The President's Daily Brief - The PDB Situation Report | July 4th, 2026: Russia Has A New Problem At Home & Iran's Diplomatic Deadlock

Episode Date: July 4, 2026

In this episode of The PDB Situation Report: Ukraine is tightening the noose around Crimea while Russian civilians grapple with growing fuel shortages at home. Retired Lt. General Ben Hodges joins us to explain what this new phase of the war could mean—and whether mounting pressure inside Russia is beginning to change the strategic picture. The U.S. and Iran have wrapped another round of indirect talks, but the biggest disputes remain unresolved. Behnam Ben Taleblu of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies joins us to break down where negotiations stand, what's still dividing both sides, and what comes next. To listen to the show ad-free, become a premium member of The President’s Daily Brief by visiting https://PDBPremium.com. Please remember to subscribe if you enjoyed this episode of The President's Daily Brief. YouTube: youtube.com/@presidentsdailybrief Fox One: Sign up at https://fox.com to watch The PDB show and more on-demand with FOX One. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Welcome to the PDP Situation Report. I'm Mike Baker. Your eyes and ears on the world stage. All right. Let's get briefed. First up, Ukraine is tightening the noose around Crimea while Russian civilians grapple with fuel shortages at home. Retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges joins us to explain what this new phase of the war could mean. Later in the show, the U.S. and Iran have supposedly wrapped up another round of talks or sort of talks or kind of indirect. negotiations, but the biggest disputes remain unresolved. Ben-Urtleblow of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies joins us to break it all down. But first, today's situation report spotlight. Ukraine has been intensifying its long-range campaign against Russia, tightening the noose around occupied Crimea, while continuing to strike refineries, fuel depots, and other critical infrastructure

deep inside Russian territory. The strategy is designed not only to disrupt Moscow's war machine, but to steadily increase the economic and political costs of continuing the conflict. And those costs are now becoming harder for the Kremlin to hide. In a rare public acknowledgement, Vladimir Putin admitted that fuel shortages have become a serious problem, as Russian motorists face long lines at gas stations and rapidly rising gasoline prices. The question now is whether this mounting pressure can translate into meaningful leverage on the battlefield. Field. Joining us to break it all down is retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, former commanding General of U.S. Army Europe. General, thank you very much for coming back here on the Situation Report.

We really appreciate it. And by the way, happy 4th of July. Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity. And I wish everybody, all your listeners, a happy Independence Day weekend. Thank you, sir. And let's get stuck right into it if we could. This current situation, it almost feels as if we're getting close to some sort of inflection point. And correct me if I'm wrong, but Putin's recent comments admitting problems from the Ukrainian effort to target the energy infrastructure, the rising gas prices in Russia, the fact that it's becoming more apparent perhaps to the Russian population, that there are costs to this,

invasion of Putin's. Am I wrong in thinking that this feels like we might be getting somewhere at this point after all these years? It does feel that the momentum has shifted in favor of Ukraine. You know, we're not getting close to the end, but it does feel like it's so many different ways that the momentum has shifted. The obvious things are, of course, in Crimea, the way the Ukrainians have isolated the peninsula and they're making that place untenable for Russian forces.

And now you've got thousands of Russians who are down there for their annual summer holiday are trying to get the hell out of there. And partly because there's no gas, but also because it's pretty dangerous there now. So that's an indicator. And that's not something that Putin will be able to ignore. The increasingly effective long-range precision strikes that the Ukrainians are launching against Russia's oil and gas infrastructure has not only resulted in gasoline shortages and very, very long queues at gas stations, but it also bites into Russia's ability to finance the war. They're not able to export as much oil and gas to China and India and other customers. So there's a strategic effect there.

The thing that the Ukrainians have not been able to stop yet, of course, though, is Russia's continued attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. So that's, you know, the last couple of days have seen some terrible attacks. But, you know, from history that that strategic bombing of populations never achieves the decisive effect. if anything, it makes people fight harder. And I think that's what's happening in Ukraine. But it would seem as if, I don't want to oversimplify this, but it would seem as if Putin is then facing two options,

either double down, become more aggressive, which appears like that might be his path, given his, you just mentioned, the increased aggressive missile and drone barrages, or, you know, say, okay, fine, let's sit down at the negotiating table. am I reading that wrong? No, I think those are two possible scenarios. Well, we don't see an indication yet that he actually is interested in doing some sort of negotiation.

There's reporting over the last few days that Russia has closed border crossings on their western border with the Baltic countries and on their eastern border with Georgia and Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, which makes me think that perhaps, you know, what's going on? Why would they do that unless it was to make sure people did not leave, as would be the case if they were to announce a big mobilization, then you could imagine a lot of people trying to get out of there. So that's speculation on my part, but I thought that was an interesting announcement by the Russian side.

Now, I think that Putin will continue doing this as long as he thinks he has a chance, that Ukraine will finally collapse or that support from the West will finally collapse or that maybe, you know, the American president will exert some kind of influence on behalf of Russia to bring this to a conclusion that's favorable to Russia. So only when Putin is realizing as himself, or the people around him say, hey, this has got to stop. We're being ruined. We, Russia, are being ruined.

