in 2003 it was the invasion. And then they had, they managed, the regime managed to build an extensive structure in Iraq that within a few years, they were pretty much dominating. And you may recall that in Iraq, the number one killer of American forces were what they called the EFPs, explosive before projectiles or penetrators, that penetrates through armor. And, you know, I worked with Fox and we did a special in 2007, I think, about how these

that EFEs were being produced into Iran and by the Oats Force shipped across the border targeting the Americans and they were getting nothing in response. So the regime fell, okay, now we can get on the offenses because we're not getting any kind of, you know, we're not paying a price for it. So why not? And that's why the order came to turn them into a more active anti-American entity. Okay. So you're not buying because in recent weeks, as an example,

example, right? There's been some attempts by the Iranian regime to say, hey, we, you know, we don't tell them what to do. We know, we don't have any say over their actions, in part responding to what they're seeing from the White House, which is, you know, President Trump saying that he's going to hold the Iranian regime accountable if the Qutis continue with their current course of action. So, but you're not buying that from the Iranian regime. Absolutely not, Mike. You know, the Houthis, the way they are, would not even exist if it wouldn't for the Iran regime. The level of training, you know, three years ago, we put out the report and held a press conference right here in Washington, detailing how the Iran regime

had taken some of the Houthis to Iran near the Caspian Sea in a training camp to create what they call the naval terrorist group that they would be able to carry out terrorist attacks in the sea. And they trained them for several months, at least six months, near Ramsa, near the Caspian Sea in Tehran, and they send them back. So when you see those attacks by the Houthis taking place at the Red Sea and also other targets, none of that would have happened without direct training, planning, intelligence, weapons, all of that coming from Tehran. And it's, you know, this is like the regular playbook of Tehran. They always deny all of that.

They took hostages in Lebanon in the 80s and 90s. They said, you know, it wasn't us, but we can help you release those hostages. And then they get into negotiations and get money and resources and concessions in order to have the hostages released. All of those cases, the regime denies. Look at Syria. You know, the regime had spent at least 100,000 of their forces there, including at least 20,000, Esbalah, in order to keep Assad in power. At least $50 billion was spent. And they considered that Syria, asset in Syria as a strategic debt. But when the time came and the whole thing collapsed in 11 days, thanks to the very weakening position of the regime in the region.

Then they said, well, you know, it wasn't us. You know, it was another country and, you know, too bad. And they say the same thing about Hezbollah and all of the others. They said they're, you know, they're acting on their own, which in fact they aren't. To what degree do you think the Iranian regime, the current regime, has been damaged or weakened, lost influence as a result of the efforts against Khazbullah of Hamas, and to what degree do you think there can be success against Sakhutis along those same lines?

There is a whole new reality in the region, but also inside Iran. And I think these two elements are intertwined because the regime started getting weaker and weaker inside Iran since 2018, where those uprising started. There have been nine rounds of major uprisings in Iran in all 31 provinces, shaking the very foundation of the regime. People calling for change, calling for an end to the rule of clerics. They were, you know, what they called resisted as units formed inside Iran, run by the

Mayerene opposition in the MECA. They were targeting the Revolutionary Guards and, you know, the centers of power. And then in parallel in the region, the regimes that, you know, that, you know, that image of invincibility that Tehran had built over the years, that has been badly shattered. Who would think that a regime in Damascus that Tehran tried for about three, four years, tried to keep Assad in power with a huge amount of money and resources, but also bringing Russia to help them, that whole thing would fall in 11 days. And the same situation with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and look at that.

the situation in Iraq and now the Houthis. This regime is far weaker than they have ever been. And this is not a small thing. This is not a side show. All of these proxies of the regime represented what commonly described as the strategic depth. That's what they mean, meaning that if we don't fight in Lebanon, in Iraq and Syria and other places, we would have to fight in Tehran to keep the regime in power. Those. Those are actually almost exact words that commonly use, and now all of that is happening. So this regime is far weaker that they have ever been, and therefore I think there's a huge opportunity to end all of these threats.

