The Rest Is Politics: Leading - 118. Ex-Head of Mossad: Hamas, Ceasefire, and Netanyahu (Uzi Arad)

Episode Date: January 27, 2025

What’s the relationship between intelligence agencies and the politicians they serve? How does Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu react in a crisis? How confident should we be that the ceasefire will last? Alastair and Rory are joined by former Head of Mossad Intelligence and National Security Advisor to Benjamin Netanyahu, Uzi Arad, to discuss all this and more. TRIP Plus: Become a member of The Rest Is Politics Plus to support the podcast, receive our exclusive newsletter, enjoy ad-free listening to both TRIP and Leading, benefit from discount book prices on titles mentioned on the pod, join our Discord chatroom, and receive early access to live show tickets and Question Time episodes. Just head to therestispolitics.com to sign up, or start a free trial today on Apple Podcasts: apple.co/therestispolitics. Instagram: @restispolitics Twitter: @RestIsPolitics Email: [e-mail] Video Editor: Josh Smith Assistant Producer: India Dunkley + Alice Horrell Social Producer: Jess Kidson Producer: Nicole Maslen Senior Producer: Dom Johnson Head of Content: Tom Whiter Exec Producers: Tony Pastor + Jack Davenport Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Thanks for listening to The Restis Politics. Sign up to the Restis Politics Plus. To enjoy ad-free listening, receive a weekly newsletter, join our members chat room and gain early access to live show tickets. Just go to the restispolities.com. That's the restis politics.com. This is an interview where Alistra and I are interviewing Uziara, the former Israeli national security advisor. I think it's a fascinating interview. And I think it's an interview which will be interesting to all sites, to Israelis, to Palestinians. There will be a moment in the middle of it where he is giving a more conventional defense of the Israeli government position. Beyond that, if you listen on, he goes on actually to making some quite radical criticisms and coming up with a peace plan. So I think really worth listening to. Nobody's going to agree with all of it.

But I think it's a really good insight into the way that a very senior Israeli is thinking and the strength and weaknesses of all these different positions. Welcome to the rest of politics leading with me, Alistair Campbell. And with me, Rory Stewart. And we're very privileged to have with us today, Dr. Uzi Arad. Dr. Arad is an extraordinary commentator for us to have at this particular time because he was a long-term officer in Mossad, Israeli intelligence, ended up as director of intelligence, and then was the national security advisor for Israel for an earlier incarnation of

Benjamin Netanyahu. He is somebody who's also had an academic training and background, is profoundly interested in grand strategy and the theory of intelligence in the shape of the world, as well as, I guess, some of the most contemporary issues, such as what the options might be in Gaza and in the Middle East. So, Dr. Erid, thank you very much for joining us. Thank you. I'm glad to be here. We like to start off with, I guess, by asking them to tell us briefly about where they came from, their life, where they grew up, how they grew up, who they grew up with. So just give us a sense of what your early life was like and how that led you into the world that you then entered as an adult. Well, I was born in Israel, but my family came from Romania. And like all of us carry some kind of memories from the Second World War. This is noticeable here in London.

Everybody remembers the war. But for us, the war, of course, was the Holocaust. And my father was in the underground fighting against the fascists in Romania. He was captured. Some of his friends were executed. He spent three years in prison. They were a bad prison. I visited that place years later.

And then after the war, he was recruited to come to Israel. he was among those who fought in the War of 48, established a kibbutz, which is in immediate vicinity to Gaza now, one of those which were attacked, and he went to become a professor of education. My mother was with him in the same underground, and I was born when she was unwed at the early age of 17, and she had to infiltrate Palestine because immigration to Palestine was prohibited. So she was escorted across borders. So it is a typical Israeli story. Every one of us has his own peculiar, but we are all in a way, refugees one way or another.

During the war of independence, we had the kibbutz evacuated exactly that has happened now. The Syrian army was about to invade, the grown-up state to defend, and we children were taken amassed to Haifa for a full year. So I could be defined as a very early Palestinian internally displaced baby. Well, that's the origins. And Uzi, tell us a little bit about then what happened in your teenage years. And sorry, it's so slightly rude, but what dates are we talking about? When did you graduate from high school?

When did you go into university? You spent some time in the States as well, didn't you? Yes. Well, in the 50s, my family went to France, again on a mission to bring the Jewish communities from North Africa to Israel. And I was in southern France, and I liked to say that I lived in a chateau. Yes, I grew up in a chateau because that chateau was a military compound which was rented to the Jewish agency. And that's where it was as a kid. So I went to school with French kids, and this is perhaps what made me a francophile for you.

years. That was in the 50s. But I remember 56 very vividly, which was a joint British-French adventure. The Suez. The Suez. The Suez, yes. Then in the 60s, we returned to Israel. I went to a good school. But then again, my family moved to Mexico and I traveled with them and went to an American high school, a time by which I got to know America and the American scene of the 60s. Well, you do not remember of the America of the 60s. I do. When I came to Washington, there was this fascinating young president, John Kennedy, and I remember the day who was shot like everybody else. We all remember that day. I returned to Israel to serve in the army and served in the Air Force in a non-important job, and then went for my studies in America and chose to come to Princeton because

I intended to go into public affairs. When you became an intelligence officer, Mossad has always had this pretty fearful reputation. I don't mean fearful in a bad way, just that, well, for some people, maybe it is bad, I don't know. But we used to joke in government about how, you know, if something wasn't going quite well, we said, well, can't we get Mossad involved? Because what Mossad do? Now, I want to ask you, how did they build that reputation? Is it deserved that they were seen as this absolutely elite intelligence agency?

and how badly have the agencies in Israel been hit by October the 7th? Well, you know, I haven't had the privilege of working with most of the Western intelligence services. I've just been driving via Vauxhall Bridge just now. That's the British Secret Intelligence Service. We all know, you know, I've been coming to the Century House when it was nearby here. So I had the occasion to compare, say, the American intelligence service to the Israeli, to the French, to the German, even Russians we ran into. And they all have different cultures and reputations and standards.

