The Rest Is Politics: Leading - 74. Kwasi Kwarteng: Liz Truss, becoming Chancellor, and Britain on the brink (Part 2)

Episode Date: May 19, 2024

Why did the Tory Party choose to make Liz Truss and Boris Johnson prime minister? How does it feel to be the second shortest-serving chancellor in post-war history? What was the true thinking behind the disastrous Truss-Kwarteng mini-budget? On today's episode of Leading, Rory and Alastair are joined for the second and final episode of their conversation with former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Kwasi Kwarteng. TRIP Plus: Become a member of The Rest Is Politics Plus to support the podcast, receive our exclusive newsletter, enjoy ad-free listening to both TRIP and Leading, benefit from discount book prices on titles mentioned on the pod, join our Discord chatroom, and receive early access to live show tickets and Question Time episodes. Just head to therestispolitics.com to sign up, or start a free trial today on Apple Podcasts: apple.co/therestispolitics. TRIP ELECTION TOUR: To buy tickets for our October Election Tour, just head to www.therestispolitics.com Instagram: @restispolitics Twitter: @RestIsPolitics Email: [e-mail] Podcast Editor: Nathan Copelin Video Editor: Teo Ayodeji-Ansell Social Producer: Jess Kidson Assistant Producer: Fiona Douglas Producer: Nicole Maslen Senior Producer: Dom Johnson Head of Content: Tom Whiter Exec Producers: Tony Pastor + Jack Davenport Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Thanks for listening to The Restis Politics. Sign up to The Restis Politics Plus. To enjoy ad-free listening, receive a weekly newsletter, join our members chat room and gain early access to live show tickets. Just go to therestispolities.com. That's the restispolics.com. Hello and welcome to The Restis Politics leading with me, Rory Stewart. And me, Alistair Campbell. And in our second episode with Quasi Quarteting now. So, Quasi, we entered Parliament at the same time. But I think we had a very, very different impression of politics and what it means to be an MP. One of the things that struck me at the time is things that really depressed and disturbed me about politics. You actually quite enjoyed or were quite relaxed about. I mean, tell us a little bit about what your experience was of just being a working politician. So I'd stood in Brent East in 2005, and you and I have spent many hours in the past talking about history and politics, the empire, things we're interested in. And I saw the modern House of Commons as something completely different. And I think you, to your credit, had a more romantic, probably less cynical view of what actually was going on.

You said that knocked out of him. So, you know, crazy things like when you had a reshuffle. And you described this very eloquently in your book. So, you know, the one man who knows more about Asia than anyone, what will we do? We'll make a minister for Africa, which he knows nothing about that. But this happens all the time. And I think I was very conscious of that right from the start that actually, you know, you could be the world's leading expert on China. And they would never put you in a department where you had to use your

knowledge. I mean, it's crazy. And why? I think it's control. And also it works in our institutions. I mean, I know people in the foreign office who were told they were brilliant Arabis and they were moved to Hungary or Japan. And so it's good for you to broaden your horizons. Well, I've just spent 10 years learning Arabic. Why are you sending me to Japan? But it's, it's a form of control. It's about Control. It's about making sure that you don't put someone who's too knowledgeable in the position of power. That kind of thing. Or it's just random. And random. So there's a random. It's two dynamics. There's a randomness. And then there's a slight control. I mean, there are people on our benches who are fluent Cantonese speakers, Mandarin speakers. They've never been ministers. I mean, you know who I'm talking about. It's absolutely extraordinary. And the people who were the Asia minister wouldn't be able to name three Asian capitals. I'm not going to say any names. But that's... Let alone pass the Eden. Scholarly of his own.

I'm glad I got one of the two questions. You see, I've sometimes wondered about you whether, because I have read your Empire book, and it is a really, really impressive book, whether you wouldn't have been a better historian-academic, and whether Rory sometimes I feel is not necessarily cut out the politics. But the House of Commons should be able to encompass all of these people. Right. You know, there's not just a... Why doesn't it?

I think it's just a very demand, and we could talk about that. It's a very demanding life now. I think the social media has made things a lot more sort of hostile. You need a much thicker skin. You know, thickens the skin, thins the hair, someone said to me. And you just need to be very robust. I think it's quite intrusive now. And even, you know, I've been in politics, in the House of Commons of 14 years.

Even in that time, it's changed. It's changed. And, you know, people I know who were MPs, people like Ken Clark was an MP in the 70s, others. Someone said to me, you know, a busy week, you'd get 10 letters in the 90s. There's no email, nothing like that. And you might get 10 letters. And the friend who told me they said and half of them were about Palestine, even then.

That was the mailback. And I think now there's, you know, I get 200 emails a day, which is fine, and we deal with them, we read them, we have to have a response. And it's a much faster pace. And that has a knock on effect. I think that's why you're seeing people,

you know, they're not going to stay in the House of Commons for 40 years. And if you're getting 200 emails a day and you're there 24-7 and you're replying on Twitter. You're leaving you? Yeah, I'm out. It's a difficult decision, very difficult decision.

And what tipped it? So I think I just felt I didn't quite have the sort of the energy to do. Because you need it. This is the thing. That's a 24-7 culture. I also was very worried about what the parliament, and we could talk about that as well. I mean, the party, the state of the party. And a friend of mine who's an MP said, I'm not worried about losing.

I'm worried about winning and coming back. So he's not a good voice. He's stepping down. He's stepping down. But we could, you know, I mean, five months, six months is a long time. Who knows what will happen. But there's a view that, you know, the party, if it does lose, will go through this sort of fatricidal.

You know, Labor did it. You know, you had Corbyn and all the rest of it. Just develop a little bit more some of the downsides of being an MP. The public doesn't necessarily see because in some ways the public's not very sympathetic towards us. They don't really want to know that MPs are having a tough time. No. But it can be quite tough. I think it's tough.

I think, but it's rewarding as well. I mean, I would, I've said, even though I'm leaving, I would do it all over again. I think it's an incredible privilege. You get huge access. Actually helping people on the constituency level is hugely rewarding and representing people. That's a great privilege.