I think he's going to continue. Yeah, we've talked about that here on the PDB in the past, in that it doesn't so much matter if the Russian population, you know, is getting concerned about this, right? What matters is whether the elites, the people around him who, in a sense, they kind of live in a symbiotic relationship, Putin keeps them in power, they keep Putin in power. Whether those elites, the business, the military leaders, and others, if they start to question in a serious manner the cost of this invasion, then, yeah, I think you're right. That's where perhaps then he starts thinking about a possible negotiating position. But what would, I mean, have you seen any indications that he's backed off any of his earlier demands? He seems to have been fairly consistent over these years in what he would expect from any endgame. I see no reduction in their maximalist demands.

You hear the same kind of language from Lavrov that we've been hearing. And so I just don't get a sense that they really intend to do that. They probably, I tell you what, though, what has surprised me is the inability of the Russians to effectively stop Ukraine's attacks against their oil and gas infrastructure, the long range, and the mid-range drawl attacks that are wrecking Russia's logistics network between Crimea and Rostov and along the Azov. coast, you know, they're wrecking it, and then the Russians don't seem to be able to come up with ways to stop it. That's striking to me. The other thing that's striking is Russia seems to be totally without imagination on how to continue the war. I mean, all of their ground operations have been across the front trying to push, and they're literally gaining feet per day. and enormous costing casualties and resources for no real, you know, even tactical benefit. So they haven't changed that. They're continuing to attack Ukrainian civilians. So I'm not seeing the kind of imagination that could somehow change the momentum or regain the initiative.

That to me is maybe there's something that they're working on, but I'm not seeing it yet. Well, Putin, and also talking about the fuel shortages and the impact on the energy infrastructure, he also did allude to their air defense problems and said that they need to, from a, you know, a defense industrial base, they need to step that up. So that was a very interesting admission. And it does seem like the Ukrainians are having success in forcing the Russians to reconfigure their air defenses. And so they're having to make these choices. between, okay, what resources, what infrastructure do we protect? And, you know, of course,

they can't turn that around overnight. I mean, everyone has that same problem. The U.S. has that problem in terms of, you know, how do we rebuild stockpiles? It takes time. Well, you put your finger on a problem that every commander has, every leader has to prioritize what you protect. Nobody has enough air and missile defense capability to protect everything. So, of course, you have to prioritize what absolutely must be protected and so on. To me, Russia's great strength over its history was its vastness, just the sheer size of Russia that it could absorb invading armies and then just wear them down or destroy them.

Now that vastness has become a vulnerability because, as you say, They can't protect everything. And now the Ukrainians have the ability to launch a drone with a very capable warhead out to 2,000 kilometers. I mean, that's incredible that they can hit with precision, factories, oil and gas infrastructure, ship repair facilities, military targets at that range. And that becomes almost impossible for Russia to protect effectively. all of these sites. General, I've got to become more pages of questions to throw your way. But first, we have to take a quick break.

So if you'll stay right where you are, we'll be back with more from General Hodges and just a brief minute. Stick around. Dave, Mike Baker here with some very exciting news for all of you who enjoy podcasts. There are podcasts now streaming on Fox One. That's right, Fox One, because sometimes the headline, well, you know that isn't enough. Fox One brings you on-demand video podcasts that dive deeper into what's happening, getting you closer to the voices, shaping the conversation across news, politics, and culture. Don't forget culture. You want to get yourself some of that.

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With a fit that creates natural movement and a wide leg that feels modern, not overwhelming. Plus, that signature, wait, for this price, moment. Old Navy's drapey denim wide leg. Welcome back to the PBB Situation Report. Joining me once again is retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges. He's the former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe. Sir, thank you. very much for sticking around here on the situation report. We've been talking about the impact, the Ukrainian effort targeting Russian energy infrastructure has been having. We alluded to it, and you alluded to it, the idea of a large mobilization, perhaps, by the Russian military.

And the last time they did that back in 2022, there was a very significant exodus of military-age, Russian men. from the country. And it was decidedly unpopular amongst the population, although they tried to get around that by focusing on conscripts from regions outside the key urban centers. Have you seen any indications that they are building up towards another mobilization? Or do they seem to be able to maintain their manpower concerns despite the casualties that they're suffering on a monthly basis? I think that the possibility of them having to do a major mobilization is very real.

They don't care about how many casualties they have from a humanistic sort of side. But the practical matter is, you know, if you lose 150 or one and a half million troops, a third of which have been killed and two thirds of which have been wounded, I mean, that's even Russia will have a hard time. making those good without no either wrecking their industry because obviously you need the same kind of people working and throughout the country and all their different industries so they have focused recruiting on the poorer regions of the Russian Federation and bonuses have worked but I think they might be getting close to the end of being able to do that so they may have to finally pull young men out of the St. Petersburg area and Moscow, where it will be difficult to conceal the fact that this war

obviously is not going well. When you start having funerals and those metropolitan areas, that's going to bring it home. And so I think as we were discussing earlier, what the oligarchs think and the people around Putin and the senior military leadership thing, that will be a source of pressure on Putin if it continues to go badly. What I can't, I'm not well-educated enough on Russia to be a good judge of what the population thinks about things. How do they feel? I always hear this.

You know, Russians, they can suffer better than anybody. And I think that these oligarchs are not suffering. They never suffer. You know, so the bottom 90% of society is accustomed to suffering because they've never had it good. And so I think I would not assume that they're willing to just continue to put up with this with so many casualties. And their life is not getting any better, especially when they can't buy gas. I mean, when you read what Russian, the average Russian are saying on their social media about, I mean, There's a growing sense of anger and I don't know where or if there's a tipping point for them, but I imagine that there is.