And each one has its own. You know, intelligence services probably reflect the culture of their societies and their fortunes. They rise and fall with the performance of the nation at that point. Anyway, I could tell you about Mossad. Usually, unlike other members of similar organizations who go for the fun, and some go for the game, the big game, and some enjoy the exotica of espionage and the many exploits, most of the Israelis come there because of the simple understanding that it is a national security issue and that we're still in a struggle. And intelligence is just one branch which conducts and serves the nation's security. And if we do anything well at all, it is because with a seriousness and determination that

people have, we are not really excited by some of these adventures. And we also do not necessarily excel in everything. There are many things others are doing better, and sometimes we underperform. we are serious about our business. I think it's the seriousness that characterizes what we do. So was October the 7th seen as a real blow? Well, it is the worst. I mean to the reputation of the agencies. Well, not ours. It's the other agencies. The domestic? The domestic and the military, remember that within intelligence communities, there are rivalries, but we should not rejoice at the miseries of our colleagues because

in the first place, it was a severe blow because we were militarily attacked. Now, look, there is nothing in the encyclopedia of war and peace that is more cruel than to be first attacked because it's very unpleasant. The enemy has the initiative and the advantage. And then to be by surprise, it's deadly. It is a multiplier of your problems. And we were severely surprised and attacked brutally, savagely, to an extent that shocked many by the scope, by the audacity of the attackers and by the barbarism that they exhibited, which, of course, went to length of committing atrocities,

which do not shock us because of the extent of barbarism in them, but because it reflected hatred. It reflected the degree we are not very much liked in that neighborhood. So it's traumatic. Professionally speaking, we are now looking into the causes of this intelligence failure. And it is shaming because we failed as a result of some typical pathologies that afflict intelligence services. We did not have sufficiently good collection. We should have known better. we had the people who were not sufficiently well-trained in some key positions.

We entered a period in which there was a lot of people were not alert. We forgot lessons learned if ever, there were ever lessons learned. We forgot them. We had serious deficiencies in some critical part of the process, primarily between the intelligence and the policymakers. remember in the first few hours, our Prime Minister was completely isolated on his seaside town, not knowing what's happening. I mean, this is a total collapse of command and control. Incredible that it can happen in a country which sometimes has to take fatal decisions

like employing all kinds of munitions. And that's a glaring, glaring mistakes. So we are now in the process, I think, of, calling for a massive intelligence community reform, first to rectify the many things that were done wrong, and also adjust to the current situation because things have changed even in the world of intelligence and you practice intelligence and you produce intelligence differently today than we used to in the past. But I think we are recovering. You could see that in some operations we had good intelligence and sometimes even surprisingly good intelligence.

Well, that's life. See, I remember Jake Sullivan, the U.S. National Security Advisor, said just before October the 7th, that the Middle East had never been so peaceful. And in fact, it was reflecting the fact that in his perception, in the three, four years before October the 7th, people really did think that the region was relatively calm. Can you talk a little bit about that period four, five years before October 7th and why somebody like Jake Sullivan would have perceived it as a very calm period? Well, I don't blame Sullivan for that, because that attitude was also shared by other Israelis. They were complacent. I think it was a failure, a profound failure,

of the understanding of the situation. I've always believed. that our condition, the Israeli condition, is very fragile. Israel is not a solid being, which stands on pillar of security, which give us sufficient strength so as to maintain stability, and neither do other states. Behind the facade of sometimes of status quo or relative to equality, the elements of instability, the elements of conflict which could erupt, and the weaknesses that and vulnerabilities that call for such action are many. So I always, always thought that this is a high-risk area. In fact, I said it so in a few words. I said it even to National Security Advisor today that I think that he is serving during the most difficult and

perilous period in Israel's history. And that was told him to his face four days before October 7. Was he going back to a remarkable moment in your career where you went suddenly into this incredible role of being the National Security Advisor? Can you tell us a little bit about that moment in history, what it was like taking over that role, what your responsibilities were and how you saw the world at that time? Well, I was recruited by Netanyahu. from my position as Director of Intelligence, I wanted to retire and go and have a great time on some American campus. And I asked for early retirement, but I was declined. He said, I will not approve your early retirement. I need you here. So I became his foreign policy advisor because at

that time there was no such position. Immediately it became clear that it is a very high-risk position to be in. And you constantly have the feeling that on your shoulders rests a degree of responsibility, which is greater than, say, my other friends, colleagues in the same position, because none of those people in the same position in other countries, although they dealt with extremely complicated global issues, but they were not facing a situation in which their countries was exposed immediately to hostile. election, some of which very close to its borders, and some of which could be very, very dangerous. The agenda then was Iraq 2003, but the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program were watched

and we view that as a high-risk issue, that Iran was already preparing something was evident also at the time. And I was involved working with. allies, America, primarily Britain and others, on stopping leakage of missile technology to Iran and nuclear, and that was at that time. All these things occupied our attention. And at the same time, the two other risks, the Islamic terrorist violent type, which develops in all kinds of varieties. Call it Hamas, call it Daesh, call it that it's there, and the ever-present conflict we have with our Palestinian neighbors. And all these very, very complicated. And I did it with a sense of, I wouldn't say timidity, but I was so glad that the responsibility was not on me.

I was just an advisory. You've worked both inside an agency, Mossad, and then you've also been a political, part of a political operation as an advisor to the Prime Minister. And Ned Njahou, this is what a survivor is. He was Prime Minister when Tony Blair first arrived in 1997, and that's kind of the time that you were starting with him as well. What would you say about the interface between politics and intelligence? Having seen it from both sides, as it were, how would you describe that relationship and that interface? Well, you know, it's very interesting that in the past, let's call it this difficulty, the tension or the difficulty that prevail between the top consumers of intelligence, the leaders and the providers of intelligence, was known to be of a certain kind. Today, it takes

many, many, many, forms to give you just one example. It is not only that intelligence is something, politicized by the politicians, and therefore it is no longer objective and truthful. And as we say, it's not saying things like they are. But sometimes there is intelligence to please, and sometimes that there is intelligence which is demanded, as happened in 2003. But in our case, we have different types. We have, for example, in America and in Israel, a condition in which the elected political leaders hate and resent their intelligence communities. It's an adversarial

relationship. And I was talking just to a colleague, what do we do? And how can we provide our political masters with the intelligence that they need, which should be honest and truthful, irrespective of whether it pleases or not? But at the same time, we know that they think that we are trying to sabotage their policies or that we hostile to them, and therefore they suspect us, and sometimes they even undercut us. What do we do? Rebell? We cannot rebel. What do we do? This is a situation that the American intelligence community is facing, has faced from Trump primarily, and now we have with Netanyahu a very awkward situation to be in. But it's there. The effect of the The effects of politicization are many, and ideally, they should be prevented at all cost.