And of course, nothing will be resolved unless the molas are overthrown and of course by the people of Iran and the organized resistance. Okay, well, on that note, we're going to pick it up right there after a break, but Ali Reza, if you could stay right there, we are going to take a quick break, and then we'll be back with more of the Situation Report. How many discounts does USAA auto insurance offer? Too many to say here. Multi-vehicle discount. Safe driver discount? New vehicle discount. Storage discount. How many discounts will you stack up? Tap the banner or visit usaa.com slash auto discounts.

Restrictions apply. Welcome back to the Situation Report. Joining me once again is Ali Reza Jefferzadeh, Deputy Director of the Washington Office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. I'll be raised it when we wrapped up the first segment. You mentioned that nothing really will change until somehow the Mullahs are moved out. And there's a regime change, essentially, is what we're talking about. So how does that happen? What do you think that looks like?

And is there a realistic timeline? because people have been anticipating or thinking that that could happen or hoping that that could happen for a fairly long time now. Well, you know, the good thing about what's different now, I know the mullahs have been in power for 40 plus years. And that's what they use to actually build this perception in the minds of others that, you know, we're the permanent feature here. We're going to be around and all the videos has always been like that. It will always be like this. You better find a way of living with our terrorism and all of that. That's the thinking of the mullahs.

And I think we need to put an end to that because you have never seen this level of weakness of the regime in the region, but also the uprisings inside the country. What you really, the world saw in the past few months or the past year, they saw that the head of the snake of war and terror lies in Tehran, but also the solution is also there. Nothing would be resolved unless the mullahs are overthroth. Now, what the benefit the regime had over the years was that they always managed to get concessions for their terrorism. And terrorism became a very profitable, you know, business for the Ayatollahs, combining the export of terrorism with the hostage taking, you know, taking a few husses.

You remember back in the 80s, the Terry Anderson and all the Americas and foreign other nations that were taken hostage by Tehran, and they always got something for it. They never paid the price for it. They developed nuclear weapons. You know, we were first to expose the nuclear size of the regime right here in Washington. In August of 2002, I revealed the nuclear sites in Natanz and the heavy weather facility in Iraq in near Tehran. And then in about that of a year, we revealed several other nuclear sites of Iran and their,

you know, we showed a complete picture of the nuclear weapons program of the regime, even though they were in early stages. With the nuclear program, what's your perception? Where are they right now with their nuclear weapons development? And how do you view the current US administration's perspective on this? They've said they will not get a nuclear weapon, but what does that mean in your mind? I mean, you know, you can talk about this. I know Washington and other capital I've been talking about this, but what we know on the ground

from our information on the ground, it shows that they have a very advanced, sophisticated nuclear weapons program that is working on all levels, both in terms of the fissile material that you can get it from a rich uranium or plutonium. They are working on the weaponization part, which has been very little overseeing on that. The IA is pretty much doing nothing about the weaponization part, and then the delivery system, building the missiles to carry the nuclear warheads. We just had two press conferences within the past four months showing that the main organization in charge of building the nuclear bomb, known as SEP&D, which we first exposed in July

2011 and three years later it was sanctioned by the US government, that entity is heavily involved in developing nuclear warheads in Sebnan and Shahrut, but also in Tehran. So, you know, whether the Khomeini decided to put all these pieces together and build a bomb, that's a different issue. We should get ourselves involved with that. We should look at the realities on the ground. It's not about their decision. It's about what they're doing. This program, this system, day one has always been about developing nuclear weapons. It's not about energy, and now they're moving towards that direction. But getting back to your first question about how to bring about change in Iran, you know, change is going to happen. You need to have several elements. First,

the population has to be in a situation to reject the regime, which is already there since 2018. As I mentioned, there have been nine rounds of major uprisings. You know, it's not. really the intellectuals anymore is the poor, the deprived, the smaller town, cities who used to be the bedrock of support for the regime, who are now involved in the protest. Second, you need to have the organized opposition to move things forward to turn that this content into change. That's what those resistance units are doing on the ground, you know, around the clock. At At least an average of seven acts of resistance are doing a day in Iran. Not much is being reported in the media.

