The President's Daily Brief - PDB Situation Report | October 4th, 2025: A Game Changing Weapon For Ukraine? & Gaza Ceasefire Talks

Episode Date: October 4, 2025

In this episode of The PDB Situation Report: The Trump administration is weighing whether to provide Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles capable of striking deep inside Russia. Alongside new U.S. intelligence support, this move could escalate the conflict. We’ll hear from George Barros of the Institute for the Study of War for more. Later, Israel’s military continues its push through Gaza City as Hamas deliberates on a ceasefire proposal backed by President Trump, Prime Minister Netanyahu, and much of the international community. Bill Roggio from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies joins us to break it down. To listen to the show ad-free, become a premium member of The President’s Daily Brief by visiting https://PDBPremium.com. Please remember to subscribe if you enjoyed this episode of The President's Daily Brief. YouTube: youtube.com/@presidentsdailybrief CBDistillery: Visit https://CBDistillery.com and use promo code PDB for 25% off your entire order! American Financing: Call American Financing today to find out how customers are saving an avg of $800/mo. NMLS 182334, https://nmlsconsumeraccess.org. APR for rates in the 5s start at 6.327% for well qualified borrowers. Call 866-885-1881 for details about credit costs and terms. Visit http://www.AmericanFinancing.net/PDB. Birch Gold: Text PDB to 989898 and get your free info kit on gold Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Choice Hotels gets you more of what you value. Comfort in. It's calling your name. Save on the stay. Oh, and free waffles are yours to claim. Book direct at Soysotails.com. Welcome to the PDB Situation Report. I'm Mike Baker. Your eyes and ears on the world stage.

All right. Let's get briefed. First up, the Trump administration may give Ukraine Tomahawk missiles to strike deep into Russia, along side, new U.S. Intel support. We'll be joined by George Barros of the Institute for the Study of War for more on that. Later in the show, the IDF presses its offensive in Gaza City, while Hamas weighs a ceasefire proposal supported by Trump, Netanyahu, and much of the international community. We'll break it down with Bill Roggio from the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. But first, today's situation report spotlight. The Trump administration is weighing a major upgrade to

Ukraine's arsenal, and that would be Tomahawk cruise missiles capable of striking some 1,500 miles into Russia, including Moscow. The request came directly from President Zelensky, and Trump's envoy, retired Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg, confirmed that it's under serious review. This comes as Kellogg revealed Washington has already authorized certain long-range strikes inside Russia, declaring there are, quote, no sanctuaries. At the same time, U.S. officials say Washington and will now provide Ukraine with intelligence on Russia's energy infrastructure, refineries, pipelines, power plants to help target the Kremlin's war chest. For more on this, we're joined by George Barrows. He's the Russia team leader at the Institute

for the Study of War. George, thank you very much for coming back on the Situation Report. It's great to see you once again. Thanks for having me. First up, of course, is the fact that Taylor Swift is dropping her new album. I don't know if that's what the kids still say, but I know. We were talking before the show, and we're both super excited about this. Yeah, I mean, it was a surprise for all of us. I wasn't expecting that. But here we are.

We are blessed on October 3rd, and now we have a new thing to study, I guess I'll close. Oh, man, it's exciting. Your government shutdown, Taylor Swift, Ukraine crisis. Where do we even start? I tell you what, let's set that aside and start with the Ukraine crisis. Tell me what you think of this talk that's just come out recently over the past couple of days about the idea that the U.S. administration may start providing tomahawks to Kyiv. So look, there's long been a strong operational requirement for the Ukrainians to interdict important Russian military objects

that are not only in Ukraine, not only in the near rear, in the border areas of Russia, but also further and deeper, further away. And Tomahawks, I think, would be a positive development because, for example, there are some hardened, big, specialized military objects that the Ukrainians should be able to destroy, but the Ukrainians cannot destroy what their own homegrown drones. A lot of these Ukrainian homegrown drones and their homegrown missiles, I mean, they have limited payloads. And payload really, really matters for taking out some of these facilities. For example, in the Republic of Tartarstan in Russia, there's the Iranian drone Shahed factory where they churn out somewhere on the order of about 2,700 Iranian one-way strike drones a month. And some Ukrainian drones can get that distance, but they don't have the payload.

And a system like Tomahawks would be able to take that factory offline, which is a necessary thing I would argue. Now, just for the sake of our viewers, the previous administration, the Biden administration, had drawn a line at the long-range missile systems, right? So they were providing what's known as attackums. That range for one of those is just shy of, I think, 200 miles. We're looking at tomahawks with a range of some 1,500 miles. And so it is a massive.

sea change, right? And are there concerns here? I mean, I'm assuming the Biden administration was, you know, torqued about the idea that, you know, now we'd be providing weapons that could reach deep inside Russia. Obviously, there's concern over escalation. Do you have any of those concerns? So, I'm personally not concerned about escalation because, look, we've gathered the data. We know what happens. The Ukrainians have been conducting military operations at Russia. They've driven strikers and Radleys and M1 Abrams tanks and killed Russians in Russia with these weapons. And look, this would just be a continuation of the geography of conventional war fighting. It would not be an escalation on the ladder, so to speak.

What I'll also say is we had some very interesting Russian statements and reactions just in the last four to eight hours to the rumors that the U.S. is mulling giving Ukraine the tomahawks, which has essentially not been, this is going to be catastrophic. copyright for World War III, it's been a lot of the, you know, sort of Kremlin downplaying and saying, no, this weapon's not a silver bullet. It's not going to necessarily decide to we change the war, that sort of thing. So the Russian reaction has sort of already been mollified a little bit, and they've part of me, mollified a little bit. They've taken, you know, some soft rhetoric because, look, we've done this song and dance before. We've had these huge debates about, can we take the war to Russia? And the data sets already been established. You can indeed take the war to Russia, and it's just a continuation of conventional operations in a new geography.

