The Rest Is Politics: Leading - 4: Michel Barnier: The Truth Behind Brexit

Episode Date: February 6, 2023

Who is the EU's man behind Brexit? How did he combat Britain's negotiating tactics? What is life like at the top of European politics? Alastair and Rory are joined by Michel Barnier, the EU's chief Brexit negotiator, three years on from Britain's exit from the European Union. Instagram: @restispolitics Twitter: @RestIsPolitics TRIP Plus: Become a member of The Rest Is Politics Plus to support the podcast, receive a weekly newsletter, enjoy ad-free listening to both TRIP and Leading, join our Discord chatroom, and receive early access to live show tickets and Question Time episodes. Just head to therestispolitics.com to sign up. The New European: www.theneweuropean.co.uk/leading Email: [e-mail] Producers: Dom Johnson + Nicole Maslen Exec Producers: Tony Pastor + Jack Davenport Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Thanks for listening to The Restis Politics. Sign up to the Restis Politics Plus. To enjoy ad-free listening, receive a weekly newsletter, join our members chat room and gain early access to live show tickets. Just go to therestispolities.com. That's the restispolities.com. Welcome to the Restis Politics leading with me, Rory Stewart. And me, Alistair Campbell. And we're going to go now back into a detailed discussion on Brexit. And for listeners, just very quickly, because it now seems distant history. UK voted to leave in 2016. And Theresa May then came in as Prime Minister, did these negotiations. People were a member vaguely, I guess, phrases like the Chequers Agreement, the withdrawal agreement. The backstop. Backstop, yeah. Through negotiations with Michel Barnier, at the end of 2018, produced her withdrawal agreement. Took it to the House of Commons and was defeated three times. And eventually she resigned as Prime Minister.

Boris Johnson was then elected. And he came in promising that he had a different oven-ready deal, so he'd spent the previous this three years rubbishing Theresa Mays deal and then produced his new deal, whose fundamental change was to create a border in the Irish sea

between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Now, just before we get into our interviewee, Alistair, give us a sense of what you were doing during that period. I think you were a major leading voice which you and the campaign to remain for a second referendum. I was within the campaign

for a second referendum, yes. I wish I'd been more of a major voice in the referendum him on the big question to leave because I think like a lot of people I didn't think it was going to happen but Michel Barnie is a very very interesting guy I I had a bit to do with him during that period because I think we were trying he records a meeting in his book that's just come out called my secret Brexit diary now out in English at policy press and the you know he recalls a meeting with Tony Blair where Tony Blair was saying that you know he thinks there is an

opportunity for a second referendum on the final deal. And of course, that's all history now. But what is absolutely extraordinary about Barnier's book is, I mean, God, as you know, I keep a diary. And there were times when I just thought, how did we get through so much in one day? But for him, it was like literally for year, month after month, year upon year, he's having to be the sole negotiator representing 27 countries and all the sort of institutions of Europe. and holding so many people together, and he did it. And there's actually a quote on the back of the book, the English version from my old colleague Jonathan Powell,

whose assessment is that Michel Barnier's new book helps explain why Britain ended up being comprehensively out-negotiated over Brexit. Where were you when all this was going on? So I was a minister throughout this period, minister first in David Cameron's government, then in Theresa May's government. And it was a very interesting period for me, because initially I felt as a minister very excluded from these negotiations.

Theresa May and her team kept their cards very close to their chest. I knew little more about the negotiations than what the public had, often actually nothing more than the public did. But when the withdrawal agreement came out, I thought this is something I can get behind. I believed in Theresa May. And fundamentally, this thing that we now call the backstop was a customs union, and it seemed to me a good, pragmatic compromise.

It was going to keep Britain close to the European markets. It was, I think, the foundation of us being politically close to Europe, diplomatically close to Europe, but also delivering on many of the things that Brexit voters wanted. They wanted to troll over immigration, leaving the political constitutions, etc. So it seemed like a good deal. And I really became the major spokesman for that deal. I remember being mocked by my colleagues as being the comical alley of Theresa May's deal. I was out there like Saddam Hussein's general, defending it on the airwaves.