But I think in terms of the, it's much more attritional. So, you know, you can't look at Twitter too much because there's a lot of, you know, stuff that people will be saying. Well, I would recommend don't look at it at all. Yeah, yeah, exactly.

You have to respond to your emails immediately. Or if not immediate, you know, I get emails after, you know, two days. Why haven't you responded to me? That sort of thing. I think that the debate between the parties and also within the parties, people are just sort of fed up with each other and quite rude. There's something that I grumble, I think, slightly have a go. You in my book about, which is that I worried a little bit that there wasn't enough kind of serious policy discussion in the tea rooms.

There isn't. There isn't any, no. Yeah. So I always felt whenever I was trying to stop you in the corridor to have some earnest discussion, you'd make some joke and move rapidly onwards. But it's sort of place. You say, Rory, Rory, Rory. It's not what is about. It's what it's about.

I'm always struck by that. And I have, like you, nobody actually talks about politics in Westminster. It's terrible. They talk about politics, but not policy. They talk about gossip. Yes, you're right. You're right.

They talk a bit about gossip or they talk about very particular issues. But they don't talk about policy. No one, I've never had, really, a conversation. Why not? I don't know. I think it's... We don't know to talk about policy all the time.

I know. But I think there's something... I think it's a very British thing where you don't want to be seen to be talking shop. I think it's a cultural thing, actually. So, you know, it's like, you know, if you're bringing up some tax issue in the tea room, it's kind of bad manners. So you know what I mean? You know, people are there with their scorn, you know, they're sipping their tea.

They don't want to hear about. I certainly always got that impression from you. Every time I was trying to bend your ear, you'll always make a big joke and charge on. I think what works actually, and, you know, where the Conservative Party, the parliamentary party, they do things off-site. So a lot of the plotting and all of that kind of business, it never happens. actually within Parliament. They'll have a beer somewhere or they'll be, you know, the cultical, wherever.

And that's where a lot... But I think that's always been the case. Because also that as an MP, when you're in Parliament, you're kind of on show, you're kind of in a public place, you're watching what you're saying. You know, there are MPs who you think they're your friends, but they might be saying things to the whips or what have you.

So everyone's a little bit guarded. And I think a lot of that conversation happens outside of... I do like to think that in our time, there was, yes, there's always the gossip stuff. and the who's up, who's down, stuff. But I do think people spend a lot of time sitting around arguing about specific issues. In the actual parliament? I think so, yeah.

And I also think there is a sense that things are changing. I mean, I think Liz Truss is quite a contemporary figure. Yes. I mean, difficult to imagine in the 1970s someone like that becoming the leader of the conservative party. My model, but I may be wrong, is that even as recently it's the 70s, yeah, maybe 30% of the time people were jockeying for position and promotion. But there was space, maybe 70% to, think a little bit more seriously about government.

And that sort of flipped round. So now the 30% thinking about government, 70% campaigning and soundbites. If you look at people like Liz Tras, who's a friend, or Grant Shaps, their skill, they are TikTok, Instagram, Twitter people. So it's all about the message and being a bit unfair on Grant. But he's good at that stuff. And that now counts. I mean, as you say, 40 years ago, none of that stuff existed. Yeah, but I think that you'll be careful here because that is what has driven out, the serious stuff.

And by focusing on that and thinking that that is how we should judge modern politicians, that's what I think has led to people like Trust and Johnson becoming prime minister. I think that's a phenomenon across the modern world. I don't necessarily think it's a great thing, but I just accept it as something that's happened. Looking back, so you back Johnson and you back trust. Which was the bigger of the mistakes? That's a very good question. So let me just talk through my thinking.

So with Johnson in 2019, the party had reached an impasse. Theresa May wasn't going anywhere. The Brexit thing wasn't going anywhere. And we needed someone to break that mold. And Johnson was the agent who did that. Roll forward to the summer 2020, essentially had two candidates. He had Rishi Sunak and his trust.

It was pretty clear that those two. And to be fair, they were the only ones who had a sort of operation. I think Penny Morden had an operation as well. still does. She's been running for lead of the last five years. Why did you not have an operation? I mean, Rishi's not going to join five years after you. Because I was naive.

And I remember saying to Grant, I had lunch with Grant a few months ago. And I said, if you really actually want to get to the top, you've got to start thinking about it from the first day you're in the cabinet. It's a continual thinking about it, planning. And that might be unfair on them and they would deny it. But then it's not, you know, they're always thinking about it. Because what happened with the collapse of Johnson was it happened really quickly. You know, at every stage during 2022, he looked precarious.

But he somehow survived, you know, and it looked as if it was a tipping point. And then the tip, but then it happened incredibly quickly. So the letter came, I was having breakfast with a friend. The letter, I saw the tweet, Simon McDonald's written the letter on, I think on the Tuesday. By the Thursday, he'd gone. And then we went through these rounds. And at the time, I said, look, we can't just have a leadership election, you know, in the next. week or two. But that's what we did. We went through all these rounds. I think from the position

I was in, I was business secretary at the time. Sunak's tax position I wasn't in favor of. So we went with this with epic consequences, I mean, which I'm sure we'll talk about. So it was a sort of binary question. Those were the two candidates that were up and running. And also there's a sort of convention, which was a foolish thing for me to think, but that you've really got to be one of the senior office holders to become prime minister. It's very rare that that hasn't happened. It's usually either the Home Secretary or the Foreign Secretary or the Chancellor. So those were the two people that were in play. And it was clear to me, because of the things we were talking about, the messaging,

you know, Liss Ross was always going to win that race, always. And so then you come in as Chancellor. That's right. Which is an amazing thing. No, it's an amazing. I was, but you know what? The funny thing about it was looking back, it never felt real. Because the first thing that we were plunged into was the accession council.

And, you know, the late magistrate, yeah, the passing and all. It never felt secure. For some, I didn't it? I never felt. So you were in for just over 30 days, and quite a lot of those first days were actually mourning for the late queen. That's right.