Are you surprised by the response from the Kremlin, at least this initial response, because I agree with you. It's been remarkably measured, I think. The response has been interesting. So, yesterday, October 2nd, Vladimir Putin engaged in the Valdei Discussion Club, which is sort of the principal, big international discussion club, think tank club where Putin speaks with all the people that internationally and the Kremlin ologist scholars who want to speak with him. And Putin gave some interesting keynote speeches there where he essentially said, look, if he said that if we provide the Ukrainians with the Tomahawks, then that means that the

US will be finally involved in conducting military operations against Russia and all that stuff. But that's really tired rhetoric because the Russians have been claiming that for literally everything. And so it's sort of, but how many more times are you going to call will, claim that this would be an unprecedented step, that sort of thing. And then Putin also notably said that, you know, he wants to have a restoration of relations with the United States and he said that providing Ukraine tomahawks would be detrimental to the restoration of relations. So that's interesting.

The Kremlin seems to be trying to persuade Washington to not send Tomahawks with a new tactic. If the tactic that was very effective for the Biden administration was, you're going to You're going to ramp us up on the escalation ladder. We're going to get into some sort of hot war thing. If that was the tactic for the previous administration, the new tactic is not that. It's, well, we always sort of want to establish relationships and start talking again, and this is going to be detrimental to that. So therefore, it's not practical to do so.

So what we really see is just the Rochon is trying to do whatever they can to keep this necessary tool out of the hands of the Ukrainians, and they're using whatever line they think is most effective for their interlocutor at any given time. What this tells me as an analyst is I'm fairly confident this is not going to result with a massive escalation. By the way, not to mention what the Russians are already doing in all of Europe with these unprecedented drone incursions and sabotage and assassinations and other acts of war against NATO member states, which happened before we even started talking about Tomahawks.

Right. No, you're absolutely right. And we've talked about that here on the PDB in the past, is the is the, is the sort of hybrid warfare, however you want to refer to it off the radar and some of the things they've been doing. But just to play devil's advocate here in regards to escalation, because it was such a big issue for the administration previously. Look, we've got this, you mentioned the drone incursions. There have been a number of issues where not all have been positively identified as being related to the Russians, but I think we can make that speculation with some confidence.

And so now there's been this talk saying, okay, fine, anything that crosses over into our borders, whether we're talking to Stonia, Poland, wherever, we're shooting it down, whether it's a Russian drone or a Russian jet. And President Trump's now come out and said, absolutely, that's what, you know, that's what you should do. So we are seeing sort of the temperature going up. I take your point that now with this news of the potential release of Tomahawks to Keev, that the Kremlin so far has been relatively, measured. I'm surprised at Dimitri Medvedev, who never misses an opportunity to get out the other and shake the nuclear saber. He hasn't said anything that I'm aware of yet. So maybe they're keeping him muzzled. But it does seem as if you look at what NATO's stance is now, and now this latest word from Trump, it does seem that there is this heightened tension. And I guess, again, playing

devil's advocate, because don't get me wrong, I also think it's the right move. But it appears that perhaps we're pushing Putin into a corner, not that he doesn't deserve it, but, you know, I'm not sure where that off ramp is. If, you know, his, again, again, your point is correct. I think you're, the thinking that Putin is saying, okay, you know, maybe I take a different line with Trump. Maybe I try to flatter him. Maybe I talk about we need better relations. Maybe we need more business. But if that doesn't work, and we start providing those tomahawks and we start hitting energy infrastructure a thousand miles inside Russia.

I'm not sure that that doesn't lead to something worse. So, look, the reality here, I think, is that it is actually the Russians who are drawing themselves into closer risks of having war in Europe. As you know, the United States obviously doesn't want to have war on backward at a national level trying to reprioritize other theaters. But nonetheless, it is the Russians who are investing a tremendous amount in their own defense. It is the Russians who are reconfiguring their command and control system across their entire western border to optimize it for operations against the Baltics and Poland.

It is the Russians who are conducting these air domain penetrations and sabotaging events against the European defense industrial base. And it's the Russians who are actually preparing their own population were war by in the Russian language saying things like, well, the Baltic states aren't really legitimate countries. Well, Finland was aligned with the Nazis of World War II, and so there are a bunch of neo-Nazis there. And so the D-DACATION mission actually has a larger mandate beyond Ukraine and all of these things. And so really, if the Russians decide, if Putin decides that he wants to achieve his goal,

he wants to go down the Russian history books as the great man who proved that. NATO is a paper tiger. You can indeed seize an Estonian city or something and won't get a decisive response. I think Putin is the one that's gearing up for that. And so now NATO members are under some Russian incursions. You're right. Some members are being coy, not attributing them directly to the Russians, but some NATO members are, like Poland and Romania have explicitly said this was these were the Russians. So when that happens, we have two options. We can choose to not respond and let the Russians continue to poke and prod us for whatever reason, or we can choose to be forceful and protect the air batteries. And I'll note, you know, we have a lot to learn

from Turkey in this regard, also another NATO member that we don't talk about very often. But, you know, Turkey back in, I think it was a 20, 2016 or 2019, and forget the exact year, but there was a Russian gen that violated Turkish airspace in northern Syria. And the Turks shot it down and the Russians were very well-behaved around Turkey for quite a while there. And then of course we had that famous battle where the United States killed a whole bunch of Wagner group mercenaries in Syria as well, where essentially we called them up, we said, hey, are these your guys? He said, no, these are our guys.

We smoked them, killed several hundred Russians, and everything was fine. So really, the Russians respect strength. We have been very weak and permissive in what we've allowed the Russians to do. Europe is waking up. They're finally starting to invest in defense. The Russians are just as bellicose and leaning into being more bellicose. And they're also trying to paint this image of, this is purely reactionary. We are simply responding to Western malfeasas. And really the Westerners would love nothing but to spend zero dollars on defense and sip their their coffees and their apparel sprints that will let the Americans subsidize their defense forever.