Yeah. You would think you would think so, although, you know, you could also, you could, you know, move over to Iran and say that we've, we haven't been good over the years at reading the mood of the people in a sense, you know, from, because we, we tend to put our Western values and we think, okay, they're not going to put up with that anymore. You know, they're going to, they're going to rebel at some point. They're going to say, enough is enough. We want a better life. And then it doesn't work out. And in part because, you know, we do this mirroring of our, of our perspective and our values onto other cultures. I'm curious about your assessment of, because you referenced this in the earlier conversation, Putin's, you know, a view on allied support for Ukraine.

and in there i'm not so much thinking about u.s support for ukraine because that can shift almost on a weekly basis but what's your assessment of where the EU is in terms of their support their patience their willingness to continue to to stick with ukraine yeah i think it is as strong as it's ever been and actually getting stronger uh germany is the largest provider of uh in terms of overall euro value financial and military support to Ukraine with many other countries doing the same. Sweden just announced a sale of Griffons to Ukraine. So there's a lot that's going on. I don't detect any lessening of the willingness of European countries to support Ukraine.

I think they all realize that this is in their own best interest. if Ukraine fails, then Russia has said they will be coming to a NATO country near you, and that this will expand. So I think people are sober. They understand who the aggressor is, and they understand. They can also see that the United States may not be as much a part of the deterrence and defense as it has been in the past. and so they are they are going to have to make sure that Ukraine is successful. And then I think they will be actually.

I think Ukraine is in fact going to actually win this war with mostly European help. And I think we in the U.S. are going to regret to some extent if Ukraine does this without us, if Europe does this without us, we'll have less influence, will become less relevant in Europe. And I don't know that that's in our best strategic interest. I'm glad that Europeans are stepping up. I'm glad Ukraine is doing what is doing. But, you know, the other side of that coin is that we will have less influence with, you know, a very important part of the world. When you talk about that in terms of Ukraine could win, how do you define when?

Russia goes back to the 1991 borders, the internationally recognized sovereign border of Ukraine. from 1991. You know, when this all started, Russia 12 years ago, since then, Russia still only has 20% of Ukraine. And I think that if Ukraine continues to pound away on the oil and gas infrastructure and continues to isolate Crimea and make it untenable, I think there's going to be a sudden shift, actually and how Russia is postured to continue fighting. I don't think it's just going to be a straight line degradation. I can imagine, particularly because of Crimea, a sudden change.

Do you mean a, when you say a shift, do you mean a military shift, or are you thinking more of an internal political shift in Russia that causes this thing to finally? The military shift will cause a political shift. You know, when you look at the map and you see Crimea, it's obvious why it was so important because of how it dominates everything in the Black Sea. It's a launching pad for further attacks against Ukraine. It can influence the ability of Ukraine in Romania to do oil and gas exploration in the Western Black Sea. It disrupts shipping. I mean, it's why the Russians wanted it so badly.

And Putin has talked about it how, you know, so from a psychological standpoint, it's he's personally connected to it, almost the way Stalin was personally connected to Stalingrad in the Second World War. And so when it falls, when it's gone, I mean, that will be a psychological blow that people will wonder what the hell happened, how did this happen? Why are we still fighting this war if we can't even hang on to Crimea? And that, I think, has the potential. Now, you could rightfully say, all right, Hodges, you've been a Ukraine over-optimistic forever, and now I'm just saying what I hope happens. But, you know, I mean, when you study the history of warfare and how

things change, the psychological impact defeat is not always just a slow, gradual, it sometimes it can happen in a sudden sort of way. And I think Crimea has that potential. Do you think there's a danger that if Putin senses that, that he maybe just pushed all his chips into the center of the table, maybe not the nuclear chip, but everything he and just says this is it, I'm going all in. Well, I mean, what else is he going to do? I don't believe he would use a nuclear weapon against Ukraine because there's nothing, there's no positive outcome for him if he does.

There's only negative outcomes for the Russians if they do that. The Chinese have said, do not do this. Indians have said, do not do this. It would really have more negative outcomes than any positive. And as most of your listeners will know that, you know, a tactical nuclear weapon, there's no place on the battlefield in Ukraine where the use of a tactical nuclear weapon would all of a sudden change everything, you know, create a big gap that could be exploited. It's just not going to happen. So I think that's an unlikely scenario. Although you can never rule it out.

I mean, they have thousands of nuclear warheads and they don't care. It won't be a big moral decision for the Kremlin. but from a practical standpoint, you know, they, after they do it, then nobody's going to be threatened or deterred by the threat of a nuclear weapon. That's where their nukes have been most effective for them. So what could they do? The great Black Sea Fleet is no longer a factor there. They've been pushed out of Crimea. I think that even Lukashenko and Belarus,

can see what's happening, you know, just a couple weeks ago. He apologized to President Zelensky for, hey, I haven't been such a good neighbor, and I'm sorry, all this. And they, after Zelensky threatened them, they allegedly turned off or removed some devices that were helping Russian drones fly into Ukraine. So, you know, the Russians could launch them underground. operation into and through Belarus and then try to attack Ukraine from the north again. But I mean, Ukrainians know this.

I mean, they know their geography. They know the possibilities. So they would not be surprised. And I think maybe they have something. I just don't see what the Russians have other than more of what they're doing right now. Yeah. Yeah. That's it.