And third is the role of the outside world. Is the outside world helping the regime in maintaining power, or they're holding them accountable and squeezing them? This is the missing part over the past few years. Different administrations, whether it was in Washington and Europe, always gaining them concessions. Now is the time to reverse that, and you will see the impact. if the maximum pressure policies fully implemented, and what I mean by maximum pressure,

you need to squeeze them where they actually feel it. And the most important element in addition to the sanctions is the organized opposition. U.S. should recognize the right of the people of Iran to stand up against the regime, overthrow them, recognize the right of those resistance units to confront the Revolutionary Guards, and you will see the outcome. In real terms, what does that recognition look like? You're talking about material support to those? organizations or just moral support? What are you thinking? Well, good question. You know,

that question was posed to Mrs. Maria Rajavidu, who released this movement. She was at a hearing just last month before the U.S. Congress. And the members of Congress asked her, what do you want from the United States? And she said, let me tell you what we don't want from the United States. There's no need for boots on the ground. There's no need for arms or appropriating money. that is needed, just recognize the right of the people to stand up against the repressive rulers. Definitely this means moral support, but also it means like creating space for those who want to overthrow the regime. Let me just give you one example. You know, in 2002, when we exposed the nuclear size, within a year, we had several major press conferences against

the regime. The regime was just going nuts. So they put pressure on the State Department and the US government, you know what happened? Instead of us being, you know, at least recognized for what we were doing, they shut down our office in Washington. And, you know, they designated, they added this movement to the FTO list. We had to fight for 15 years to go to different cores and get members of communists to get off the list. Why would you want to waste the time and energy and resources of a movement

that is trying to overthrow the biggest enemy of humanity today? That's what I mean, you know, when it comes to maximum pressure, when it comes to recognizing their rights to confront the regime. Those who are fighting the regime are not terrorists. They are true freedom fighters who want to bring about change in Iran and might think about an Iran that is free, that is non-burigerent, that is seeking peace, seeking a republic form of government, that vote of the people will count. what a difference you will make in the whole region.

What a difference it would make in Iraq, in Lebanon, you mentioned all of the countries in the region, but also globally in the world. And that's why I think this is the opportunity for the United States, but also Europe, to line up all their vectors behind these new realities on the ground. And I think there are regional actors, right, who would not be sad to see the current Iranian regime go away, right? And so let me ask you this and maybe you don't want to answer, but to what degree are some of those actors, some of those states out there that are, you know, not inclined to support the Mullahs? Do they have a relationship in any way with the resistance

within Iran? I mean, is there any moral support or any effort from the regional players who benefit from a more peaceful, stable Iran? Well, Mike, honestly, so far in the past few decades, the terrorism of the Iran regime was very beneficial to them because, in a way, in addition to taking hostages and getting money for it, but the regime used that against the players in the region, asking any of these Arab nations in the region. They were afraid to rock the boat with Tehran. And of course, the most important way to rock the boat with Tehran is to somehow side with

the organized opposition in Iran. Tehran has made it a red line to all of the countries that, you know, the one place you can't go is this organized resistance. You know, the Adibaba Badi, who is now the deputy foreign minister for, you know, international affairs, legal affairs. He said that since about two and a half years ago, in every single year, he said that since about two and a half Every single meeting they have had with their foreign counterparts, whether it was in Europe or the region everywhere, one of the topics on the table, no matter what the issue is,

is the issue of the organized resistance, specifically the MEK, and asking them to demonize them, to limit their activities. Look at how they treated Albania that has about 3,000 members of the MEK based there in in Ashraf 3. They wage a huge cyber attack on the Albanian infrastructure in Europe, telling Deb, if you want those cyber attacks to stop, you need to stop facilitating the, you know, hosting the NECA there. And that's why it's so important to fight back, to tell the Iran regime that we're going to hold you accountable.