The whole value of intelligence in its being truthful. Two quick questions on this. I think the first one is, why is it that somebody like Netanyahu or Trump is mistrustful of the intelligence community? And the second question is, what did you learn working with Netanyahu of the way that he works in a crisis? how does he function in a crisis? These are two separate questions, but it's extremely important in today's life. In the case, Netanyahu, well, in the first place, let me tell you, that there is a grain of truth. When he suspected that some, say, generals who then headed the intelligence were telling him things that were motivated by political consideration rather than being professional, he was right.

because some of them were aspiring future politicians. He was talking to a guy whom he knew in two years' time will shed his uniform and run on the early elections against whom, against his prime minister. So how can he relate to him knowing that? And that's a complication. Are we talking barrack here? No, not necessarily Barack.

We're talking in this particular case, I saw it in action. when Amno Lipkin, Shachak, a very distinguished man and an honest man, but still we all knew that in a matter of two years he will retire from the military, join the opposition, and lead the campaign against Netanyar. Now, Netanyar sits on the other side of the table, looks at him and cannot help but wonder to what extent this man is once in my success. There are other things. Sometimes the politicians do not like have intelligence that tells them that their policies are wrong.

They think they are trying to defeat their policies. But even if they are not trying to defeat their policies, they are just pouring, you know, water, cold water on some of those political aspirations. They are treated with dislike. They don't like to have that. So they develop an antagonism there. and sometimes they prefer among the analyst those whose views resemble theirs. Netanyahu once explained why he chose me. By the way, I voted against him and he knew it.

So I took it to his credit that he chose me, confided in me, knowing that I voted for his opponent. That to me was a mark of a, of a, you know, a guy. But then it turned that when he explained why he chose me, He said that on one occasion, he alone was within the group who had a different view from the intelligence. And I was the only one who voiced the same view that he had. That's why he noticed me. So there you go. I think that his memory is not correct, but who cares?

The point is that there is this built in tension between, and again, it's not black and white. It's not the politician who is corrupt in a sense of departs from the truth and the professional and the intelligence people are honest. Sometimes you're the other way around. Before you get on to what he's like in a crisis, can I just drill down on this? Because one of the points at which you sort of broke with Netanyahu was over the Iran deal and you ended up being pretty critical of him. Is he like Trump when you turn against him?

Is he somebody who wants vengeance against people who turn against him? Not in my case. He was, I think, disappointed. He expected me to support him no matter what. He expected me to have gratitude to the fact that he appointed me twice that I would not position myself with those who took issue with him. And when he noticed that, he looked sad and disappointed, rather than vindictive or anything of that kind.

He became vindictive after that when I criticized what had happened to be and that is complicity in some of the defense corruption problems that we've had. But yes, I told him I tended my resignation. Can you just remind us of the policy issues? What is it that you felt so strongly about that you felt that you should resign and speak at? You don't believe that.

And he couldn't believe it either. He thought that I was a Boy Scout, that I was just a purist. The first issue became one in which there was a decision by him and the defense minister to call on some kind of a so-called countdown in anticipation of an attack on Iran, a military attack. And he had ordered this countdown to take place, which is a reversible process. It does not mean that a decision has been taken. but sometimes you have to start making the necessary preparations well in advance in accordance with a certain protocol so that you would have the option should you wish so at the time and all would be ready.

So he ordered such can'town. I asked him whether that was reversible. He said, of course, it would be reversible. Yet I thought it was uncalled for. And besides, he did not do it as according to the Israel. law on the War Powers Act. Activities of that kind of thing have to be approved by the cabinet. And he did it without such approval. Now, my capacity as his head of the National Security Council was that decisions were taken appropriately, legally, but not because of the legality of it.

because these were lessons learned how one should proceed with such decisions, and he shortcuted those decisions. So I told him, you're acting against the law, against the law, indeed the extent to which it regulates decisions of that kind. And that, of course, offended him. And what offended him, plus, is that the head of the security services, the chief of staff, and the head of the Mossad, all three also. opposed that position. So I became, against my will, an additional member of the Gang of Four.

The Gang of Four, Barack called us like that, and it was a deadly thing to be called. You've been actually quite sympathetic towards some of Netanyahu's positive qualities, but I'd be interested in your describing how he works in a crisis and what the positive and negative aspects of his personality there are? You know, there have been psychological and biographic profiles of Netanyahu, and most of those who wrote them did notice that at times of stress, at times of crisis, he usually has a built-in type of reaction, which usually, if it really hits him by surprise, if it is something that is not anticipated at all, in which you have to make quick decisions,

and in which you have very, very important issues at stake, he usually panics in a sense, but that panic takes the form of exaggerating the threat. To give you just one silly example, when COVID came on the scene, one day he appeared on television and said, you know, with a very, very stern face, that that pandemic could kill half of humankind.

Now, half of humankind, where did he get that? You know, half of humankind. Apparently, somebody told him about the exponential nature of that thing, but not realizing that it does not go indefinitely. So for a few hours, he really believed that this is, okay, but he was quickly corrected. But on other issues, his first reaction is to inflate the threat. So as to collect himself the own,

strength to confront this big, big, big threat of any kind. It could be a financial crisis. And then the reaction is hyperactivity. He starts micromanaging. And also going for the big, big things. He needs either super tankers to fight fire and to throw money, big money, believing that if you throw big money and something, it's a solution to big problems. So these are all tendencies of his at the time of crisis, and you have to help him sometimes

by telling him to be quiet, we're doing the job, and allow him to get out of this moment. The same had happened on October 7th. We'll come back to October 7th. Just tell me this about Netanyahu. What is it that makes him such a survivor? I mentioned that he was in power when we first got into power in 1997, and okay, he's been in an out of power, but he's there again. We thought he was going to get him over corruption. We thought they were going to get him over the Supreme Court and the reforms and the big protests that were

going. He survived so many difficult moments. So what did you see in him that you can recognize they're the qualities that made him above all a survivor? Well, more than a survivor. To the extent that he confronts problems, they are often his own doing and they are the product of his weaknesses. For example, the corruption, he cannot blame the corruption somebody else. Neither can he blame others for his choice of wife. He has some weaknesses. But at the same time, he survives because he's strong and he's a combative and he's intelligent and he's a consummate politician and he knows how to pull the levers of political power,

be it electorally or politically, and he has stamina in him, and besides he has no alternative. So all this is making him fighting to such an extent. The interesting thing is, which is also the case with Trump, narcosists do not take easily the fact that they've been defeated. They need a second chance, a comeback. Now, in the case of American presidents in which the terms are regulated, I don't know what precedents you have to this one in which you have a president who lost,

went into, say, the wilderness, only to come back. Why does he want to come back? He had it already. Well, he wants to come back because he wants to something. Netanyahu, it was clear to all who knew his personality that once he was defeated in 99 by young Barack, he couldn't help himself. he had to have a comeback. And he did it.