Often I was doing, one day I think I did 27 meter infuse in a day, just trying to defend this deal. And it was fascinating because I discovered amongst other things that as we went into the third vote, many of my ministerial colleagues, two and a half years in, still did not know what a customs union was. I was having to organize events to try to brief ministers on the details this deal right the way through to the votes. Well, the thing about his book, what comes through a lot is just how exasperated he. and some of the European leaders feel that the people they're negotiating with, just he's got a lot of time for the civil servants, but some of the ministers and some of the politicians literally have no sense of what they're talking about. Well, I also wrote to Theresa May and tried to persuade her to see if she would be allow me to move to Brussels with my family to be a full-time negotiated because I had read about the fact that that's what McMillan had done with Edward Heath. I was very, very worried about the amateurism of British government, the sense that ministers reshuffle all the time, that they're not really on the ground. And I was terrified

that unless we had somebody who was on top of the details located in Brussels, we would be out-negotiated. Anyway, without further ado, here is the interview that Alistair and I did with Michel Barnier on the third anniversary of Brexit. Welcome to the rest is politics leading with me, Alistair Campbell. And with me, Rory Stewart. And with a very special guest who, if you look up this gentleman online, you will discover that his most significant role, so far as the United Kingdom is concerned, he was the European Commission head of task force for relations with the UK, aka Europe's Mr. Brexit, Michel Barnier,

who got that job in part because of his experience as a European Commissioner, as a Cabinet Minister in France as a long-serving member of the French Parliament. So somebody who knows an awful lot about negotiations. So, Michel, I guess maybe a good place to start. We're meeting around the time of the third anniversary of our departure. Trying to be neutral about this rather than just seeing it through the European Union lens. What's your assessment of how Brexit has gone? Brexit is a lose-lose game.

and lose, lose game for everybody on both sides. I did not change my mind. There is no added value to Brexit. There is no added value to be out of the single union, single market or the custom union. And nobody has been able, even Mr. Farage, listen carefully when I met him in my office a few years ago, even Mr. Farage, nobody has been able to give me

any proof of the added value of the Brexit to be out. To be frank, I look at the current difficulty of the UK. Nobody can be happy. Both sides is the same for EU. Many things are not going well on the EU side. Nobody can be able because we need to be stable. We need stability and progress on both sides to cooperate together. But I think that all these difficulties, current difficulty in the UK,

are not linked to the Brexit, but all these difficulties are more severe and more serious because of the Brexit. Monsieur Manit, thank you very much for coming. One question. Did you think that the deal which Theresa May negotiated was a better deal than the deal which the UK ended up with under Boris Johnson? Essential part, Rory, of these two deals are the same. As far are the trade with the single market. The only difference, the key difference is about Ireland and Northern Ireland. And a way to find, solutions to the problem created by the Brexit in Northern Ireland. What create problems in Northern Ireland and for the Good Friday Belfast Agreement and for stability and peace

on the island of Ireland is nothing else than the Brexit. So we try with great patience to find operational and concrete solutions to these problems. And I always try to work with any kind of traumatization or ideology in the most objective way as possible. And finally, we found a solution with Theresa May at the end.

She was not able to get a majority to support this option, which was for the UK in its totality to remain a certain time in the Custom Union. Johnson was opposed to this option and we find another solution.

And this is proved that we have been on the European side very flexible. I read your, we had dinner on Monday and you very kindly gave me a copy of your book, and I've read it very, very quickly. But I just want to, I get the sense that you had much, much more respect for Theresa May than certainly for Boris Johnson and certainly for Nigel Farage, for whom I sense, even with your diplomatic skills, a certain level of contempt that is commendable. I commend you for that.

But here's what you said about Theresa May. This was when she had that awful. Rory, you remember the Prairie Party conference when the letters fell off and the prankster brandished a P-45 and she had a terrible coughing fit? And you wrote this, I don't want to laugh at this,

let alone mock her for it. She is a courageous, tenacious woman surrounded by a great many men who are more interested in their personal fortunes than in the future of their country. So you see her as somebody of duty and diligence surrounded by men who are there for their own interests rather than the national interest. Is that a fair assessment? She always act with dignity, certain courage, tenacity.

The reason why I respect Theresa May. I think we worked with her in good face. But for the rest, what happens around her in the Tory party has been evident. these people succeed to push Theresa May outside. And you said of the two other prime ministers, this is when emotion went in finally to get rid of her. And you said, this woman is really up against it, but I think she'll win.

