The President's Daily Brief - PDB Situation Report | May 31st, 2025: 50,000 Russian Troops Amass On Ukraine’s Border & No End in Sight for Gaza

Episode Date: May 31, 2025

In this episode of The PDB Situation Report: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky sounds the alarm as Russia amasses 50,000 troops near the northeastern border. Is a new offensive coming? Retired Lt. General Ben Hodges, former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe, joins us to assess the threat and what it means for NATO. As the war between Israel and Hamas reaches the 600-day mark, the fate of dozens of Israeli hostages remains uncertain. Bill Roggio from the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies shares the latest on Israel’s efforts in Gaza. To listen to the show ad-free, become a premium member of The President’s Daily Brief by visiting PDBPremium.com. Please remember to subscribe if you enjoyed this episode of The President's Daily Brief. YouTube: youtube.com/@presidentsdailybrief Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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Services not available in all areas. Welcome to the PDB Situation Report. I'm Mike Baker. Your eyes and ears on the world stage. All right, let's get briefed. We begin tonight with a warning from President Zelensky. Ukraine says 50,000 Russian troops are now masked near the border, sparking fears, of course, of a new offensive. Former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe, retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges joins us with insight. Later in the show, this week marks 600 days. since the war between Israel and Hamas began when Hamas kicked off this conflict with those brutal 7 October 23 attacks. For the families of the hostages still held in Gaza, each one of these days has been a living nightmare. We'll bring you an update on the latest with Bill Rojo of the

Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. But first, our situation report spotlight. Tonight, Ukraine's President Zeletsky is sounding the alarm. According to the latest intelligence from Kiev, more than 50,000 Russian troops are now mass. near Ukraine's northeastern border. Now, this isn't just a show of force. It may be the prelude, of course, to a new Russian offensive, likely targeting the Sumi region. At the same time, Western allies have reportedly lifted range restrictions on Ukraine's use of long-range missiles, meaning that Kiev can now strike deeper into Russian territory. Joining us to break it all down is retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe.

Sir, thank you very much for joining us here on the Situation Report. Well, thanks for the privilege, Mike. The reports that Putin is massing troops on the border of Ukraine and the Sumi region in particular, what do you make of that? Well, I have to say I'm skeptical. There may be a lot of troops there, and certainly the Russians would like to try and get momentum somehow. But as General Kovoli said, a month ago in his testimony to the House and Senate Art Services Committee, Russia is losing on the battlefield.

They have demonstrated they do not have the ability to knock Ukraine out of the war. They can only kill innocent people with their attacks at nighttime on cities, but they don't have the land power. And certainly they're not integrated with air power supporting land operations the way we would. So while they may have a bunch of troops, I don't think they have a lot of equipment. So I'm skeptical that this is going to be some breakthrough kind of point in the war. Is it a complete stalemate at this point, or is it your impression, and based on what you've seen, that there is slow but some progress by the Russian military in terms of taking

territory, as small as the gains may be? Well, I mean, you could imagine that there are villages or places where the Russians may gain a thousand meters or two kilometers or something like that. But when you go back to where they were, I mean, frankly, today the situation of the ground is not one bit better from the Russians than it was before 22 February or about the time they launched their large-scale invasion. And yet since that time, they've lost close to 900,000 casualties. They are using museum pieces for armored vehicles.

They've got soldiers attacking in golf carts and e- scooters. So I think that they can still put lots of troops on the ground, but these are not going to be well-trained, and they're not part of a mobile armored formation that can penetrate Ukrainian defenses. Now, I don't want to overstate this for the Ukrainians, obviously, on the receiving end of these attacks, they're getting pounded with drones and artillery and rockets, and it's still a very, very difficult close fight. But I try to think more broadly about what's going on, and here we are, after 11 years, with Russia having every advantage, they still cannot knock Ukraine out of the war.

the Air Force is still not got near superiority. The Black Sea Fleet, nobody even talks about it anymore. The question that I'm trying to get to is, and part of this is a speculation, obviously, but do you think that in Putin's mind what little progress they may be making, again, assuming it's just not a stalemate at this point where nobody's moving in either direction, Do you think that he views that as sufficient reason to continue the effort? I mean, there must be some reason for massing some 50,000 troops up there on the border with the Sumi region. So I'm wondering, and again, I realize that, you know, I'm asking you to speculate a little bit here and get inside Putin's mindset.

But is the scenario that we're looking at where Putin thinks, okay, I've got enough progress, I believe it looks like the U.S. may be backing away. from Ukraine, perhaps. And so why would I sit down at the negotiating table? Well, you've put your finger on it. The decisive part of this war now is what's going on inside Putin's head. He obviously doesn't care about casualties. That's not his concern. And this war is not going to be won because the Ukrainians finally killed a million or a million-plus Russians killed or wounded them.