And he explained it. I have a mission to say. He said, I'm not there because I need to have a V on my CV to show that I've been prime minister. I did it. But I have a mission to accomplish. He convinces himself that he is a blessing to the country and that he has a mission to accomplish. And that what strives him. Now, that may be true or was true.

But now his problem is to escape punishment. So he has to stay in power because as an incumbent, he can avoid the legal procedures that any normal citizen would have to go through. And besides, people say, enjoys the difficulties of political life to the boredom of the absence. He's got nothing else to do. And on top to that, by the way, he's aging. and with age come health problems. So I would not be surprised if one other thing that would affect his decision to stay or leave would be his health problems. International listeners don't completely understand this question around a corruption.

So we interviewed Ehud Olmert. We've heard about corruption allegations around Netanyahu. Can you explain what these allegations are and how seriously people are supposed to take them? Because, of course, he himself says this is nonsense. Well, he would, wouldn't he? We can be very, very factual about it. I don't have to tell you about the similar incidents of corruption that have happened here in England, or some well-documented I'm talking about, or elsewhere. There are two types of things he were guilty of. One is of benefiting in some way, in an illicit way, from his position. And this is usually when you get, you

take bribes, or you get gifts, or you have other things, and that is a thing that is not permissible. And it is illegal, and it's criminal. But in Netanyahu's thing, something had came on this, and that was that some of this corruption took place in the procurement issue, in defense. Now, it's a whole different when, say, a corrupt leader gives certain licenses to real estate, Nobody really gets hurt by that. You know, it's a breach of trust, it's not elegant, but exactly, you can't say that the average guy is adversely affected by the fact that some licenses were given to a certain trader.

But when it comes to national defense, when it comes to the domain in which there is a contract between the citizens and the leaders, this is their very existence. when it talks about the acquisition of submarines, which are the most expensive war machine that men had invented, and which it involves submarines of the kind that we purchased in Germany. In the past, we used to buy them in England, but in Germany, which presumably were the spearhead of our national security, to be involved in that kind of thing when your closest aids or your criminal,

are benefiting financially from making those deals, that to me is not pardonable. Now, when you have leaders committing crimes of this nature, you enter the field that is already called grand corruption. This grant here is well tailored with grand strategy. There is a grandness to this, but the problem with grants corruption is that unlike any other field of corruption. Lesser officials cannot use their power to distort the legal procedures, to fire the prosecutors, to go after the courts, to select the juries. This is not the case when the leader himself is the head of the police indirectly. And when it happens at that level,

you cannot really take action. That is why all incidents of grant corruption that we know of were not in the defense area. There are only two instances of the many scandals that they know that went up as high up as to the number one, in South Africa, in the purchase submarines, and in Israel. Here in England, it's ministers, in Greece, it's usually ministers of defense, top generals, but the big ones stay away.

The Berluscones of this world, they go into other fields which are no less lucrative. Netanyahu got implicated in defense, and to me, not only to me, that's a weakness, a moral weakness, and it's very, very grave. We have to say, in his defense, he hasn't yet launched his own Bitcoin

and made billions in a few days on the back of it and said that it's just peanuts. But anyway, we'll part of that there. Can we go back to October the 7th and actually bring it forward to the ceasefire? I know you weren't directly involved, but from your experience, both alongside a prime minister and as part of Mossad, give us your sense of how that might have been put together. Who was involved?

What the sort of process would have been that led while this horrific war was going on that led to that ceasefire? Well, it's very interesting to look even to watch how it evolved over time. It started very badly, as you know, to such an extent, as some people that said, Israel was traumatized and the early decision-making was affected by this shock, what had happened to us. As I said, the degree, it's not only the barbarism, but the scope, the number of people had been killed on the first day, all civilians, women, children, and the numbers and the fact that Israel territory was invaded. and their ambition was to reach very far, and it was done almost jointly from all fronts. The Hezbollah, after the north, started to bombard our villages.

Then the Iranians led indirect, but they also fired a few things. So at certain moments, we were attacked from all directions at the same time. That's a nightmare. Now, the Israeli reaction followed three steps, which led ultimately to the ceasefire. The initial one was defensive to blunt the invasion and to turn them out. It took a few days in which many died gallantly. The valor of the Israeli reservists who all flocked to the South, took up their arms, and on their own initiatives without command, they all met, essentially, until the military,

and at one point there were no one left in occupation of, the Israeli villages or Kibbutzim or settlements. But at that very moment, we already started to attack from the air. And air attacks have a limited purpose, but they already cause damage. The collateral damage involved in that is always there. So although we attacked from the air, the Hamas targets, there already was a beginning of what would amount to a pretty heavy punishment. And it took a few days more for us to go on the offensive, namely to prepare, because they were not even prepared the plans for how to enter the Gaza Strip with which forces, according to which plan, and we started

the grand maneuver, so to speak. And it went on and on and on, and it became very prolonged because this is urban warfare, and we all know from other examples that there are no easy way of it and you have to go after them individually. We were surprised by the scope of the tunnels, although we knew, but little did they know how extensive they were. We were surprised by some of their munitions. We had many small surprises, but this was done systematic, but at the same time, almost four days into the war, the question begged itself whether we should open a second front with the North. And some people had proposed because we knew that we had as contingency plans some of those jazzy means that we employed this booby-trap communication gear that essentially

decimated their command structure. So the option was to do it right away at the beginning. We would have succeeded in some extent, but the decision was taken not to, so it's not to spread ourselves too thin because we really stretched. So first concentrated on the South. In the interim, Iran at one point challenged us directly with those missile, ballistic missiles, barrage. And they were disabused of what they thought they scored very little, turned out our defenses intercepted much of what they did. But still, one cannot take away from them that they attacked directly with heavy missiles, hoping to create large damage again to Israeli population centers and especially to certain targets. So that was a very complicated thing. But what brought about

the ceasefire is that dimension that no one attracted into it. The hostage-taking business. hostage taking is a worldwide practice today done by criminal organizations or terrorist organizations. We are not the only one to be subject to that. It was part of their plan to take hostages. Again, elderly, young, women and so. They abused them terribly while they were in captivity. And the issue of bringing about the release of those hostages became the driving factor. With the passage of time, that is the single issue that brought about this ceasefire. The desire of the other side to stop our offensive against them and for us to have our hostages back, those alive alive. So that's led to what is essentially an interim agreement, a ceasefire and not a final cessation of the hostilities.