It's madness to see the extent to which the future of this great country and our relationship with it has for three years now been dependent upon the bickering, backstabbing, serial betrayals and thwarted ambitions of a handful of consequences. Conservative Party MPs. Boris Johnson, who since yesterday has been sporting a new haircut, God knows what that looks like, will, along with David Cameron and a few others, carry a real burden of responsibility in

their country's history. So you're quite damning about Johnson. Without giving any lessons and being always respectful, Johnson was much more baroque, if I can use this work. I write this word in my book than Theresa May. More than that, it seems to me that during the time of Johnson the last year, we conclude the two agreement with Johnson, November 19 and the second adherent on the withdrawal of the UK from a single market. During this time, with Johnson and Frost ideology took hold against a certain traditional pragmatism of the UK. And frankly speaking, I think that I've been all...

long story, and particularly during this last year, much more pragmatic than the Brits. Which is unusual? Unusual for French. So just to remind listeners, Michel Barnier led these negotiations during Brexit, and he had two major negotiations, one which was a negotiation for more than two years with the government of Theresa Mayne, and then a shorter negotiation after Boris Johnson was elected. And I was a minister under Theresa May, and I remember the moment when the withdrawal agreement was announced at the end of 2018. And when it came, I want to quote

a famous British politician. He said, this is a terrible deal. This is not a compromise. It is a capitulation. The European Union negotiators have won. They have humiliated the British. Do you accept this view, which was the view of Alistair's friend, Tony Blair? No, I didn't remember this sentence, but I do not agree. It was not an humiliation. It was certainly not a capitulation. It was just, no more nor less, a treaty drawing the lessons and drawing the consequences of the Brexit. The decision of the UK to leave, in the same time, it was not an obligation.

Rory, you know that, to leave the single market and to leave the custom union. But this decision is globally historical and in a certain sense dramatic. As I said, personally in front of the press, a few days after my nomination in October 16, in the press room of the Commission in Brussels, I said clearly nobody must underestimate the consequences of the Brexit. the Brexit will have many, many consequences under legal, financial, technical, economic, social and political dimension. Leaving 600 treaty, leaving 45 years of cooperation, have many consequences. So that is, no emulation and no capitulation in my view.

You met a lot of British politicians during this period. And what comes through in your diary? which honestly the work rate and the travel and the number of meetings that you're having, it's phenomenal. I mean, you're just non-stop because you're having to hold the 27 together and part of the British strategy is to try to break you apart from that. A huge mistake. A big mistake.

And it actually probably cemented the European strength in the negotiations. But if I give you, go through the four main interlocutors you had, is this a fair assessment from reading your book that David Davis cordial but a bit cavalier. Rab, unpleasant, not very bright, and not very good at his job. Barclay, plodding and efficient, frost, arrogant. Are they fair assessments?

It is your words, huh? Yeah, yeah. It's my words based upon my reading of your book. And you're allowed now to push back any of them. No, no, I negotiator, the minister with who I have for a long time, a cordial relationship is David Davis because we knew we knew each other a long time

before because we were used to be both of us Minister for European Affairs in 9094 95 each of them has his own personality

each of them has been an ephemeral okay it was a they weren't the main player it was a I don't know why but it was the reality

the truth that I had during these four years four different British negotiators. One of the complaints of the politicians is they said that they were not the real negotiators. They said that particularly the senior civil servants like Olly Robbins were actually doing the negotiation and they felt that they didn't really have much involvement or freedom in the process.

That's one of the reasons why. they kept resigning. They felt that Olli Robbins and the ambassadors and Theresa May were really controlling the process. Did you feel that there was a challenge there that the politically elected ministers were not actually controlling the negotiations, that really the control was coming from the civil servants? Yes, you're right in the certain sense, but what can I say? It was a British choice to organize a negotiation as the British decided to do that. I have no comment. On my side also, I had a president of the commission, Uncle Juncker, head of cabinet, very strong, but they trust me. They trust me to be the unique and single negotiator.