And they'll probably hit that million number by the end of the summer. It's as long as Putin thinks that he can win, which means as long as he believes that the West is not going to actually give Ukraine what's needed, support Ukraine with what's needed, both in terms of real support, but also the West using its economic power to wreck Russia's oil and gas industry. and especially if he sees or believes that the United States under this administration is not going to hell, then I think he keeps on going because he has never backed away from any of his stated objectives. He still doesn't recognize Jolensky or refuses to recognize President Cholensky as a legitimate later. The Russians have zero interest in actually coming to a negotiated settlement. So as long as he thinks he can win, he'll keep doing this. So do you interpret their latest, whatever you'd want to call it, it's not an olive branch in any way,

but their suggestion of a meeting in Istanbul on Monday on the 2nd of June to discuss terms of a ceasefire or a piece of some sort. Do you interpret that as just a stalling tactic or just stringing along the U.S. and the West? Now, this is just more nonsensical noise from the Kremlin. They're not interested in actually having a conversation, and you see what they're doing. And so far, our president has been completely reluctant to do anything that causes pain or problems for the Russians. And so by tossing out a bone here that, hey, we really want to have negotiations that they believe, I believe that the Russians believe that that would be all that President Trump needs this. I see, the Russia is really doing a talk, so no sanctions.

And so this is part of them continuing to play the administration. Yeah, it's a bit bizarre, if you think about it. Well, the whole thing is bizarre. But if you look at comments from Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who just the other day came out and said, well, now it's not the time to increase the price. pressure because we wouldn't want to force them away from the negotiating table. And yet, Putin sees no problem in increasing air strikes on Ukraine, you know, as if somehow, you know, there's, we're not on the same logic train here. And so I'm not quite sure, you know, why at this stage of the game,

the White House isn't thinking to themselves, okay, you know, nothing else has worked. How about we ratchet up to sanctions pressure. Well, I think you're right that the White House is not on the same project train as the Russians. And that's been the problem from the beginning. The administration's approach, I think, was doomed to failure from the very start because they never really understood or appreciated the history, the culture, the geography, why Ukraine is fighting, what the Russians actually would.

And you'll remember back in the beginning of the administration, where Secretary Rubio said, well, obviously, Ukraine's going to have to give up something. That's before any negotiation. I mean, that doesn't quite sound like order the deal to me when you start stopped by giving up something. And, you know, the president, the couple of rare times where he was critical of Putin, he also would badmouth President Jolensky also. And so the Russians can see this.

And the fact is, I mean, they're mocking the president, you know, two days ago a pre days ago and the president said, Putin's gone crazy. I don't know what happened. You know, then Peskov, the spokesman of the Kremlin, says, well, obviously the president is under great emotional stress. I mean, they're haunting this administration. And I kept hoping for the last few months that the president would finally be so

angry and irritated with how the Russians are making us look foolish and frankly making him look foolish and weak, that he would say, okay, I'm sick of this, and he would use all the enormous leverage that the president of the United States has, whether it's to provide Ukraine everything they need, or to help European countries stop these illegal shadow fleet vessels that are taking oil and gas out of the Baltic Sea and Blackseat, or do something in the markets that would lower the price of oil and gas so lest that it would wreck Russia. But he's done it done with those things, and I don't think he ever will.

Yeah. General Hodges, I want to pick up on that point when we come back. But if you could stay right where you are, we do have to take a quick break. And then we'll be right back with more from General Hodges talking about Ukraine here on the Situation Report. Stick around. Welcome back to the Situation Report. Joining me once again is retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges. He's the former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe.

Sir, we were just talking about the reluctance of the White House, or however we want to describe it, to impose more pressure, more sanctions on the Kremlin. And I guess once again, I seem to be asking you a lot of questions that require you to speculate. But why do you think that the White House hasn't moved at this stage? Why do they seem so reluctant to push the Kremlin harder? Well, of course, you're right. I'd be speculating. I don't know. It's been a mystery to me. A number in my life did I imagine that a Republican president would be so unwilling to use our great leverage in power, economic as well as industrial power, against Russia. It's difficult to understand. Now, I know there are a lot of people to speculate about what the president's motivation. is, is it there's a personal thing? Is there some, does he envision himself as, you know, one of the three great leaders along with Putin and Xi to divide up the world? Is it one of those

kind of things? Or is it, I honestly, I think the president has zero interest in Ukraine. He's, you know, these issues about sovereignty and freedom and navigation don't mean anything to him. It's not a big moral decision for him. I think this is about, can I get a good deal here with Ukraine or he would get to business with Russia. It feels like that's what it's motivating this. The problem is, of course, the Chinese are watching all this. The Chinese are watching to see, oh, the U.S. things to be kind of flexible when it comes to sovereignty.