And then the fundamental thing that we got wrong, Prime Minister myself, the pace of it was absurd. You know, at that point, having won, and given what had happened with this national disaster, really, in terms of the Queen's passing,

it was a great moment of national reflection. You know, she'd been a monarch for 70 years. everything should have been slowed down. But I remember thinking, okay, we've got the funeral on the Monday and the mini budget was on the Friday. Do you think if she hadn't died that politics would have been dominant in the national debate and therefore the usual thing would have been going on

that have been all sorts of sort of debate going on about, are they going to do this, how are you going to do that? You might have been rained in a bit. Yeah, so I think there were two things that happened and for the people who were following the markets. we did this energy intervention, which was incredibly generous. I mean, that was billions and billions and billions. And the market sort of absorbed that.

And sorry, explain in simple terms of what you did for people. So what we essentially did was we capped the energy price at two and a half thousand pounds for households for two years, which was hugely generous. And this was because as a result of the Ukraine war party, prices were shooting up. Gas prices had gone up through the roof. And there was a debate in the government. You know, some people took a more cautious view. the prime minister's view was that we should be very generous. So that was the one big bazooka.

So billions committed to that. And it wasn't even debated. So that was announced, I think it was during that announcement that we got the news that the Queen was in grave danger in terms of her illness. And so that was announced. And then of course, this huge event of the passing of Queen Elizabeth II happened. And there was no debate about the energy intervention, none whatsoever. I remember thinking, this is extraordinary.

We've just committed 80 billion or whatever it was. the black hole, one of the black holes, and there was no debate. And then, looking back, hindsight is a great thing, but looking back, everything should have slowed down at that point. But what we did was we just, we just, we just doubled up. And was that to do with her psychology? I think so. She talks about being somebody who just likes to kind of blow things up. I mean, is that what was going on?

So I mean, I've read the book and I know her quite well. Her book. Yeah, the list trust book, 10 days. 10 to 10 years, sorry, not 10 days to save the word. That's what sounds like a film, but no, 10 years to be reminded. I think she just had this intense urgency. I mean, you've worked with her in a department. There was just that intense urgency, which I respect.

But you can't do that all the time. You can't sprint a marathon famously. You can't do that. And actually, I remember one point after the mini budget, I said, what we've got to do now is just slow everything down, just be extremely calm and not try and rush and do anything, not overreacting.

But the calm had gone because of the market's reaction. Yeah, but she inflamed that. I mean, when she called me back in the middle of the IMF thing, I thought, what on earth are you doing? This is getting quite complicated. So let's go back, just for listeners, just go back a couple of stages.

Tell in the simplest terms you can, objectively as you can, what it is that you did and what that then meant for the currency interest rates markets. So there were two things that happened. So there was the energy intervention, which was scored by the OBR at, I think it was about an 80 billion.

Right. So that's capping the energy prices for that. That's right. It was scored very highly. And then the mini budget, which I was announcing, we announced 45 billion of unfunded tax cuts. So what that means is that you're reducing taxes, but you're not getting any money. You're not reducing spending and you're not raising other taxes. And that was quite a radical thing to do.

That was. And the other thing that was a mistake. was that we ratchet, you know, she campaigned on two things. She was going to reverse the increase in national insurance, and she was not going to increase the corporation tax. And that scored at $35 billion. Okay. And I think the market knew that,

because she'd been saying that all through the campaign. So it was $80 billion, $35 billion. That's right. And then when we announced... So we announced the actual measures. So there was all this sort of personal taxation stuff, which in retrospect, I think even at the time, but we should have delayed that for the budget.

We should have sliced it in maybe for the spring. What was the personal tax issue? So just explain that quickly. Abadition of the 45p rate, which was very controversial. Right. So let's bring it down to 40. You had your bankers bonuses. But they stuck with that.

And I don't think Labour would change that. And then of course we said, well, if we're going to reduce the top rate of tax, we should reduce the standard rate. And we took 1P off and that costs $6 billion. So all of these things added. So the $35 billion of unfunded tax cuts ended up being at $45 billion. Then you put that on top of the energy intervention. and you're spending a ton of money.

And there's no... So that's what is announced. And then the markets react in various ways. So I put my hand up, did an interview with Coonsberg where I don't remember exactly what words I said. But he's gone mad. He's doubling down. He's going to cut taxes more. So the markets were reacting to that.

And what killed the government was the gilt market. So the currency was doing all sorts of things. What happened with the guilt market? It was, and it's sort of complex, but I might as well try and explain as best. I should throw in a plug here for the rest of his money because they've done a very long series on this. Oh, have they? Yeah. Okay.

I'll listen to that. But so what happened was that there were these funds that had borrowed money essentially to buy government bonds. And the government bonds were what's called long dated. So they're 20 years to redemption. And they borrowed money. And of course, when interest rates go up, the price of the bonds goes down. So what they were holding had totally collapsed in value. and essentially they needed to be bailed out.

And what the Government Bank of England said, okay, we'll open this window so you can borrow the money and we'll support you or we will buy back the bonds. But the window will close on the 14th of October, which is the day I was sacked. Because the Prime Minister was terrified that when the market opened on the Monday the 17th, the bank wasn't providing any support

and there would have been a massive free form. So you had to signal something that was different. Can I just sort of just for one more session? So that explanation is very interesting. because my guess is that the vast majority of people in the country and probably the majority of people listening are going to struggle to follow what you've just said and understand it. And yet the consequences are enormous. So how do we deal with an interesting thing in democratic politics, which is you make a decision which is quite difficult to explain, quite difficult to analyze, it's quite technical, but has absolutely enormous catastrophic consequences. And if I can add to that, it's also something where I think.

I think I've seen Liz's trust, and I may even have seen you as well, saying that you didn't really understand that that was going on. We didn't know that was going. Well, the bank didn't know. Or if they did know, they didn't tell us. But look, I mean... But they must know. We can blame... I wouldn't blame the...

I mean, I think we were responsible. I mean, as a political leader, you've got to put your hand up and say, I was responsible. Not for everything, but I was responsible. And that's one of the things, you know, in Liz's book, is not hearing... She's not accepting any responsibility. You know, there was clear, you know, you can't... It's like anything in life. If you drive a car at 150 miles an hour,

that's a lot more dangerous than if you drive it at 20 miles an hour. There is a risk with speed. And you have driving 150 miles an hour? I think that's what we were doing. I think that's what we were doing. And did it feel like that? Did it feel?