Let me just recall that it was the very first time that for such a serious and extraordinary negotiation, the three institutions of the EU chose one single negotiator. I was a negotiator for the commission with all the technical means and the capacity of the commission to deliver expertise, but also the negotiator for the European Parliament and also for the 27 member states. And it's the reason why to prove this trust, which was key for me and for the negotiation on the EU side, I took part during four years to the European Council. I was invited, which was totally unusual to take part, to sit at the table, to be seated at the table with the head of states and the government during four years every time they spoke about the Brexit. You clearly had respect for Theresa May. He felt she was dutiful, diligence and so forth. You then, in dealing with Johnson, who I don't think it's any secret to any of our listeners that both Rory Stewart and I think is a pathological liar and a terribly bad human. being and I don't expect you to respond to that. But it must have made it very difficult to negotiate with somebody who, the 27 leaders,

some of whom, who I know personally, felt they could have no trust or faith in anything that he said. And that's what you were negotiating with. And you were doing it from the perspective of saying, I'm going to show no emotion, I'm not going to speak out against these people. I mean, your diary is an extraordinary portrait in patience. and I don't quite know how you kept your call some of the time. What Boris Johnson and some others said by words in radio or in speech,

one has a point is what they sign and signing a treaty on the name of so great country that the UK is a key point for us. But then they went against it on the protocol. The point is that they have signed after they have negotiated very carefully, word by word, comma, by comma, this treaty. There is no surprise. For the 27 member states, for the parliament, what is important and what remain important now, the treaty itself, we are speaking, I'm there, of two international treaties. I worry that there's a problem in the structure of the negotiation.

You were appointed as the unique negotiator and you were there throughout the five-year period representing the three institutions. and against you, you had this British system where ministers were reshuffled very frequently, where the civil servants were there permanently and the ministers were coming in and out. So here is an idea, a hypothesis. Would it have been better if they had done what was done with Macmillan and Ted Heath, which is to put the minister permanently in Brussels, leading the negotiation in the same way that you were leading the negotiation, rather than having the system of them flying in and out all the time?

It's possible, Rory, that it would have been more efficient for the Brits to have a permanent negotiator, but the ambassador was there and took a large place, a key place in the negotiation. The key point is to know what is the link, what is the level of trust between who negotiate and who decide. And on my side, I was a single negotiator, but this unity of the 27 was not given by chance to not fall from the sky. I've built this unity every day by several means and several ways. For the first time in Brussels, in such an extraordinary negotiation, we play total transparency, total. In addition of that, I went once per week in a capital of the 27.

Every once a week. Meeting the prime minister, the business community, the trade unions, the national parliament, the press. And every week, at least every week during four years. So this is the reason of the unity. And if I may add one point, what the Brits did not understand until now. I'm sure they understand now. But it was losing time to try to divide us. Because at the end of this road, linked to the European Treaty, we needed to be unanimous to approve.

So that means that the obligatory unanimity was a key for unity. The key. That means that one problem of one member state, first of all, Ireland, the peace in Ireland, but also the place of the two sovereign base of the UK in Cyprus, but also Gibraltar for Spain. but also for eight member states, the fishery issue, all this specific and national issue became obligatory challenge for all. Yeah.

When we talked about the system, though, Friday the 9th of November, 2018, this is you saying this now. As for Dominic Raab, he appeared in front of an audience of worried business leaders, no doubt with the aim of reassuring them. I'm not sure he succeeded. He said, I hadn't quite understood the full extent of this, but if you look at the UK and look at how we trade in goods, we're particularly. reliant on the Dover-Caleigh crossing. No shit, Sherlock. That's me, not you. This is you again.

I don't even want to crack a smile at this, but there is most definitely something wrong with the British system. It's now almost two and a half years since a majority of British people voted for Brexit under the leadership of politicians like Raab, and every passing day shows that they have not realised the consequences or what is truly at stake. Exactly what I mean a few minutes ago when I spoke about the lack of realism. Remember, when we went with Jean-Clood Juncker for this famous dinner, Ten Downing Street with Theresa May,

a few days before, the official minister in charge of the negotiation, David was. Well, you said they had very nice French wine. French wine are nice. Not the French wine, but they're nice. And David Davis said in the British press a few days ago about the two

agencies, the two European agencies located in London. And he said, and banking agencies. He said two days before, in the middle of the negotiation, it's perfectly possible that these two agencies remain in London.