That's bad news for Taiwan in the Philippines, or that the U.S. is not so keen on, you know, this international law or freedom of navigation. It's not such a big deal. I think that tells the Chinese kind of where our limits are. But my hope is that the Congress, you know, it looks like Senator Graham has got at least 80 other senators, Republicans and Democrats, that are prepared to put forward a big sanctions package. I think the Republican senators, the particular ones, have been there for a long time, and they've always been pro-NATO, pro-transatlantic.

They're very uneasy with how the White House is handling things right now. And so we could see a case soon where the Senate puts forward a sanctions package, maybe in the next couple of weeks, with or without the president's endorsement. They could override it if the president tried to stop it. I think they would much rather do it in support of the president, so we'll see where that goes. But that's my hope is at least the car is will take some action. I would think that if we have the talks in Istanbul on Monday on the 2nd of June and nothing is accomplished, and it looks like it's going to be relatively speaking, low-level negotiating teams that are going to be sitting at the table.

It's not going to be some summit between Zelensky and Putin. And if nothing happens, then you would imagine that at that point, perhaps, Trump will maybe alter the calculus here a little bit and think that, okay, now we're getting absolutely nowhere in this regard. Even if he starts to back away from the provision of military support of hardware, that the sanctions, the economic pressure would be the next move, the next option. But again, we'll just have to wait and see you at this stage. I think you're absolutely right. All of this hinges on what's in Putin's head and frankly, what's in President Trump said. What do you make of the recent moves by the EU? They seem to be looking to

backfill any potential gaps if the U.S. backs off of providing military resources. And then the German had said Friedrich Mertz indicated that, well, on one day they were going to provide the tourist missile systems. And then the next one day, they were going to provide the tourist missile systems. and then the next day he said, well, that's not the case. But what do you make of EU moves lately? Well, I think European countries realize that if Ukraine fails, that they're next. I mean, that Putin has been very open about, you know, he has aspirations beyond Ukraine.

And they also know that if Ukraine fails, millions more Ukrainian refugees will be heading west into Poland, Germany, Romania, and other parts of Europe. So there's an economic problem as well as the security problem. So I think they're recognized. And I think they've come to the conclusion, frankly, that our administration is not going to actually do anything of substance. And therefore, this has been put completely in their lap. And that's why you've got UK and France and now Germany,

much more forward-leading on support to Ukraine. Now, they should have been doing this all along. But the fact is, they are stepping up to do it now. The new Bundes counselor, Mr. Merritt, indicated that he's not going to talk publicly about, you know, what they provide and don't provide anymore, which I think is probably smart. You know, we should quit advertising, okay, we just said 10 more or whatever. And they are going to invest a lot of money in Ukrainian defense industry, particularly on helping Ukrainians develop. their own long-range precision strike capability. So whenever this aid looks like, this is a positive thing that I think Europeans know they have to do it for their own security.

This is not charity for Ukraine. Merz, yeah, you made a really good point there. He did say, after there was a bit of a kerfuffle over, you know, will, they won't, they provide the tourists. Then he commented that Germany is going to do everything possible to help Ukraine develop their own capabilities internally to produce long-range missile systems. What's the timeline on something like that? That would seem to imply that there is no ceasefire in the works, there is no truce down the road, that at least the EU is looking at this and thinking this is a longer term, even though it's been three years already. Well, once again, you've put your finger on an important point. The Ukrainians, by the way, I don't think any serious people will show up in Istanbul from Ukraine on Monday.

They know Russia better than we ever will, and they know that the Russians actually have zero interest in a real set of negotiations. And, of course, Ukrainians also know that the Russians cannot be trusted and would never live up to any agreement. That's why they've insisted there has to be a ceasefire before you can get to real negotiations. So all the talking, everything that's been going on so far, that's just to try and get to a ceasefire of some sort. And the Russians have made it clear they will not do a ceasefire until they get some kind of deal in place. Well, that's the exact opposite side of this.

And so I think people are realizing this is going to go on a lot longer. I do anticipate, at least what I read today, that what the German government has planned on do with it, that there will be output, let's say, before the end of this year, some new capabilities that are perhaps are already in the works, but this economic boosts from Germany and maybe even some technology boosts. And of course, that's why the Russians immediately threatened in Germany. He said, well, obviously the Ukrainians can't do this without Germany, so if they do, they will have to strike Berlin. That's a big, giant, fat, empty, empty threat, but it has worked in the past, these kinds of threats.