We're not going to reward you. This is the end of it. That policy of the past 40 years is over. But do you have optimism that that is going to happen? And then there's two parts of this question. I've got to be mindful of our time. But first part would be you talk about that and sort of the support from the international community. Do you think that things have changed sufficiently in terms of the weakening of the Iranian regime that that could happen?

And then if you could, and I know this is tough to do, but in short order, if you could provide just sort of from your perspective, how close is the regime to announcing to the world that they're suddenly a member of the nuclear club? Well, this last question I can't answer intelligently because honestly, I don't know. But I can tell who based on what we know already, and we know a lot, but not everything, they are close. they have worked on all of those elements and they have actually sped up their dash towards building the bomb. This is perhaps the very last leg left for the Ayatollahs as a tool for their survival. But in terms of the prospect, I think I'm very optimistic and not just because of the,

you know, the policies outside of the world, but I think very optimistic about what's really happening on the ground. Inside the country, this regime is so weak. Their economy is just like nothing is working because the economy is built on corruption. It builds on further empowering the revolution guards. No other how much money you give them, still the economy is going to go down. The past four years that the export of oil went up to close to two medium barrels a day, up from about two, three hundred thousand, you would think the economy of the country would improve. It did it. It made it worse.

And it actually, of course, it made the revolution guards more powerful, more money, more funding to their proxies. But it also made them, you know, more greedy. And that's why the regime is resorting to killings inside Iran. See, the past one year, 1,000 execution of prisoners has taken place. This is all sign of weakness. But also in the region, the influence of the regime has been badly shattered. There's no way they can repair it. Nothing is going to bring back what they had in Lebanon, in Syria, in Iraq, and what's

really happening now in Yemen. So that's why I'm very optimistic, and I think the relying on the people of Iran, their force, they are also very optimistic. They feel that now that Assad, that seem to be invisible, just went down in 11 days, the same thing can happen in Iran. And of course, what it took there was an organized force on the ground. And that's the same situation in Iran. That's why I say, you need to keep the focus here. And if I say like three steps that the US can do is, first of all, they did to hold the regime accountable, snap back all those sanctions at the UN, you know,

bring back all the sanctions that were relieved. And also hold the regime accountable in in all different areas, recognize the right of the people of Iran to see change. That's what you will see change will happen. Al-Araza, I've got a dozen or more additional questions I could throw your way right now, but we're going to have to save that for the next time. And I hope you do come back the next time because the conversation is fascinating. Ali Reza, Jefferzade, see, look at that. I almost had it, Ali Reza, almost added.

Jefferzade, deputy director of the way. Washington Office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, thank you for joining us today on the Situation Report. Well, that is all the time that we have for this week's PDB situation report, right? A lot of information there to digest. If you have any questions or comments or humorous anecdotes, please reach out to me at PDB at thefirsttv.com. You've heard me say this before, but I mean it, the highlight of every week here at the PDB secret compound, while I'm not there right now, I'm on the road, but at our secret compound, which is located somewhere under a dormant volcano, is when Carl the mailman somehow finds us and drops off another sack,

filled to the brim with your postcards, your emails, your faxes, your telegrams, your edible fruit baskets, and every month, our amazing team, including the above-average interns. Well, they all select a bunch of your questions, and we produce one of our critically acclaimed Ask Me Anything episodes, which is in the pipeline right now to be released very shortly. Listen, finally, to hear the podcast of the show ad-free, just become a premium member of the president's daily brief. It's very simple by visiting PDB Premium.com. I'm Mike Baker, and until next time, stay informed. Stay safe. Stay cool.

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