No way, no way. It was totally impossible. It's so legally impossible. The EU agency has to be located in one member state of the EU. He wanted to have his gatto and mongay it. I think we're just going to take a quick break. see you in a second. Hi everybody, it's Dominic Zavarik here from The Rest is History. Now, some of you may have

heard me on your show, The Rest is Politics, when Rory was away and I was filling in and enjoying Alastair Campbell's tremendous banter. And I'm back to tell you about our new series on The Restis History, which is all about Britain in the 1970s, a period with a lot of uncanny resemblances to our own. So right now we're living through a moment when oil shocks generated by war, in the Middle East are rippling through the world economy when Britain feels like it's sunk in a bit of a malaise. People are arguing about Europe. The government has got a few issues with the trade unions. And we have a kind of, I suppose you'd say governing elite, a kind of political class that is really struggling to come to terms with all of these issues. And people are asking if Britain

is governable at all. So there are a lot of parallels between that Britain that I'm describing, which is our Britain and the Britain of the mid-1970s. So in this series that's coming out on the rest is history, we're looking at these and other issues. We'll be talking about the rise of Margaret Thatcher, obviously a colossal figure in our political life even now, whether you love her or loathe her. We'll be talking about the very first Brexit referendum of 1975,

a subject that I'm sure Rory and Alistair will have strong opinions about. We'll be talking about the fall of the Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson, and we'll be talking about one of the, grimmest moments in Britain's economic history, the moment in 1976 when we had to go cap in hand, as people said at the time, to the International Monetary Fund, the IMF, for a then record bailout. Now, if that sounds good to you, how could it not sound good to you? Of course it sounds good to you. We have a clip for you to listen to at the end of this episode. And if you want to hear more, just search for The Rest is History wherever you get your podcasts.

rather fittingly, given the interview subject of Monsieur Barnier, this episode of leading is sponsored by the New European. The New Europeans' independent journalism is world-class, and in terms of presenting a positive view of Britain's relationship with Europe, it is simply peerless. It's full of fascinating articles from across the continent and around the world, both political and cultural. And since Brexit, it's fair to say the New European has been a leading light in trying to balance out the corrosive nationalistic media in the UK that helped us get us into this mess in the first place. Besides my weekly diary, you'll find regular articles from writers as varied as Bonnie Greer, John Tie Bloom, who is brilliant on the economy, Tannick Koch from Germany, Will Self, Jason Solomon's, Mitch Ben and James Ball.

And here's some good news for you. They've done a special offer just for our listeners. and these are the best rates you'll get anywhere guaranteed and wait for it with a bonus. Sign up to the newspaper and website for just £2 a week or just the digital version for a pound a week, and they will also give you absolutely free a copy of the book they've done of their best front pages since that dreadful day, June the 23rd, 2016 Brexit. It's a real treat, and if you're buying it elsewhere, it cost you at £15. You get it for nothing. So sign up now.

you'll be supporting top-class independent journalism and doing something positive to correct the right-wing bias of most of the UK media today. Just go to www.the-new European.com.com-U-K-forward-slash-leading. That's the new-european-co-U-K forward-slash L-E-A-D-I-N-G. Thanks very much and all the best. Welcome back to Restis Politics Leading. We're here with Michel Barnier. There is now, across Britain a very strong and consistent view that Brexit was a mistake in every constituency except one now, the majority believes Brexit was a mistake, which means there is now a political opportunity for British politicians at least to campaign for rejoining, for example, the customs union, but even possibly in the medium to long term rejoining the European Union. What would be

involved in doing that? It's for you to choose. It's for you to decide. It's for you to act. The door is open for the custom union. The door is open for the single market. The door is open for the union. But it is for the UK people to decide. Not me, frankly speaking. The only point is to be aware that if from now to this time of discussion at this point, we have to avoid two great divergence, regulatory divergence, because it could be more complicated, but it is for the UK to decide. Just on that, there's an assumption, I think, in our country and probably in Europe, that there may be a change of government fairly soon. And you said this, page 113.

Among my British interlocutors, Kea Stama, always courteous and professional, is without doubt, along with Hillary Ben, chair of the House of Commons, exiting the EU committee, the one who impresses me the most for his ability to grasp, the detail of what is at stake in the Brexit negotiations. Listening to him, you say, I get the feeling that Kirstarmer will one day be UK Prime Minister. So what gave you that impression? You presumably didn't think that about Jeremy Corbyn.

If I wrote this sentence, it's because I thought at that time that Kierstamber, among other people, other leaders, had at that time, and I asked today the capacity to the Prime Minister, but nothing more it's not for me to choose the British people to choose who will be their future

or next prime minister not to me, never Michel let me tell you just my question is he's clear working with Kerstammer several times I thought that

he is a strong a strong leader he has the capacity and what do you think what do you think the European Union wants or expects from a Labour government

in relation to Britain's relations with Europe We expect and we hope for any government, the government today, the government tomorrow, once again is the choice of the UK people, the British people, to respect the signature, to implement, to normalize, in particular this very key issue of the peace and the stability in Northern Ireland, and to build on this base of trust a new partnership. Because for the people who listen to us just right now, I want to say that the future of a cooperation, the future of Europe, the continent of Europe, including UK, the continent.