Issy, the big fact of the scale of destruction in Gaza, the 46,000 deaths, the 60% of the building's gone, those images that you and I would have been looking at over the last few days of what Gaza looks like, the scale of that destruction and the International Criminal Court rulings, the challenges now coming from so many countries against Israel. I mean, I can understand very strongly the trauma that, Israel feels that you feel. But have you found a way of also talking about or thinking about what people in Gaza feel and the trauma that they've experienced since? Of course. Of course. Listen, we are close. This is a reality. What Gaza is like is not a new thing to us. Who are the people there we know? The politics and the history of what has happened is clear. And the kind of condition that those people are going through, one can imagine more than you think. Sometimes we take into Israeli hospitals, people who are brought from Gaza, discreetly, to be operated in Israel and so forth, the human condition, the desperation, the destruction,

the pain. One doesn't have to have a big imagination to know what's going on. But let's understand what is happening here. In the first place, it is the deliberation. strategy of the Hamas to use those people as human shields. That is to say, instead of making it sure that their civilian population is immune or protected and taken away, they do the exact opposite. They place their facilities within those populated centers. They place their command position in hospitals, expecting us that because it is a hospital, we won't touch that.

So in a way, they are deliberately exposing them to danger, and that confronts you with a choice. What are you to do? What are you to do, for example, if suppose you are a policeman and somebody stands ahead of you, holding a hostage to protect his body, and says, there I go, don't touch me. Well, as we've seen in films and also in history, sometimes people say, okay, we will not touch you and you'll get away with it because others might be hurt. But sometimes you take the risk. I mean, I think we obviously are not going to completely get to the bottom of this issue. But I guess many people will feel that they can understand better the early stages of the conflict.

but after this number of people have been killed, Ismail Hania has been killed, Shina has been killed, Shina has been killed, Hisbalah has been crippled. I suppose the question is, why did it continue so long and why is there many people in Israel saying we want to go back to war again? Because the sensation is, when can this stop? I mean, what's the end state? What's the point at which this can finish? It should be finished, obviously. but let me explain the thing that one has to focus the question a little bit in a wider scope. It is not just the two first days in which the Hamas committed those atrocities.

Not at all. For the last a year and almost a half, the Hezbollah and others were daily bombarding Israeli cities, settlements, population. were daily death of children, women, civilians in Israel, all those throughout the war, until the very last day, even the last hour before the ceasefire went to effect, they still fired a symbolic missile at Tel Aviv. So it is an artificial and wrong editing of the situation as if attacking civilians and causing death and destruction was confined by the Hamas only the first two days, or as we, when in fighting for the duration, were causing more damage in Gaza. True, this is what we did in Gaza.

But that was done, and you should have been in Israel, to see it, when at the very same days, again, civilians in Israel. And the misery among those Israelis displaced, there are hundreds of thousands of homes were burned, businesses were burned, farms who were burned, they are inhospitable now, neither in the north nor in the south. There are all people who are now, as I said, internally displaced. And the fact that civilians were targeted, you see, in our case, our account is that this is collateral damage. we were not after civilian, certainly not after babies and that. Yes, the commanders, yes. But that was decapitation. Decapitation as a process is understood. And, you know, why did somebody go after bin Laden? Although sometimes you hold the heads responsible, particularly when it comes to those.

That's another issue. When you talk about the civilian population in Gaza, this is very much collateral damage, should have been avoided, can be avoided, and hopefully we will not return to this kind of condition which coerces us to go and confront this difficult situation. Just on that, though, is you just listening to you explain that. There is a danger, though. You said earlier that Israel's a democracy. You had a dispute with Netanyahu because you felt that he was making decisions that weren't necessarily governed by Israeli law. Whereas on the other side, you're talking about what you might say, a combination of terrorist organizations and political rogues, as it were.

I'm sure you don't want to have that sense of moral equivalence. But looking from here, and I accept we're not in Israel, and I can imagine how horrific it has been to be in Israel. But when you do see the state of Gaza now, it's very hard. to hold on to the idea that Netanyahu and his team were sitting there with regard to the humanitarian effects of what they were doing. But in a sense, they saw, right, the whole of Gaza is basically attacking us. The whole of Gaza is Hamas. But you and I know that's not the case. Yes, again, I grant you, I understand what you're saying, and I understand, why are you saying that?

I can understand. I'm trying to tell you what it looks from Israel's point of view, because again, you're not looking at the full scope. The full scope is look at how Metula, the city, why don't you go and film Metula? Metula is completely destroyed like Gaza, except that there were villas and not this kind of dense part. Or the city of Kiriat Shmona.

Entire cities have been burned and leveled off. and in the south you have at least four areas of urban which are about the size of Gaza. But somehow it is the concentration of people in Gaza which has been watched. We have civilians hurt at the same time. And again, in our case, those civilians were deliberately targeted as such. And there is another thing, Rory, I want to tell you. Look at the context. somebody had made the statistic that is, I don't know if you thought that in the course of one day on that early October 7th, we lost a number of fatalities that we've never had in one single day in our entire history.