It felt very febrile. That was what, that was what, and dangerous is not the right word, but it feels slightly uncomfortable. And I never thought, this is going to last. I never thought. And did you say to her,

this is not, this, well, I said after the mini budget, just slow, everything down. And she said, well, I've only got two years. I said, you'll have two months if you carry on like this. And I actually think, and I've said this, I think that if it had meant for the mini-budget, there would have been other things. I mean, it was the fracking boat that did for her. That was the straw that broke the camels back. But again, there was that chaos

that the whips didn't know whether it was a three-liner confidence vote. But part of the problem is that she was, I felt when I was working for her, is that I could already see this when I was the Environment Minister and she was the Secretary of State, DEPRA, we could all see as ministers and civil servants that she was a very, very unreliable, unstable leader. I mean, she would, you know, she'd come in and see me and say, I've just met a business person and he's told me that every business can be cut by 25%. So we're going to cut the department by 25%. And you'd be like, well, can we have a conversation, please, about the impact on the...

She didn't want to do it, right? Or she'd say, once she'd write a 25-year environment plan and she'd ask three different bits to the department to write the same plan. And then when we presented the plan to her, she'd refuse to look at the details. She'd just say, this is no good, this is rubbish, go and write it again.

And eventually, you know, by about the third time, I'd say, Secretary State, you know, what is it you don't like about the plan? Is that you don't, do you think we should do more in water and less on air? Do you not like the graphics? And she'd say, Rory, I think everybody knows perfectly well what I don't like about the plan.

And then she'd leave the room and I'd look at the other civil servants. Yeah, there was a style that was, and I think she brought a lot of that to the top job. And I think you can, the system can protect you when you're a secretary of state. But when you're at the top of this machine, you're totally exposed. Just on the machine, do you think it was a mistake that one of the first things she did and you did, was to sack Tom Scholar, who's the permanent secretary of the treasury? and did that maybe turn the treasury against you? No, I think that was a difficult decision,

but I think that happened to happen because what we haven't talked about was the whole treasury itself. The treasury is essentially almost like an accounting function. So money comes in, money goes out, and it doesn't have any real mandate to drive growth. And she was very clear about that. And that I totally was in agreement with her about.

You know, we had to sort of gear the trip the department towards more growth. I always felt when Gordon Brown was in charge of the Treasury, that if you have political leadership and an understanding of how the Treasury works, you can get stuff done. I agree. I wonder whether you just lost the trust of the Treasury from day one. I think it was difficult.

But then I made a very deliberate statement that that was the only thing. Because people were worried that we were going to clear everyone out. And I said, no, it's just Tom, you know, just to show that we're doing a new, this is a new chapter. But I don't think that was what caused the whole thing to fall apart. I think the pace of it, the fact that it was on balance,

we didn't have spending reductions. Because we'd have had an almighty political route, but at least that would have been more credible than saying essentially we can have our cake and eat it. So you've been disturbingly blunt and open about the problems. I hate it when people say I'm disturbingly blunt. But help us understand. Make your case at the time,

what would be the generous way of understanding what you and Liz Trust thought that you were trying to do? What was the big idea for the British economy? Okay, it went wrong, but what was the big idea? The fundamental problem that we have, and this is a, we haven't discussed this, but it's a problem that Rachel Reeves will, and across the Western world we're facing, certainly in Europe, is that we have a public sector that's growing, let's say, at 5% a year, order of magnitude.

And we have growth figures that are between 0% and 1%. And the logic of that, if your costs are going up in terms of the money you're spending, is going up much faster than the money you're getting in through tax and through the size of the economy. you essentially have to raise more tax by lifting up rates. And of course, that damages growth. That's the theory. So that's the doom loop. And even I heard Rachel Reeves use that phrase.

So the problem is how do you get out of that doom loop? How do you actually grow the economy so that you can get tax revenues to pay for public services? And as I say, this is a problem that every country in the Western world is facing. So that's my growth is the key. Because if you don't get growth, you've got a cake and you're just simply just trying to slice it in different ways. And it's not sufficient to pay for the kinds of services you'd expect in the 21st century, you know, modern economy. So your idea was we need to create growth. That's right.

And your theory on how to create growth was... So the theory is that you reduce the tax burdens to incentivise economic growth and investment. We've just got a mixed record, historically. Mixed record, but sometimes it has... My big problem with this, looking back, because at the time I signed up to it, I made a statement and I confessed that. And we were thinking about this is that you can't just reduce taxes willy-nilly without showing some restraint on the other side of the ledger. And we should have done this at the same time. So what Jeremy Hunt came up with in the November, his statement on basically the spending envelope should have been put together with the mini budget.

And then I think it would have been ordered. So cut taxes but also cut spending more dramatically. Yeah. And you're not cutting. spending. Again, it's a difficult thing to explain, but you're reducing the rate of growth of spending. When you were making that statement in standing at the dispatch box, was the part of you feeling this is nuts? It was kind of, at the end, I just thought, let's see, that was what I would, because I, and I just thought. And what were you, what vibe were you getting from across, from labor and from behind you? It was kind of,

they were kind of quite surprised. I mean, it was, it was, it was, it was a real. And it, Again, it was the sort of style that we, you know, it was a very, very bold statement. And people were like, really? Wow. Oh, God. That was the reaction. Why didn't you, sorry, I'm being a bit mean here, but you knew those trust very well. And I knew her very well. And I concluded she was manifestly unsuitable to be prime minister. She was a person ultimately lacking in prudence and seriousness. I wouldn't trust her to run the country. And you, you, she was a really, she was a really good friend of yours. Yeah, she was... Why couldn't you see what I could see very clearly in 2016,

which was that she was silly. She wasn't a serious person. Well, look, I think... I don't agree with that. But I think there were definitely... Did you agree with the unsuited to be prime minister? I don't think she had the right temperament for it, and I've said that, because you've got to have a very cool temperament.