I always find it's important to look at all sides of this, right? And I know that, I mean, I started hearing it right away. I started hearing from a certain segment in the U.S. of, you know, my God, how could we be providing tomahawks, and now we're going to escalate and why are we even doing this? And it kind of that same steady drumbeat that we've heard for the other past three years as to why do we even care? But I think there continued a good.

meaning the Russian military and their testing of NATO's response in a very continuous manner, whether it's drone incursions or anything else they've been doing. I think it's been fascinating because it does highlight the fact that given free reign, Putin isn't stopping at holding onto the Donbass. That's, you know, he doesn't have limited ambitions here. So I think this move is important, but I do find it also important to say, okay, what what are the, arguments against so that, you know, because one thing I think the current administration doesn't do a very good job at is messaging. And I don't think they explain their actions very often very well. So I would like to see a little bit more of that. Listen, George, I'll get off that soapbox now.

And if you could stay right where we are, where you are, we have to take a quick break. And then we'll be right back with more here on the Situation Report. Hey, Mike Baker here. You know those nights when you just don't sleep? You know what I'm talking about. You're tossing and turning. Maybe your mind's racing. Sleep just won't come. And the next day, well, you're dragging. You're exhausted. And well, everything just feels harder. That's where CBD from CB Distillery can make a real difference. But it's not just sleep products with CB Distillery. They've got solutions that work with your body to help with stress, pain after exercise, even mood and focus. And it's all made with the highest quality clean ingredients. and that's important. No fillers, just premium CBD. Imagine waking up rested or enjoying your day without those nagging aches and pains. That's the real win of CB Distillery's solutions. And that's why over 2 million people, I said 2 million people, trust CB distillery. Look, I use their relief balm for after workouts because frankly, at my age, every workout involves some level of pain. And the relief ball from CB distillery works great. So if you're ready for better sleep or less stress or just generally

feeling better. Try CBD from CB Distillery. And right now, you can save 25% off your entire purchase. Visit CB Distillery and use promo code PDB. That's CBdistillery.com promo code PDB. Again, CBDistillery. Specific product availability depends on individual stay regulations. Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report. Joining me once again is George Barros, Russia team leader at the Institute for the Study of War. George has so much to talk. about here when we talk about the developments in the Ukraine conflict and where is it going. We've been talking about the fact that the administration may, and they haven't made any final decision, may provide Tomahawk missiles to Kyiv and what that would mean.

Equally as important, I think, and just as interesting is the fact that the Trump administration is sort of let on that they're now involved in intel sharing with Kiv related to, they've been very specific. Now, obviously, they've been providing assistance on the intelligence front for three years. So that's not new, but what is interesting is that they were more specific this time around over the past couple of days and saying that they're providing Intel targeting information on energy infrastructure inside Russia. What do you make of that? So there's two hypotheses here, right? Hypothesis one is that there's some bespoke and meaningful intelligence that we have to provide to help mature and make more effective Ukraine's long-range strike

campaign against Russian industry, energy infrastructure. A lot of these Ukrainian strikes historically against Russia and oil refineries and that sort of thing, some of them have caused different levels of damage, sometimes irreparable damage, but sometimes the time of damage that only takes some plants down for a set amount of time, they fix some things, they swap out some parts, and the plans go back up. So, PyipaLas is one is perhaps we can mature those strikes. by doing more irreparable damage by targeting weaker things, more vulnerable things that the other Koreans otherwise wouldn't help out.

The other hypothesis is that that was just a messaging thing, and that was the way that the Trump administration decided to present its decision to continue intelligence sharing with Ukraine for a variety of things, which includes and goes beyond energy infrastructure to include other military things, but they then selectively omitted to discuss about that. but I'm not keen to speculate because I really don't know. What I do know is that the Ukrainians have been able to strike the energy things without intelligence sharing. I mean, those are stationary targets.

And my understanding is that the intelligence sharing that Ucom provides is really most important for dynamic targeting. That is hitting those sorts of targets that don't have permanent fixed structures, hitting things on headquarters that get stood up that are not there full-time, you know, peacetime locations. Because look, an oil refinery, you know where it's going to be not moving around. But a division headquarters or an army headquarters, that thing can move around. Or a unit that's a redeployment in the rear, moving on a rail line.

That thing can move around. And that's really where the dynamic targeting and intelligence sharing makes a difference. Have you heard any current estimates, credible current estimates about the overall damage done at this point to the Russian energy sector? Yeah, I don't know all the statistics memorized off my head candidly, but it's getting there. I mean, there's widespread gas shortages in several regions in Russia. Russian energy revenues are projected in the current federal budget for next year to go down drastically. I believe the number that the relevant authority in Russia, they said it was going to go down from something like about 40% of Russia's federal budget to an estimated to like 20% of

their Russian federal bunch revenue, which is substantial. The key thing I want to communicate here is that while hitting Russia's energy is good and will ultimately degrade their ability to attract the war, it's not going to stop them from being able to conduct the war because this is the sort of thing which is not a critical vulnerability, but it's the dampener. So to end the- So what will? I mean, if that's the case, I'm sorry for interrupting. George, but if that's the case, then what will, and I realize this is a very tough question,

but what will get them to stop? So you got to invalidate Putin's theory of victory. Putin's theory of victory postulates that, look, his military is sloppy. It takes a lot of resources to wage the war, but he doesn't really care because he's got a constant of operations where as long as they keep making small, pure tactical victories, they can mount those over time, and they eventually compounded. operational victories. And his theory is that that will in time compound to strategic victories. So we will argue that to actually end the war, you have to invalidate the theory of victory,