Only the time of the Holocaust, you had that number as a daily production, death production. But remember, again, what memory this evoke. the Hamas are not saying that and they do not do that because they say we have an issue with Israel or because it is the occupation. They say we are here to see Israel destroyed. I hate to see that. But this is what the Iranians say they call for our complete demise. It is not even the kind of evil that Churchill had said about the Germans should they

ever invade Britain. The expectation was not to destroy Britain and its population. Here you have people who ideologically mean what they say. They would like us as a collective entity and its individuals to vanish. And they affected a very brutal offensive of a limited nature, which they thought was conducive to that future option. We failed to deter them from that kind of attack. Now, should they want a repeat, they would have to factor into that the price tag is at least on the same order of magnitude

as the one exacted now. Okay, let's just take a quick break. Hey, this is Michael and Hannah from Gollhangers, The Rest is Science. This episode is brought to you by Cancer Research, UK. We often think of beating cancer as treatment, but imagine stopping it before it begins. After years of work, Cancer Research UK scientists are launching a clinical trial of lung Vax, the first vaccine designed to prevent lung cancer. It builds on TracerX, the world's largest cancer evolution study, which tracked lung cancer

cells over many years to uncover the disease's earliest warning signs. Lung Vax is designed to train the immune system to spot these sites. early on, destroying 40 cells before cancer develops. So it's not treatment, but preventative with the potential to stop lung cancer before it starts. The first stage of the trial starts this year focusing on people at higher risk. It shows what long-term research makes possible. For more information about Cancer Research UK, their research breakthroughs and how you can support them, visit cancerresearchuk.org forward slash the rest.

is science. Hi, everybody. It's Dominic Samarach here from The Rest is History. Now, some of you may have heard me on your show, The Rest is Politics, when Rory was away and I was filling in and enjoying Alastair Campbell's tremendous banter. And I'm back to tell you about our new series on The Rest is History, which is all about Britain in the 1970s, a period with a lot of uncanny resemblances to our own. So right now we're living through a moment when oil shocks generated by war in the Middle East are rippling through the world economy

when Britain feels like it's sunk in a bit of a malaise people are arguing about Europe the government has got a few issues with the trade unions and we have a kind of I suppose you'd say governing elite a kind of political class that is really struggling to come to terms with all of these issues and people are asking if Britain is governable at all

so there are a lot of parallels between that Britain that I'm describing which is our Britain and the Britain of the mid-1970s. So in this series that's coming out on the rest is history, we'll be looking at these and other issues. We'll be talking about the rise of Margaret Thatcher, obviously a colossal figure in our political life even now, whether you love her or loathe her.

We'll be talking about the very first Brexit referendum of 1975, a subject that I'm sure Rory and Alistair will have strong opinions about. We'll be talking about the fall of the Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson, and we'll be talking about one of the grimest moments in Britain's economic history, the moment in 1976 when we had to go cap in hand, as people said at the time, to the International Monetary Fund, the IMF, for a then record bailout. Now, if that sounds good to you, how could it not sound good to you? Of course it sounds good to you.

We have a clip for you to listen to at the end of this episode. And if you want to hear more, just search for The Rest is History, wherever you get your podcasts. Back in a minute. Let's fast forward to the future. So one proposal for what can happen now, if the ceasefire is successful, hostages returned,

humanitarian access happens, one proposal, which you and I have discussed in the past, is that the Palestinian Authority, not Hamas, but Fatah, moves into Gaza, that there will be some elements of Hamas, who will still be in Gaza, that they will be supported to try to establish Palestinian control in Gaza, maybe supported by Egypt or UAE or Saudi. Can you talk me a little bit about this scenario? What is this vision? What are the advantages and disadvantages? Do you think this is practical?

What are the political challenges around it? Just so people can understand what options you think there are for Gaza now. As you know, this is a very fluid time, and there's certainly room and need for action by leaders and by people capable of affecting action. And there are many, many possibilities, and they're all extremely complicated because of the microeconomic or the micro-political difficulties that each one has in terms of practicality. But on the whole, in very simplistic terms, there is a course of action which would be positive, and that is, possibly through the benefit of other actors from the Middle East, a process would be put in place in which order would be restored to Gaza. A leadership that would come and be responsible for the

Gazaan interests should be come from the Palestinian Authority, whoever the Palestinian Authority elects, hopefully responsible people who do have national positions and aspirations, of course, why not? But they should not be Hamas, not because the Hamas is some kind of a label, but because Hamas by its very principle does not call for a resolution of the conflict. It calls for the destruction of Israel. They do not see that their being there would be as part of a party that would do anything but call for action to bring about Israel's destruction. So you're not bringing into the leadership a kind of a poisonous pawn, but if they renounce, for example, if they just did the neat thing that leaders have done in history,

you know, former terrorist who employed terrorism and were brutal and everything, then upon the changing circumstances and came involved, said, OK, the role of violence has ceased. Now I'm part of another process. And I do not renounce, but I'm in favor of peace. What kind of peace? Suppose it is the long formula, the old formula, which is two entities, which is the one of partition.

That has always been, since the British mandate and since the UN decision, always, whenever they came to finding a formula, how to settle the issue between the rivals for sovereignty over Palestine or the Holy Land, it was one of partitioning along the lines of demography. Sometimes, and that has been the case. Today, this is called the two-state solution. Today, it rests on the United Nations Security Resolution 242, which said essentially that one should go back to approximately the 67 borders.

But let me add you a very creative idea that had been injected, that if there would be some Israeli who would hold on to territories that were occupied in 67, there would be a swap so that if we take some land, we'll also give some land, that principles had been inserted by Clinton and is a possibility. So essentially there would be this. One could adjust the borders to the current realities. One could arrive at all the stages that the Oslo process in its various configurations

as late as Annapolis about 15 years ago. To have final borders declared, to have a peace between the two parties, and to have a normal relationship. That is not, you know, a pipe dream. Now, one should work toward that, that possibility. I think that the Israeli government would go for it. Yes, we have some extreme fringe in Israel, which is always less than 10%, which have either messianic ideas that they believe that they're not really influenced by realities.

And they would like to annex. Okay, so, but they've never been the majority, far from it, and they've never been even seriously considered. At this moment, they emit some voices. But when reality comes in, Netanyahu himself, throughout his career, when he dealt with certain efforts, he talked about another entity. He called it a state minus. And he meant that the Palestinians would have a state, but possibly demilitarized.

But there is open-mindedness, and this is what we ought to do. So, Rory, I think that, first, on the inclusion of Hamas, it would be self-defeating. That's the point. We should not take that as a reality because it would ruin the process from the start. It should be the Palestinians, and they should be as demanding as they can, and they should feel as nationalistically as they can. And we know some of them. And they do have people who care for their own interest. And this should be nerdy. The creativity should come from the fact that now we have a constellation in the Middle East in which other participation could assist that process, ranging from the local partners in the Middle East who have normalized their relationship with Israel, all the way to involvement of other interested parties, which often involved the United States, Europe. We've had such international involvement throughout because of the significant. of the Middle East. So all help would be welcome, I think. Thank you so much for your time,

Uzi. And I want to, my final kind of little set of questions. First of all, are you reasonably confident that this current ceasefire agreement can and will hold? Do you think we will get anywhere near that two-state solution that you talk about in your lifetime? And my final point, if that presumably does have to be an election eventually in Israel, who would win it? Well, no, I'm not sure that this hostage issue would be fully resolved. And the built-in problems are there that even with that malice, there is a chance that it will not be consummated, and therefore it could collapse under its own weight.