It is fascinating. And I think that it does appear. as if the Ukrainian military has the access, the ability in terms of resources to continue this push against the energy infrastructure. The question then is, I guess, you know, if Putin's reaction to that is to increasingly target civilians and civilian infrastructure inside Ukraine, you know, how does that play out? And that's just pure speculation, I suppose. Well, I think the Ukrainians have made it clear that they're not going to stop or give in just because another other nightful of Russian drones and missiles that have hammered apartment buildings in Kiev or Harkiv or Hessell or other cities. I think the Ukrainian capability for long-range strike against Russian energy infrastructure. It gets better each day.

You know, they've grown not only the capability, but the size of the capability, that they can hit more and more targets. And I don't think the Russians so far have come up with a way to stop this. I mean, why are they wasting missiles against apartment buildings instead of hunting down, you know, to Ukraine's defense industry? Now, of course, Ukrainians are aware of this. I think they figured out ways to distribute and disperse what they're doing. So you don't lose it all with one factory getting destroyed, for example. I'll just repeat some of the said earlier. I think that so far I don't see Russia having the imagination,

the creative operational design to win this. Yeah. Well, sir, being mindful of time, I think, you know, what I would ask is the last question is completely off subject. But if you have any wisdom for the Fourth of July, and I always like to ask, you know, what does someone, what do you value most about the United States, about America on this Fourth of July? You know, it all started with a declaration of independence. And that people were determined that the king was not the law, but that the law was the king. And so, you know, this protecting our laws, protecting our constitution that guarantees all of us, independence and freedom. That, that to me is what is most important.

And of course, we all have to be responsible citizens. But I think most Americans really value the chance. You know, if I want to live here, I'm going to live here. If I want to live there, I'm going to live there. If I want to do this, if I want to go to school here, whatever it is I want to do, whatever it is I want to say, those rights are protected by the Constitution. And so, you know, this weekend, we should be reminded two and a half centuries. we've been able to enjoy that.

But democracy is not ballet. I mean, it is football all 24-7 and you've got to fight to defend it. Yeah. No. And I think regardless of anybody's politics, you know, what I hope for is, you know, that we just can appreciate as Americans what we have. And it shouldn't come down to what your politics are. it should come down to, again, appreciating what you point out, which is the freedoms, freedom of movement, freedom of thought, freedom of religion, everything that's wrapped into it. And I think you and I are a bit similar in the sense that we've spent a lot of our lives overseas and we've seen a lot of places that don't allow for that.

And I just, you know, my hope is always that we don't take things for granted and that young people coming up don't take things for granted. Sir, General Hodges, I just want to say thank you so much. always always appreciate your time your expertise your insight your experience and have a most wonderful fourth of july i hope to see you again very soon thanks mike i did i enjoy that well coming up next another round of u.s iran negotiations uh supposedly we've wrapped up another round of negotiations i know uh we'll see uh what comes of that um we'll ask whether the two sides are any closer to something resembling an actual understanding. Ben and Ben Talibu from the Foundation for Defense of Democracy's Iran program will join us to

break all that down. Stay with us. In Toronto, every arrival is a statement and nothing says it better than this. Cadillac Optic was the number one selling luxury EV in Canada for 2025. Find your rhythm across a seamless 33-inch display and an immersive 19 speaker AKG surround audio system. This city demands agility and Optic delivers with precision to make every drive. Extraordinary. Let's take the Cadillac. Find out more at Cadillac Canada.ca. Luxury sales claim based on S&P Global Mobility Canadian New Vehicle Total Registrations for calendar year 2025 for the Cadillac definition of luxury.

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Rather than tackling the biggest unresolved issues, Tehran's nuclear program, sanctions of relief or its missile and drone capabilities. Yeah, those are all pretty big unresolved issues. The talks focused largely on implementing the fragile interim agreement or memorandum of understanding that halted the fighting or sort of halted the fighting. That means maritime traffic to the Strait of Hormuz, frozen Iranian assets, and Tehran's continued threats to control or monetize passage through one of the world's most important waterways are still being discussed or supposedly discussed. Let me bring in Benham Ben Taliblu. He's the senior director of the Foundation for Defensive Democracies,

Iran program. Thenum, thank you very much for coming back on the Situation Report. Always a pleasure. Great to be back with you. Thank you. And by the way, it's a happy 4th of July to 250th birthday. So here's the first question I've got for you. What should we believe when it comes to these negotiations that are supposedly taking place? I know I sound cynical when I'm phrasing this question, but what should we believe about what's currently happening in these discussions? Well, first and foremost, the happy fourth to you and the viewers and listeners. Ironically, and I don't mean that sassily,

there are some sort of public events in the Islamic Republic today, but they're not the celebrations of America's birthday, but they're the beginning of a week-long funeral for the country's former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Hamidate, who was killed in the early hours of the U.S. and Israeli air strikes against the Islamic Republic in February. The funeral will be going on for a week. And you can tell if the funeral is going on for a week, perhaps the government of the Islamic Republic isn't going to be putting its best foot forward

or sending its best, if you will, for negotiations that are supposed to be going on for the next week as well. I see these talks as a time-buying mechanism, to be brutally honest with you, a way for the Islamic Republic to be able to get some sanctions relief during these 60 days, and then to create the conditions where America feels like there's enough normalcy in the Strait of Horn Rules to look the other way, while also kind of continuing to tempt us with things that we are interested in getting, like access to that highly enriched uranium, like the restoration of IEA inspectors, and to be able to push Trump into a pay-to-play scheme,