You know, when things and things do go very badly wrong, you need to keep an even temper. And you must have seen that she was, at the very least, an eccentric person. I think you're right. I think the temperament, and what I've learned is... Temperament is probably the most important thing. It's more important than almost an experience, actually. Because what was extraordinary about that is...

Yeah, but what was extraordinary about her? It was that on paper, she was the most experienced... She'd been in cabinet for, what, eight years from 2014? Yeah, but as you say, she'd made her reputation doing the stuff that ultimately isn't what politics and government is about. You can say that, but in terms of the CV, she had held those posts. But you must have been able to see that. I'm just putting up the obvious.

What I would have said to you at the time is, yeah, she's been in government-flinant-long-time, but she learns nothing. You know, and I would have lectured you to a bored, bored in the thing, of all I'd seen in Deffra of her making reckless and catastrophic decisions. No, but I think you would have said about, oh, come on, Rory. I mean, I know she's, she's. And also, that's the thing, you're in this world where you've got to make quite snap, almost binary decisions. and I knew that there were candidates that I liked that weren't standing. And there were three essential candidates, Penny Morden, Liz Trust and Rishi Sunak. And I made the calculation that Liz Trust would be better.

And somehow you always imagine, like with Boris, it was the same. You always think they're going to be rained in or there's going to be something. I never thought that for a moment. But ideologically, I was very much where she was. But then you don't know what people are going to do. Maybe you do know. I didn't see it, but you don't know how they react. And actually, the funny thing about her book was that both her husband and her election

agent said it was going to end badly. I mean, there was a bit in the book. They probably know better than most. Yeah, and the husband said, it's all going to end in tears. Oh, well, thank you. Thanks for telling me. And then the election agent, your own election agent, saying to you, well, yes, you should stand for leader, but it would be better if you came second.

And I thought that was just remarkable. I mean, if my election had said that to me, there'd be real crisis of self-doubt. What have you made of her on the tour with this book tour? Just no self-reflection, no acceptance of responsibility, utter arrogance about the way she's protected of. So the two things that I hate are the conspiracy theory stuff. I mean, we've talked about history all our lives, our adult lives. Conspiracy theory, whenever someone says this is a conspiracy, this is a deep state, I just turn off because human beings don't work now. They're not smart enough.

Do you think she's been manipulated by these hard right people in America? I think her view is, you know, her problem, her issue is to try and sell these books. So she's trying to generate noise to sell the books. It's not a great, you know, J.K. Rowling doesn't need to, you know, you can rest quiet at night in terms of the book sales. But I think that the point she's trying to, says, when she went to America, there's very much more of a market for that sort of grievance politics, which I don't like. You know, it's a conspiracy. It's the deep state. They're against you because you're. white or they get against you because you're a conservative or they're against you because they're Christian. And I think she's trying to feed into some of that. So when she said,

they should abolish the UN. I mean, at that point, I was like, you've been foreign secretary. How can you publicly say that? And I was, I was concerned. I was, I was upset about that. Sorry, you said there were two things. So that's the conspiracy theory stuff I don't buy. And then the second point was that struck me was people very close to her saying, this isn't going to end well, which was, which was interesting. chose to support her not Rishi Suna. What was it that concerned you about Rishi Suna? So Rishishish Suna, I'd been energy minister, and we'd had all sorts of tussals about tax. I mean, the thing that I, and I was just in Aberdeen last month, you know, the so-called

energy profits levy, which I know is very popular, and many of your listeners will appreciate that, I think will have very damaging consequences to the North Sea. And you already see this with the SMP green tension. The SMP realise that if they do anything to harm, the oil industry in the North Sea, lots of jobs and there'll be lots of bad economic impact. And I thought that was wrong and I argued against that. And actually, Rishi temperamentally, I think, is much better placed. Very cool, very calm, very rational. And I've always personally got on with him.

And how about as a communicator and a charismatic leader and somebody who can really... He's not quite that. I mean, he's not, he's okay, but he's not gifted in that way. Very analytical, very bright. And what I was really impressed with about him was his temperament. And that comes from all sorts of things. That comes from, you know, his Hindu faith, his family. You know, he's a man of means.

You know, we can't be coy about that. He's got, he's wealthy. So he's got that sort of stability that comes from that that he projects. His problem, and this is a problem for the party, is that no one really knows what he's about. And that's why I think we're struggling. Or one of the reasons why we're struggling. On top of all the Boris and the lives and all that.

stuff. You're not standing at the election. No. Can you see, well, first of all, can you honestly hand on heart stand up before the British public and say, do you know what, after the 14 years, the Conservatives should definitely come back after the next election? And can you see any way that Kia Stama won't be prime minister?

So my view on this is that there's a pendulum. We've got first past the post, they're two main parties, and there's always a pendulum. And when it goes, it goes. And I think we could well be at that point. I don't think it's a possible for the Tories to win. But I think it's unlikely. But actually, even if we had the most charismatic leader ever, I think the pendulum, when it swings, it swings. And I think people have said, we've had enough of these guys. Let's let the other people.

And have they got a point? I can see why they think that. I don't think that. I'm going to be campaigning for the Tories and all the rest of it. But I can see why a swing of floating voter can think, actually, we've seen that. Let's move on. You said you're worried about the Conservative Party after the election. What are your worries? So what happens, I mean, you've seen this, I mean, you've been fighting these battles. You know, what happens when parties lose is very simply, one faction says we weren't right wing or weren't left wing enough. And the other lot says, we've got to be more left wing, a center or, you know, we've got to move to the centre. And it's a very crude debate.

It's a silly debate. And it's very nasty because everyone will be blaming each other. My own view is that all the leaders since May have contributed to this in their small ways. But big ways. In that big and small ways. But then, of course, the Sunakites will blame the trust sites. The trust sites will blame Rishi, the Borisites. Do you see what I mean?

There's all that factionalism. But actually, they're all responsible. Because Rishi Sunak, if we do lose, he can't walk away from it because he's been a leader for two years. You can blame the other law up to a point. But he took the leadership. And I was very struck by the fact that he inherited a mess. I mean, could you imagine Winston Churchill saying, I've inherited a mass, you know, in 1940? You get on with it.