So we have to brace ourselves and hopefully, the best and try to help this happen. But should it be concluded, then of course one would have to move on from where we stand and it is extremely difficult to affect this process. Much depends on the role that the United States would choose to act. Will it succeed? Well, if nothing is done, then a war would be resumed. This is the natural product of no action. You know, need active intervention to sustain stability and to move on a very fragile and a very thin ice to move forward, each time overcoming the complications. Now, things that have been done before. In our history, we've done many, many frustrating experiences, but we've had some good ones.

And, you know, history, I did not expect the peace with Egypt. You know, when Sadat was assassinated, I was having lunch with the American CIA station chief in Israel. We were both surprised. But look at the surprises. First, the peace with Egypt, just a few years before came as a surprise, a pleasant surprise, an important surprise. But so was the assassination of the architect of that piece, of Sadat, Huay, Islamists. So all these spoilers and all these things happen. And we have them around. So we need luck and also creativity and the usage of interests and the judicious employment of leverages and enticement and all that. And we can move on to have a positive resolution of the Israeli-Palestin issue. It is in Israel's absolute interest

to resolve its crisis and century-old dispute with the Palestinians. And BB survival? Well, you know, there is a race here. I used to say back in 2015, people were concerned what will happen if you'll get elected. I said, if he gets elected, that increases his chance of being re-elected after that. Each time, its chances increase. because incumbency has its advantages. So in effect, I said,

prepare for BB as Prime Minister in perpetuity. So my audience was shocked. I myself, if that think, I mean, I don't take myself that seriously, but it turns out that I was coming to being close. But no, he'll depart from the scene sooner or later. There are come variations. He could withdraw

out of his own volition because he would be exhausted but he could also fight it out because he believes that he still can and even be good for the nation he could be chased out by the criminal investigations that are afflicting him

he could lose his support from his base because the base is eroding and it takes a BB to defeat BB There is no opposition. One of the problems we have in Israel is deficit in leadership. None of the leaders of the opposition has the stature, the background, and the political strength of BB. And that's his success because he essentially neutralized them all. That's his political savvy.

But he will have to leave the scene. At the moment, he is really causing more damage than Israel than good. but he's still there, and he still feels that he has other battles to win, not only the one to stay in office. He still wants to see us addressing the Iranian threat, which he believes is no less a peril to Israel than other things. So we have to wait and see, but there is an end to that story. Two quick last questions from me then. First one, what do you mean when you say Bibi is doing harm? What is it that he's doing which is harmful in terms of Israel? direction of the month. You see, when he appointed as the Minister of the National Security,

this person who is called Ben Gvier, by all accounts, he knew who he was. Israel is a small place. We know all each other. We are very incestuous. We all know each other. This guy is a thug. He's a clown. He is a provocateur. You don't do that. It is a mark of utter irresponsibility to the nation. to give the portfolio of national security to this kind of a guy. He did it only because he needed this man's votes for his own personal staying.

But that is a damaging thing that he did. He knew he bought. The man has corrupted the police. He started to appoint his own kind. He's a man who's been convicted, scores of time. This is not just, you know, an omission

the margins. This is an act. I would, you know, it comes close to, I don't know, reckless. I think, you know, we used to refer to Caligula's appointing his horses as senators as to be a kind of a metaphor to what Bibi might do. But, you know, Caligula's horses were not damaging the state. Benfir has pure damage to Israel's interest and he knew it. So in that sense, he's doing it. So in that sense, he's damage. Another thing is that it was evident that he was prolonging the war, although it could have been stopped earlier, because it served his political interest. And even the case of the method of negotiating for the hostages release was affected by some considerations of his own political expediency. This is pure damage to Israel's national, to Israel itself, and he's

guilty of that. Okay, my final question then. Reflecting on styles of national security advisors, I wonder whether you could reflect on the difference between Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance as models of how you do the job of a national security advisor. All these characters who have become typical bureaucrats in the modern age sometimes compare themselves one to another, All countries have those kind of guys which do the thing. And they often refer to the big examples that we know in the American case, although I take interest in the British as well. And of course, they are different.

And also my French friends and my European friends, you all have them. Kucinger was a certain type of national security type. He was extremely active. He was first national security advisor, then he moved to the State Department and became minister. Secretary of State. And he liked to play the game of countries. You know, he was a student of Metternich and European history, and he liked all those machinations. By the way, he is the grandest strategist of them all. And when he writes, he writes historical grand history,

and nobody writes like Kissinger. Cyrus Vance wouldn't be able to write even a chapter, But he was a superb lawyer, an extremely straight shooter and very direct, very correct. The prototypical legally trained then with defense and foreign affairs. So they're completely different. But if you asked me, I got to know many of them, but I also knew the history of. I regarded as the best national security advisor that America had Brent Scrowcraft, which was a man who was managing things from behind, doing things quietly, doing the necessary staff work, not trying to play himself, being at the margins,

but doing a good service to the president and the national security machinery that makes decision. So Scraft was my example as the effective NSE. Now, I don't know the guy who's in, that would be an interesting thing. Trump had experimented with some. But the British, well, you know about so much better, but there are also some formidable characters whom I admired greatly. I just wanted to just catch you on the kissing thing, because I don't know whether you're prepared to repeat it on the podcast,

but you were very interesting about the question of being too clever by half and telling one story to one person. another to another and why that goes wrong. This comes into the ethics and the practice and theory of how to work with partners, allies, and so forth. Usually, assumably partners and allies are friends of yours, not enemies. The common is greater than the different. And the thing that you share, interests are more than the ones you have in dispute.