like the Islamic Republic was able to push other presidents. So the question is not what do we believe is being said to be true, but what do we think in the heart of hearts of the U.S. President Donald Trump? What will he settle for? Yeah, and that's we could spend all day speculating on that. Let me ask you about the idea of the straight right now, the water of the way. You mentioned the sanctions relief, and they'll be pushing for that during the course of this 60-day stretch. But they've already got, is it true, they've already got sanctions relief in the sense that we've allowed them to get back into the oil markets? Yes, that's the primary vector of sanctions relief. I'm glad you mentioned that because there was a special license given general license X that changes or waves penalties, not in one or two, but in 11. I want to stress that for the audience, 11 different regulations, statutes, and even executives.

of orders that deals with Iran's ability, not just to sell oil, but to repatriate the money, even in dollars of that oil revenue. And when you look at the MOU, that memorandum of understanding, something else that the U.S. does is, in addition to waiving these penalties, it commits to not issuing any new sanctions. So it's basically a sanctions, it's not an escalatory environment in the 60-day negotiating window. And it removes the single biggest non-kinetic source of pressure against these oil exports, which was the U.S. blockade. The numbers don't lie. I'm sorry for interrupting Benham. Is there any way to quantify? If I don't interrupt, I typically forget what I'm about to ask. So is there any way to quantify what that means

to the Iranian regime over the course of the next 60 days in terms of fat tax, in terms of money going into their bank? Well, it depends if you believe that they still have to sell oil at a discount or not, but there is a way to quantify. But first, let me give it to you in Barrel and folks who have better math skills that I can be able to translate that into dollars. But in the month of February, Iran exported 2.1 million barrels of oil per day. In the month of March, once the war started, it exported 1.15 million barrels of world. This was the question mark period because other countries weren't exporting, and there was a war, but Iran was exporting.

In the month of April, Iran exported about 900,000-plus barrels of oil per day. About half the month was the U.S. blockade. In the month of May, those take a nose down it. Only 64,000 barrels of oil per day. So from 900,000 to 64,000 barrels of oil per day, only four ships in the month of May got past the U.S. blockade. So that just shows you how effective this was. Now, when you're looking at the bounceback,

people are estimating for the month of June that Iran export about 1.6, 1.8, that's a conservative estimate when it comes to, you know, average barrels of oil per day. You multiply that times the price of oil, you minus some of the transaction costs, and then you be able to look at the way the regime is able to repatriate the money. It is a lot of cash. And now it may not be astronomical sums that are transformational for this regime, but for this regime, there is such a thing as good enough for government work,

and it's trying to limp along and outlast Trump and outlast BB. So suffice to say, anything greater than six, 64,000 barrels per day is going to be helping this regime get off the mat and stand back up. And that's really the fear I have for the administration, which is as it moves to tackle the harder issues, like the nuclear issue in these 60 days, it will have less, not more leverage. Right. And also, look, they're cloning the way back up. That's, you know, what it sounds like is if those are conservative estimates for June and there was 1.6 million, that's only half a million off of. pre-conflict numbers. It sounds like when you're talking about, say, going back to February. But am I wrong in thinking that the reason for issuing those sanctions, right,

for allowing the Iranian regime to get back into the oil markets to trade in dollars was because the trade-off there was a free and open straight of Hormuz. You know, that's exactly what the administration wanted. And you can even kind of envision President Trump telling the to go. get me the straight open at all other costs. Let's promise them some unicorns and rainbows that after 60 days will cross that bridge when we get there. There are some things legally and politically like the sanctions waiver that are problematic. In my view, if the administration has no intent on delivering on bigger relief, well, then that may be a cyber relief for us, but then we have to be prepared for the escalation that we were unprepared for during the fighting and during the ceasefire. So yes, the strait is supposed to be open, but you just saw last night the Islamic Republic. threatened tankers saying if you don't use pre-approved routes, we'll strike you. And you see at the same time diplomatically the Islamic Republic trying to get Oman to force it to amplify its talking points about what the future of this trade should look like.

And then you also see the Islamic Republic trying to get all of these tankers and shippers to sign up with its own kind of insurance Ponzi scheme and register. You know, if this is a free and open international waterway, why do you have to register with the Navy of the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism? So look, and this is what I'm about to say is not a political statement. I don't really care. I don't have a dog in the hunt in that regard. I'm just talking about from an operational perspective.