You don't blame the other people. Essentially, just a disagreement with Alistair. Alistair actually, I think, probably would have said that Rishi's approach should have been to be much clearer about attacking his predecessors. Yeah, I think his only opportunity was actually to say, I've maybe not say inherited a mess, but just say, we will be doomed unless we admit that terrible things have happened under the previous Johnson particular. But then the problem with that is you're essentially trashing your brand. I mean, they would have reshap. But at the moment, they're all trashing the brand anyway. Yeah.

I think there was a middle way. I think he could have distinguished himself from the leaders. needed a positive vision. Okay, Quasi. Alistair, let's take a quick break back in a minute. Hi, everybody, it's Dominic Zavrick here from The Rest is History. Now, some of you may have heard me on your show, The Rest is Politics, when Rory was away and I was filling in and enjoying Alistair Campbell's tremendous banter. And I'm back to tell you about our new series on The Restis History, which is all about

Britain in the 1970s, a period with a lot of uncanny resemblances to our own. So right now we're living through a moment when oil shocks generated by war in the Middle East are rippling through the world economy, when Britain feels like it's sunk in a bit of a malaise. People are arguing about Europe. The government has got a few issues with the trade unions. And we have a kind of, I suppose you'd say governing elite, a kind of political class that is really struggling to come to terms with all of these issues. And people are asking if Britain is governable at all.

So there are a lot of parallels. between that Britain that I'm describing, which is our Britain, and the Britain of the mid-1970s. So in this series that's coming out on the rest is history, we'll be looking at these and other issues. We'll be talking about the rise of Margaret Thatcher, obviously a colossal figure in our political life even now, whether you love her or loathe her. We'll be talking about the very first Brexit referendum of 1975, a subject that I'm sure Rory and Alistair will have strong opinions about. We'll be talking about the fall of the Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson and we'll be talking about one of the grimmest moments in Britain's economic history,

the moment in 1976 when we had to go cap in hand, as people said at the time, to the International Monetary Fund, the IMF, for a then record bailout. Now, if that sounds good to you, how could it not sound good to you? Of course it sounds good to you. We have a clip for you to listen to at the end of this episode. And if you want to hear more, just search for The Rest is History wherever you get your podcasts. Now, Quasi, over the years, you know I've had many, many disagreements about Brexit, but honestly, you cannot possibly say that it's going well.

I can't say, but you see, what I don't like about the sort of Remainer position is this idea, and I don't think it's your position, but some people have this, that if we stayed in the EU, everything would be. No. We'd be dealing with exactly the same problem. No, I think we've made them worse. We'd be dealing with. We'd be dealing with growth.

We'd be dealing with the size of the public sector. We'd be dealing with, you know, environmental challenges. But we've made them worse. It's not clear to me that they are worse. I mean, if you look at Germany, our growth is exactly the same. We're facing exactly the same. And France. But has Brexit delivered the things that you posted it?

No, I don't think it's been perfect at all. I don't think, I don't think it has, you know, I think we've made mistakes. Is one of the mistakes that you imagined a world that didn't exist? I mean, it struck me that quite a lot of the Brexit campaigners were saying, you know, European growth is sluggish, so we need to connect ourselves to the rapidly growing economies in China. And one of the problems is the whole world's changed. We're now talking about decoupling from China. We're worried about the security risks, the trade risks, about too big. And suddenly it feels as though we're in a new world where it might be smarter to be close to Europe. I think there's a phenomenon about referendums. You basically have everything's binary and polarised. If we'd had this debate, and we probably did in 2014, I would have been a sort of mild Brexiteer,

and you probably would have been a mild Romania. The positions were much more nuanced. But when you get into this sort of binary, you know, the red team versus the blue team, all the positions become harder. So people that I knew were kind of moderate Remainers became extreme Remainers. People I knew as moderate Brexiteers who wanted the customs union. You know, people like Dan Hannan were quite happy with. They were just interested in the sovereignty bit.

they became hardline Brexiteers. So the positions hardened. And so, of course, you were in this crazy world where, you know, Brexit was either 100% right or, you know, 100% wrong. And there was nothing nuance. There was nothing balanced in that conversation. I'm 110%. I was actually pushing for the customs unit never got any much. That's right.

That's right. Can I finish them with my final thing? You're associated with something very, very, very dramatic, which will stay with you. for the rest of your life. It will be in your obituary. And, you know, without being unfair to Alastair, I guess, in some ways, I guess the Iraq war may feature like that in Alice's obituary, right?

I think the three election wins, my help. I think the good Friday. Okay. Bear with it. So just reflect kind of psychologically how it feels. You committed yourself to public service. This is something you desperately have wanted to do for 2020.

years and there's been this incredible catastrophe where your dream of being chants sort of blew up in your face 30 days. There are a lot of people in the country, some listening to this who will be very, very angry with you. And even though you've been apologetic and you've been nuanced or explained, they will feel he's not apologetic enough. He's not really. But that's like in any political thing. I mean, you mentioned Iraq. It's exactly the same. There are people who are still fuming about that.

But I don't think time. I think the new government, if there is a new government, I think the problems of growth, a lot of the fundamental problems will still be around. And I think people will look back and say, okay, they screwed up the delivery. But actually, we get what they were trying to do. I mean, my life will move on. That's one of the reasons I think we should probably leave politics and do something else. Because I think, I don't know what Liz Trust is trying to do.

Who are the greatest historians? What in the world? Yeah. Today. Who are the historians that have really kind of impacted upon you? So I like, I mean, lots of them are, you know, I consider friends. I mean, I love Seabag Montefiore. He's a great sort of journalist, actually, of history.

I think he's a very colourful historian. I used to read, and these people I was read, they're still very active. I was reading as an undergraduate, Neil Ferguson, Andrew Roberts, right wing, yeah, yeah, yeah, Seabag. I mean, he's not really any wing. But on the left, you've got, I mean, there's a guy called, what's his name, Tim Schneider. Do you know him? Yeah, he's a colleague. He's a colleague, yeah, he's very good.