which means you got to stop the Russian army dead in its tracks. You got to actually make it so that those small, tiny tactical victories aren't possible. And there are tactical and operational concept problems related to that, how to actually stop the current tactics the Russians are using. But once they stop moving forward, Putin then has to shift his mind from, how do I sustain this drive to, okay, how do I now actually get out of the situation where I'm spending a lot but not getting anything out of it? It's right now he's getting what he wants out of it. So is that by implication, does that mean just the provision of more weapons systems? Because I mean, look, again, I don't see a scenario where there's NATO or EU boots on the ground

assisting the Ukrainian military up to this point, you know, with the exception of a handful of incursions, it's been mostly defensive efforts on the Ukrainian military's parts, incredible efforts, but it's not as if they're, you know, sustaining a massive counteroffensive and pushing them back into Russia. So if, if, I mean, again, look, I'm not disagreeing, right? I think, you know, Putin, you know, is at the heart of all of this. This is his mess, right? There's no other responsible party. And yet, yeah, I'm just, I guess I'm asking you, again, one of those odd questions that doesn't really have a direct answer.

But if that's the case, if you have to stop them in their tracks, then what's that look like? I'll tell you what it looks like. Look, it's a multifaceted problem, but the big factor that we're concerned about now has to do with the operational planning on the Ukrainian side and the development of how to actually degrade tactical frontline forces. So part of me, I'm going to get a little bit into the weeds here, but we have to defeat the way that the Russians currently advance. And this is a problem that's not going to be solved exclusively by just giving them a bunch

of more equipment, giving them a bunch more stuff. That is part of the solution, obviously. But the Ukrainians need to figure out how to actually degrade the Russians throughout their depth. So here's the current problem. The tactics have evolved drastically. The current tactics are that Russians no longer do their mechanized assault. So tanks and armor personnel carriers are very, very seldom used anymore in broadband combat. They're occasionally used for in supporting roles, but basically the main mode for maneuver is three to five guys, less than a squad, morselized, and then they do infiltration missions, or they then attempt to penetrate weak spots in the line, get to a bunker or a trench line, or a forested area where they can then dig,

and then they try to hold it down. And so it's a series of essentially three to five guys trying to go through this very difficult drone contested frontline area. Now, here's the good news. When you're counting from the zero line, basically the Ukrainians reconnoiter and strike with extreme prejudice, anything from the zero to the 25 kilometer front line. All your brigade headquarters and stuff is further in the rear than that. Battalion headquarters a little bit closer. But by the time you get within 25 clicks of the zero line, you are now in super tactical formation which is remorcialized into very, very small groups and is a very ineffective way

to move forward. a requirement operationally to push that denial zone further. I would like it so that the Ukrainians can actually deny that safe zone where they can organize and have their assembly areas in that like 25 to 100 kilometers on. And that's actually doable. And it's funny because what we're really talking about here is intermediate range strike and intermediate fire operations to make it so that that Russian infantryman doesn't have to basically infiltrate 20 kilometers. He's got to infiltrate now 50 kilometers, 70 kilometers. And as an infantry, you know, that gets really, really hard.

And that's where you start to invalidate the tactical ability to move forward. Here's the issue. The Ukrainians have to reconstitute their red-range strike. They used to have it. They used to have the Biroctar, the Turkish drone that was effective in the early parts of the war. In the second and first years of the war, they had the Gimler's from Haimars systems, which used to also service targets in that range.

But the high mars are ineffective now because of advancements in Russian electronic warfare that have adapted. And so really what we have is a very, you know, a developed Ukrainian strategic long-range strike campaign with their strikes against the oil infrastructure, an extremely lethal tactical strike capability within the zero to 25 kilometer range. But then this intermediate range where the Russians are basically operating with impunity. And so the Ukrainians do need more instruments and tools to strike those things, but they also need to think and not be so myopic about simply swashing all the Russians in front of them in the tactical zone, but going into the depth, working it.

And that requires having commanders that think about planning missions, think about integrating the drone and strike capabilities and assets in order to degrade those things. It's kind of like, this is a very crude analogy and not perfect, but kind of like thinking about Ergerland battle doctrine, but then applying it to a the land domain, but into the depth. And so that's sort of one of, I think, the operational planning and the technological problems that we're facing right now. And that's the issue. What about manpower issues? Manpower continues to be an issue.

The Ukrainians are going to have to recruit more people in order to reconstitute their infantry forces. So I'm not going to poop with that. I mean, it is a problem. The Ukrainians have some very strange force. generation policies and structures in place. The good news is that they do retain those men. I mean, they still have the ability to push them into service when the political decisions are made. I think there's some merit to the decision to necessarily maybe not hold it off because

the fact of the matter is the, if you're going to take a bunch of infantrymen now, I mean, how are you going to deploy them? Because all the infantry battalions don't have enough vehicles to properly protect them or service them. And the Ukrainians are able to, they are able to basically keep the Russian advance to a literal foot pace with what they're currently rocking. And so if we're going to talk about reconstituting the infantry and building the infantry, there are good things that can happen there. And I believe, you know, we, the United States financed by Europe, we just signed a deal to send them more, or Bradley's, which is great. So when you get more Bradley's, you can start getting more infantry. So these things depend on each

other. Okay. Last question, I want to be mindful of your time, George, but Given what were you saying, it sounds very logical, but this has been going off for three years now. Putin doesn't seem to be in any way looking for an off ramp. We know just from history that, you know, it's kind of a trite saying, but the Russians do seem to be able to suffer very, very well. and beyond what sort of the Western mindset would comprehend. Do you, are you optimistic at this point about the Ukrainians' chances of getting to a point where they can have, from a Ukrainian perspective, a successful resolution here? Yeah, it depends what we mean by success. Right. If we define success in Ukraine taking back all of its territory, I give you a different

answer. If we define success in terms of we successfully secure a new fraud line that is operationally sound, operationally defensible so that Ukraine can exist in the future moving forward and not essentially be a state that is condemned to be on perpetual life support by forward backers, and if Ukraine can exit this scenario with robust security guarantees to ensure that this never happens again, then that could also be defined in success. It depends what you're talking about. But the key thing here is that, look, the previous administration refused to define what success means at any level of the strategy.