If all you're talking about is negotiating tactics, right, then what we've done is we've essentially handed over a steady stream of revenue allowing, again, going back into the oil markets. And we haven't gotten what we promised in return. So why are we still engaged in this? Why do you think we haven't just said that's it? you have not done your part of the bargain. Case closed. It's not as if we're questioning have. They have they not. They haven't. So why haven't we reimposed the blockade? We may have felt, I mean, the blockade is something that Trump, term one, flirted with at the tail end of the administration. I think for oil market reasons, for escalatory reasons, I think it avoided

doing it. I actually think it would have been wiser to do it earlier, but we are where we are. So I think the administration is trying to balance the security concerns with the economic concerns. And if I have to be brutally honest with you, the U.S. has fought the war and also managed the ceasefire. And I try not to make this a political statement, but it's done so politically, meaning it's done so with an eye towards the media. It's done so with an eye towards markets, and particularly the oil market and energy prices. It's done so with an eye towards the midterms. And then perhaps the final thing, which is, I would say, the more responsible one is to fight it with an eye. towards munitions because we do have a munitions crisis as well. So the U.S. isn't keen to rush

back into conflict, given how much it would move all of those vectors, all those Ms into the red media, markets, munitions, you name it. But at the same time, the Islamic Republic understands this. And they understand so much about this kind of economic-based midterm craze for the U.S. to restrain itself, that you've even had a hardline Iranian commentator on a pro-refer regime media podcast recently say that we have to make sure that Trump loses one of the houses. I mean, this is exactly where we are, where the Islamic Republic is basically banking on U.S. domestic politics to restrain U.S. foreign policy at this level and so publicly. Well, we've talked about that here on the PDB before, which is that we're not dealing with,

and I think sometimes the public makes a mistake, we're not dealing with an unsophisticated regime. They have spent a long time studying the U.S., all the administrations that they've had to deal with, and they have become extremely good at understanding how to work or gain whatever administration is in charge. And I think we're seeing that again here, again, not a political statement. I'm just saying the operational realities are, it seems as if they haven't changed their playbook. And I want to get into a part of this in terms of your, and this will be speculation, you know, going forward in the next couple of questions, Ben, and I apologize for that, but first, we have to take a break. And so if you'll stick right around there, stay right wherever you are.

And we'll be right back with more from Benham, Ben Talibu for the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies right here on the PDB situation report. Stick around. This episode is brought to you by Activia. You might already be eating yogurt, but not all yogurts are. are created equal. Activia contains over one billion probiotics per serving to survive and reach the gut alive. When it comes to gut health, Activia is the number one family doctor recommended probiotic

yogurt brand. Choose Activia, feel good from the inside out. Visitactivia.ca for more details. Welcome back to the BDB Situation Report. Let me bring back our guest, Senior Director of Foundation for the Defense of Democracy of Iran program, Benham Bentow. Benin, thank you for sticking around. appreciate that very much. It would have been awkward if we'd come back after break and you weren't

there in your chair. So I appreciate that very much. Let me ask you this. We were talking about the way that the U.S. administration has been approaching this negotiation. And you talked about how it's essentially from a political perspective. And we can't ignore that, right? With the terms coming up with gas prices, all the gas prices have been falling and the White House has been very quick to point that out. But do you think that the strategy of the Iranian regime is going to work? And by that, I mean, where do you think the White House will settle on this? What do you think the White House will agree to call a win or a victory? Well, I'm yet to see at least the administration publicly articulate the strategy and the direction that they want to go in with this. You know, we have

broad, big picture understanding of the things that the Trump administration wants to deal with in terms of threats, whether that's missile, whether that's nuclear, whether that's straight-in-form moves. But the tactics, how to get there, you know, those are very much up in the air. And that's actually where the administration is weak and it excels at the exact same time because both its allies and its adversaries, domestic and abroad, are left wondering, hedging, you know, even fearful of what may come next. And some of that is wielded strategically by the administration and some of that can be a little bit of a political mess. I'll give you one example. In the MOU, it actually links Lebanon, a ceasefire in Lebanon, to the agreement over the

Strait of Hormuz between the U.S. and Iran. And unfortunately there, that seems to be tying our partner's hand in the region, the Israelis. But on the flip side, you have this new agreement that the U.S. on the side separately carved out, away from Iran, away from Esbola, between the central government in Lebanon, in Beirut, and the Israeli government in Jerusalem. So in essence, even some of the weak points of the MOU, if the U.S. steps up its game in the region, it can begin to kind of hold the line and roll back and force the Islamic Republic to say, hey, if you don't like it, you can violate the MOU. But if you violate the MOU, please know that we'll be speaking in terms of missiles, not dollars and sanctions relief. So there are things that the administration

is doing to limit the damage already, in my view. of the MOU, but the challenge is some of its most powerful tools. Economic sanctions and moving new military forces into the region. For the text of the MOU itself, it is not allowed to be doing those things for the next 60 days. So elsewhere, the U.S. is looking for these things, diplomatically, politically. Isn't that, Ben, I'm sorry for interrupting. Isn't that contingent, though, whether they do those things or not? That's contingent upon the Iranian regime.

This is the part I think maybe confuses people. It's contingent upon the Iranian regime. holding up their end of the bargain. I had to say that I couldn't keep a straight face talking about the Iranian regime holding up there under the bargain. But it's contingent upon that. And if they're not doing it, then I get it. I understand that the White House is reluctant to get back into any sort of kinetic conflict in a big way. I get that they're worried about the midterms.

But at a certain point, right, if it walks like a duck and talks like a duck, right? I mean, you have to call out this regime for their. They're constant, and they are consistent behavior of never negotiating a good faith. I don't know that there's a question in there, but I'm just puzzled, as are, I think, a lot of people. You know, I'm, you hit the hell that had I'm puzzled as well, but we see a playbook that the administration has levied against this, where it'll say, I'm comfortable talking to you, but I'm also comfortable shooting at you. And in a sense, I think not this weekend, but last weekend, we saw the U.S. respond, actually. to an Iranian drone attack against Singaporean, I think, owned or flagged vessel that was trying to transit the strait. The U.S. did intercept and strike some of the drones, and then ultimately got into a little bit of a small shooting war there by firing against Iranian radars and coastal defenses and drone and missile depots in southern Iran.