He's a hero. Back in the day, E.P. Thompson, does anyone read him now? I mean, I think I had big issues with that. But he's a great historian. But oddly the people you've chosen are provocateurs. They're quite journalistic in nature. They are. They're not actually people who, when you read them, you think they're doing a very nuanced,

balanced, on the one hand, on the other. They're taking very strong positions. Neil Ferguson's like empire. That was my book. Roberts is like George III is a genius and a hero. I mean, there's that lining, John Maynard Hain said, you know, words have to be a little wild because they're the first battalions that storm, you know, the towers of thought. You're definitely a little wild.

Isn't that your problem? No, no, no, no, but I'm interesting. There isn't a connection between the kind of historians you admire, your kind of intellectual style and your political style that you are a bit wild. That actually, that you like these provocateurs and partly as a bit of, you're a bit of politician. You're a bit of a provocateur. Yes, I hadn't thought made that connection. But I mean, I like, I think that was,

again, you know, looking back at our experience as MPs when we came in in 2010, all we were talking about was how long is a coalition going to last? I'd go on radio programs. And then when we weren't talking about politics, we talked a bit about tuition fees. And then there was this whole sort of debate about austerity, which was a kind of slightly artificial debate.

Yeah, it wasn't. But generally... Totally disaster. Well, actually, what... I mean, you say that, but what... It was. What George Osborne did was what Alastair Darling said he was going to do if he'd won the election. It wasn't.

It wasn't there. No, no. That's basically where we were. And actually, what I wanted to do, and maybe you're right, I did want to change dynamics and change the mold, break the mold, all that sort of stuff. Have you got another book in you? Yeah, I've got lots of books. I mean, I don't have enough time to write them. I mean, I want to write a book on The Empire, which is called Must of the World, on Congo.

I'd like to write something on politics, not just about my crazy experience. On the edge. Now, where have I heard that? But also looking forward. I mean, I find, you know, in a way, I'm sad to leave the House of Commons because I think this is going to be the most interesting period. You know, I feel I'm walking. Because you left just before this incredibly interesting period.

And I feel I'm going to do the same. It's one way. But if Labour do get in, how they respond to this, this, this crisis that we're facing. And as I keep saying, it's a global crisis. It's not. I mean, in Britain, we've got particularly dramatic features. But it's something which is pretty commonplace across the world.

That's interesting to me. Well, as we're sort of moving towards the end of our conversation, I want to finish in a way by thinking about political leadership and political judgment. Isaiah Berlin praises people like Bismarck and FDR and Churchill for, seeing things that other people can't see for not accepting reality as it's given to them and imagining a new world. And I guess you and Liz Trust thought you were doing this, but unlike Churchill, Bismarck and FDR, you miscalled it. You didn't call the future, right? What do you think you've learned about political judgment from that, about the difference between, were they just

lucky the Bismarx and FDR's church, or did they have something that Liz Truss lacked? So I think with Liz and what we were trying to do compared to those other leaders, it was in a way too ideological. You lost sight of the practical deliverability of it. You know, when, you know, Rab Butler said politics is the art of the possible. I think that is a very important phrase.

And I also think the judgment issue. You know, when things go wrong, you've got, you know, the church will keep bugging on KBO and having a measure of calmness is really important. And you look at, you know, someone like Antibank. He was totally brittle and very, very volatile. That's what people, how they describe him.

And I think having the temperament just to see things through and be calm, David Cameron was very good at this. I mean, whatever else one says about it, he did have a good temperament. He was not very excitable. And I think those things of judgment and thinking about politics as the art of the possible, absolutely fundamental. Our last seven prime ministers list them in order of achievement and contribution to the country. Well, I think in terms of, I think Blair probably, is Blair the first of the list of the last seven?

I mean, he was there the longest and probably had the most impact. Contested legacy, but had the most impact. I think Cameron was up there. I think Boris is in a space of his own. I think he had phenomenal skills, but, you know, he had flaws, quite deep flaws. And then the others were perhaps less. I don't think, I think Gordon was a great chancellor, but I don't think he had the temperament for, you know, he was trying to, you know, He was trying to control too much, I think.

From what I hear, I have respect for him, though. He's a great mind and powerful intellect. But I don't think temperamentally he was right for the job. And Theresa May and Les Truss? They didn't have the temperament. I don't think. But that's, you know, it's easy to say that with hindsight. But, you know.

But, of course, I feel very strongly that the difference in those two is that Theresa May had a form of moral character that Liz Truss lacked. I mean, it's interesting, you don't take moral character versus Pocisian. Well, I've done. I think that's a bit harsh. I don't... You don't believe in virtue.

Yeah, yeah. I mean, all that stuff, the virtue and these are the goodies and these are the baddies. I think that's a bit simplistic. I think there was a lot of virtue in some of the baddies that you think. And I think there was a lot of vice in some of the goodies there that you... I wouldn't just characterize them in that sort of sheep and goats way. Well, there's a good book in there. I don't think Liz Truss went in there thinking, I'm going to destroy everything.

I think she thought she was doing good. Similarly, I think Theresa May was a little bit more kind of. than many people thought. And actually even Boris, for all his exuberance, he genuinely thought he was a force for good. Probably still does. Yeah, I think he does. And actually, we haven't even talked about him,

but it wouldn't surprise me if he comes back in some shape or form. Absolutely, definitely over my dead body. How are you going to stop it? I don't know, but dead body. I mean, I don't know. No, it can't happen. But anyway, so that's where I disagree with you. I don't think they can be easily categorized as good people or bad people.

I think there's always a mix. Well, look, thank you so much, Quasi, for all your time. It's quite amazing. But just my final question, I'm going back to an Eaton entrance exam question. I think it's a brilliant one. It's 2040, and you're the UK Prime Minister. Explain why it was both necessary and moral for you to employ the army to fight and kill violent protesters in London. That's a lunatic question.