We were going to do this forever long it takes. The goal was never supposed to say it stated what the terrain is going to be. it never stated, it's mostly what the political vote, it just sort of be whatever, however long it takes. The current administration had a slightly better articulation of the goals, which is we're going to end the war, which is better than Savar's. It is an articulation of a goal, the contours of which obviously were clear. But now we actually have President Trump's most recent big truth social statement, which was actually after having looked at this very hard and after having ended a number of wars, but failed to end this one so far, we actually see some of the accumulated risks and accumulated vulnerabilities that Russia has taken on, particularly in the economy sector.

And the president seems to see a strategy that how this could actually work. I mean, the US taxpayer is no longer putting this bill, it's being financed by Europeans. It's a European war after all. And we are leaning into, we're moving the blinders that we've self-imposed about what can we not due to push against, push back against the Russians and take the Russian war to Russia, which is a reasonable proposition. And I think President Trump is actually, he's not, he's not binded by the same self-imposed restriction that the previous administration had.

So I think we have some good clarity coming around here. We're talking about security guarantees. We're talking about what constitutes a defensible order, which I'm happy to talk about and define that geography. But the career front line is not defensible. Ukraine will have to get some territory back so they can have a defense world order. And we've got to lean into pushing into the Russian weaknesses. So far it's basically been, we're going to make it hard for the Russians in Ukraine, but we're

not going to be hard for the Russians in Russia. And now we're starting to sort of peel that, peel those layers back. And that's, you know, it's been a long war and this all sucks. And it's a tragedy. But I am optimistic that we seem to be finally like taking the self-imposed restrictions of life for once. Yeah. No, I agree with that 100%. I guess I'd, look, I've been about a long time, George, and I've seen a lot of crap that makes me a rather cynical person. So when you talk about

how do you define success, there's various scenarios. I would argue that when you say, well, our objective is to end the war that's equally vague and complex and doesn't tell you what that means, right? We're going to end the war. Okay. In, what capacity. So I guess as a cynic, my big concern here is that we'll be asking these same questions in another two or three years time. And we won't really see a resolution to this. Whatever that resolution is, you know, we'll just be in this perpetual state. Maybe I'm completely wrong here. Maybe the Russian economy, you know, drives this thing to a logical conclusion because it's tanking.

Maybe there's other issues here that we haven't seen yet. But listen, I will say this, George, as always, I love our conversations and always appreciate you coming on and sharing your insight, your expertise. And I hope you'll do that again because the syndic in me tells me this thing's not ending soon. Well, thank you so much. I agree. I mean, this is going to be a multi-year war.

We have to plan for as such. But as long as we have clarity on the goals, which seems to be going. We should be good. But yeah, thank you for having me and really appreciate it. Okay. Of course. I'll see you the next time. George Barros of the Institute for the Study of War. As always, thank you for being here on the Situation Report. Yeah, complex. Sorry, I don't mean to be a big bummer when it comes to the Ukraine conflict, but I am somewhat cynical. And it would be great to see them finish up, get all their territory back, including Crimea. Whether that happens or not, who knows, and in what time frame, again, who knows.

knows no one can get inside of Putin's mind at this stage of the game. And I'm not even sure if he's still riding the logic train. All right, coming up next, as the IDF continues its offensive inside Gaza City, the world waits on Hamas's response to a ceasefire deal backed by Trump, Netanyahu, and pretty much the rest of the world. Now, we'll have more on that with Bill Rojo, from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. When we come back, stick around. Hey, Mike Baker here.

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Whether it's the funds-fueling AI or crypto's trillion-dollar swings, there's a money side to every story. And when you see the money side, you understand what others miss. Get the money side of the story. Subscribe now at Bloomberg.com. Welcome back to the PDB situation report. The Israel Defense Forces, the IDF, continue their offensive inside Gaza City today, pressing block by block through what they describe as Hamas strongholds.

Heavy fighting has been reported in several neighborhoods with Israeli officials, saying their focus remains on dismantling Habas' command structure in weapons cash. At the same time, the world is waiting off Hamas' response to a ceasefire proposal. The deal is unusual in its breadth of support, backed not only by President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, but also by most of the international community, from European allies, to key Arab states. The question now is whether Hamas accepts, stalls, or rejects the plan outright. For more on this, we're joined by Bill Rosio. He's the editor of the Foundation for Defense of Democracy's Long War Journal and a friend of the show. Bill, it's great

to see you again, Matt. Thank you, as always, for coming on the Situation Report. Always a pleasure to join you. It's one of my high points of my week when you have me back on. Let's start from 30,000 feet. Where are we with the IDF's operation on Gaza City? Yeah, so the IDF has pushed into Gaza City. They are looking, this is believed to be the last stronghold of Hamas. I'm skeptical of these claims. The IDF and the Israeli government have made some pretty definitive statements about the state of Hamas and the destruction of its battalions. Here we are. We'll write it almost two years since Hamas's attack on Israel on October 7, 2023.

I hesitate to call it, but it's still an effective fighting force. It's able to give the IDF fits. The IDF is not able to walk in and immediately occupy Gaza and Gaza City. So, but the Israelis, I will admit, I'm very surprised at this. In the past, the Israelis have never had time on their side. You could pretty much set the clock when the Israelis would go at it against Hamas in previous conflicts. But in this one, and given the gravity of October 7th, that it's understandable.