What do you think about former Russian President Medvedev's comments talking about World War III the other day? Well, another drunken stupor by Medvedev, who they try out about every two weeks to threaten nuclear war and all that, because he knows that, frankly, during the Biden administration, the Biden administration was very susceptible to these threats of nuclear war, as were several European countries, particularly Germany. Now you've got new leadership in Germany that is not shaken by this. And I imagine that the Trump White House also is not moved by the nuclear threats. Yeah, you're right. Nobody loves to rattle the nuclear saber more than Dimitri Medvedev. He kind of does it on a regular basis. And it is interesting because now they, you know, again,

you be thinking about, okay, well, if we had really solid intel sources, we could understand the plans and intentions and motivations of Putin and his increasingly shrinking inner circle. But you would have to assume that they made that realization, that they said, okay, look, this type of talk isn't impacting this current U.S. administration. It doesn't seem to be impacting the EU the way that it did in the past. with the U.S. and others saying, yes, we've given a green light to using our systems to strike further into Russia. And the Germans obviously on board with that now in some fashion. At some point, you know, you have to ask yourself, what would it take?

And I guess once again, we started with asking you to speculate. I guess I'm kind of wrapping up with asking you to speculate. but a two-part question, what would it take to get Putin to actually sit down at the table, in your opinion, and what do you think this conflict looks like by the time the end of the year rolls around? So I think he will only sit down when he's forced to when he realizes they are either going to lose or there's no way that they can lit. You know, his economy is being propped up right now.

it's on a, somebody called it a sugar high of defense investment, which is not a sustainable way to do it. And then so if we would go after their oil and gas industry in such a way so that they could not export to India and China, then they would not be able to pay for what they're doing. So the economic pressure would be enormous. And I think that kind of pressure is what it's really going to take, using our economic power. That's us working with Europe, working with the Saudis and others, so you can manipulate the market and severely damage the Russian side. I'd not think it's only going to be that.

Or with a commitment by the United States and European countries, we're going to help Ukraine win. My business, we're with you for as long as it takes BS, but we're going to help win. And here you go. and as many attacks, the javelin's artillery, everything you could possibly use,

it's coming. Then I think Putin would realize, and the people around him would realize, okay, we're never going to, we've got to get out of here somehow. That's, I think that's the only way. What does it look like a year from now? Obviously, it depends on what the U.S. does

and what Europe does. I think, if nothing changes, I think we'll be about where we are right now, come de sever. That's a cheery thought. And to your point about China, with China watching what's happening, everything, right? The world is constantly shrinking. It's very interconnected.

And so we also have to take into account. Look, they've been able to keep their war machine humming in part because of Chinese support from Xi Jinping and the Communist Party there. So, you know, increasing those sanctions, there has to be. You know, we've got to be very strategic about then also thinking about how, you know, do we deal with China to ensure that they don't then continue this level of support or increase the sport to keep Putin's war machine humming along. General, as always, very, very much appreciate your insight, your experience, and you're taking the time to join us here on the Situation Report. I can't thank you enough, and I hope you'll pick up the phone the next time we call you. Thank you, sir.

Well, 600 days into the war in Gaza, can you believe that 600 days into the war in Gaza? Israeli forces are preparing to launch a major new ground offensive against Hamas. Now, the IDF says it aims to seize most of the territory in the strip within two months. We'll get the latest with Bill Rojo from the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Stick around. How many discounts does USA auto insurance offer? Too many to say here. Multi-vehicle discount.

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Welcome back to the BDB Situation Report. This week marks 600 days. Can you believe that's 600 days since the war between Israel and Habas began? 600 days of conflict, destruction, and for the families of the hostages still held in Gaza, well, 600 days of anguish. Now, Israel is launching a major new ground campaign. It's dubbed Operation Gideon's Chariots, and the offensive aims to occupy some 75% of Gaza's territory within the next two months. The Israel Defense Forces, the IDF, have deployed five full divisions, tens of thousands of troops, into the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, Israel confirmed the death of Muhammad Sinwar, Hamas's Gaza chief, and the younger brother of the group's slain top leader.

He was reportedly killed in an Israeli strike targeting a hospital in southern Gaza. Joining me now is Bill Rojillo. He's a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the editor of FDD's Long War Journal. Bill, thank you again for joining us here on the Situation Report. I believe at this stage, perhaps you may have the title of, you know, the most frequent guest on the Situation Report. But don't get excited. There's no prizes that come with that. Well, it's an honor regardless, prize or no.