Is that what you would have said? Yeah, I wouldn't have put it as boldly as that, but I'd have said that's an absurd question because we don't kill protesters in London. It's amazing. You found this. I'd forgotten what we were all doing at 13. I don't remember that question. Yeah, but these are quite grown-up questions for 13-year-olds. And I am impressed by how quickly Quasi did his numbers. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And he didn't even have to go to the OBR. Yeah. Quasi, thank you. You've been really frank with us and we're really grateful. Thank you very much, indeed.

Yeah, thank you very much. Thank you. Very interesting conversation. Well, then, Rory, what do you think of that? Well, I mean, I think the first thing is you get sense that he's very clever. But I think I also get the sense of the ways in which his cleverness has a limit. I mean, I never really quite get over this problem of I don't quite get how, when it was so obvious that Boris Johnson and Liz Truss would be catastrophic prime ministers, that his sense is, well, you know, I can see that with the benefit of hindsight, but it wasn't obvious at the time when he and I had joined at the same time, spent years working with them together.

And I also wonder, I mean, one thing that struck me is, I mean, yes, he apologises, but quite, I'd sort of want. Yeah, I'd worry that if you were a listener, he's like, yeah, you know, I got it all wrong, I blew up the economy, but, you know, who knew? And, you know, we make mistakes and politics. And then he was like, yeah, it's a bit like the Iraq war. I mean, sometimes people make the wrong calls. But I guess that doesn't really work for people, right? I don't know what people will make of it because, I mean, I was surprised how Frankie was. He wasn't very defensive.

And he wasn't doing this sort of, I mean, List Trust has gone around all the studios sort of blaming everybody but herself. He was accepting some responsibility. I think she gets the lion's share. You get the sense, you know, you've talked lots about dealing with List Trust and how difficult she is. You get the sense he was going along with something he didn't really believe. I thought the most fascinating thing was when he was describing how he was feeling as he stood at the dispatch box and could tell that Labor were sort of going, is this for real? And then every time he sort of looked that way to his own side, they were going,

is this for real? And he sort of knew. You got the feeling he knew the whole way through this was a car crash. And yet he couldn't stop the car. Yeah, well, partly because he bought in, hadn't he, early on, to a particular vision of the world, which was that what Britain needed to do was radically cut taxes in order to generate growth. And he's obviously still thinks that's right.

He thinks they did it too quickly. But basically he says the problem in the world is a lack of growth. And the only real solution he's coming up with in Britain, I guess, is tax cutting. And that's interesting because there would be other people on his side of the party who would argue, I think, more convincingly that actually if you wanted to do growth that way, what you'd need to do is be much more thoughtful about getting rid of regulation encouraging investment, creating a good ecosystem for business. So if you're on the right of the Tory party, what you'd probably want to say is that growth comes

from business. And what you need to do is make it easier to set up a business, easier to hire people, easier to invest, easier to do infrastructure, and that actually cutting taxes isn't really the route through to that. I was surprised how sort of warm he was about Gia Stama. He's nice about Gia Stama. Well, he's not very, I remember this. He's always been quite good at making full.

friendships with Labour. It's quite sort of light-hearted and cheerful. He's a funny person because he's somebody who generally in my experience talks a great deal more than he listens, but he's got this incredible memory. So you get the impression he's not listening, but actually he remembers almost everything that you said 30 years ago. I mentioned our sort of many encounters over Brexit. They weren't just in studios, like bumping into him and having arguments. And I always got the feeling he wasn't taking anything terribly seriously. It was all the beard of a game and get out, no, why you, I remember doing the people's voting every time I was somebody saying, why are you doing this? Why are you trying to stop? Is it going to happen? Just

get over it, move on. Look, you know, we won, you lost. Move on. It's fine. It's going to be fine. And that was always his thing with me. When I was very earnestly trying to discuss with him in 2014, 2015, his argument, and I think you get a bit of this in the interview. When I'm trying to argue against the Wrightwood Lurch, trying to make the case of Sunderground, he says, you don't understand our right-wing voters. You don't understand the party base. People are much more Eurosceptic, much more right-wing than you want to give them credit for being. And again, that worried me because that's a little bit not about standing on principle. It's about saying this is where I think public is, and therefore that's where I'm going to go.

Give you another glimpse, just to sort of finish of quasi. He sent me a WhatsApp just as he left the studio, which went, Victris Kauser-Deus Placuate said Vigieg. Victor Cotoni. So the victorious cause pleased the gods, but depressed Cato. And I don't actually know what the reference is. I mean, he's presumably, this is somewhere in the back of his enormous capacious memory is some reference, I guess, to Caesar's triumph. Who is God and who is Caesar in this? So I think in this story, Boris Johnson is probably Caesar and the victorious cause is probably Brexit, and that pleases the gods. But it oppress is Cato, who in this case is Rory. But, you know, that's a really interesting indication

of Quasi, who is, you know, comes from this extraordinary background, right? I mean, you know, he, it's true, his father was an economist, his mother was alive, but I imagine his grandparents lived in relatively straightforward conditions in Ghana. It's been an incredible immigrant success story, and he got this King's scholarship to Eaton, went on to Trinity College of Cambridge. What did you reply? I sent back a little note saying, Victrix, Kowza, neck deis, placuit, neck, catoony. Do you not really speak to each other in Latin? I mean, honestly, this is just, I just, I did actually do, I got grade A, O level Latin,

but I don't, what does that mean? So I said, I said the victorious cause pleased neither the gods nor Cato. So neither you nor. So I'm basically saying this Brexit was not actually. Everybody lost. Yeah, Brexit was a fuck up for everyone, which is kind of what I said. Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Right, Joddy good. Well, thank you, Quasi, if you're listening, and on those and upwards. And I think, thank you also for making it happen, because I had real reservations. You did, I remember. Well, my reservations are that I like us interviewing people and leading who we admire and want to promote. And I think both of us were very troubled by what Quasi did. And I felt that that might lead to a slightly difficult interview where we weren't bringing out.

So in some ways, tribute to him for being relaxed enough, open enough to make, what could have been a very touchy interview work. And I think it's given people a chance to, I imagine most listeners like us will profoundly disprove of what he did. But you get more of an insight into some of the strengths as well as the weaknesses of that generation of conservative politicians. Anyway, thank you and goodbye. Bye.