But that clock hasn't run out on Israel. And that, to me, is surprising. To me, it's not today or tomorrow when it comes to the fight against Hamas is what does that look like next month and next year. The Israelis have to defeat Hamas on the battlefield and they have to defeat them politically. And both of those, I do believe the Israelis can defeat them militarily if they don't let the clock run out on them. And if they are committed, they're going to, they are taking casualties. They have to do this. It's difficult. But politically, as long as Hamas has support from countries like

Turkey and Qatar and they, you know, where they're headquartered and President Trump for crazy reasons I don't understand or unfortunately, maybe I do, gives Qatar a security guarantee to the likes of NATO while it's hosting Hamas. And these are, this is what makes my long-term projection of the Israeli fight against Hamas, against terrorism, against the Palestinian Authority, where I ultimately skew negative on these issues. I believe the Israelis can defeat Gaza in the field. It's not easy. It's going to take them time. Urban warfare is exceedingly difficult. We learn that particularly in Iraq. It requires a commitment. It requires blood and treasure. The Israelis seem willing to commit that. But the longer term prospects, that's my real concern.

Yeah. Look, I think as far as Qatar goes and sort of the way that the U.S. has dealt with them, obviously we've got that, you know, our largest base in the region there. That's important, you know, from U.S. perspective. But you could have argued, I suppose, in the past, certainly before the 7 October attacks, you could argue that it was helpful, pragmatic to have a communication line to Hamas leadership, which were all entrenched there in Gutter, for the most part, living the high life. After 7 October, with the dynamic changing the way that it has, I think that should have been recalibrated, meaning the relationship with Gutter and whether we view having that life or that communication line to Hamas leadership there is you know is that

worthwhile or is it just you know should we just look at them as targets but you've got a guerrilla army now I'm going to play devil's advocate here this is what I do apparently you've got a guerrilla army in an urban setting concentrated population civilians and it's it's devolved because of the success that Israel's had in attacking the leadership element, it's devolved into more of a flat disseminated organization. And so I think that also makes it more difficult to eradicate. I don't know that you can defeat them militarily in sort of the way that the West thinks about this. Ever since 7 October, Nanyahu came out and said, we will destroy Hamas. We will eliminate them.

I would argue having spent a lot of time in counterterrorism operations that you can't do that. You don't approach it with that mindset, right? You're trying to mitigate the risk. You're trying to eliminate as much as possible. I'm not saying you don't make a good faith effort to terminate them all, but you don't want to go in there thinking that's a logical conclusion. But I do think, to your point, they can defeat them politically. I think there seems to be some very interesting dynamic right now that we could actually. get the Arab, the Muslim world behind that, obviously, you know, there'd be a couple of actors

they've already named that will probably push back somewhat. But if we could get to that point where they are minimized, they are defeated politically in terms of governance in Gaza, that's a big win, no? I do agree. Look, I think a lot of friends of mine, question this deal that Trump put out. And in many ways, it's very fanciful, right? The first statement is that Hamas will no longer be a terror zone. Well, Amas would have to agree that it's a terrorist organization and then it would lay down its arms, which Hamas is never going to do. But if you, like, as you said, politically, if you could get all of the Arab countries and Turkey to back this, that really isolates Hamas. This is a deal that is really for the Palestinian

people, not for Hamas. It would make Hamas look like the real villain here. Not that you and I don't know that. And I'm sure you're those who are watching the show, don't see that. But, you know, amongst the wider world, if Hamas rejects this, that's a massive political defeat. And if the Qataris particularly and the Turks particularly are very serious about this, they can really pressure Hamas to accept these terms. It would mean the dissolution of Hamas. My question is, is what comes next? You know, look, I do think you can defeat terrorist organizations and certainties. History is full of examples where it has happened. It's difficult. It's time consuming. I do think Hamas, hey, you know, I would argue Hamas very likely is militarily defeated at this point, right?

in the sense that it can no longer do what it had done pre-October 7th. No, the problem is, I would argue. I would argue they're degraded. They're degraded. But I wouldn't say they're defeated. That's right. They are significantly degraded. I should be more careful in my words.

You're correct. Well, no. Well, that was not admonishing you about your wordsmith. I think, Bill, you're extremely, extremely talented in that regard. But look, I think you've hit on something that I want to start pulling on that thread, which is, you know, then what, right? If you can get to a point where Hamas has no role in governing, right? They'll still have fighters on the ground, right?

They'll still be doing what they do. Because unless you get the Iranian regime to step on them, right? But, you know, getting Qatar and Turkey on board, I think you're right, that's very, very important. But ultimately, look, the only people that have complete sway over Hamas and their direction is the Mullahs, the IRGC. And so we could go down that rabbit hole about, you know, how do you remove that threat? How do you deal with the Iranians, you know, so that they say, okay, no mas as far as Hamas's activities. You see what I did there, no mas, Hamas? I did, that's right.

I could love that on a T-shirt. We had to put that on a T-shirt, Bill. Anyway, you know what's going to happen. Somebody's going to do this, and we're going to see it. We're going to go, see, we should have monetized that idea. Yeah, what we do was, see, if I was still in the outfit, if I was still in the, we would have proposed this as a covert action campaign. We would have produced a bunch of T-shirts that said, no-mas, Hamas, and we would

air drop them over Gaza City. You know, maybe I'm digressing here, Bill. I might be digressing. But the point being is if, you know, setting aside the idea of, you know, how do you get the Iranian regime, you know, to tell Hamas to stop? Because, you know, they're basically pushing the objective of the Iranian regime, which is to destroy Israel. That hasn't changed.