It certainly is an honor. There's so much to talk about here. But let's talk about this offensive that the IDF is currently preparing for, engaged in. I mean, they've already moved their personnel. What do you make of it? They're talking about occupying up to 75% of the Gaza Strip. Yeah. So right now, the main focus of the operation is in Rafa and communists.

in southern Gaza. The Israeli military, for them to occupy, look, it's 2 million people in Gaza. It's a large area. Israeli military isn't built for this. They're built to fight

quick, fast strike, high technology type wars. Something like an occupation. They just don't, the Israeli doesn't have that kind of manpower. in their military. So, you know, how many, I think we've heard the Israelis say time and time again since this war began that its objective is to defeat Hamas. And yet here we are well over a year

and a half since the October 70,023 attack. And Hamas is still in the fight. I think it's going to be difficult. The Israelis have to be smart about this. The only thing I could think here is that I do see some evident that the Gaza people in Gaza are starting to grow tired of Hamas. We've seen a couple of instances of protests. Now, Hamas has responded to that by going out and beating and executing the ringleaders of these protests, which shows that they still have staying power and that they still can wield the stick, particularly amongst their own people. for the Israelis to completely, you know, to occupy 75% of Gaza, well, then what about that other 25%? Is this where Hamas slips into in order to slip away from the Israeli defense wards and buy their time? We've seen this in, you know, the insurvencies that we fought, particularly in Afghanistan and in Iraq over time. So I call me skeptical that it can be successful, that the Israelis can succeed here. But,

Maybe, but maybe they can. They certainly have to try because raids and airstrikes that they've been doing over the last year and a half. Of course, they haven't inserted brown forces. That just hasn't worked. I do think they need to try here. But I do have a lot of questions as to whether the Israeli military and Israeli society, because their military is primarily made up of reservists. So of all of these call up reservists that are going to have to be focusing on occupying Gaza are unable to. go to their jobs and contribute to the Israeli economy. So there's a lot of difficulties. It's fraught with problems, both militarily and within the, you know, politically and within the civilian population for the Israelis to maintain the type of occupation that I think they would need to maintain in order to truly defeat Hamas and Gaza. Yeah. And then you could argue, we've talked about that on the PDB in the past. Is, you know, the idea that it's not feasible when, and look, Netanyahu said this at the very outset, right, on 7 October, the day after 7 October, he said, we will destroy Hamas.

And I would argue and have argued that, you know, it's, it's understandable to say that. You know, you can understand the emotion in it. You can understand the concept, but in reality, you know, the idea that you're going to completely destroy this organization is, I think, just not feasible. So what they're talking about, it appears to be, Bill, and correct me if I'm wrong, is they're talking about essentially moving from the south, Rafah in that area, up north, and then kind of squeezing Hamas operations up into the northern section of Gaza, in that whatever, remaining 25%, and then conduct operations at that point to take out the remainder of Hamas.

But as you pointed out, and as the U.S. military knows full well from, you know, urban warfare in Afghanistan in particular and in Iraq, that is probably the toughest type of combat operation. Yeah, absolutely. And you have to remember. So look, support for Maza is certainly dipped. But by all accounts, it's somewhere almost 50% of the population. Now, could that be because the people are afraid, you know, the pulsed, maybe it's 30%. But, you know, the numbers with, there's multiple studies on this. And who knows what the real percentages. You know, there's lies, damn lies and statistics. But they say anywhere from 2 to 5% of the population is what a successful insurgency needs to maintain itself. So let's say that number's 25% or 20% or 30%

who knows what particularly the spread is. The reality is that the support amongst the people in Gaza for Hamas is still high. The people have been indoctrinated for decades by Hamas. This was the real danger. You know, it's interesting, right? I'm going to make it Afghanistan in comparison here. The Israelis withdrew from Gaza in what it was 2005 or 2000. six. And the thought was they could isolate it and, you know, just let them be and they won't have any reason. And here we are two decades later. And the problem is metastasizing and Hamas still remains in control of Gaza, even if it's tenuous. U.S. invaded Afghanistan to, to eject the Taliban from power. And here we are two decades later, the Taliban is back in power.