And the Islamic Republic responded to that by again firing drones, ballistic missiles at countries that house U.S. bases like Kuwait and Bahrain. for example, which, by the way, are countries that it knows will not be punching back militarily against it. The problem is, you know, it was good that we signaled was all due to the drone strike, but it was bad that we let the Islamic Republic close the round. And the U.S. thinking, and this is actually articulated in General McKinsey's book about his experience at SENTCOM back in the early 2020s, is that what the U.S. takes away from the Islamic Republic in its strikes is more important than what the Islamic Republic. gets in a face-saving return of fire. And he's talking there explicitly about the U.S.

killed Soleimani in January 2020. That's Iran's chief terrorist. The guy with so much American and allied regional blood on his hands. And then on the flip side, the Islamic Republic fires, I don't know, 16 ballistic missiles at two U.S. bases, no people die. And we kind of call it even Stephen. And, you know, the U.S. looks at that as dangerous as it was as performative. The problem is, in the mind of the Islamic Republic, because it's allowed to close the round, it is allowed to set the tempo. And in my view, there is a straight line from the fact that the regime got to close the round using these dangerous weapons before to continuing to respond to every single

American use of force. These guys are not backing down. They are weak, but they are still lethal. They are battered, but they are still confident. And now they feel like, hey, if you're taking these weapons away from us, we have a lower threshold for the use of force. So expect a lot more the Iranian use of these weapons as you've been. begin to diminish their quantity, you will only for us grow their importance.

Yeah. No, I would argue that I think the regime actually, they're not just confident. I think their confidence is increased, right? I think they view themselves in a strange way as negotiating from a stronger position than the U.S. I think that's their interpretation of this. I could be entirely wrong. And by the way, I'm also make, now it makes me wonder if there's a farcey phrase for

even Stephen. but I don't think, I don't know. I'm not sure if there is. I don't think there is. You mentioned the Lebanese situation. And we could spend an entire show talking about that. I'm going to play devil's advocate on the carve-out that you mentioned, the U.S. having an agreement with the Lebanese government.

And if I'm playing devil's advocate there, I'm going to say that doesn't mean anything. Because the Lebanese government can't control Hezbollah, never has been able to. And so any agreement we have, and I think the Israeli government knows this, but I think they're playing ball. I think they're, you know, they understand that they've got a certain role here that they're going to have to play. And I guess my question is, am I wrong to be cynical about any discussion, any agreement, any understanding with the Lebanese government because of that inability to control Hezbollah?

You're not wrong to be cynical because ultimately it does come down to the number of men you have on the ground, as well as the amount of guns and violence that they wield. And unfortunately, there are, there's still our areas where the LAF, despite the foreign and the Western and even American financial support that they've gotten over the years, they still are fearful of going in and, you know, disarming Hezbollah. Now, that's not necessarily what this calls for, because previous, you know, political agreements and UN resolutions have called for that, ultimately to have the Israelis be the only one who can militarily do this. what the Lebanese state, which is, again, also weak, fears, but since the past few years has

been at least willing to politically and publicly call out as belittes it, fears the resumption of civil war. And that's one reason why the LAF camped and perhaps won't do this. But why this agreement is important is that shows that the Islamic Republic diplomatically will not have free reign and will diplomatically not lean on America to lean on Israel to lean out of Lebanon. It actually is the U.S. kind of writing Israel back into the script. So it's kind of an American version of even, Stephen. You got the MOU where you thought you had the regional ceasefire.

Now we're going to get this bilateral agreement that kind of writes the Israelis back in. And then it goes to the Lebanese. It goes to the hopeful folks who say, hey, if you do think that the LAA is this kind of actor, let's begin with pilot zones. This is something that people have talked about for a long time because the Israelis occupy a certain part of the southern portion of that country. why don't we begin with pilot zones where there's phase withdrawals and phase takeovers. And if those areas are secure and Hezbole doesn't cause a problem there, well, then we have a roadmap of how to replicate phase withdrawal, phase takeover, and to deal with the Hezbollah threat in that area.

But we've gone through this route before where supposedly the, you know, admittedly it was more of the unifil, the UN force was supposed to take over areas that you know, would then be free of Hezbollah influence and involvement. And of course, that didn't appear to work. So I'm just wondering, again, I don't need sound, I don't need to sound so cynical. You've got to, you've got to try these things. I get it. You have to have diplomacy. You have to make the effort. You never wanted to get to a point where you just throw your hands up and say, that's it. We have no other option but kinetic force. Sometimes I think you actually do find yourself in that position. But I'm just wondering, you know, what? makes this different than previous efforts?

I would say it's a win-win because one, what makes it different is it nullifies an Iranian diplomatically. I see the Iranians coming out on top diplomatically in the MOU because of the hand-tying, because of the linkage of Lebanon to the Strait of Hormuz crisis, I see this as delinkage and freeing up Israeli hand. So that is my even, Stephen, at least diplomatically on paper, the Iranians got a win there. Now here's where we've been and we get the American, when we get the Israeli bin. Second is you're absolutely right. The history shows that this is probably not going to work out

because of the resolve of the actors on the ground. This is probably going to be something that goes to be kinetic. But that means that, hey, at least there's some kind of a legal, political attempt to resolve the situation without making things kinetic. And the third is, you know, the Lebanese government claims to want to do this. Let's transfer the burden on to them. You know, they want the Israelis out. They want the Hezbole issue deal with.