But to your point, what happens next? I'm fascinated by this idea that people are still somewhat clinging to about the Palestinian authority somehow being part of this solution. and I just don't see it. They're enormously unpopular in Gaza. And I think Mahmoud Abbas, who's 190 years old, I mean, he's excited about the concept because, you know, hey, you know, maybe they can expand their responsibilities,

their authorities and more importantly, get their hands on the billions of dollars that will flow in the Gaza after this hot mess is finished. Yeah. Abbas certainly is looking for that sweet, sweet international money to flow into his coppers. if he's even, you know, coherent enough to be able to understand what's happening. Look, on the point on the Iranians and the IRGC, their influence with the access of resistance is certainly enormous throughout the Middle East.

I think Gaza is one of the few places where the IRGC wields the least influence, where they could be contained. The geographic borders, as long as the Egyptians are on board. And if you did have this deal, though, you would have to closely move. money. It's difficult for Iranian weapons. Maybe not so much Iranian money would given the nature of international financial methods, right, people like crypto and we go on and on with that. But I think it's a lot more difficult for Iran to wield influence, particularly if you have the Arab countries, you have Turkey on board and they're saying no, because that's where I think to me,

the lifeblood of Hamas is within Qatar, within Turkey, to some extent in Egypt and allowing that open border. But again, if this, look, this deal has a lot of unicorns in it. Another one of them, aside from Hamas laying down its weapons, is the international peacekeeping force. I mean, who's going to do that? Yeah. I'm really curious to see who is willing to come in

and put their blood on the line when Hamas is, you know, if it survives, if it's not on board with this or elements break off. And we need to remember, in Gaza, it's not just Hamas. They're the main player, but there's Palestinian Islamic jihad. Are they on board, PLFP, and all of the Monty Python derivations of, you know, Palestinian liberation front groups that are out there? Are they going to be on board? And that the security, whatever security forces there is going to have to contend with that alphabet soups of terrorist organizations that aren't on board with this deal.

Again, assuming, let's just be, we'll just assume that Hamas does accept this. But it's a real mess. And I don't, you know, but again, I think more so politically this deal, the proposal of this deal is the value in that. think that this, I think it's a non-starter for Hamas. Maybe I'll be surprised. I hope I'll be surprised. Yeah. But even if you get Hamas, hold that green. Yeah. Hold that thought, Bill, if you could. I want to pick up on that in terms of their likely response. And then I've got a whole other topic for you in our next segment. But as you know, well, look here at the situation report, we've got some terrific sponsors. So we do occasionally have to take a break. And that's what we're going to do right now. And then we'll be back with more from Bill Rojo. And the situation. report, so stick around, thanks. Hey, Mike Baker here. I want to take just a moment to talk about protecting your hard-earned assets, and that's

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Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report. Joining us once again is friend of the show, Bill Rojo, editor of FDD's Long War Journal. Now, Bill, thank you very much, first of all, for sticking around. We were talking about all the complexity of the layers of the Gaza mess and Hamas' situation. Currently, the IDF response, potential for a ceasefire. and also governance of Gaza after this whole thing may come to an end at some point, perhaps. So at this stage, everybody's waiting for Hamas's response. I know this is asking you to speculate, which I love to do.

So what do you think Hamas's response is going to be to this proposal? I think Hamas is ultimately going to reject this deal. I can't see Hamas accepting laying down its arms. It'll probably come back with Hamas's position is that it wants a temporary ceasefire that allows it to remain in power. And that's been its position all along, despite these reports that we've heard that there are 99% there. Hamas is probably going to return with some type of counter deal that'll be unacceptable

to the Israelis. and I'll suspect will be back to square one. Now, is that because they're used to getting their way, Hamas, I mean, and by that, what I mean is they understand narratives, they understand messaging very well, and they've always been able to get that narrative turned quickly against Israel, right, because they're, you know, Hamas's currency is dead Palestinians, frankly. So they're embedded in there. they know that any military operation inside Gaza was going to result in civilian casualties.

And they've always been able to count on the international community turning and saying, oh my God, how dare you do this? They got a little bit more leeway Israel, I mean, after the brutality of the 7 October attacks. But clearly, I think the dynamic has changed in the sense because I don't think Israel cares anymore, right? Not that they cared 100% over international community sentiment in the past, but I think at this stage, they really don't care. And so I think that timeline is stretched way down the road in terms of the IDF's willingness or ability to engage in this effort against Hamas.

So I'm wondering if Hamas perhaps has misread this doesn't understand. And if they reject this proposal or come back with a counter proposal that it's unworkable, I wonder if they understand what that actually means. Well, I want to reiterate a point you made at the beginning. For Hamas, how dead Palestinians in Gaza is a feature and not a bug. This is what Hamas, it's currency for Hamas. They want those images. So in many ways, the longer these conflicts, the more bodies that pile up, the more sympathy Hamas gets,

which is absurd because Hamas is. is the reason. From the very beginning, all it needed to do was lay down its arms and surrender, and you would not see what's happening in Gaza. To your question, it's hard to know. I think Hamas believes that it could still run out the clock on Israel.

It just, this is the, it's been able to playbook from the very beginning. It believes, Hamas believes that ultimately President Trump or someone will put the pressure on Israel, either in President Trump or internal Israeli politics because these Israelis have issues of their own. Their troops have been mobilized for a long period of time.

They're not in the world. Those troops that are mobilized aren't in the workforce. These operations cost a lot of money. You have countries cutting off aid. You have countries now recognizing Palestine as a state, which is crazy. Someone named me the government of Palestine and the president. And does that include is Gaza and,

the West Bank? Are they under the same government? But I think Hamas, I just ultimately believes it thinks he can run out the clock on Israel. Whether that's true, I guess we're going to find out. So Trump is very interesting, to put it mildly. He wants the answer to this in days. But as we've seen in other issues with Ukraine, with negotiations, with Putin, and in other areas like this, I'm not sure the follow-through is always there.

with President Trump. Is he, which side does he pick here? Is he going to let the Israelis continue? Or is he going to turn around and look at the Israeli continue operation as being frustrated, as being counter to what he wants and he's going to put the clamps down on Israel? You'll flip a coin on that one.