maybe we need to learn something about how we engage with terrorist organizations that are more than terrorist organizations and that have outside support. Maybe that's where the Israelis and the West, the problem is as much of the West isn't supportive from us. Now, look at Europe and their attitudes towards Israel. The Israelis have a real long-term problem when it comes to Hamas. Amos just needs to figure out how to bide their time, how to wait out the Israeli offensive, and just move back in in the Israelis tire. Well, I think that's exactly their mindset, right? Which is why, you know, they're constantly changing the, you know, the strategy of the potential

ceasefire discussions is that they feel that they can just, they wait this out. They've always found in the past that, you know, they can get the international community on their side, you know, whether they're actually supporting Hamas or the, you know, the international community is just upset with Israel over the level of, response in Gaza. But I think Hamas's calculation really hasn't changed that much, despite the fact that their leadership has been fairly well degraded. But again, if we're talking about the impact of all of this on Hamas as a future organization, you could argue, yes, I think you're right that some of the population of Gaza is or has turned against Hamas, right? They rightly understand

that Hamas brought this suffering and this pain and all of this destruction onto them. But I think then you've also got others. I would argue you've got a well of new recruits for Hamas or, you know, radicalism, particularly sort of the younger male population who's been suffering through the fighting since October 7th. And instead of blaming Hamas, they're blaming Israel. And if Israel does intend to occupy for any period of time, you know, the strip, then I think they're creating a new generation of potential fighters here. No, I agree.

I mean, that new generation, the young male, the military age male or even younger than that, I mean, when you look at the destruction in Gaza, what do they have to lose? On one hand, I don't blame the Israelis. I mean, one hand, the Israelis have been far too kind for what the people of Gaza did to, it's not just Hamas, right? The Palestinian Islamic jihad and the PLFP and the alphabet super terrorist organizations that emanate from Gaza, as well as the West Bank celebrating that attack on Israel. On one hand, you know, have the issue, what would our response be if the cartels did on the scale of what to the United States, New American citizens? with what Hamas and company did to the Israelis. I can only imagine. I mean, I think me and my friends would certainly be rounding up and going to Texas

to exact some revenge for what, you know, for 20,000 plus American dead in an attack at a horrific attack like that. But as you note, those consequences to that, does it create another generation? Is it the destruction that Israel has leveled upon the people of Gaza? has it just given them no other opportunity but to fight? You know, I'm torn on this issue, but that ultimately I don't, you know, I kind of come down on the side here that these Israelis have tried to play nice for decades. They left Gaza. They ended the occupation in the mid-2000s to leave Gaza and the Palestinians to govern on their own.

And they were repaid by multiple attacks being rockets, missiles, missiles. of balloons, the incendiary balloons, terrorists coming across the border to kill people in rammings and shootings, and ultimately the pogrom that occurred on October 7, 2020. You know, what other option did the Israelis have? I mean, how much longer could they turn the other chief? Yeah, and I think they knew going into it, I think that they would lose the international community after that brief sympathetic moment after the 7 October attacks, I think they were probably also surprised at how quickly the international community turned on them

as a result of their response inside Gaza. But Bill, a lot more to talk about. But if you could stay right there, we do have to take a quick break. And then we'll be right back with more from Bill Rojillo on the Situation Report. Stick around. Ryan Reynolds here from Intmobil, the message for everyone paying big wireless way too much. Please for the love of everything good in this world, stop. With Mint, you can get premium wireless for just $15 a month.

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Bloomberg follows the money. Whether it's the funds fueling AI or crypto's trillion dollar swings, there's a money side to every story. Get the money side of the story. Subscribe now at Bloomberg.com. Welcome back to the Situation Report. Joining me once again is Bill Roggio, the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy. Bill, thank you for being here. And let me ask you this.

There's roughly 2.3 million residents in Gaza. How about that plan to relocate them to other countries? Yeah, that one seems to have gone by the wayside. The Trump administration, if they were serious about this, I think this was something that would have been better handled behind closed doors. Although part of me wonders if this is the Trump negotiating style of going and, you know, taking a swing for the grand slam and then possibly hoping to get, you know, a single or a double here.

I, you know, far be it for me to understand the mind of Trump and his foreign policy team. I look at what happened in Syria and I'm perplexed that the president, even if he wanted to re-engage with Syria and lift sanctions, why you would sit down with a person who's still on the list of specially designated global terrorists. So I, you know, I've given up on trying to figure out what the Trump administrations, what their end game is and how they handle negotiations. But to me, if I was to do this, I think this is something that would have been better handled, at least at the outset to be on behind closed doors. It certainly is a threat. The reality is, look, I'd learn this in my travels to the Middle East and the early, I'm sorry, the mid-2000s. You know, while people, Middle Easterners profess to support the people and the Palestinian people, they don't like them.

The Iraqis didn't like that the Palestinians sided with Saddam Hussein. And while they don't like Israel, they also have a distaste for the Palestinians who they believe to be entitled to suck up a lot of the oxygen in the room to receive all of the international aid and all of those things. So a lot of countries, they just don't want that problem. I mean, where are they going to go to Jordan, where they have their own Palestinian problem? The Jordanian regime is terrified of their Palestinian population. The Egyptians, you know, the only reason they tolerate the Palestinians as a force. boil against the Israelis. They're just, you know, I've realized I'm generalizing here, but there just isn't a lot of

like for the Palestinians. And that's why I think ultimately, you know, why would these countries, why would Egypt, why would the Saudis? What, you know, I heard like Somalia was a landing ground. That's a country with its own problems. They want Palestinian troublemakers when they're dealing with an al-Qaeda insurgency that controls 40% of the country. A lot of this just doesn't make sense.