This future is much more important than the Brexit. We need to build this strong partnership as far our war and peace are concerned in Europe, in particular those days, as far as the climate change is concerned, as far as the poverty in Africa and a way to help these incredible. continent to develop itself and for the people to live where they are born, capacity to resist and to control the financial services in the world or the internet companies. There is so many global challenges. We can fight, we can resist to the challenges alone, nor neither Germany, France or UK. We need to be together to cooperate. That is the most important. One of the global challenges, which was relevant to Brexit and which you spoke about during your campaign for the presidency, is the challenge of immigration. Can you share with us your thoughts on what kind

of challenge immigration poses to France, to Europe, to Britain, and what policy solutions you would have? Well, we need to be precise to avoid any kind of misunderstanding. When I spoke during the primary in France, two years ago last year, when I spoke today, when I speak today, is about the migration coming from Africa, North Africa, Syria and so on. And I'm not speaking about the movement of population, the movement of citizens inside the EU. No question, no debate. This freedom movement is one of the four fundamental freedom of the single market. But were you raising the issue in the way that you were out of a worry that Marine Le Pen is in the ascendancy within French politics? And do you think Marine Le Pen could be the

next French president? I think that one lesson of the Brexit is very clear. An event which seemed improbable can happen. So it was true for UK. The Brexit was improbable, even for some of the Brexiteers. And it happened. So the third reason why the first chapter of my book is called a warning, perhaps for you, for the British.

But surely for us, we need to draw the lessons and to not to confuse, to merge what I call the popular sentiment, the social anger in many regions against unemployment, against uncontrolled migration, against insecurity, lack of security. These are the tools, the materials of the social anger, the popular sentiment we need to take into account, we need to understand that we need to answer. Is Macron doing that? The Europeans in general have to draw the lesson, and I think we have begun to draw the lessons by less naifety in our trade relations, better control of the border with 10,000 new posts, the border of the EU, for instance, Alistair. For the first time, we borrow 750 billion, billion euros after the COVID crisis to invest and to react.

It's the very first time in 60 years that the EU decided to borrow and to invest together. It is the right way, in my view, to protect ourselves. Michel, you became a politician at the age of 27. You've been a politician for many, many decades. Can you reflect looking back on what it means for you to be a politician, to have chosen this life? what were the positive aspects of having a life in politics and what were the personal negative aspects of a life in politics? Yes, good and personal question. To be clear, I was involved in politics sooner when I was 14 and 50 years, thanks to a great statement, General de Gaulle, the contrary of a politician.

I'm proud, and it is my first reason to be proud to have to have been. involved in his party when I was 15 or 16. And I was elected the first time by the citizens in 22 and at the National Assembly at 27. I used to be even the youngest member of the French National Assembly. You know, it was title, you lose very quickly. But what is politics? What is the reason to be involved in politics? For me, it's very simple and very difficult at the same time. When you are involved, you have values, convictions, ideas, projects, the citizen gave you a mandate, money, public money,

what must you do? What must you do with all these tools? You have to create progress, collective progress for the people. So that at the end of your mandate, four years, five years, six years, the people can see a progress in their collective life.

It is, what is, in my view, politics. And what I always try to do As a cop minister, I've been the president of the territory of Savoy in my region, but I always try to do is to put people coming from different sides together on the same table to build together, to create progress together. Can I maybe make this my last question? I just wondered on that whether you're worried about the state of the Franco-German relationship, which for so often has been seen as the motor of Europe.

Yes, I'm concerned. if you look at the past, the Treaty of Deliséé between General de Gaul and Conradin-Rour, this cooperation has never been spontaneous

and never been evident, they've been easy, except perhaps, Anister, during the time where the two leaders were

on one side Valéry Giscardestin and the other side Elmuch-Schmidt because they had between themselves a real and great friendship.

So, this cooperation is, if I'm may say day after day more and more necessary and less and less sufficient. So we have to work together. It has been never easy to find solution, to find proposal, but being always careful to take into account the others, to respect the others.