I have no idea with the answer. I tend to believe that he'll side with Israel on this. But who knows? It could go the other way. Yeah. Yeah. Again, I think, Yeah, trying to read President Trump's thought process is kind of a losing game.

I don't think anyone can figure that out. He's very transactional. And then you can see that in this, okay, they've got three days to come up with an answer. You know, we'll resolve the Ukraine conflict in the day. You know, the left, the hard left in particular drives themselves crazy, imagining that everything he says he means literally. Yes. And in reality, you know, he just sort of this transactional guy.

who throws things out, sees how people respond, you know, and then adjusts. So I never take anything he says, you know, as a literal statement of fact, because you're right, it's always in the, it's always in the follow-through. I agree with you. I think, you know, the inclination will be to stick with Israel on this. I do not believe, as you've also pointed out, I don't believe that Hamas is going to come out and say, sure, we'll lay down our arms, we'll return all the hostages, all they've got for leverage at this stage. of the game are the hostages, right? And so I think, as disgusting as it is, that's how they view this. They're not going to lay down their arms. They're not going to willingly give up governance

in Gaza. So I think we're heading towards continued conflict. But again, Bill, you know me? I'm a cynic. And one day, one day, maybe I'll be a glass half full guy. Let me change subjects entirely. In the time that we've got left, you're a veteran. And I would love to hear your thoughts on the recent gathering of U.S. senior officers in Quantico to hear the Secretary of War and President of the U.S. speak. What do you think? Yeah, you know, and usually what I do in these circumstances is I watch the speech and then read the coverage. This time, I took a different tack.

I was curious to see what the press view of. of what statements. And you would have thought that he came out there and insulted generals and admirals to their face and picked them out and called them fat and et cetera, et cetera. And so, okay, okay, that I went and watched the speech. And I thought it was one of the more measured things I've seen. Look, for the people that are critical of getting rid of things like DEI

and having physical standards and all of the things that were mentioned in these speech, speech. I just want to know what war we've won since the beginning of the 21st century that would tell you that what we've been doing works, that how our military is structured and how we approach things is working. It's not. It's clearly not. We need a change of direction.

Now, what he's asking for, or what he's ordering with Trump and with Secretary Heads that are demanding or in line them, whatever. I believe in military standards in the military. I believe in equality and not equity. I believe that, you know, you need to be physically fit. I don't care if you're a man or woman. You should have the same exact standards. You know, that grooming standards matter.

All of these things matter very much. My time in the military in the 90s, I began to saw some of this stuff creep in at the very early stages. And at that time, it was very divisive to units. I talked, I obviously have friends who served during the war on terror, some who just retired, who told me how, in one instance, one lieutenant colonel told me how one trans case dominated. He said it was around 90% of his administrative time, that he had to deal with one soldier who created all kinds of problems and investigations within his unit. that stuff that is not what a fighting force needs we're either a social experiment as a military

or we're a fighting force secretary execpt and president trump want the u.s military to be a fighting force and that's what they're asking for and i don't i i'm firmly behind this i'm shocked i just a couple of veterans i know were just appalled by this and i turned to them and said go watch the speech go don't read about it go watch take 40 minutes and listen to what Secretary Hanksets said. It was, I thought it was very reasonable. It was well delivered. He's far more articulate that even I gave him credit for.

I don't know how if you were a veteran, if you're someone who served, how you can't support these initiatives. Yeah. No, I'm glad to hear you say all that because like I, as far as the standards go, I've really enjoyed watching the left, the hard left in particular, the media left in particular, talk about this and give their views on how the senior brass are taking this, as if they have any clue what the military mindset would be. But they're all, they can't help themselves.

And yes, they've got to fill up airtime. But look, if you've got the same standard for men and women, That's the definition of equality. That's it. Right? And it's absolutely true. Nobody gives a shit what your gender is on the battlefield. You've got to perform, right?

And so you just set that standard. And if a guy can't meet it, too bad. If a woman can't meet it, too bad. That's just the way it is. Right? So that I was very glad to hear because that makes things. I think in a sense, you can't lower the bar continuously and expect you're going to get good, solid, efficient results over a period of time. And when you change standards, adjust standards, that's what you're doing.

Whether you're trying to meet recruitment targets or whether you're worried about, you know, getting complaints from one gender or another. So, yeah, make that one standard, make it stick and, you know, and just get back to it. I don't care what you call it. What they call it woke or whatever. It's nonsense when you're talking about, you know, a military structure. We sound like those two guys that would sit up in the balcony during the Muppet show. That's what you sound like. Those two old guys.

I forget what their names were. But anyway, yeah. All right, listen, man. As always, always enjoy having you on it. It's wonderful to talk to you. And I hope you'll come back again because I don't think the world's going to call. calm down and suddenly we'll all be, you know, looking at peace and prosperity across the board. So I think we'll have plenty to talk about going forward.

Well, I hope for peace and prosperity, but prepare for the opposite because that seems to be the way we go. Always a pleasure to join you, my friend. Thanks for having me on. Absolutely. Bill Rozier, the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. We'll see you next time, man. Well, look, that is all the time we have for this week's PDB situation report. I know, sad trombone. If you have any questions or comments or humorous anecdotes, please reach out to me at PDB at thefirstTV.com. You know what we do once a month, we take the best comments, the questions, and we put them all together into an episode that we call Ask Me Anything, right?

I mean, within reason. How about that? And, you know, we do that with the entire PDB team, including our very capable interns, for the most part, anyway. Everybody gathers around our very expensive mahogany conference room. in our rather posh conference room lined with many bookshelves filled with leather bound books and with a smell of pipe tobacco hanging in the air. And they put together the Ask Me Anything episodes. So, my point being, keep your cards and letters coming.

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