Libya, Libya, Somalia. Yeah, no, look, I don't think you're generalizing. I think, you know, it's clear. Jordan's got a very large Palestinian population already inside the country, right? And Egypt has always been holding them at arm's length, right? They built a wall down there in part because, you know, they don't want, you know, incoming Palestinian refugees flooding into their country. And so, look, I get it. I think even Netanyahu was surprised when President Trump first mentioned this idea. I believe if I'm keeping my phrasing right, it was going to be the Riviera of the Middle East. But, you know, if you step away from that, I mean, it did create conversation. You remember shortly after that, you know, the Saudis held a summit to talk about, okay, what is going to be our plan?

Because clearly that plan is not one we want to sign on to. You know, most of the surrounding countries, you were very quick to say, no. But at least they got them talking. So you could argue sometimes that, you know, some of the policy statements that the White House comes out with, on the surface you may look at and go, what? You're going to relocate 2.3 million people. But, you know, then there's a knock-on effect that can create some dialogue or create somebody else throwing another idea on the table. So, you know, I guess I fall in the camp of, you know, at this stage of the game, all the past efforts and ideas haven't worked for the Palestinians. So, yeah, let's be as creative as possible.

Syria. I'm going to agree. Yeah, I think that that's exactly what the plan was. It was just sort of to kick the hornet's nest and get discussions going. That's ultimately where I come down with this. I mean, you know, I was addressing it more in the terms, like, this was serious policy. probably be handled differently, which is what tell leads me to believe that it wasn't really serious, that it had, there was an ulterior motive. And I do ultimately agree with your assessment

at that. Well, it was interesting because, you know, Netanyahu came out not that long ago and said that the relocation concept, you know, would need to be part of any long-term solution, ceasefire solution. So, you know, again, whether he was throwing that out there as sort of a nod to President Trump or whether he was throwing it out there as just yet again another way to, you know, create further dialogue, who knows. But he had picked up on it recently and said that, yeah, that would be a condition for, you know, a future long-term peace agreement of some sort. So with Syria, I would just, you know, it's interesting because, you know, now we've got credible reporting that Israel and Syria have been holding direct conversations. And look, again,

Maybe that goes nowhere, and, you know, we have to be very pragmatic about, you know, to what degree we trust Ahmed al-Shara and his new, you know, government there in Syria at this stage until, you know, they prove otherwise. But again, you know, hey, let's have some dialogue. I guess it's not a bad idea. As long as we don't approach it, you know, sort of like past administrations, I would argue, the Obama administration, certainly the Biden administration, You know, they always acted as if hope was a good thing to base your policies on. You know, like we somehow live in a community of nations. So I guess what I'm saying is let's have the dialogue, but let's be very pragmatic about how the world actually works.

So that, you know, we're not surprised. What do you think is going to be the sort of the end result of what you're seeing in Syria? I mean, let's stick there for just the moment. Yeah, Syria, I have a lot. And this is where I do fundamentally disagree with the Trump administration. This was a very bad decision. Akhmet al-Shara, before he became, look, he is a wolf in a town of the suit with a nice haircut. This guy is a specially designated global terrorist, at least for the moment. He led al-Qaeda's branch in Syria, probably still does. Even when he disassociated from the group, he praised Osama bin Laden and Niman al-Zawigiri. He essentially, receive permission to do what he's done. He has really played the game. This is a guy who reported to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the head of the Islamic State. Why would you trust him? Look, I view jihadists like I view pedophiles. They don't change. You know, all of a sudden we go, I'm not a pedophile anymore, and I'm not a jihadist anymore. These are core beliefs or that

it's the core, it's they are. One of the conditions that the Trump administration wanted the Sharah and his people to adhere to was getting rid of the foreign jihadists. And those numerous groups had documented them at the World War Journal. One of these groups is the Turkestan Islamic Party, right? This is a terrorist organization. Its leader sits on al-Qaeda Shura. It commands the Turkestan Islamic Party. He's based, his name is Abdul Hakal Turkestani.

He's based in Afghanistan. He issues orders to the fighters that are in Syria. He appointed the Syrian leader. And they've been rolled into the military, the Syrian, new Syrian military, and Darylhara. Meanwhile, they participated in the massacre just a couple of months ago in March that targeted the Alawites. Why should we trust that? You know, would I trust a pedophile to run a daycare center or an axe murderer to give him the keys to a cutlery shop? But somehow I'm going to let a jihadist, I'll trust the jihadist to run a country and direct a military.