These, you know, sometimes are. are two sides of the same coin. Do you have the capacity? Do you have the capability? Do you have the wherewithal to do this? And then third, perhaps for the administration, who wanted at least, you know, the guns to file silent across the region, whether they're allies or adversaries, if the administration doesn't understand that there's ultimately going to have to be some kind of military force

used here, perhaps not by us, but by the Israelis. And they are looking to find any way to plug that hole. and if they try this and it fails, so perhaps that's a way to disabuse themselves of the fact that, hey, there is no military solution or there is no military option. Perhaps even this might be one way for themselves to say, hey, look, we tried.

You know, the challenge with the U.S., this is not the Trump administration, is that we oppress, we come to meet a whole host of problems and we treat them as fresh. And sometimes administrations replicate paths that previous other folks had gone down because they simply hadn't been the ones to try. Well, now the administration is the one to try, and we'll see how far the administration

gets, and we'll see how resolute the U.S. will be in trying to delink Lebanon from this MOU, and we'll see how resolute the Iranians are and trying to relink it. And perhaps there, in the crisis that emerges, we'll have the back of our ally on balance and we'll have the legal political understanding with our adversary. Yeah. No, look, I think you raised a really interesting kind of topic. line the point here, which is sometimes it seems we don't really learn from even recent history. And we'd also have this issue of every administration, well, frankly, every generation thinks that they can do whatever it was that was attempted before.

They can do it better. And that's not a bad thing. I think it's a, I think it's a, it's kind of a human trade. Maybe it's even more of an American trait that, you know, we will get this right this time, you know. It may not have worked before, but we're going to do it right. All you got to do is, you know, look at Afghanistan. you know, the follow-up after the Soviet Union, you know, abandoned Afghanistan,

which could have probably learned something there. But let me ask you this. To tie things up, I'm going to be mindful of time. This is pure speculation. I realize that. But, Ben, where do you think we're going to be at the end of this 60-day MOU period? I think certainly in the Levant's with Lebanon and Israel, I would say the situation would limp along. In the Strait of Hormuz, I'll say 60 to 80% of the traffic, which is close to what it is now restored,

but restored under a situation of crisis where the Islamic Republic is working kind of politically, legally, you know, with a knife in one hand, with a handshake in another, against individual tankers, against insurance companies, against the flags of certain vessels that try to create a new order for ships that are looking to enter and exit the Strait of Hormuz, but at the negotiating table, between Tehran, and Washington, you know, whether that's being hosted by the Qataris or the Pakistanis, which, you know, we didn't have time to get into, but they have their own tea to sink into this. I would say it's going to limp along, and that means that in all else equal, I think the administration is going to make a play to say, you know, we're quite close. We need a little bit more time

to negotiate. And I fear that they'll take the can down the road because it is written into the MOU that this is mutually extendable. And, you know, my fear is that the position, we're going to is that this is not the 2015 Obama era nuclear deal. The context is different, the relief is different, the situation is different, but this is looking like the negotiating period between the 2013 and 2015 deal, where that 2013 deal focused on one issue, this deal focuses on the Strait of Ormoves. There was limited sanctions relief there. There was limited sanctions relief here. And then that deal tried to carve out time and political space for a larger agreement. And now these folks might try to carve out time and political space for a larger agreement.

And I think even if you take a cynical approach by the administration and say, yeah, we'll do whatever it takes just to get to the midterms or just stabilize markets and get media to calm down while we build up on the munitions front, well, then you will have to take the can down the road because mid-August is when this 60 days is up. And I think August 21st is when the sanctions waiver is up. So keep your eyes on August. Yeah, yeah. I think you're right. You know, I would be in agreement with that assessment. I think that, but look, every administration has kicked again down the road when dealing with the Iranian regime. That to our point earlier about we don't seem to learn much from recent history, it's not uncommon. And, you know, the problem is nothing really changes. We just keep putting a Band-Aid on a sucking chest wound over all these years. Nothing really ever changes. in that part of the world until that regime just goes away. And of course, nobody's got a really good idea on how to make that happen other than just internal uprising that finally removes that regime. Just a brief footnote there.

What the president should do in these 60 days is really unleash the intelligence agencies, authorize them to come up with a defection strategy, authorize them to have a playbook for the next time the regime shuts down the that authorize them to actually have a way to materially support the Iranian protesters, if that's something that the administration wants to go down on. The country is a failed state anyway. It was sliding towards failed state status even before the protests, even before the war. So this will be an issue that raises its head for the Trump administration again.

Deal or no deal, war, no war. The question is, will we be ready for it? Well, Benham, as always, man, listen, thank you very much. the insight, the experience, really appreciate it. And I appreciate you taking the time here just before the 4th of July to join us here on the Situation Report. Look forward to seeing you again. Absolutely great to speak with you and happy for it.

Well, that is all the time that we've got for the PDB Situation Report this week. I know. Don't be sad, though. We will be back next week, as always. If you have any questions or comments, just reach out to me at PDB at the first. TV.com. You know what we do? Every month, we select some of your best questions. We mush them into a big episode that we call Ask Me Anything. You can get that. That's premium content just by becoming a premium member of the president's daily brief. Just go to PDB premium.com.

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