French are sometimes arrogant. I tried not to be arrogant. I think for a long time that in the EU today, past EU with the UK, every and each member state has an added value, even the smallest one. As my final question, Michel, thank you also for coming on the show. I want to return to the question of what is the negative personal impact of being a politician? You talked about progress, collective progress, but from a personal point of view, what sacrifices does a politician make in terms of their personal life, their family?

No, the lack of time for your private life, for your wife, for your children, your grandchildren. The reason why I dedicate my book to my two grandchildren, because two of them... You shared them with Johnson and May. Yes. Two of them were born during the negotiation, and I sang them, one boy, one girl, to have accepted to share their grandfather with the wits. very well

when we have done an interview with Francois we have given the occasion

in in a minute to explain if there there is there's there

there think that we're going to think in French to explain in

in a minute in in in French auditors don't worry

about the people don't worry about it no the The front of things, is that in the

world of today, that is a world dangerous, instable, unjust, with these

countries who have finished that are of great power, the China, the Brazil, the India,

it's going to be together, it's to be to be to be our values,

our ideas, no interests, for being by the grand, when you

look a table, the table where the great leaders who organize the order or the disorder or the disorder of the world

is that table? Inevitably inexorable because we have a size insufficient, a power

and the countries are excluded of these table if they are all the if we are we're still

we're still so, so much. Thank you. A good message for the British who have been

not listened. For the French too, and the French. without giving any lessons. Thank you very much. Okay, Michel, merci.

Merci. Well, there we are. That was Michel Barnier. For those who listened to his French without necessarily understanding it, he was essentially saying that in the modern world with all its challenges, the countries that stand apart from each other

are going to fail and that to be taken seriously by the big powers in the world, we have to stand together. And he issued that as a warning to the UK on Brexit, but also a warning to countries like France. And he did it so beautifully. I mean, yet again, I mean, I think I get seduced by this more than you do because your French is better than mine.

But I couldn't believe his inevitably, inexorable. I mean, the order, desordre. I mean, it was, I thought it was so sort of beautiful. And the fact that everything he said always had a, in French, had a tricolon. We're always three adjectives behind each word. It's funny because he doesn't think he speaks very good English. But when you read the book, honestly, the complexities and the, the sheer scale of the number of issues he was dealing with, the number of people he was

dealing with and trying to keep on board, he did, he really did do a pretty amazing job. And I think in the interview, there was a sort of reminder of that, wasn't the, when he said talking about the individual member states, how he was having to think about fishery, the Irish border, the sovereign British bases in Cyprus, the issues around Gibraltar, and how that clarity of all these different issues was lacking when you read the media reports in Britain. He was able to articulate that so well. I think he's somebody, this sort of sense of his patience,

and he did have that mug, he had this mug on his desk the whole time, keep calm and negotiate. And it must have been infuriating, seeing this never-ending succession of different characters all playing politics or using it to play politics. But I think that, you know, we talked a little bit about We've talked a lot actually about how the European Union has pretty held together pretty well over Ukraine. But I think the dry run of that was them holding together over the Brexit negotiations

because part of the British strategy throughout was to kind of divide and rule or separate them off from Barnier. It was a natural strategy, wasn't it? Because there was every reason to believe two things which turned out to be untrue, but which many British negotiators, including diplomats, had said have been true for 45 years, which was ultimately the European Union doesn't necessarily hold together that you can end up with tensions particularly between France and Germany and that nothing has ever agreed till the last moment. And this myth, which had been very important for previous European negotiations, was quite dangerous in Brexit because it created the expectations.

First of all, with David Cameron when he was trying to get a deal before the Brexit referendum, but then for Theresa May and Boris Johnson that somehow we were going to pull some funny rabbit out of the hat at the last moment, when the EU was determined that that wasn't going to happen. Anyway, off microphone, as it were, off air, the best thing that emerged from that was that he's invited me to swim in this wonderful lake up in the Ote Savoire. So I shall definitely be doing that. The two of you going to go together. Am I going to get a vision of you in this very distinguished, beautifully quaffed silver frocks,

French politician? Silver frock? Doing the breaststroke together. What's the silver frock? What are you talking? Silver fox? What are you talking about silver fox? He said a silver frock.

I mean, you're suggesting Barneyer going swimming in women's clothes. I thought, what is it on about that? Anyway, that was Michel Barnier. We've got another Michel next week. And that is when I'm flying solo with one of the greatest athletes of all time that Rory thought was a basketball player. That is Michael Johnson. He will be on leading next week. Thank you all very much.

Bye-bye.