So basically, the attitude should be one of being coer. honest, direct, and act loyally as you should, as allies should, and that is also true on the level of the functionaries themselves. But everyone is in a while,

it so appears, that Machiavellian considerations and the values of deceit and not telling the truth and deceiving one another enter into play. And some even prosper in using that because there are some

advantages to hiding from one another, not trusting one another, as well as there are disadvantages in being too confiding and trusting, because then you are duped. I've always thought that one should give a chance to being innocent, naive, and direct, and honest, even at the expense of your own interest. For example, whenever we were meeting with some of our American friends after something went wrong, we were quick and I insisted on admitting our mistakes. Well, why should you not do it? We got something wrong. We filed up something. So say it. There is no penalty in saying that. But be truthful. Be surgically correct. You gain more by that. then by trying to cover or deceive or do that. And in many, many cases I found the this of management of either relationships,

personal or institutional, is advantageous. It pays off. Although, there are always exceptions. When the exception becomes president of the United States twice, then it has a big effect on the world. Well, you know, the Trump period, I don't know how to look at it. Is it the kind of world we're getting into, which would be affected by so many eccentricities and things of that? I don't know.

I hope it is the exception from the historical rule, and we'll go back sometimes to the more boring world in which, you know, things are within boundaries. Well, listen, thank you so much for your time. It's been great to talk to you. Thank you very much. All the best. Thank you, Uzi, very much. I hope you enjoy the play this afternoon, and thank you for sparing the time. Oh, yeah. I do look forward to enjoy the play and the rest of my days here in London.

What's the play? Well, you know, Hamilton, like all good tourists. Oh, okay. But I know the end. Yeah, but you get there in a very interesting way. You'll enjoy it. You learn a great deal by coming. And what you learn here is not necessarily good theater, but also good political views, politics at the highest level. and Shakespeare is its greatest when it does the political plays.

And let me add you one thing. I do number myself among those who would like to see a restoration of the memory of Richard the Third who was given a very bad press and he deserves so much better. But that is because even Shakespeare got his history wrong. And on that, he thank you. Thank you. Thank you so much. So, Alison, what did you think of that?

I thought it was very, very interesting. Do you know what? I actually think the Israeli government propaganda machine will think I'm crazy to say this. I think they should put him up when they're trying to justify Israeli actions. I think they should put him up because he does it without the sort of ideological overlay and with at least an understanding of the other side, the other sides of this very, very complicated picture. You know, I think it is really interesting that he, when we talked about this political intelligence interface, I was fascinated by the fact, listen, Bibi's got a point. You know, he's the first person I've heard say that in relation to this kind of relationship. So, and I think that, you know, that kind of wealth of experience, his commitment to Israel, but with an understanding that, the actions that you take have consequences. And I thought some of the ideas he was talking about at the end were really interesting. You know, the idea of land for land, which was part of the

Clinton deal. So yeah, I hope people will listen to that and digest and understand. That's a serious guy with some very serious insight. It's also, I think, very worth listening to, even for people who are horrified by Israeli actions, because it's a reminder of the fact that here is somebody who's, in Israeli terms, is from the left, who is openly prepared to say that Netanyahu is corrupt. He didn't say this, but Uzziaharid has just been testifying in the corruption trial of Netanyahu's associates over the sovereign deal.

He's prepared to say that Netanyahu extended the war for political reasons, betrayed the hostages, brought in a complete buffoon as his national security adviser. But on the other hand, it's a reminder that somebody with all those views is also very, very firmly protective of most of the actions that Israel took in Gaza and wants to keep bringing it back to Israeli casualties. So I think all that's really worthwhile, because I think part of foreign policy is understanding mindsets. I mean, we're going to go on, I think, in the future, and interview a lot of people. We're hoping to interview the Serbian president. We've got a Middle Eastern leader we're about to interview.

There are African leaders who are about to interview. And we're now touching on this territory where often we're going to have moments in our interviews where people will be saying things that we profoundly disagree with. It's a question of journalistic ethics, too, isn't it? How much time do you spend reinforcing the fact? I mean, I, for example, strongly disagree, as I imagine you do, with a lot of what Uzi was saying there, but how much time do you then spend fighting an argument, which is going nowhere? I suspect that, you know, on the one hand, we're going to get people that we get right into us every time that we talk about Israel saying that we are very anti-Israel and we don't understand what it's like and

because we're having this conversation rather than just sort of accepting as gospel, his description of why Israel had to act as it did. And on the other hand, we'll get people who say that we didn't give him a hard enough time because I thought what he was saying was, for part of the interview, was what you might expect from an Israeli government spokesperson. But around that, I think he was somebody of very, very strong view, a lot of integrity there, I thought.

I think it's sort of almost viscerally offended when he was talking about the corruption, the corruption of leadership. And also that description, when we were talking about his resignation, because it was the big thing afterwards was he pulled away from Netanyahu because of Netanyahu's views on the Iran nuclear deal. But that was a very, very simple thing. You know, I'm sorry, Prime Minister.

I don't think that's within the Israeli law. I'm not going to support it. You know, it's been so hard to get people to talk about Israel, Palestine, without just immediately being one side absolutely black and white. Final note from me, he laid out this very interesting. account of what the future could be. And it was Palestinian Authority and ultimately the offer of a two-state solution and them taking responsibility for Gaza. Just to put on record, there will be many skeptics out there who will say that is completely politically impossible, that Netanyahu's, and particularly his coalition partners, are never going to accept that, that Smotrich, the finance

Minister just wants to basically undermine the Palestinian Authority on every side, there'll be other people who will say the Palestinian Authority has no way of establishing its authority in Gaza that in practice Hamas is much stronger than they are, and they would get drawn into a bloody civil war if they tried to fight their way to dominance. And there will be other people who will say the Israeli public have no appetite at the moment for any conversation about a two-state solution and that he's being too optimistic that the world has moved on. But I still think, for what it's worth putting my own cards on table, his account is about the best you can hope for.

And if we don't give it a go, what on earth can we do? I also like the fact that when he was talking about Sadat and Egypt, and sometimes things happen that is completely taken by surprise. You don't expect them to happen what they do, and then they move in a different direction. So he was desperately trying to be optimistic. I guess the questions that you're talking about there, that's why ultimately these are going to depend on future,

elections. What, the nature of the governments that get chosen by the Israeli people, but also the nature of government that returns if and when they get through this current ceasefire process. And political courage and leadership, because even in the very best times, people like Rabin were taking huge risks pushing for a two-state solution and ultimately getting themselves killed in the process. Well, thank you. Good. Excellent. Bye-bye. See you soon.