I maybe I'm old school maybe I don't know if you all the syllable politics but I I think this was a massive mistake by the Trump administration so but what would you do differently then how would you deal with Syria I would not grant them look the Trump administration is lifting sanctions and people be like well it give the Syrian people aid and it'll give them you keep them away from food insecurity and get on a chance in life well you're still have a jihadist regime that has foreign terrorists within its military that serve at the highest level of its command, including its leader. And every dime that we, you know, aid is like money is fungible. Every dollar that we provide or allow them to have access to is money that they could pay foreign fighters, that they could pay their military. If the world wants to recognize Syria, let the world recognize Syria. Why do we have to fund? it, why do we have to be part of it? If disengagement from the war on terror, for instance,

and this was another criticism of my Trump in his first term, the Doha agreement with the Taliban, if you wanted to disengage from Afghanistan, disengage, but you don't have to cut a deal with the Taliban, and we don't have to recognize Ahmed al-Shara as a world leader. It's just an absolute mistake. We don't understand the individuals that we're dealing with.

I understand this. I don't know what you, what politic. Is this real politic? I have no idea. But I do know that I have principles. Part of my principles are not dealing with individuals who are, you know, sponsored suicide bombings who were, who led al-Qaeda's branch. Yeah, no, I think you're, I think you're absolutely right in the sense of, look, this is who they were.

This is who they are. I think the mindset right now from the administration is. is that engagement, right? I mean, look, everybody was so happy to see, you know, the backside of Assad, right? He and his dad were butchers. And so I think people were so excited to see him leave that, you know, perhaps, you know, the mindset was very proactive, perhaps a little overly aggressive in saying, well, now let's engage, you know, with what's coming in behind Assad.

Again, you have to temper that with let's see what their actions are. But I think the mindset is a better engagement than just stepping back and allowing whatever is going to allow there to fester without trying to temper their behavior or influence their behavior in some fashion. Look, they just raised the U.S. flag over the embassy there, the Basterers residents in Damascus. I think that's the first time they've done that since, well, at least a dozen years. So it is fascinating. And now Israel is having conversations of their own.

You know, perhaps the calculus is changing, which may have, again, sort of this knock-on effect that we can't predict. But I understand exactly what you're saying, and I don't disagree. But maybe real politic is the best way to describe it, right? We got to, you live in the world that you've actually got rather than the one you hope for. And so sometimes you're dealing with people who are odious. I don't know. Yeah. But I just wonder why we have to deal with them.

You know, does American taxpayer dollars and does we have to let the Europeans, if they want to sponsor a member of Al-Qaeda or if the Russians do, let them deal with it. What are we going to influence? You know, we're back to, we tend to throw money at problems

and ignore the nature of our enemies. Those are true. Our biggest problems in there, why we lost. the war on terror. And I'm just of the mind that, you know, nothing we do. Al-Shaar will not accede, just like the Taliban and never acceded to one of our demands. He's not going to accede to any of our demands either. He allows foreign terrorists to remain in Syria.

That's the easiest thing that he could do. But he can't do it because he relies on them to keep him in power. Why, you know, just two, months ago, his people were behind the massacre in Latakia. And he's like, well, we'll hold an investigation. And I mean, is that what it takes to get recognition? Let me put it just another way. If he was a member of the Klu Klux Klan, would the American people and the American government be so willing to accede to his demands, to recognize him? Would he be welcome at the White House? Would he shake the hands to the president? I've had a hard time, understanding where you stand on this.

Because you've compared Shirat to the KKK to an axe murder, to a pedophile. And yeah, so it's really hard to see where you fall down on this subject. Yeah, but I mean, there's a lot of nuance in there, isn't there?

I'm well known for my knowledge. There's a lot of, you are extremely nuanced, Bill. If there's one word that people use to describe you, look, again, I think it's a very valid point. I can see, you know, look, again, it's kind of like the way the world operates. You know, I can see your point and I can see the idea anyway, the concept of having some engagement, right, at this early stage when you're trying to feel this new potential government out.

But I can see problems with both, you know, both plans. And so typically, as is usual in this world, you end up choosing the least one. worst, I suppose. But Bill, I got to tell you, as always, love having you on the show. At some point, you're probably going to start demanding producer credits here. But Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, editor of the Long War Journal. Bill, thank you so much, man. And I hope you'll pick up that phone the next time we call you because we'd love to have you back. Well, that is, what a great guy, right? Bill Rocio. Anyway, listen, that's all the time we have for this week's PDB situation report.

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